December 7, 2018- State of New Mexico Department of Game and Fish v. Timothy L. Rawlings, No. A-1-CA-36131

1 	IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF NEW MEXICO
2 	Opinion Number: ______ _
3
4 	Filing Date: December 7, 2018
5 No. A-1-CA-36131
6 	STATE OF NEW MEXICO
7 DEPARTMENT OF GAME AND
8 FISH,
9 	Appellee-Petitioner,
10 V.
11 	TIMOTHY L. RAWLINGS,
12 	Appellant-Respondent.
13 	APPEAL FROM THE DISTRICT COURT OF SANTA FE COUNTY
14 Raymond Z. Ortiz, District Judge.
15 	Hector H. Balderas, Attorney General
16 Regina Ryanczak, Assistant Attorney General
17 	Santa Fe, NM
18 	for Appellee
19 The Simons Firm, LLP
20 	Quinn Scott Simons
21 	Santa Fe, NM
22 	for Appellant
Court of Appeals of New Mexico
Filed 12/7/2018 11:04 AM
Mark Reynolds

1 	OPINION
2 	VARGAS, Judge.
3 	{t} 	The New Mexico Department of Game and Fish (Game and Fish) appeals
4 from 	the 	district 	court's 	order reversing 	Game 	and 	Fish's 	decision 	to 	deny
5 Respondent's application for a New Mexico outfitter's license. Game and Fish raises
6 four issues on appeal. First, Game and Fish argues that its hearing officer's decision
7 to deny Respondent's 	application for an outfitter's 	license was 	supported by
8 substantial evidence in accordance with NMSA 1978, Section l 7-2A-3(C)(2) (2001)
9 and 19.30.8.9(A)(6) NMAC. Second, Game and Fish claims that the district court
10 	acted arbitrarily and capriciously when it reversed Game and Fish's decision. Third,
11 1
it contends that the district court erred when it applied Section 17-2A-3(C)(3), rather
12 than Section 17-2A-3(C)(2) to the evaluation of Respondent's outfitter application.
13 	Finally, Game and Fish claims that the district court erred when it concluded that
14 Game and Fish violated the Interstate Wildlife Violator Compact (the Compact),
15 	NMSA 1978, Section 11-16-1 to -12 (2001). Because we conclude that the actions
16 	of the Arizona Commission on which Game and Fish relied to deny Respondent a
17 	license are akin to a suspension under our relevant statute and regulations anq the
18 	Legislature intended for Game and Fish to treat the Respondent's Arizona license
19 	"revocation" as if it had occurred in Arizona, pursuant to the Compact, we affirm.

1 BACKGROUND
2 {2} 	After working as a licensed hunting guide in New Mexico for three years,
3 Respondent submitted an application for a New Mexico outfitter's license to Game
4 and Fish. Game and Fish denied his application pursuant to Section 17-2A-3(C)(2),
5 which precludes an individual from working as a registered outfitter "if the person
6 has had a guide or outfitter license, registration, permit or certificate revoked in
7 another state." In support of its denial, Game and Fish pointed to a February 21,
8 2003, action by the Arizona Game and Fish Commission, which unanimously
9 concluded:
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That the license and/or license privileges of [Respondent] to hunt, fish,
trap and guide in the State of Arizona be revoked and he be denied
another for a period of five years; that the current licenses be suspended
as of the date of this hearing and that they be revoked as of the date the
order in this case is signed by the director; [and] that he be required to
complete 	the 	hunter 	education 	course 	and 	provide 	proof to 	the
Department's law enforcement branch before applying for any other
licenses to hunt in the State [of Arizona.]
18 	Respondent requested an administrative review 	of Game and Fish's decision,
19 pursuant to Section 17-2A-3(S) and the Unifonn Licensing Act (ULA), NMSA
20 	1978, Section 61-1-1 	to -34 (1957, 	as 	amended through 2016). Following an
21 	administrative 	hearing, 	the 	Game 	and Fish 	hearing 	officer entered 	an 	order
22 upholding Game and Fish's denial. Respondent appealed to the district court,
23 	pursuant to NMSA 1978, Section 39-3-1.1 (1999) and Rule 1-074 NMRA.
