October 31, 2025- State of New Mexico v. Melvin John Billey, No. A-1-CA-41478

Corrections to this opinion/decision not affecting the outcome, at the Court's discretion, can occur up to the time of publication
with NM Compilation Commission. The Court will ensure that the electronic version of this opinion/decision is updated accordingly
in Odyssey.
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF NEW MEXICO	1
Opinion Number:__________	2
Filing Date: October 31, 2025	3
No. A-1-CA-41478	4
STATE OF NEW MEXICO,	5
Plaintiff-Appellant,	6
v.	7
MELVIN JOHN BILLEY,	8
Defendant-Appellee.	9
APPEAL FROM THE DISTRICT COURT OF SAN JUAN COUNTY	10
Daylene A. Marsh, District Court Judge	11
Raúl Torrez, Attorney General	12
Santa Fe, NM	13
Meryl E. Francolini, Assistant Solicitor General	14
Albuquerque, NM	15
for Appellant	16
Bennet J. Baur, Chief Public Defender	17
Kimberly Chavez Cook, Appellate Defender	18
Santa Fe, NM	19
for Appellee	20
Court of Appeals of New Mexico
Filed 10/31/2025 11:26 AM

OPINION	1
IVES, Judge.	2
{1} 	The State appeals the district court’s order suppressing evidence that was	3
seized as a result of the investigative detention of Defendant Melvin John Billey for	4
a violation of the Motor Vehicle Code, NMSA 1978, §§ 66-1-1 to -8-141 (1931, as	5
amended through 2025). The district court concluded that the arresting officer did	6
not have reasonable suspicion to seize Defendant for violating Section 66-3-707(A)	7
by riding a bicycle at night without a rear reflector. The district court provided two	8
alternative rationales. First, it concluded that Section 66-3-707(A) applies only to	9
bicycles ridden in areas reserved for vehicular travel, and that sidewalks are not such	10
an area. We disagree and hold that our Legislature intended to require bicycles to	11
have rear reflectors and headlights when used on sidewalks at night. Second, the	12
district court concluded that an officer may only form reasonable suspicion of a	13
violation of Section 66-3-707(A) if the officer was able to observe the bicycle from	14
directly behind it, and that the arresting officer in this case was never in a position	15
to do so. We believe that the manner in which the district court applied the statute is	16
overly rigid in the context of a determination about whether reasonable suspicion	17
warranted 	an 	investigatory 	detention. 	Because 	neither 	of 	the 	district 	court’s	18
rationales support its suppression order and because we decline Defendant’s request	19
to affirm that order as right for any reason, we reverse the order. We remand for	20

2
further proceedings on Defendant’s motion to suppress consistent with this opinion,	1
and for any additional proceedings that may be appropriate.	2
BACKGROUND	3
{2} 	Officer Jarame Gordon observed a person who he believed was riding a	4
bicycle on a sidewalk at night without a rear reflector, and the cyclist then turned	5
into the Farmington Inn parking lot. The officer entered the parking lot and	6
eventually found a bicycle flipped upside down outside of one of the motel rooms.	7
Officer Gordon observed that the bicycle did not have a rear reflector. Defendant	8
then exited a nearby room, at which point the officer confronted him, explaining that	9
Defendant was required to have a rear reflector on his bicycle. Defendant responded	10
that he had only been riding in the parking lot. When asked to provide identification,	11
Defendant provided a fake name, and Officer Gordon arrested him for concealing	12
his identity. During a search incident to arrest, officers found a fentanyl pill and a	13
metal pipe. The State charged Defendant with concealing his identity, possession of	14
a controlled substance, and possession of drug paraphernalia, as well as operating a	15
bicycle without lamps or other equipment in violation of Section 66-3-707(A).	16
{3} 	Defendant moved to suppress the evidence obtained from the stop, arguing	17
that he was biking on a sidewalk, not “on a roadway,” and therefore was not required	18
to have a rear reflector. Because Defendant maintained that he was not in violation	19
of any law, he argued that Officer Gordon had no reasonable suspicion to stop him.	20

