April 01, 2014 – State of New Mexico v. Raul Tarin, No. 32,650

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF NEW MEXICO
Opinion Number: 	__________
Filing Date: April 1, 2014
NO. 32,650
STATE OF NEW MEXICO,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v.
RAUL TARIN,
Defendant-Appellant.
APPEAL FROM THE DISTRICT COURT OF CHAVES COUNTY
Steven L. Bell, District Judge
Gary K. King, Attorney General
Pranava Upadrashta, Assistant Attorney General
Santa Fe, NM
for Appellee
Raul Tarin
Dexter, NM
Pro Se Appellant

OPINION
GARCIA, Judge.
{1} 	Defendant Raul Tarin appeals his conviction for speeding after a trial de novo
in the district court. He argues that the State failed to present sufficient evidence that
the speed limit in question was under seventy-five miles per hour pursuant to NMSA
1978, Section 66-7-301 (2002) because the State failed to produce an engineering
survey and traffic investigation set forth in NMSA 1978, Section 66-7-303(A) (1996).
Defendant also challenges the admission of the State’s evidence on lack of personal
knowledge and hearsay grounds. We disagree and affirm Defendant’s conviction for
speeding.
BACKGROUND
{2} 	Defendant was stopped by a state police officer and issued a traffic citation for
speeding while traveling at a speed of seventy-one miles per hour in a posted forty-
five miles per hour speed limit zone. Defendant was originally convicted of speeding
in the magistrate court and again after a de novo appeal to the district court. Defendant
appeals his speeding conviction, challenging the sufficiency of the evidence against
him based upon his construction of the applicable speeding statutes. Defendant asserts
that the State was required to produce an engineering survey and traffic investigation

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to prove that the legally enforceable speed limit was below seventy-five miles per
hour at the location in question.
DISCUSSION
{3} 	We interpret Defendant’s arguments to be a request that this Court review and
interpret our speed limit statutes as well as a challenge to the sufficiency of the
evidence. Defendant also challenges the admission of the officer’s testimony on
personal knowledge and hearsay grounds. We begin with the analysis of our speed
limit statutes.
A. 	Establishing the Enforceable Speed Limit
{4} 	Section 66-7-301(A) prohibits an individual from speeding by setting maximum
speed limits for various kinds of roads within the State. All roads within the
jurisdiction of the State, that are not within a school zone, a business district, a
residential district, or a construction zone, statutorily default to a maximum speed
limit of seventy-five miles per hour. Any deviation from the default speed limit must
be determined on the basis of “an engineering survey and traffic investigation, a
detailed report of which is filed with the traffic safety bureau of the state highway and
transportation department[.]” Section 66-7-303(A); see also § 66-7-301(C) (permitting
alteration of the speed limit in accordance with the provisions of Section 66-7-
303(A)).

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{5} 	Defendant was cited for exceeding the posted speed limit that had been altered
and reduced to forty-five miles per hour pursuant to the authority granted in Section
66-7-301(C). Because the posted speed limit had been altered from the statutory
maximum, Defendant contends that it was insufficient to simply prove that he had
driven in excess of the posted forty-five miles per hour speed limit. Instead, he
contends that the State was further required to produce the engineering survey and
traffic investigation to prove that the speed limit alteration in question was
appropriate. Accordingly, Defendant contends that the State failed to present sufficient
evidence to establish the legally altered speed limit under Section 66-7-301(C) and,
therefore, he was not violating the maximum speed limit under Section 66-7-301(A).
Defendant’s arguments presuppose that (1) the methods for establishing the posted
speed limit are a required element to establish a charge of speeding, and (2) it is the
State’s burden to prove the validity of the methods for establishing the posted speed
limit. Defendant’s arguments regarding the statutory interpretation of Section 66-7-
301 appear to be matters of first impression before this Court.
{6} 	We first address Defendant’s overarching argument that the State is required
to produce an engineering survey and traffic investigation to prove the legality of a
posted speed limit that is not specifically identified in Section 66-7-301(A). We
review questions of statutory interpretation de novo and begin by looking at the plain

