July 26, 2012 – State of New Mexico v. Daniel Almanzar, No. 30,600

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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF NEW MEXICO
Opinion Number:

Filing Date: July 26, 2012

NO. 30,600

STATE OF NEW MEXICO,
Plaintiff-A ppellee,

V.

DANIEL ALMANZAR,
Defendant- Appellant.

APPEAL FROM THE DISTRICT COURT OF BERNALILLO COUNTY
Neil C. Candelaria, District Judge

Gary K. King, Attomey General
Nicole Beder, Assistant Attomey General
Santa Fe, NM

for Appellee

Jacqueline L. Cooper, Chief Public Defender
Nina Lalevic, Assistant Appellate Defender
Santa Fe, NM

for Appellant

OPINION
GARCIA, Judge.
{1} 	Defendant appeals the district court’s denial of his motion to suppress evidence
removed from his pocket during a pat-down search. The district court found that the
evidence was discovered in a legal pat-down search and that in any event, it would
have been inevitably discovered in a search incident to arrest for the misdemeanor
domestic battery charge. We conclude that the removal of evidence from Defendant’s
pocket exceeded the scope of a legal pat-down search for weapons. In addition, the
officers were not statutorily authorized to arrest Defendant for misdemeanor domestic
battery without a warrant because the arrest was not at the scene of the domestic
disturbance. We therefore reverse and remand.
BACKGROUND
{2} 	We set forth the underlying events in the light most favorable to the ruling
rendered below. 	See State v. Cline, 1998-NMCA-154, ¶ 6, 126 N.M. 77, 966 P.2d
785. On December 1, 2007, Officers Fuller and Crafton of the Albuquerque Police
Department were dispatched to Central and San Pedro in Albuquerque to respond to
a call regarding a domestic violence incident between Defendant and his live-in
girlfriend (Victim) in the parking lot at Tingley Coliseum. At the time the officers
were dispatched to investigate, Victim and Defendant had both left the Tingley

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Coliseum parking lot and gone to two separate locations. 	Officer Fuller located
Victim outside a Walgreens store. 	Officer Crafton and Officer Cortesi located
Defendant at a nearby Circle K convenience store. The officers located both Victim
and Defendant within seven minutes after receiving the dispatch.
{3} 	When Officer Fuller approached Victim, she was crying and holding her lower
abdomen on the left side. She said Defendant had kicked her at the Tingley Coliseum
parking lot, and she had walked to Walgreens to call the police. Victim knew that
Defendant had also walked away from the parking lot, but she did not believe that
Defendant followed her from the parking lot. 	Victim did not feel threatened by
Defendant after they separated.
{4} 	When Officer Crafton and Officer Cortesi approached Defendant at the Circle
K, Defendant put his hands in his front pockets and refused to remove them. At that
time, neither officer had any reason to believe Defendant was armed. 	However,
because Defendant was a suspect in a domestic violence incident, the officers escorted
him outside, handcuffed him, and conducted a pat-down search for weapons.
Defendant was cooperative and non-threatening during the pat-down search. Officer
Crafton did not locate any weapons during the pat-down search, but he did feel and
remove a hard “golf ball-size thing” from the right pocket of Defendant’s pants.
Officer Crafton did not believe that the object in Defendant’s pocket felt like a knife
or a firearm. 	Nonetheless, Officer Crafton chose to remove the object from

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Defendant’s pants because he did not know what it was. The object appeared to be
powdered cocaine.
{5} 	Defendant was handcuffed and placed under arrest for possession of a
controlled substance with intent to distribute. 	See NMSA 1978, § 30-31-20(A)(3)
(2006). Officer Crafton chose to book Defendant only for the felony of possession of
the cocaine and not the misdemeanor domestic battery because it was a more serious
charge. 	Had he not conducted the original pat-down search of Defendant, Officer
Crafton testified that he would have arrested Defendant on the domestic battery charge
and then conducted a search incident to that arrest.
{6} 	Defendant moved to suppress the cocaine found in his pocket on the grounds
that the search violated the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution and
Article II, Section 10 of the New Mexico Constitution. 	At the hearing, Defendant
argued that Officer Crafton did not have grounds to conduct a protective pat-down for
weapons and that he exceeded the scope of any protective pat-down by removing an
object that was clearly not a weapon. Defendant also asserted that the officers did not
have grounds to conduct a search incident to a warrantless arrest because Defendant
was not “at the scene” (the Tingley Coliseum parking lot) of the domestic disturbance
when he was arrested. He points out that the exception to the warrant requirement set
forth in NMSA 1978, Section 31-1-7(A) (1995) only permits a warrantless arrest
when the officer is located “at the scene” of the domestic disturbance.

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{7} 	The district court did not enter any written findings of fact or conclusions of
law. 	Instead the court simply denied Defendant’s motion to suppress. 	At the
suppression hearing, the court orally concluded that the officers were justified in
conducting a pat-down search and removing the cocaine from Defendant’s pocket.
The court said that the conduct was justified because the officers were investigating
a claim of domestic violence and because Defendant’s refusal to remove his hands
from his pockets was “curious.” The district court further concluded that the officers
conducted a de facto arrest for domestic violence when they placed Defendant in
handcuffs outside the Circle K convenience store, and that the officers were statutorily
authorized to arrest Defendant at that time. In doing so, the district court chose to
broadly interpret the “at the scene” language in Section 31-1-7(A) to include the
general vicinity or area where the incident occurred. Defendant entered a conditional
plea to trafficking cocaine (possession with intent to distribute) reserving his right to
appeal the denial of his motion to suppress.
DISCUSSION
A. 	Standard of Review
{8} 	We review the denial of a motion to suppress as a mixed question of fact and
law. 	State v. Williams, 2011-NMSC-026, ¶ 8, 149 N.M. 729, 255 P.3d 307. 	The