3
After an evidentiary hearing, the district court granted Defendant’s motion on two	1
grounds. First, it concluded that Section 66-3-707(A) applies to bicycles “operated	2
upon an highway or path set aside for bicycles”; “[a] sidewalk does not fall within	3
the definition of highway” because highway is defined as an area “generally open to	4
the use of the public . . . for the purpose of vehicular travel”; and “the [L]egislat[ure]	5
did not intend for motor vehicles to be driven on sidewalks.” Second, it concluded	6
that Officer Gordon lacked reasonable suspicion because he “was never directly	7
behind . . . the bicycle” and therefore could not “determine whether . . . Defendant	8
was in violation of the statute.” The State appeals.	9
DISCUSSION	10
{4} 	When an appeal of a suppression ruling involves “a mixed question of law	11
and fact,” State v. Paananen, 2015-NMSC-031, ¶ 10, 357 P.3d 958 (internal	12
quotation marks and citation omitted), we review “factual matters with deference to	13
the district court’s findings if substantial evidence exists to support them,” and we	14
review de novo the “the district court’s application of the law.” State v. Almanzar,	15
2014-NMSC-001, ¶ 9, 316 P.3d 183. Because we resolve this appeal without	16
addressing any factual questions and our holdings address only legal questions, our	17
review is de novo. See State v. Duhon, 2005-NMCA-120, ¶ 10, 138 N.M. 466, 122	18
P.3d 50 (recognizing that the standard of review for legal questions is de novo).	19

4
{5} 	Under the Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution and Article	1
II, Section 10 of the New Mexico Constitution, before an officer makes a traffic stop,	2
they “must have a reasonable suspicion of illegal activity.”1 State v. Moseley, 2014-	3
NMCA-033, ¶ 9, 320 P.3d 517. Reasonable suspicion exists “if the officer is aware	4
of specific articulable facts, together with rational inferences from those facts, that,	5
when judged objectively, would lead a reasonable person to believe criminal activity	6
occurred or was occurring.” State v. Hubble, 2009-NMSC-014, ¶ 8, 146 N.M. 70,	7
206 P.3d 579 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).	8
{6} 	We divide our analysis into three parts. First, we explain why we decline to	9
affirm the suppression order under the right for any reason doctrine. Second, we	10
explain why we disagree with the district court’s conclusion that Officer Gordon	11
lacked reasonable suspicion because Section 66-3-707(A) does not apply to bicycles	12
ridden on sidewalks. Third, we explain why we disagree with the district court’s	13
legal conclusion that an officer can only develop reasonable suspicion of a violation	14
of the rear reflector requirement by observing the bicycle from directly behind it.	15
1Defendant mentions the search and seizure provision of our state constitution,
but he does not argue that it affords greater protection than its federal counterpart.
We therefore assume without deciding that both constitutions guarantee the same
protection in the context of investigatory detentions. See State v. Ochoa, 2004-
NMSC-023, ¶ 6, 135 N.M. 781, 93 P.3d 1286.

5
I. 	We Will Not Affirm the District Court’s Decision as Right for Any	1
Reason	2
{7} 	Defendant argues that we should affirm the district court as right for any	3
reason because: (1) there was an “insufficient factual basis to infer” that the cyclist	4
seen by Officer Gordon was Defendant; and (2) Officer Gordon improperly detained	5
Defendant 	for 	a 	penalty 	assessment 	misdemeanor, 	§ 66-3-701(A), 	under 	the	6
balancing test outlined in State v. Wright, 2022-NMSC-009, ¶ 27, 503 P.3d 1161.	7
We decline to apply the right for any reason doctrine because, as we will explain,	8
the doctrine does not apply to the fact-dependent arguments presented by Defendant	9
for the first time on appeal.	10
{8} 	The doctrine permits affirmance on a basis not relied upon by the district court	11
if the result reached by the district court “was right for any reason, as long as the	12
arguments in favor of affirmance are not fact based such that it would be unfair to	13
entertain them for the first time on appeal without notice to the appellant.” See State	14
v. Granville, 2006-NMCA-098, ¶ 12, 140 N.M. 345, 142 P.3d 933. “[I]t is improper	15
for an appellate court to apply the doctrine to unpreserved arguments where the party	16
opposing its application had no opportunity in the district court to respond to the	17
unasserted argument.” State v. Marquez, 2023-NMSC-029, ¶ 32, 539 P.3d 303	18
(internal quotation marks and citation omitted). As a consequence, “appellate courts	19
usually apply the [doctrine] to strictly legal questions.” Id. (alteration, quotation	20
marks, and citation omitted).	21