2

1 {3} 	The district court reversed the decision of Game and Fish, finding that Game
2 and Fish acted arbitrarily and capriciously, applied an inapplicable subsection of
3 Section 17-2A-3, and violated the Compact. Game and Fish petitioned this Court for
4 a writ of certiorari, which we granted.
5 DISCUSSION
6 	{4} 	Initially, we note that while Game and Fish raised issues of substantial
7 evidence and abuse of discretion by the district court, the only argument developed
8 in its brief involves the district court's interpretation of the relevant statutes and
9 regulations. As such, this case requires us to interpret provisions of our statutes
10 	governing our statewide system for hunting activities set out in NMSA 1978, Section
11 	17-2A-1 to -3 (1996, as amended through 2001) and the regulations promulgated
12 pursuant to 	those 	statutes, 	in conjunction with the 	Compact adopted by our
13 	Legislature. Specifically, we must decide whether the action taken by the Arizona
14 	Commission constitutes a revocation of Respondent's guide or outfitter license such
15 	that he is precluded from "work[ing] as a registered hunting guide or outfitter in New
16 Mexico," pursuant to Section 17-2A-3(C)(2). As all of the arguments on appeal
17 raised by Game and Fish are related, we address them together.
18 	Standard of Review
19 	{5} 	This Court "conduct[ s] the same review of an administrative order as the
20 district court sitting in its appellate capacity[.]" Rio Grande Chapter of Sierra Club
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1 v. NM 	Mining Comm 'n, 2003-NMSC-005,, 16, 133 N.M. 97, 61 P.3d 806. We
2 will not disturb a decision of Game and Fish unless it acted in a manner that is: "[(1 )]
3 arbitrary, capricious, or an abuse of discretion; [(2)] not supported by substantial
4 evidence in the record; or [(3)] otherwise not in accordance with law." Id. , 	17; see
5 Rule 1-074. "A ruling by an administrative agency is arbitrary and capricious if it is
6 unreasonable or without a rational basis, when viewed in light of the whole record."
7 Rio Grande Chapter of Sierra Club, 2003-NMSC-005,, 17. "A ruling that is not in
8 accordance with law should be reversed if the agency unreasonably or unlawfully
9 misinterprets or misapplies the law." N.M 	Mining Ass 'n v. N.M 	Water Quality
10 	Control Comm'n, 2007-NMCA-010,, 11, 141 N.M. 41, 150 P.3d 991 (internal
11 	quotation marks and citation omitted). In considering whether Game and Fish's
12 	actions were in accordance with the law, we note that interpretation of a statute is a
13 	matter of law that this Court reviews de novo, and we are not bound by Game and
14 Fish's interpretation of the relevant statutes. See 	id. (citing Rio Grande Chapter of
15 	the Sierra Club, 2003-NMSC-005,, 17).
16 	Statutory Interpretation
17 	{6} 	When interpreting a statute, a court's primary goal is to "facilitate and
18 	promote the [L]egislature's purpose."United Rentals Nw., Inc. v. 	Yearout Mech.,
19 Inc., 	2010-NMSC-030, , 	17, 	148 N.M. 426, 237 P.3d 728 (omission, internal
20 quotation marks, and citation omitted). In discerning that purpose, "we look first to
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1 the plain language of the statute, giving the words their ordinary meaning, unless the
2 Legislature indicates a different one was intended." Flores v. Herrera, 2016-NMSC-
3 033, 18, 384 P.3d 1070 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). While the
4 plain meaning rule provides that "statutes are to be given effect as written and, where
5 they are free from ambiguity, there is no room for construction[,]" this rule must be
6 applied with caution, as "a statute, apparently clear and unambiguous on its face,
7 may for one reason or another give rise to legitimate (i.e., nonfrivolous) differences
8 of opinion concerning the statute's meaning." State ex rel. Helman v. 	Gallegos,
9 	1994-NMSC-023, 112, 23, 117 N.M. 346, 871 P.2d 1352 (internal quotation marks
10 	and citation omitted). Consequently, courts will reject the literal language of the
11 	statute if doing so is necessary to "conform to the obvious intent of the [L]egislature,
12 	or to prevent its being absurd." Id. 	1 3 (internal quotation marks and citation
13 	omitted); see Baker v. Hedstrom, 2013-NMSC-043, 115,309 P.3d 1047 (indicating
14 that the statute must be interpreted in the context of the statute as a whole with an
15 	eye toward its purposes and consequences). We consider all parts of the statute
16 together, "read[ing] the statute in its entirety and constru[ing] each part in connection
17 with every other part to produce a harmonious whole." Key v. 	Chrysler Motors
18 	Corp., 1996-NMSC-038, 114, 121 N.M. 764, 918 P.2d 350. Furthermore, a statute
19 "whose construction is in question, [is] to be read in connection with other statutes
20 concerning the same subject matter." State ex rel. Children, Youth & Families Dep 't
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1 v. Djamila B., 2014-NMCA-045, 110, 322 PJd 444 (alteration, internal quotation
2 marks, and citation omitted), ajf'd on other grounds sub nom, In re Mahdjid B.,
3 2015-NMSC-003, 342 PJd 698. Finally, we interpret statutes "to avoid rendering
4 the Legislature's language superfluous." Baker, 2013-NMSC-043, ~ 24.