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language of the statute. State v. Tafoya, 2012-NMSC-030, ¶ 11, 285 P.3d 604; see also
State v. Tafoya, 2010-NMSC-019, ¶ 10, 148 N.M. 391, 237 P.3d 693 (explaining that
when interpreting a statute, the appellate court seeks to determine the Legislature’s
intent by “apply[ing] the plain meaning of the statute unless the language is doubtful,
ambiguous, or an adherence to the literal use of the words would lead to injustice,
absurdity[,] or contradiction, in which case the statute is to be construed according to
its obvious spirit or reason” (internal quotation marks and citation omitted)).
Defendant’s argument on appeal is simple: that actual evidence of the engineering
survey and traffic investigation is an essential element to establish the violation of any
speed limit that is posted below seventy-five miles per hour unless the roadway falls
within a school zone, a business district, a residential district, or a construction zone.
See § 66-7-301(A), (B).
{7} 	The plain language of Section 66-7-303(A) only requires the posting of a sign
giving drivers notice of an altered speed limit and states: “[the designated] speed limit
shall be authorized and effective when appropriate signs giving notice thereof are
erected at that particular part of the highway[.]” No evidence, other than evidence of
a posted speed limit, is required to establish the validity of a speed limit. See Dahl v.
Turner, 1969-NMCA-075, ¶ 35, 80 N.M. 564, 458 P.2d 816 (explaining that, once
alteration is authorized, the altered speed becomes the speed limit and notice of the

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alteration must be given by posting). Nothing in Section 66-7-301 requires the State
to provide any evidence addressing how a posted speed limit was established or
adopted. The statutory scheme strongly indicates that the Legislature did not intend
that evidence of the underlying engineering survey and traffic investigation be a
required element in nearly every case involving a speed limit violation below seventy-
five miles per hour. Nothing in the statute directly imposes Defendant’s additional
element for a posted speed limit violation.
{8} 	To interpret Section 66-7-301 as Defendant suggests would produce an
unworkable situation and an absurd result. See State v. Javier M., 2001-NMSC-030,
¶ 46, 131 N.M. 1, 33 P.3d 1 (recognizing an unworkable situation and absurd result
in the interpretation of NMSA 1978, Section 32A-2-14(C) (2009)); State v. Billington,
2009-NMCA-014, ¶ 8, 145 N.M. 526, 201 P.3d 857 (“We must . . . avoid adopting a
strict construction of the statutory language if it would convey an absurd or
unreasonable result.”); State v. Galaz, 2003-NMCA-076, ¶ 11, 133 N.M. 794, 70 P.3d
784 (interpreting NMSA 1978, Section 30-1-12(B) (1963) narrowly to avoid an
absurd result). As Defendant conceded in the district court, such an interpretation of
Section 66-7-301 would require the State to present a witness and an admissible copy
of the engineering survey and traffic investigation for the applicable section of
roadway at nearly every trial involving a speeding infraction below seventy-five miles

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per hour. We conclude that such an interpretation of the statute would burden the State
with needless, inefficient, and unreasonable acts that were not contemplated by the
Legislature. See State v. Young, 2004-NMSC-015, ¶¶ 26-27, 135 N.M. 458, 90 P.3d
477 (refusing to recognize an interpretation that would frustrate the legislative purpose
to maintain public order and avoid an absurd interpretation of NMSA 1978, Section
33-3-28(A) (1985)); State v. McClaugherty, 2007-NMCA-041, ¶ 38, 141 N.M. 468,
157 P.3d 33 (interpreting NMSA 1978, Section 39-1-1 (1917) to avoid inefficiency
and dual jurisdiction that would frustrate appeals), aff’d, 2008-NMSC-044, 144 N.M.
483, 188 P.3d 1234. As a result, we interpret the Legislature’s intent underlying
Section 66-7-301 to establish a prima facie case for a speeding violation where the
State presents evidence that the speed limit was posted on a visible sign along the
roadway, giving drivers proper notice of the designated speed limit, and a driver
exceeds the posted speed limit.
{9} 	Defendant relies on two speed trap cases from California to support his
argument that the State was required to produce an engineering survey and traffic
investigation to prove that the speed limit had been altered from seventy-five miles
per hour to forty-five miles per hour. See People v. Earnest, 40 Cal. Rptr. 2d 304
(App. Dep’t Super. Ct. 1995); People v. Halopoff, 131 Cal. Rptr. 531 (App. Dep’t
Super. Ct. 1976). Defendant’s reliance on these speed trap cases is misplaced.