6
{9} 	These limitations on the applicability of the doctrine preclude us from	1
affirming based on either of Defendant’s arguments. See id. ¶¶ 32, 35. As to	2
Defendant’s first argument—that the evidence did not establish that Defendant was	3
the cyclist observed by Officer Gordon—Defendant acknowledges that “the parties	4
all appeared to take for granted that [Defendant] was the original cyclist.” Because	5
Defendant never argued in the district court that Officer Gordon lacked reasonable	6
suspicion to believe that Defendant was the person riding the bicycle, the State had	7
no notice of any need to present evidence on that topic. Cf. State v. Goss, 1991-	8
NMCA-003, ¶ 13, 111 N.M. 530, 807 P.2d 228 (“Generally, motions to suppress	9
must set out with particularity the grounds relied on for the relief sought.”); State v.	10
Ponce, 2004-NMCA-137, ¶ 7, 136 N.M. 614, 103 P.3d 54 (recognizing that if the	11
defendant carries the burden of “com[ing] forward with evidence to raise an issue as	12
to an illegal search and seizure,” then the state bears the burden of rebutting the	13
defendant’s prima facie case). It would therefore be unfair to the State for us to	14
affirm the suppression order on the basis that the State did not present evidence to	15
establish reasonable suspicion that Defendant was the cyclist, see Marquez, 2023-	16
NMSC-029, ¶¶ 32, 35, and we decline to do so.	17
{10} 	For similar reasons, we decline to affirm the suppression order based on	18
Defendant’s argument—made for the first time on appeal—that Officer Gordon ran	19
afoul of Wright by detaining Defendant to investigate a possible traffic offense after	20

7
losing sight of Defendant. Defendant appears to assume that Wright applies to	1
investigative detentions as well as arrests. We need not determine whether this	2
assumption is correct because even if Wright does apply here, the right for any reason	3
doctrine does not. Because the defense chose not to make any argument based on	4
Wright in the district court, the State lacked notice of the need to present evidence	5
pertinent to the fact-driven question about whether the intrusion on Defendant’s	6
privacy interest was outweighed by the State’s need to detain Defendant to promote	7
a legitimate government interest. See Wright, 2022-NMSC-009, ¶¶ 27-34. Affirming	8
based on Wright would be unfair to the State, and we will not do so.	9
II. 	Section 66-3-707(A) Applies to Bicycles Ridden on Sidewalks	10
{11} 	Whether Section 66-3-707(A) applies to bicycles ridden on sidewalks is a	11
question of statutory interpretation. In answering that question, our task is to identify	12
the intent of our Legislature, and we therefore begin with the plain meaning of the	13
words that our Legislature chose to include in the statute. See Ferlic v. Mesilla Valley	14
Reg’l Dispatch Auth., ___-NMSC-___, ¶ 10, ___ P.3d ___ (S-1-SC-40162, Apr. 21,	15
2025). If those words are “clear and unambiguous,” we honor their plain meaning.	16
Duhon, 2005-NMCA-120, ¶ 10. When interpreting the statutory text, we strive to	17
ensure that “no part of the statute is rendered surplusage or superfluous.” State v.	18
Adams, 2022-NMSC-008, ¶ 10, 503 P.3d 1130 (internal quotation marks and citation	19
omitted). And where, as here, the question involves multiple provisions of the same	20

8
statutory scheme, we consider the scheme holistically, “construing each section or	1
part in connection with every other part or section so as to produce a harmonious	2
whole.” State v. Baca, 2005-NMCA-001, ¶ 9, 136 N.M. 667, 104 P.3d 533 (text	3
only) (citation omitted).	4
{12} 	In this case, all of the relevant statutes are in the Code, and the key statute at	5
issue, Section 66-3-707(A), is among several in a part of the Code that is dedicated	6
to the regulation of bicycles. The first section in this part of the Code is critical here	7
because it includes a provision that explains how to determine whether each specific	8
regulation applies to a bicycle that is used in a particular area. The plain language of	9
that 	provision, 	Section 	66-3-701(C), 	describes 	a 	general 	rule 	with 	specific	10
exceptions: “The[] regulations applicable to bicycles apply whenever a bicycle is	11
operated upon any highway or upon any path set aside for the exclusive use of	12
bicycles subject to those exceptions stated in Sections 66-3-701 through 66-3-707.”	13
The subsequent sections of the bicycle statutes include various prohibitions and	14
requirements, including the headlight and reflector requirements in Section 66-3-	15
707(A):	16
Every bicycle when in use at nighttime shall be equipped with a lamp	17
on the front which shall emit a white light visible from a distance of at	18
least five hundred feet to the front and with a red reflector on the rear	19
of a type approved by the division which shall be visible from all	20
distances from fifty feet to three hundred feet to the rear when directly	21
in front of lawful upper beams of head lamps on a motor vehicle.	22

