29,733 | Omnilex

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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF NEW MEXICO
Opinion Number: __________
Filing Date: 	June 16, 2011
NO. 29,733
MR. and MRS. RON GLASER,
THERESA CULL, CHERYL HOST,
EDMUND AUERBACH, DR. and
MRS. DAVIS SPENCE, DONALD R. ASHER,
HEIDI LARSEN, BRAD LEONARD, TED THRASHER,
ANNE DANIELS, BRYAN and LISALEE GOSS,
WILLIAM W. MERSHON, KEITH and
DEBORAH HILLEGOND, and
MR. and MRS. BRUCE CHARNLEY,
Plaintiffs-Appellants,
v.
JAMES L. LEBUS, DANIEL E. RAKES,
CHARLES VERRY, ALAN G. YOUNG,
STEVEN R. OLIVER, THE NEW MEXICO
FINANCE AUTHORITY, AUI, Inc.,
ANGEL FIRE RESORT OPERATIONS, LLC,
and THE VILLAGE OF ANGEL FIRE,
Defendants-Appellees.
APPEAL FROM THE DISTRICT COURT OF COLFAX COUNTY
John M. Paternoster, District Judge

Armstrong & Armstrong, P.C.
Julia Lacy Armstrong
Roy L. Armstrong
Taos, NM
for Appellants
Stelzner, Winter, Warburton, Flores, Sanchez & Dawes, P.A.
Nann M. Winter
Albuquerque, NM
for Appellees LeBus, Rakes, Verry, Young, Oliver
and Angel Fire Public Improvement District Board Members
Sutin, Thayer & Browne, P.C.
Mark Chaiken
Albuquerque, NM
for Appellee New Mexico Finance Authority
Rodey, Dickason, Sloan, Akin & Robb, P.A.
Alan Hall
Albuquerque, NM
for Appellee Angel Fire Resort Operations, LLC
Canepa & Vidal, P.A.
Joseph Canepa
Santa Fe, NM
Modrall, Sperling, Roehl, Harris & Sisk, P.A.
Peter Franklin
Santa Fe, NM
for Appellee Village of Angel Fire

OPINION
WECHSLER, Judge.
{1} 	In this appeal, we consider whether (1) a formation election under the Public
Improvement District Act (PID Act), NMSA 1978, §§ 5-11-1 to -27 (2001, as
amended through 2009), incorporates the election contest and recount procedures
found in the Election Code, NMSA 1978, §§ 1-1-1 to 1-24-4 (1969, as amended
through 2010), and (2) Plaintiffs’ amended complaint constituted an election contest
subject to the Election Code’s election contest procedures. 	We hold that the PID
Act’s formation election provisions incorporated the Election Code’s election contest
procedures and that the entirety of Plaintiffs’ amended complaint constituted an
election contest. Because an election contest requires direct appeal to our Supreme
Court, this Court lacks jurisdiction, and we therefore transfer this case to our Supreme
Court.
BACKGROUND
{2} 	This case arises out of the efforts of Defendants to create a public improvement
district within the Village of Angel Fire under the PID Act. 	Plaintiffs appeal the
district court’s order of dismissal, pursuant to Rule 1-012(B)(1) NMRA, concluding
that it lacked subject matter jurisdiction, because the entirety of the amended
complaint was subject to and barred by the thirty-day statute of limitations found in

2
the Election Code’s election contest provisions, Section 1-14-3, or the thirty-day
statute of limitations found in the Municipal Election Code, NMSA 1978, § 3-8-63(C)
(1999).
{3} 	We summarize the facts in the amended complaint as follows. In April 2007,
Defendant Angel Fire Resort Operations, LLC (the Resort) submitted a petition to
Defendant Village of Angel Fire (the Village) for approval of a public improvement
district to construct roads, water, a force main sewer system, and telephone and
electrical utilities to serve 847 lots. 	The infrastructure improvements were to be
funded by a special levy assessed against the property owners of the lots. The Resort
resubmitted the petition on October 12, 2007, and included a general plan, a feasibility
study, an estimate of construction costs, a rate and method of apportionment of a
special levy, and other documents in support of the plan. The Village subsequently
mailed a notice of intent to form a public improvement district to lot owners affected
by the plan. 	Following a public hearing, the Village council voted to approve the
formation of the Angel Fire Public Improvement District (the AFPID) on February 14,
2008. The Village, the Resort, Defendant Association of Angel Fire Property Owners,
and the AFPID executed a contingency agreement that allocated responsibility for
construction, financing, ownership, maintenance, and operation of the AFPID plan.
The agreement was contingent upon the formation of the AFPID through a formation