5 	The District Court Properly Applied Section 17-2A-3(C)(3) to Respondent's
6 	Application
7 	{7} 	It is unlawful in New Mexico for a person to work as an unlicensed hunting
8 guide or outfitter. Section 17-2A-3(A). A person who has previously "had a guide
9 or outfitter license, registration, pennit or certificate revoked in another state," or
10 	suspended in another state without reinstatement, will not "be allowed to work as a
11 	registered hunting guide or outfitter in New Mexico." Section 17-2A-3(C)(2), (3).
12 	The decision entered by the Arizona Commission "revokes" Respondent's license,
13 	precludes him from obtaining another for five years, and requires him to complete a
14 	course before he can apply for another license to hunt in Arizona. Respondent was
15 	subsequently issued a new license by the Arizona Commission. To determine
16 whether Respondent is precluded from working as a registered hunting guide or
17 outfitter 	in 	New 	Mexico, 	we 	are 	required 	to 	consider whether 	the 	Arizona
18 	Commission's decision constitutes a "revocation" as the term is used in Section 17-
19 	2A-3(C)(2).
20 	{8} 	We initially consider the meaning of the term "revoke" and its counterpart,
21 	"suspend" as they are used in Section 17-2A-3(C), (D). Neither Section 17-2A-3,
6

I 	specifically, 	nor 	Chapter 	17, 	generally, 	provide 	definitions 	for 	the 	terms
2 "revocation" or "suspension." Instead, the parties direct us to the definitions of
3 	"revoke" and "suspend" in the ULA, and in the regulations promulgated by Game
4 	and Fish as part of its hunting and fishing regulations. The Uniform Licensing Act
5 provides:
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D. 	"revoke 	a 	license" 	means 	to 	prohibit 	the 	conduct
authorized by the license;
E. 	"suspend a license" means to prohibit, for a stated period
of time, the conduct authorized by the license. "Suspend a license" also
means to allow, for a stated period of time, the conduct authorized by
the license, subject to conditions that are reasonably related to the
grounds for suspension[.]
13 	Section 61-1-2(D), (E) (emphases added). The hunting and fishing regulations
14 promulgated 	by 	Game 	and 	Fish 	define 	"[r]evocation" 	and 	"[s]uspension" 	of
15 	privileges slightly differently:
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H. 	"Revocation" means when a person's 	hunting, 	fishing,
trapping, 	guiding 	and 	outfitting 	privileges, 	or 	other 	privileges 	or
authorities granted by an agreement, license or permit issued by the
department, 	are 	taken 	away 	by 	the 	commission 	after 	notice 	and
opportunity for a hearing.
I. 	"Suspension" means when a person's hunting, 	fishing,
trapping, 	guiding 	and 	outfitting 	privileges, 	or 	other privileges 	or
authorities granted by an agreement, license or permit issued by the
department, 	are taken away 	by the 	commission, 	after notice 	and
opportunity for a hearing, until the person comes back into compliance.
26 	19.3 l.2.7(H), (I) NMAC (emphases added).