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{10} 	The California Vehicle Code defines a speed trap, in part, as a prima facie speed
limit that is not justified by an engineering and traffic survey. See Cal. Veh. Code §§
40801 to 40805 (1959, amended through 2010) (speed traps). Thus, the plain language
of the California Vehicle Code makes an engineering and traffic survey, or lack
thereof, an essential element of a conviction based on a speed trap violation. Compare
Cal. Veh. Code §§ 40801 to 40805 (speed traps), with § 66-7-301 and 	§ 66-7-303
(speed regulations and establishment of speed zones); see also Cal. Veh. Code §§
22351 to 22352 (1959, as amended through 2013) (speed limit violations and prima
facie speed limits). No such requirement exists to establish a speeding violation in
California that is not part of a speed trap scenario. See Cal. Veh. Code §§ 22351 to
22352. Neither Section 66-7-301 nor Section 66-7-303 involve a speed trap scenario
that would require the State to produce the engineering survey and traffic investigation
from the New Mexico Highway and Transportation Department in order to prove the
legality of a posted speed limit. Accordingly, the district court did not err in
convicting Defendant upon the prima facie evidence that he was driving at a speed in
excess of the posted speed limit.
B. 	The Officer’s Testimony
{11} 	We now address Defendant’s challenges to the sufficiency of the evidence to
support his conviction. Defendant asserts that the officer’s testimony was insufficient

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to prove the speed limit because the officer did not have personal knowledge that the
speed limit was forty-five miles per hour. See Rule 11-602 NMRA. Additionally,
Defendant claims that the officer’s testimony was based on lack of personal
knowledge and inadmissible hearsay. See Rule 11-802 NMRA.
{12} 	Our review of a sufficiency of the evidence question involves a two-step
process. See State v. Apodaca, 1994-NMSC-121, ¶ 6, 118 N.M. 762, 887 P.2d 756.
Initially, we view the evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict, indulging all
reasonable inferences and resolving all conflicts in the evidence in favor of the
verdict, and then we must “make a legal determination of whether the evidence
viewed in this manner could justify a finding by any rational trier of fact that each
element of the crime charged has been established beyond a reasonable doubt.” Id.
(internal quotation marks and citation omitted). “The question is whether the [district]
court’s decision is supported by substantial evidence, not whether the court could have
reached a different conclusion.” In re Ernesto M., Jr., 1996-NMCA-039, ¶ 15, 121
N.M. 562, 915 P.2d 318. “The reviewing court does not weigh the evidence or
substitute its judgment for that of the fact[-]finder as long as there is sufficient
evidence to support the verdict.” State v. Mora, 1997-NMSC-060, ¶ 27, 124 N.M.
346, 950 P.2d 789, abrogated on other grounds as recognized by Kersey v. Hatch,
2010-NMSC-020, ¶ 17, 148 N.M. 381, 237 P.3d 683.

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{13} 	The citing officer testified on behalf of the State and stated that he had been
employed with the New Mexico State Police for five years, had patrolled this area in
the past, regularly passed through the area, and had personal knowledge of the posted
speed limit. The officer further testified that he was on duty on the evening in
question, and as he was approaching an S-shaped curve, he observed Defendant’s
vehicle coming around the curve “at a high rate of speed.” Using his radar device, the
officer clocked Defendant’s speed at seventy-one miles per hour. According to the
officer, the posted speed limit was forty-five miles per hour. The officer described the
three places in the area where signs were posted stating that the speed limit was forty-
five miles per hour, and the officer described the signs and the geographic location of
each of those signs. Based upon the officer’s testimony, the State presented sufficient
evidence that the posted speed limit was forty-five miles per hour and that Defendant
was 	traveling 	well 	in 	excess 	of 	the 	posted 	limit. 	See 	State 	v. 	Dowling,
2011-NMSC-016, ¶ 20, 150 N.M. 110, 257 P.3d 930 (noting that an evidentiary
review involves “deference to the resolution of factual conflicts and inferences derived
therefrom, and a legal determination of whether the evidence viewed in this manner
could support the conviction” (internal quotation marks and citation omitted)).
{14} 	Defendant argues that the officer’s testimony constituted inadmissible hearsay.
Our appellate courts review the district court’s decision to admit evidence for an abuse