3
election as required by Section 5-11-8(A) of the PID Act.
{4} 	On April 1, 2008, the Village mailed ballots to the property owners affected by
the proposed AFPID. The ballots were to be returned by April 21, 2008, the returned
ballots were counted, and the requisite majority approved the AFPID. Upon approval
of the formation of the AFPID, the board of directors of the AFPID (the Board) passed
a resolution authorizing a special levy upon the properties located within the AFPID.
On November 1, 2008, the Village mailed property tax assessments, including the
special levy, to property owners within the AFPID. The Board subsequently entered
into various contracts to finance and construct the infrastructure improvements,
including two loans from Defendant New Mexico Finance Authority.
{5} 	Plaintiffs filed a complaint for declaratory relief on June 1, 2009, more than
twelve months after the formation election. Plaintiffs filed an amended complaint on
June 19, 2009. Plaintiffs’ amended complaint sought declarations that (1) the AFPID
has no valid legal existence and all contracts and agreements made by the Board are
void and unenforceable; (2) if the AFPID was formed in accordance with the law, it
is illegal pursuant to Section 5-11-8(B), because the improvements for which the levy
is assessed will not confer a benefit upon the property contained within the AFPID
and because it will not confer a benefit upon the properties assessed the levy; (3) the
properties included in the 1995 reorganization plan are entitled to form a special

4
assessment district; and (4) the AFPID has no authority to collect any tax or
assessment or to expend such sums already collected. The district court characterized
the entirety of the amended complaint as an election contest and dismissed the action
as untimely under the thirty-day statute of limitations for election contests in the
Election Code. This appeal followed.
ARGUMENTS ON APPEAL
{6} 	On appeal, Plaintiffs contend that (1) the PID Act’s formation election
provisions did not incorporate the Election Code’s election contest procedures and
therefore the thirty-day statute of limitations for election contests does not apply; and
(2) even assuming that the Election Code’s election contest procedures apply to
formation elections, the amended complaint does not present an election contest. In
particular, Plaintiffs maintain that the amended complaint does not present an election
contest because it does not challenge the results of the election and instead (1)
challenges the underlying validity of the petition under the PID Act and the New
Mexico Constitution’s elections clause, (2) claims that no election occurred for the
imposition of the special levy, (3) claims that the special levies are excessive under
the PID Act, Section 5-11-8(B), and (4) claims that certain property owners within the
AFPID have a right under the Resort’s 1995 bankruptcy reorganization plan to form
a special assessment district. Defendants, on the other hand, argue that the Election

5
Code requires direct appeal of election contests to our Supreme Court, and therefore
this Court does not have jurisdiction.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
{7} 	On appeal from a dismissal based on a Rule 1-012 (B)(1) motion, we accept all
facts alleged in the complaint as true and resolve all doubt about the sufficiency of the
complaint in favor of the plaintiff’s right to proceed. See Martinez v. Cornejo, 2009-
NMCA-011, ¶ 6, 146 N.M. 223, 208 P.3d 443. The issues of whether the election
contest provisions of the Election Code or the Municipal Election Code apply to
formation elections under the PID Act and whether Plaintiffs’ claims constitute an
election contest are legal questions that we review de novo. 	See id. (holding that
determining whether the plaintiffs had an actionable claim required statutory
construction, which is a question of law reviewed de novo).
ELECTION CODE’S ELECTION CONTEST PROCEDURES
{8} 	The district court dismissed the amended complaint as time barred by the thirty-
day statute of limitations provided by Section 1-14-3 of the Election Code. This
statute of limitations and other provisions found in the Election Code’s election
contest procedures provide for the “speedy resolution” of election contests. 	See
Gunaji v. Macias, 2001-NMSC-028, ¶ 26, 130 N.M. 734, 31 P.3d 1008 (noting that
the purpose of the procedures relating to election contests is the speedy resolution of

6
election contests in which the normal rules of civil procedure take too much time).
{9} 	Plaintiffs argue that the district court erred when it determined that the Election
Code’s election contest procedures, including the thirty-day statute of limitations
found in Section 1-14-3, applied to formation elections under the PID Act. 	The
question of whether the PID Act incorporates the Election Code’s election contest
procedures for formation elections is primarily a question of legislative intent.
{10} 	The Election Code provides that in “[a]ny action to contest an election[, the]
complaint shall be filed no later than thirty days from issuance of the certificate of
nomination or issuance of the certificate of election to the successful candidate.”
Section 1-14-3. 	Although this provision principally addresses elections with
“candidates,” the Election Code’s election contest procedures also apply to “special
district elections,” such as a PID Act formation election, “[t]o the extent procedures
are incorporated or adopted by reference by separate laws governing such elections
or to the extent procedures are not specified by such laws[.]” Section 1-1-19(B)(2).
Thus, the Election Code’s election contest procedures apply to a special district
election when the laws governing the special district election incorporate the
procedures. In addition, when the laws governing a special district election are silent
as to the procedures, the Election Code applies as the default procedures for such an
election.