9
In order to determine whether these requirements apply to bicycles used on	1
sidewalks, we must first figure out whether the requirements are governed by the	2
general 	rule in 	Section 	66-3-701(C)—making 	the requirements 	applicable to	3
highways and paths set aside exclusively for bicycles—or instead are governed by	4
an exception to the general rule. The State argues that an exception applies.	5
Specifically, the State contends that the Legislature’s use of “[e]very bicycle” in	6
Section 66-3-707(A) tells us that the Legislature intended to require reflectors on	7
bicycles no matter where they are being used.	8
{13} 	We disagree. For reasons we will explain, we believe the State’s reading	9
would mute the general rule that our Legislature chose when it wrote Section 66-3-	10
701(C); the general rule would not apply to a single one of the regulations. The	11
State’s reading is contrary to relevant canons of statutory interpretation, which	12
require us to give the general rule in Section 66-3-701(C) and every other relevant	13
statutory provision a voice—silencing none of them—while avoiding discord among	14
those provisions. See Adams, 2022-NMSC-008, ¶ 10; Baca, 2005-NMCA-001, ¶ 9.	15
And we hear full harmony in just one interpretation: The general rule governs the	16
types of locations where a regulation applies, unless that regulation explicitly makes	17
an exception by identifying a location other than highways and paths dedicated	18
exclusively for bicycles. Stated differently, when a specific regulation says nothing	19

10
about the types of locations where it applies, then, under Section 66-3-701(C), the	1
regulation applies to highways and paths dedicated exclusively to bicycles.	2
{14} 	We are able to observe that this is how the statutory scheme works only by	3
stepping back and looking at all of the relevant bicycle statutes together. Baca, 2005-	4
NMCA-001, ¶ 9. This allows us to notice that each and every relevant statutory	5
section falls into one of two categories. In the first category are the statutes that say	6
nothing about where they apply. See §§ 66-3-703, -706, -707. In the second category	7
are the statutes that explicitly specify that they apply in places that differ from the	8
places listed in the general rule, see §§ 66-3-702, -704, -705, -709—that is, places	9
other than “any highway or upon any path set aside for the exclusive use of	10
bicycles.”2 Section 66-3-701(C). For example, Sections 66-3-702, 66-3-704, and 66-	11
3-705 specify that they apply when a bicycle is used on a “roadway,” which the Code	12
defines differently than “highway.” Compare § 66-1-4.8(B), with § 66-1-4.15(Q).	13
This categorization requires us to reject the State’s interpretation, under which	14
neither category of statutes would be governed by the general rule enacted by our	15
Legislature. The statutes in the first category would apply everywhere, and the	16
statutes in the second category would apply in the places specified in those statutes.	17
The general rule would govern nothing because every bicycle statute would create	18
2 The only other section in the bicycle statutes, Section 66-3-708, is not
relevant 	to 	the 	question 	before 	us 	because 	it 	pertains 	only 	to 	the 	labeling,
modification, and functioning of electric bicycles.

11
an exception to that rule. Because the general rule in Section 66-3-701(C) would be	1
superfluous under the State’s reading, we reject that reading as contrary to the intent	2
of our Legislature. We conclude instead that the general rule governs the statutes	3
that say nothing about the locations where they apply, and the statutes that	4
specifically state where they apply create the only exceptions to the general rule.	5
{15} 	This brings us to the statute at issue in Defendant’s case, which says nothing	6
about where it applies and is therefore governed by the general rule in Section	7
66-3-701(C). As a consequence, Section 66-3-707(A) requires a sufficient reflector	8
and a sufficient headlight for every bicycle that is used at nighttime on a highway or	9
on a path dedicated exclusively for bicycles. Because the Code makes clear that a	10
sidewalk is not a path dedicated exclusively for bicycles, see § 66-1-4.16(H), a	11
narrow question of statutory interpretation remains: Did our Legislature intend for	12
“highway” to include “sidewalk”? Yes is our answer based on the plain meaning of	13
the text of the relevant statutes—a meaning that is aligned with the safety purpose	14
of the headlight and reflector requirements.	15
{16} 	We start with the text, which includes definitions that reveal our Legislature’s	16
intent. See State v. Tsosie, 2011-NMCA-115, ¶ 19, 150 N.M. 754, 266 P.3d 34. The	17
Code defines “highway” and “street” interchangeably, in relevant part, as “every	18
way or place generally open to the use of the public as a matter of right for the	19
purpose of vehicular travel.” Section 66-1-4.8(B). This definition encompasses	20