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1 {9} 	The language of the decision by the Arizona Commission regarding the
2 Respondent's Arizona license does not fit easily into the definitions promulgated by
3 the Legislature contained in the ULA or the definitions promulgated by Game and
4 Fish contained in its regulations. While using the term "revoked," the decision of the
5 Arizona Commission clearly contemplates the possibility of future hunting, fishing,
6 trapping and guide privileges for the Respondent, ordering that "he be denied
7 another [license] for a period of five years ... [and] that he be required to complete
8 the hunter education course ... before applying for any other licenses[.]".
9 {JO} 	Under the ULA and Game and Fish regulations, however, the term "revoke"
10 	denotes a finality that cannot be overcome under any circumstances. In the instance
11 	of revocation, the conduct permitted by a license is "prohibited" under the ULA, see
12 	§ 61-1-2(D), 	and "taken away" 	by the regulations. 	See 	19.31.2.7(H) NMAC.
13 	Nowhere in the statute or regulation defining "revoke" is the reinstatement of those
14 privileges contemplated. Instead, it is the ULA and Game and Fish regulations
15 	defining "suspended" that contemplate the reinstatement of privileges after a stated
16 time or upon compliance with certain conditions. See § 61-1-2(E); 19.31.2.7(1)
17 NMAC. Notwithstanding its use of the term "revoked," the Arizona Commission's
18 	indication that Respondent may be permitted to recover those privileges after a stated
19 period of time or upon compliance with certain conditions fits more appropriately
20 into the definition of a "suspension" under the ULA and the regulations.
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1 {11} 	Game and Fish contends that the Arizona Commission's use of the term
2 "revoked" is dispositive, arguing that had the Arizona Commission intended to
3 "suspend" Respondent, it would have set conditions he must satisfy to lift the
4 suspension. Game and Fish, however, ignores two critical points. First, at least one
5 of the definitions of "suspension" on which it encourages us to rely provides that
6 suspension "means to prohibit, for a stated period of time," which is precisely what
7 happened in this 	case. The Arizona Commission prohibited Respondent from
8 obtaining a license which would permit him to hunt, fish, trap and guide for five
9 years and subsequently restored his privileges by granting him a new license. See
10 	§ 61-1-2(E). Second, Game and Fish ignores that the Arizona Commission placed
11 	conditions on his ability to engage in these activities in the future, requiring that he
12 	complete a hunter education course and provide proof before a new license would
13 	be issued to him.
14 	{12} 	Game and Fish further argues that Respondent's claim "that his revocation
15 	was really a suspension .... results in a skewed meaning of the statute in its entirety
16 and does not give effect to the objective and purpose of the statute." We disagree. In
17 addition to 	implementing statutes governing our statewide system for hunting
18 	activities, see Section 17-2A-1 to -3, our Legislature adopted legislation to address
19 the manner in which New Mexico will recognize and address wildlife violations that
20 occur in other states, including suspensions and revocations of hunting, fishing,
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1 trapping and guiding privileges. In 2001 New Mexico adopted the Compact. See
2 	§§ 11-16-1 to -12. The Compact is an agreement between participating states to,
3 among other things, ( 1) promote compliance with the statutes, laws, ordinances, and
4 administrative rules relating to the management of wildlife resources in participating
5 states; (2) 	recognize 	suspensions 	of wildlife 	license 	privileges 	by 	and 	report
6 convictions to participating states; (3) cooperate in the enforcement of compliance
7 with the terms of citations issued by one participating state to residents of another
8' participating state; and (4) assist court systems in the efficient disposition of wildlife
9 violations. Section 11-16-2(B).
10 {13} 	The 	Compact 	requires 	that 	"[a] 	participating 	state 	shall 	recogmze 	the
11 	suspension of license privileges of a person by another participating state as though
12 the violation resulting in the suspension ... had occurred in the home state; and .. :
13 	could have been the basis of the suspension oflicense privileges in the home state."
14 	Section 11-16-6(A). The Compact does not differentiate between a suspension and
15 	a 	revocation 	and 	instead 	equates 	them, 	providing, 	" 	'suspension' 	means 	a
16 	revocation, 	denial or withdrawal of license privileges, including the privilege to
17 apply for, purchase or exercise the benefits conferred by a license." Section 11-16-
18 	3(M) 	(emphasis 	added). 	Rather than 	distinguish 	between 	a "suspension" 	and
19 "revocation," the Compact adopts a policy intended to "recognize the suspension of
20 wildlife license privileges of a person whose license privileges have been suspended
10

1 by another participating state and treat the suspension as if it had occurred in the
2 home state[.]" Section l l-16-2(B)(2) (emphasis added).