7
{11} 	In determining whether the PID Act incorporated the Election Code’s election
contest procedures by reference, we look to the plain meaning of the election
provisions of the PID Act. See State v. Hubble, 2009-NMSC-014, ¶ 13, 146 N.M. 70,
206 P.3d 579 (“We first look to the plain meaning of the words chosen by the
Legislature[.]”). 	Section 5-11-7(E) of the PID Act provides that “[e]xcept as
otherwise provided by this section, [PID formation elections] shall comply with the
general election laws of this state.” The plain meaning therefore indicates that the
Legislature intended PID Act formation elections to incorporate the same procedural
protections and requirements as general elections, unless the PID Act expressly
excludes or contradicts a particular procedure.
{12} 	Additionally, the PID Act formation election procedures do not contain
independent election contest or recount procedures. See § 5-11-7 (general formation
election provisions). 	Since, by virtue of Section 1-1-19(B)(2), the Election Code
provides the default procedures for a formation election under the PID Act, the
absence of separate election contest or recount procedures supports the conclusion that
the Legislature’s language and actions indicate that the Legislature intended the
Election Code to apply to formation elections under the PID Act. The Election Code’s
provisions, including the election contest and recount procedures, therefore apply to
formation elections under the plain meaning of the PID Act.

8
{13} Plaintiffs argue that the general language contained in Section 5-11-7(E) is
insufficient to incorporate the election recount and contest procedures of the Election
Code. Plaintiffs rely on State ex rel. Denton v. Vinyard, 55 N.M. 205, 207-09, 230
P.2d 238, 239-40 (1951), which held that a statute stating that “[s]uch election shall
be conducted in a manner provided by law for general elections within said county or
city, except as herein provided” was too general to incorporate the Election Code’s
contest and recount procedures. (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).
While the language of Section 5-11-7(E) and the statute at issue in Vinyard are
similar, Vinyard is distinguishable. At the time Vinyard was decided, the Election
Code was silent as to its scope and did not contain a provision that stated that it
applied to special district elections under any circumstance. See generally NMSA
1941, §§ 56-101 to -1017 (1951) (election code under previous compilation). It was
not until 1969 that the Legislature added a provision to the Election Code that
addressed the elections covered by the Election Code. See 1969 N.M. Laws, ch. 240,
§§ 19-20. In addition, “special district elections” were originally excluded from the
Election Code “[u]nless otherwise provided in the Election Code or by separate laws
governing such elections[.]” Id. § 20. In 1975, the Legislature changed this provision
to read in the affirmative and state that “special district elections” are governed by the
Election Code “[t]o the extent procedures are incorporated or adopted by reference by

9
separate laws governing such elections.” 1975 N.M. Laws, ch. 255, § 6. The
Legislature again changed and expanded this provision in 1977. 1977 N.M. Laws, ch.
222, § 4. The language adopted in 1977, which is the current language in the Election
Code, provides that “to the extent procedures are not specified by such laws, certain
provisions of the Elections Code shall also apply to . . . special district elections.” Id.
By providing that the Election Code’s election contest procedures apply when
procedures are not specified, the 1977 amendment enhanced the scope of the Election
Code such that the Election Code now provides the default election procedures for all
special district elections, which was not the situation when Vinyard was decided.
{14} Further, Vinyard addressed the issue of whether the plaintiffs had a right to file
an election contest under a local option statute. Vinyard, 55 N.M. at 209, 230 P.2d at
240. Vinyard recognized that the “right of recount and contest are purely statutory”
and that a general statement is insufficient to incorporate the right to recount and
contest. Id. at 207, 209, 230 P.2d at 239, 240. In this case, Plaintiffs’ amended
complaint does not allege a statutory right to contest, but instead raises a claim under
Article 2, Section 8 of the New Mexico Constitution. We must determine whether the
Election Code procedures for an election contest apply to a formation election, not
whether there is a substantive right to contest the election as in Vinyard.
{15} Moreover, if Plaintiffs are correct, the statute of limitations for an election