12
“sidewalk,” which is defined as “a portion of street between the curb lines, or the	1
lateral lines of a roadway, and the adjacent property lines, intended for the use of	2
pedestrians.” Section 66-1-4.16(H). A straightforward reading of these definitions	3
leads us to conclude that highways and streets include sidewalks, and that the	4
headlight and reflector requirements apply to bicycles used on sidewalks at	5
nighttime.	6
{17} 	The district court reached the opposite conclusion, reasoning that “highway”	7
does not encompass “sidewalk” because the definition of “highway” includes the	8
phrase “for the purpose of vehicular travel,” § 66-1-4.8(B), and because “it is illegal	9
for vehicles to be operated upon a sidewalk.” We interpret the statutes differently.	10
We do not believe that our Legislature—having chosen to explicitly include	11
sidewalk in the definition of highway and street—simultaneously chose to implicitly	12
exclude sidewalk from that definition. Said another way, we cannot conclude that	13
our Legislature said one thing clearly but then suggested the opposite, all within its	14
own definitions of the statutory terms. To presume that our Legislature enacted	15
internally inconsistent definitions would bring unnecessary discord to a statutory	16
scheme—a scheme that is in harmony when we adhere to our Legislature’s choice	17
to define sidewalk as part of highway and street.	18
{18} 	Consistent with that choice, and contrary to the district court’s rationale, other	19
provisions of the Code indicate that our Legislature intended for vehicles and	20

13
pedestrians to share the use of highways, including sidewalks, and that it did not	1
intend to completely exclude vehicles from sidewalks. Although the definition of	2
sidewalk includes the phrase “intended for the use of pedestrians,” § 66-1-4.16(H),	3
and the definition of “highway” and “street” includes the phrase “for the purpose of	4
vehicular travel,” § 66-1-4.8(B), we do not read these phrases to reserve highways	5
for the exclusive use of vehicles or to categorically prohibit vehicles from using	6
sidewalks. Neither of the definitional phrases explicitly imposes these restrictions,	7
and we do not believe that our Legislature intended to imply any such restrictions	8
because the Code indicates that vehicles sometimes use sidewalks and that highways	9
and streets are not used only by vehicles. For example, the Code accounts for the	10
reality that vehicles drive on sidewalks to cross them, see § 66-7-346, and that	11
pedestrians cross streets and highways, see §§ 66-7-333, -334(A)-(B), -335. The	12
Code also recognizes that when no sidewalk is provided, pedestrians and vehicles	13
may both travel on the “roadway,” § 66-7-339(B), even though “roadway” is defined	14
as the “portion of a street or highway improved, designed or ordinarily used for	15
vehicular travel.” Section 66-1-4.15(Q). This confirms that a roadway, like a	16
sidewalk, is part of the highway or street, and that a roadway, like a sidewalk, may	17
lawfully be used by both vehicles and pedestrians, even though the roadway is	18
ordinarily used by vehicles. In short, we do not think the Code, considered as a	19
harmonious whole, can be reconciled with the district court’s conclusion that	20

14
highways are only used by vehicles, and that vehicles may not be used on sidewalks.3
1
Instead, the Code makes clear that vehicles and pedestrians share highways,	2
including sidewalks.	3
{19} 	This shared use of highways raises important questions: What was our	4
Legislature’s goal when it required cyclists to have a headlight and a rear reflector	5
at night? And does applying those requirements to sidewalks achieve that goal?	6
Although answering these questions is not strictly necessary because we see clarity	7
in the statutory text, we answer them anyhow because we believe it is prudent to	8
ensure that our understanding of the text is consistent with the purpose of the statute.	9
See State v. Vest, 2021-NMSC-020, ¶ 20, 488 P.3d 626. When our Legislature	10
enacted the Code, it intended “to prioritize safety,” State v. Farish, 2021-NMSC-	11
030, ¶ 17, 499 P.3d 622, and safety is the obvious purpose of Section 66-3-707(A).	12
Common sense tells us that the whole point of requiring night riders to have a	13
reflector in back and a light in front is to reduce the likelihood of accidents by	14
increasing the likelihood that cyclists will be seen by and see others who are using	15
3The district court relied on two legal authorities that do not support its ruling,
in our view. The first, a provision of the Farmington Municipal Code, does not
provide any information about the intent of the New Mexico Legislature when it
enacted the Motor Vehicle Code. Although the second—Section 66-7-351(A)(1)—
is part of the Code, it does not suggest that motor vehicles are categorically barred
from using sidewalks. Instead, this provision permits vehicles to stop, stand, and
park on sidewalks under certain circumstances; this is consistent with other Code
provisions cited in the text of this opinion, which recognize that vehicles may
sometimes be used lawfully on sidewalks.