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of discretion. See State v. Guerra, 2012-NMSC-014, ¶ 36, 278 P.3d 1031. Without
specifically articulating his hearsay claim, Defendant asserts that Rule 11-803 NMRA
prohibits police officers from testifying as to hearsay. In support of this argument,
Defendant relies on the public records exception, which precludes the reports of law
enforcement personnel to be admitted as public records in criminal cases. See Rule 11-
803(8)(a)(ii) (stating that “[t]he following are not excluded by the rule against
hearsay, regardless of whether the declarant is available as a witness . . . [a] record or
statement of a public office if . . . it sets out . . . a matter observed while under a legal
duty to report, 	but not including, in a criminal case, a matter observed by
law-enforcement personnel” (emphasis added)). We are not persuaded that Rule 11-
803(8)(a)(ii) applies in this case because there is no evidence that the State attempted
to offer the police officer’s report into evidence as a public record. To the contrary,
the officer testified that he personally observed Defendant traveling at seventy-one
miles per hour in an area where there were three posted speed limit signs stating that
the speed limit was forty-five miles per hour. As a result, the district court did not
abuse its discretion by admitting the officer’s testimony.
{15} 	Defendant also argues that the officer lacked personal knowledge because he
did not know who posted the speed limit signs, and this lack of knowledge constitutes
hearsay. See Rules 11-602 (defining personal knowledge) and 11-801(C) NMRA

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(defining hearsay). We disagree. To the extent that Defendant is also arguing that the
hearsay rule would not allow the officer to rely on the speed limit signs that stated that
the speed limit was forty-five miles per hour, Defendant failed to fully develop this
argument or establish how it was preserved below. See Garcia ex rel. Garcia v. La
Farge, 1995-NMSC-019, ¶ 27, 119 N.M. 532, 893 P.2d 428 (“To preserve an issue
for appeal, it must appear that a ruling or decision by the district court was fairly
invoked.” (internal quotation marks and citation omitted)). Because this Court does
not review unclear or undeveloped arguments, we will not address this hearsay
argument further. See State v. Fuentes, 2010-NMCA-027, ¶ 29, 147 N.M. 761, 228
P.3d 1181; see also Elane Photography v. Willock, 2013-NMSC-040, ¶ 70, 309 P.3d
40 (“To rule on an inadequately briefed issue, [an appellate court] would have to
develop the arguments itself, effectively performing the parties’ work for them. . . .
It is of no benefit either to the parties or to future litigants for this Court to promulgate
case law based on our own speculation rather than the parties’ carefully considered
arguments.”). For the foregoing reasons, we conclude that there were no hearsay
violations arising from the citing officer’s testimony that was based upon his personal
observations and personal knowledge of the evidence.
CONCLUSION

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{16} 	Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the district court’s verdict,
we conclude that there was sufficient evidence to support the district court’s
conclusion that Defendant was driving seventy-one miles per hour in a posted forty-
five miles per hour speed limit zone. Because the State was not required to present an
engineering survey and traffic investigation as a prima facie element in the charge of
speeding, the posted speed limit of forty-five miles per hour was sufficient to establish
the statutory speed limit under Section 66-7-301. Finally, the district court did not
abuse its discretion by admitting the officer’s testimony about the posted speed limit
and the citation issued to Defendant. We affirm Defendant’s conviction for speeding.
{17} 	IT IS SO ORDERED.
_____________________________
TIMOTHY L. GARCIA, Judge
WE CONCUR:
______________________________
JONATHAN B. SUTIN, Judge
______________________________
LINDA M. VANZI, Judge