10
contest under the PID Act would be the general four-year statute of limitations under
NMSA 1978, Section 37-1-4 (1880) (four-year catch-all statute of limitations). The
practical effect would be to allow a plaintiff to challenge a formation election well
after construction of a public improvement district has begun or possibly even
completed. An election contest arising under the PID Act is precisely the type of case
that requires the “need for speedy resolution” that the Election Code’s election contest
procedures provide. Gunaji, 2001-NMSC-028, ¶ 26.
SCOPE OF AN ELECTION CONTEST
{16} 	Having determined that the Election Code’s election contest procedures apply
to election contests of formation elections under the PID Act, we must determine
whether Plaintiffs’ amended complaint presents an election contest. If Plaintiffs are
correct and the amended complaint does not present an election contest, the Election
Code’s election contest procedures, such as the thirty-day statute of limitations, do not
apply. 	We begin by examining New Mexico case law on the question of what
constitutes an election contest.
{17} 	In arguing that the amended complaint was not an election contest, Plaintiffs
rely on several out-of-state cases and Heth v. Armijo, 83 N.M. 498, 500, 494 P.2d 160,
162 (1972), for the propositions that the defining features of an election contest are
that an election was held in which one side won and that allegations “that conditions

11
precedent to an election did not occur, . . . such as a valid petition for the election,
complete and truthful notice to the electorate, and the preparation and dissemination
of proper ballots” are not election contests. Plaintiffs note that our Supreme Court
stated in Heth that
[s]ince the objective of the contestant in an election contest is to be
declared the winner, his notice of contest should allege that he has
received more legal votes than the contestee, and a failure to so allege is
not a claim showing that the contestant is entitled to relief.
Id. at 500, 494 P.2d at 162. However, we do not read Heth in the limited manner
Plaintiffs propose. Heth involved a claim by unsuccessful candidates who alleged
various statutory violations of the Election Code. Id. at 498-99, 494 P.2d at 160-61.
The candidates’ notice of contest failed to state that any of the alleged illegal ballots
cast were cast for contestants, that the results would have been changed, or that the
contestants were entitled to the offices for which they were candidates. Id. at 499, 494
P.2d at 161. Our Supreme Court held that the failure to assert that the results of the
election would have been different in the notice of contest is “analogous to a
complaint in tort alleging that the defendant negligently struck the plaintiff, but failing
to allege that the plaintiff was injured thereby.” Id. at 500, 494 P.2d at 162. Heth only
stands for the proposition that an election contest must contain an assertion that the
underlying claim in the complaint would have changed the result of the contested
election.

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{18} More recent cases clearly show that New Mexico courts have not recognized
a distinction between allegations of failed conditions precedent to an election and
allegations that the contestant should be declared the winner of a valid election in
determining whether a complaint presents an election contest. In Dinwiddie v. Board
of County Commissioners of Lea County, 103 N.M. 442, 443, 708 P.2d 1043, 1044
(1985), our Supreme Court addressed whether the statutory provisions concerning
election contests and recounts applied to the plaintiffs’ complaint. The plaintiffs made
two allegations: (1) the bond election at issue was held in violation of statutory
provisions for the consolidation of precincts, and (2) certain ballots were cast by
persons invalidly registered. Id. The plaintiffs argued that even if the second claim,
challenging the results of the election, was held to be an election contest subject to the
Election Code’s election contest procedures, the first claim, addressing the conditions
precedent or validity of the election under the statute governing the election, was still
outside the purview of an election contest. Id. at 444, 708 P.2d at 1045. Our Supreme
Court did not agree with the distinction. Id. It stated that a “challenge to the validity
of an election is also a challenge to its result, for if it is successful, the result is
changed[, and s]imilarly, a challenge to the result contests the inherent validity of the
election.” Id. Therefore, under Dinwiddie, any challenge as to the underlying validity
of an election that would necessarily require overturning the results or effects of an