15
the highway. This purpose is served by adhering to the plain meaning of the	1
definitions, which tell us that reflectors and headlights are required when bicycles	2
are used on sidewalks at night. Safety is increased if cyclists are able to see and be	3
seen by other people who are using the sidewalk, including other cyclists and	4
pedestrians as well as drivers of motor vehicles who are crossing the sidewalk in	5
order to exit or enter the roadway. Safety is also increased in situations where cyclists	6
leave the sidewalk and enter the roadway. For example, at an intersection, a cyclist	7
riding on a sidewalk might need to cross the roadway. In such instances, a reflector	8
and a headlight increase safety for the cyclist, and for people traveling through the	9
intersection in motor vehicles and other vehicles, as well as people on foot. For these	10
reasons, we believe that our Legislature’s purpose is achieved by honoring the plain	11
meaning of the text of the relevant statutes and concluding that the rear reflector and	12
headlight requirements apply to every bicycle that is used on a sidewalk at night.	13
{20} 	We therefore hold that the sidewalk, where Officer Gordon believed he	14
observed Defendant riding a bicycle at night, is part of the highway and that Section	15
66-3-707(A), including its rear reflector requirement, therefore applies. This holding	16
requires us to proceed further and consider the district court’s alternative rationale.	17

16
III. 	Reasonable Suspicion to Investigate a Possible Rear Reflector Violation	1
{21} 	The district court concluded that the State could not establish reasonable	2
suspicion because “Officer Gordon was never directly behind” Defendant and	3
therefore could not “determine whether . . . Defendant was in violation of the	4
statute.” The State argues that an officer does not necessarily need to be directly	5
behind a bicycle in order to develop reasonable suspicion. We agree. In our view,	6
the district court applied the language of Section 66-3-707(A) too rigidly in ruling	7
on the motion to suppress, in which the question was whether Officer Gordon had	8
reasonable suspicion to detain Defendant to investigate a possible violation of the	9
statute.	10
{22} 	The district court relied on the statute’s requirement that bicycles ridden at	11
night must have “a red reflector on the rear of a type approved by the division which	12
shall be visible from all distances from fifty feet to three hundred feet to the rear	13
when directly in front of lawful upper beams of head lamps on a motor vehicle.”	14
Section 66-3-707(A) (emphasis added). A person may violate the statute by not	15
having a reflector at all or by having a reflector that does not meet the color and	16
reflectivity requirements set by our Legislature. With this in mind, the question for	17
the district court should have been whether all of the observations made by Officer	18
Gordon before the detention of Defendant began gave him a reasonable suspicion	19
that Defendant either had no reflector or had an insufficient reflector—that is, a	20

17
justification to detain Defendant “to investigate possible criminal activity.” See State	1
v. Jason L., 2000-NMSC-018, ¶ 20, 129 N.M. 119, 2 P.3d 856 (emphasis added)	2
(internal quotation marks and citation omitted).	3
{23} 	To justify an investigatory stop, the State was not required to prove a violation	4
of the statute beyond a reasonable doubt or by a preponderance of the evidence, see	5
Alabama v. White, 496 U.S. 325, 329-30 (1990), and the State was not even required	6
to establish probable cause that the statute was violated, see State v. Yazzie, 2016-	7
NMSC-026, ¶ 18, 376 P.3d 858. Indeed, “[r]easonable suspicion is a less demanding	8
standard than probable cause not only in the sense that reasonable suspicion can be	9
established with information that is different in quantity or content than that required	10
to establish probable cause, but also in the sense that reasonable suspicion can arise	11
from information that is less reliable than that required to show probable cause.”	12
White, 496 U.S. at 330. Importantly, reasonable suspicion may exist even if	13
“ambiguous circumstances could reasonably be construed as involving either lawful	14
or unlawful activity,” which means that the law did not require Officer Gordon’s	15
observations to “rule out the possibility of innocent conduct.” See Yazzie, 2016-	16
NMSC-026, ¶ 22 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).	17
{24} 	We do not believe that these Fourth Amendment principles can be reconciled	18
with the rigid manner in which the district court applied the statute’s reflectivity	19
requirement in the context of Defendant’s suppression motion. It is, of course, true	20