3 	{14} 	In this case, notwithstanding that the decision of the Arizona Commission
4 	stated that it "revoked" Respondent's privileges, it subsequently allowed him to
5 obtain a new license after the proscribed time had passed and he complied with the
6 requirements set out in the decision. The Compact requires us to "recognize the
7 suspension ... as though the violation ... had occurred in the home state[,]" Section
8 	l l-16-6(A), and the Arizona Commission's decision clearly did not intend to impose
9 the finality that is implied by the definitions of "revoke" set out in the ULA and
10. Game and Fish regulations. See § 61-l-2(D); 19.3 l.2.7(H) NMAC. We conclude
11 	that the decision of the Arizona Commission did not constitute a "revocation" of
12 Respondent's Arizona permit so as to prevent him from obtaining a license to work
13 	as a registered guide or outfitter, pursuant to Section l 7-2A-3(C). The district court
14 properly 	applied 	Section 	l 7-2A-3(C)(3) 	to 	its 	evaluation 	of 	Respondent's
15 	application. While Game and Fish argues that the district court's failure to conclude
16 that Respondent's Arizona license was revoked, as the term is used in Section 17-
17 2A-3(C)(2), renders that section surplusage and leads to an absurd result, we
18 	disagree. Both the ULA and Game and Fish's regulations differentiate between
19 "revocation," which has a permanent quality, and "suspension," which is either time-
20 	limited or conditional upon compliance with requirements established by Game and
11

1 Fish. Read together with the Compact, we are persuaded that an applicant who has
2 been permanently prohibited and his right to obtain a license permanently taken
3 away is subject to the provisions of Section 17-2A-3(C)(2), while an applicant whose
4 license has been taken away for a specified period of time or until the applicant
5 comes into compliance with the requirements established by Game and Fish is
6 subject to the provisions of Section 17-2A-3(C)(3). See Djamila B., 2014-NMCA-
7 045, ,r 10 (stating that "statutes, whose construction is in question [should] be read
8 in connection with other statutes concerning the same subject matter" (internal
,9 	quotation marks and citation omitted)); see also Baker, 2013-NMSC-043, ,r 24
10 	(stating statutes should be read "to avoid rendering the Legislature's language
11 	superfluous"). Indeed, our interpretation comports with the implicit intent of the
12 Legislature in enacting Section 17-2A-3(C)(2), (3) and in adopting the Compact,
13 	which 	clearly 	contemplates 	denying 	licenses 	to · individuals 	who 	have 	been
14 prohibited from holding them in other states. See United Rentals Nw~, Inc., 2010-
15 	NMSC-030, ,r 17 (stating that the primary goal of statutory interpretation is "to
16 	facilitate and promote the 	[L ]egislature's purpose"(omission, internal quotation
17 marks, 	and 	citation 	omitted)). 	Our 	interpretation 	imputes 	meaning 	to 	both
18 	subsections of Section 17-2A-3(C), complies with the objective of the Compact to
19 "recognize the suspension of wildlife license privileges of a person whose privileges
20 have been suspended by another participating state and treat the suspension as if it
12

1 had occurred in the home state," and avoids reaching an absurd result. Section 11-
2 	16-2(B)(2); see Helman, 1994-NMSC-023, ,13 (stating that courts should interpret
3 statutes 	to 	conform 	to 	the 	obvious 	intent 	of the 	Legislature 	and 	avoid 	an
4 interpretation that renders the statute absurd).
5 	{15} 	As the hearing officer's decision was not in accordance with the law when it
6 denied Respondent's application, relying on Section l 7-2A-3(C)(3), we find no error
7 on the part of the district court.
8 	CONCLUSION
9 	{16} 	The decision of the district court is affirmed.
10 	{17} 	IT IS SO ORDERED.
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13 	WE CONCUR:
17I':~1!-L~18 	EMIL~HNE,Judge
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