13
election is an election contest subject to the Election Code’s election contest
procedures.
{19} Plaintiffs argue that Dinwiddie has effectively been overruled by Gunaji. In
Gunaji, our Supreme Court held that the Election Code did not provide a remedy due
to a “gap in the statutory scheme” in an election contest arising from ballots
containing the incorrect candidates. Gunaji, 2001-NMSC-028, ¶¶ 2, 13-15. The
plaintiffs sued the county clerk, who was in charge of preparing the ballot, but our
Supreme Court noted that the Election Code only provides for an election contest for
error by the precinct board. Id. ¶¶ 14-15. The Court held that “[a]ssuming the
Election Code does not provide a remedy when candidates’ names are omitted from
the ballot,” there was “no barrier to our fashioning a remedy outside the Code” under
Article II, Section 8 of the New Mexico Constitution. Gunaji, 2001-NMSC-028,
¶¶ 21, 26. The Court stated that “it is the procedure in an election contest which is
exclusive, not the grounds and the remedy.” Id. ¶ 26. Thus, even while an election
contest may not arise under a specific section of the Election Code and instead alleges
some other problem “compromising the validity of the election,” the Election Code’s
election contest must be followed to “accord[] with the need for speedy resolution of
election contests[.]” Id. Gunaji therefore does not support Plaintiffs’ contention that
there is a distinction between challenges to election results and the underlying validity

14
of the election in defining an election contest. Instead, Gunaji supports applying the
Election Code’s election contest procedures even when the remedy and grounds
forming the basis of the election contest are found outside the Election Code, such as
noncompliance with the PID Act or the New Mexico Constitution.
{20} 	We thus view New Mexico case law as defining an election contest as a
challenge to the result of an election, as well as a challenge to the inherent validity of
an election when the challenge would necessarily require overturning the results or
effects of the election. An election contest can derive from a violation of a provision
of the Election Code, from a violation of another statute governing the particular
election at issue, or from the New Mexico Constitution. See Heth, 83 N.M. at 499-
500, 494 P.2d at 161-62 (election contest derived from Election Code); Dinwiddie,
103 N.M. at 443-44, 708 P.2d at 1044-45 (election contest challenging the underlying
validity of the election based on statute governing election for issuing general
obligation bonds); Gunaji, 2001-NMSC-028, ¶¶ 2, 26 (noting that Election Code
contest procedures apply to election contests alleging a violation of Article II, Section
8 of the New Mexico Constitution). Applying the Election Code’s election contest
procedures to all election contests, including election contests of formation elections
under the PID Act, “accords with the need for speedy resolution of election
contests[.]” Gunaji, 2001-NMSC-028, ¶ 26.

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AMENDED COMPLAINT AS AN ELECTION CONTEST
{21} 	We next turn to Plaintiffs’ amended complaint to determine whether it presents
an election contest and therefore must follow the Election Code’s election contest
procedures. Plaintiffs’ amended complaint sought declarations that (1) the AFPID has
no valid legal existence and all contracts and agreements made by the Board are void
and unenforceable; (2) if the AFPID was formed in accordance with the law, it is
illegal pursuant to Section 5-11-8(B), because the improvements for which the levy
is assessed will not confer a benefit upon the property contained within the AFPID
and because the levy will not confer a benefit upon the properties assessed; (3) the
properties included in the 1995 reorganization plan are entitled to form a special
assessment district; and (4) the AFPID has no authority to collect any tax or
assessment or to expend such sums already collected.
{22} 	Plaintiffs argue that they base the first prayer for relief on a claim that no legal
election has occurred, and therefore it is not an election contest. 	In particular, the
amended complaint alleges that the petition to form the AFPID was invalid because
only the Resort signed the petition to form the AFPID, and Section 5-11-3(A) requires
that the “owners of at least twenty-five percent of the real property” sign the petition.
(Emphasis added.) 	Additionally, the amended complaint states that the formation
election failed to comply with the requirements of the PID Act as stated in Section 5-

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11-7(E)(1)-(3) (requiring that the “ballot material” for a formation election include
specified, detailed information). These claims relate to whether the petition and the
ballot met statutory requirements required of a formation election by the PID Act, and
the claims therefore challenge the underlying validity of the election. 	As we have
discussed, these issues present an election contest. See Dinwiddie, 103 N.M. at 443-
44, 708 P.2d at 1044-45 (holding that a claim that an election was held in violation of
statutory requirements for consolidation of precincts was a challenge to the underlying
validity of the election and therefore was an election contest subject to the Election
Code’s election contest procedures).
{23} 	With regard to the second and third prayers for relief, Plaintiffs argue that they
do not challenge the underlying validity of the formation election and that the
amended complaint concedes that a valid election occurred. However, these prayers
for relief also rest on challenges to the underlying validity of the formation election.
The gist of Plaintiffs’ claim of illegality of the AFPID under Section 5-11-8(B) is that
the feasibility study provided in the petition inflated the projected market value of the
lots within the AFPID after construction of the infrastructure improvements. Plaintiffs
allege that the inflated projections in the feasibility study were “incorrect, misleading,
or fraudulent” and were designed to keep the projected amount of bond indebtedness
of the AFPID within the sixty percent limit of bond indebtedness to market value ratio