18
that if Defendant were on trial for violating the statute, and if the evidence were that	1
his bike had a red reflector, the State would have been required to prove that the	2
reflector was not reflective enough to meet the specific statutory requirements—that	3
is, it was not visible from distances of between 50 and 300 feet “when directly in	4
front of lawful upper beams of head lamps on a motor vehicle.” Section 66-3-707(A).	5
But less was required of the State here because this was a suppression hearing during	6
which the issue was whether Defendant’s detention was warranted for the purpose	7
of investigating the possibility that Defendant was riding without a reflector or with	8
a reflector that was not reflective enough. See Jason L., 2000-NMSC-018, ¶ 20.	9
Specifically, the State was required to prove that, at the time Defendant’s detention	10
began, a person of reasonable caution would believe that the bicycle either had no	11
reflector at all or had a reflector that was inadequate, considering objectively all of	12
the observations made by Officer Gordon—from whatever vantage points he had	13
and with the light available from his headlights and any other available sources—	14
together with rational inferences supported by those observations.4 See Hubble,	15
2009-NMSC-014, ¶ 8. This requires the State to establish a “particularized” and	16
4The lawfulness of an investigatory detention hinges on whether reasonable
suspicion existed at the time the detention began. See State v. Harbison, 2007-
NMSC-016, ¶ 10, 141 N.M. 392, 156 P.3d 30. However, it is unclear from the record
when the district court believed that the detention of Defendant began or whether
the district court believed that any of the observations made by Officer Gordon after
he located a bicycle sitting outside of the hotel room—including that it had no rear
reflector at all—were pertinent and, if they were, whether they were credible.

19
“articulable suspicion” that Defendant violated the law; “[u]nsupported intuition and	1
inarticulate hunches” fall short. See Jason L., 2000-NMSC-018, ¶ 20 (internal	2
quotation marks and citation omitted). But neither the Fourth Amendment nor the	3
statute require that the content and reliability of the observations rule out the	4
innocent activity of riding with an adequate reflector. See White, 496 U.S. at 330;	5
Yazzie, 2016-NMSC-026, ¶ 22. In other words, the observations made by Officer	6
Gordon do not necessarily fall short if ambiguity remains about whether the bicycle	7
had a reflector at all or whether any reflector that it might have had was sufficiently	8
reflective. See Yazzie, 2016-NMSC-026, ¶ 22. This means that the State was not	9
required to show that, before Officer Gordon initiated the investigatory stop, he was	10
driving directly behind the bicycle and therefore able to observe that the statute was,	11
in fact, being violated.	12
{25} 	For these reasons, we hold that the alternative rationale offered by the district	13
court does not support its suppression ruling.5 To be clear, this holding and our	14
holding regarding the interpretation of the statute address only the rationales for	15
suppression included in the district court’s order. Whether Officer Gordon had	16
reasonable suspicion when the investigative detention of Defendant began is a	17
5Our holding regarding the legal component of the district court’s rationale
makes it unnecessary for us to address the State’s argument that substantial evidence
does not support the district court’s factual finding that Officer Gordon was never
directly behind the bicycle.

20
determination that we have not made and cannot make because it involves factual	1
questions answerable only by the district court. See State v. Urioste, 2002-NMSC-	2
023, ¶ 6, 132 N.M. 592, 52 P.3d 964 (recognizing that appellate courts do not resolve	3
factual questions).	4
CONCLUSION	5
{26} 	We reverse and remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.	6
{27} 	IT IS SO ORDERED.	7
____________________________	8
ZACHARY A. IVES, Judge	9
WE CONCUR:	10
___________________________________	11
SHAMMARA H. HENDERSON, Judge	12
___________________________________	13
JANE B. YOHALEM, Judge	14