17
mandated by Section 5-11-8(B). Similarly, Plaintiffs base their claim that certain
properties are entitled to form a special assessment district on an assertion that the
information in the petition is “incorrect, misleading, or fraudulent.” Specifically, the
amended complaint alleges that the petition misrepresented the AFPID as necessary
to comply with the Resort’s obligations under a final plan of reorganization from a
1995 bankruptcy. Both prayers for relief two and three address the accuracy of
information provided to the Village and voters prior to the formation election to
approve the AFPID. The claims challenge the underlying validity of the election by
asserting that (1) the Village authorized the formation election and (2) voters approved
the AFPID based on false, fraudulent, or misleading information designed to
circumvent the requirements of the PID Act prior to the election. Further, the relief
that Plaintiffs seek, allowing certain lots to form a special assessment district, as
opposed to being included in the AFPID, and declaring the special levy illegal, would
necessarily require overturning the election results. The second and third prayers for
relief therefore state an election contest concerning the formation election. See
Dinwiddie, 103 N.M. at 444, 708 P.2d at 1045 (holding that a “challenge to the
validity of an election is also a challenge to [the] result, for if it is successful, the result
is changed”).
{24} Finally, the fourth prayer for relief, that the AFPID has no authority to tax, also

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derives from an assertion that the formation election was not conducted in accordance
with the PID Act. Specifically, Plaintiffs claim that in order to have the authority to
tax, the PID Act required that the ballot have a separate ballot question specifically
addressing the authority to tax, aside from the question as to whether to form the PID.
Further, the amended complaint alleges that the ballot failed to provide required
details of the special levies assessed on the lot owners, as required by Section 5-11-
7(E)(2) (requiring the ballot in a formation election to contain a description of district
improvements and arguments for and against the imposition of the taxes and a
statement that the taxes are for public infrastructure improvements and services within
the district). Again, this claim challenges the underlying validity of the election based
on failure to comply with statutory requirements and is therefore an election contest
governed by the Election Code’s election contest procedures.
TRANSFER TO SUPREME COURT
{25} Having concluded that the Election Code’s election contest procedures apply
to formation elections under the PID Act and that the amended complaint presented
an election contest, we further conclude that this Court does not have jurisdiction over
this appeal. “[L]ack of jurisdiction at any stage of the proceedings is a controlling
consideration which must be resolved before going further.” In re Doe, III, 87 N.M.
170, 171, 531 P.2d 218, 219 (Ct. App. 1975). “[W]e have a duty to determine whether

19
[we have] jurisdiction of an appeal.” State ex rel. Dep’t of Human Servs. v. Manfre,
102 N.M. 241, 242, 693 P.2d 1273, 1274 (Ct. App. 1984). This Court is a court of
limited jurisdiction and only has appellate jurisdiction as provided by law. Id. at 243,
693 P.2d at 1275. NMSA 1978, Section 34-5-8(A)(1) (1983) provides that this Court
has appellate jurisdiction for “any civil action not specifically reserved to the
jurisdiction of the supreme court by the constitution or by law.”
{26} 	The Election Code, Section 1-14-5, states that “[a]n appeal shall lie from any
judgment or decree entered in the contest proceeding to the supreme court of New
Mexico within the time and in the manner provided by law for civil appeals from the
district court.” 	Thus, the Election Code provides that our Supreme Court has
jurisdiction of direct appeals of election contests from a district court. We therefore
transfer this appeal to our Supreme Court, pursuant to NMSA 1978, Section 34-5-10
(1966) (“No matter on appeal in the supreme court or the court of appeals shall be
dismissed for the reason that it should have been docketed in the other court, but it
shall be transferred by the court in which it is filed to the proper court.”).
CONCLUSION
{27} 	We hold that the PID Act’s formation election provisions incorporate the
Election Code’s election contest procedures, which require a direct appeal to our

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Supreme Court, and that Plaintiffs’ amended complaint presented an election contest.
We therefore hold that this Court lacks jurisdiction and transfer this case to our
Supreme Court.
{28} 	IT IS SO ORDERED.
_______________________________
JAMES J. WECHSLER, Judge
WE CONCUR:
_____________________________
MICHAEL E. VIGIL, Judge
_____________________________
LINDA M. VANZI, Judge

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