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appellate courts “review the factual basis of the court’s ruling for substantial evidence,
deferring to the district court’s view of the evidence.” Id. However, our review of the
district court’s legal conclusions is de novo. Id.
B. 	The Warrantless Search of Defendant
{9} 	On appeal, Defendant argues that the district court erred in denying his motion
to suppress because neither the pat-down search nor the inevitable discovery doctrine
exceptions to the warrant requirement justified the warrantless search of his person.
The Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution and Article II, Section 10
of the New Mexico Constitution protect the right of the people to be free from
unreasonable searches and seizures. State v. Leyva, 2011-NMSC-009, ¶ 1, 149 N.M.
435, 250 P.3d 861. In the absence of an exception to the warrant requirement, we
presume that warrantless searches are per se unreasonable. 	State v. Weidner,
2007-NMCA-063, ¶ 6, 141 N.M. 582, 158 P.3d 1025. The burden is on the State to
prove that a warrantless search was reasonable because it was justified by an
exception to the warrant requirement. Id.
1. 	The Pat-Down Search
{10} 	We first address Defendant’s argument that the district court erred in denying
his motion to suppress based on the pat-down exception to the warrant requirement.
Defendant asserts that, in this case, conducting a pat-down search was unreasonable
because the officers had no reason to believe that their safety was in danger.

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Defendant further argues that, even if the pat-down search was reasonable, it was
unreasonable for Officer Crafton to believe that the round object in Defendant’s
pocket was a weapon, and its subsequent removal exceeded the scope of a legal pat-
down.
{11} 	The pat-down exception to the warrant requirement allows an officer to pat-
down or frisk a suspect for the limited purpose of locating weapons. 	State v.
Vandenberg, 2003-NMSC-030, ¶¶ 22-23, 134 N.M. 566, 81 P.3d 19. A pat-down is
conducted solely as a safety precaution, and an officer may only pat-down a suspect
when the officer has a particularized and objective basis to believe the suspect is both
armed and presently dangerous. 	See id. 	A protective search is limited to what is
necessary to discover weapons that may be used to harm the officer or others nearby,
and an officer may “remove a hard object if by touch the officer remains uncertain as
to whether the object might be a weapon.” State v. Barragan, 2001-NMCA-086, ¶ 14,
131 N.M. 281, 34 P.3d 1157, overruled on other grounds by State v. Tollardo, 2012-
NMSC-008, ¶ 37 n.6, ___ N.M. ___, 275 P.3d 110.
{12} 	We consider a particular officer’s conduct in conducting a limited pat-down for
weapons 	as 	reasonable 	when, 	under 	the 	same 	circumstances, 	“a 	reasonable,
well-trained officer” would have conducted a pat-down search. 	Vandenberg,
2003-NMSC-030, ¶ 23 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). “If reasonable
people might differ, we defer to the officer’s good judgment.” Id. (alteration, internal

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quotation marks, and citation omitted). 	In this case, we defer to Officer Crafton’s
judgment to conduct a pat-down search.
{13} 	Defendant was generally cooperative and Officer Crafton had no specific
information that Defendant was armed or dangerous. 	Officer Crafton reasonably
suspected that Defendant was the primary aggressor in a domestic violence incident,
and Defendant’s behavior in hiding his hands in his pockets was suspicious. Thus, it
was reasonable for Officer Crafton to be concerned that Defendant might be armed or
dangerous and to conduct a protective pat-down for weapons. Cf. Barragan, 2001-
NMCA-086, ¶ 13 (holding that an officer who was investigating a reported burglary
was justified in handcuffing the defendant while conducting a protective search to
determine whether the defendant was in fact armed); State v. Chapman, 1999-NMCA-
106, ¶ 18, 127 N.M. 721, 986 P.2d 1122 (concluding that an officer was justified in
conducting a pat-down for weapons during a routine traffic stop when a suspect’s
behavior was erratic, nervous, and hostile); State v. Flores, 1996-NMCA-059, ¶ 17,
122 N.M. 84, 920 P.2d 1038 (noting that the nature of a crime may justify a pat-down
search even where the tip provided to officers does not mention weapons). Having
concluded that Officer Crafton was justified in conducting the protective pat-down
search, we consider whether retrieving the concealed round object from Defendant’s
pocket exceeded the proper scope of a pat-down search for weapons.
{14} 	A pat-down search must be “limited to that which is necessary for the discovery

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of weapons which might be used to harm the officer or others nearby.” State v. Paul
T., 1999-NMSC-037, ¶ 17, 128 N.M. 360, 993 P.2d 74 (internal quotation marks and
citation omitted); see also Leyva, 2011-NMSC-009, ¶ 25 (reiterating that “[a]
protective search is not a search for evidence [and it] must be limited to its purpose
of protecting the officers, and the public, during the stop” (citation omitted)). After
conducting a pat-down search, an officer may remove an object from a suspect’s
pocket only when the officer remains uncertain as to whether an object is a weapon
and the object’s size and density suggest that it might be a weapon. 	See Paul T.,
1999-NMSC-037, ¶ 18.
{15} 	In the present case, nothing in the record suggests that Officer Crafton
suspected that the object in Defendant’s pocket might be a weapon or that it was
reasonable for Officer Crafton to remove the object from Defendant’s pocket. Officer
Crafton specifically testified that although he did not know what the golf-ball size
object in Defendant’s pocket was, it did not feel like a weapon. Moreover, the State’s
answer brief does not provide any argument or authority to persuade this Court that
Officer Crafton’s conduct in removing the object was reasonable.
{16} 	We conclude that the State failed to establish that the golf-ball sized object
located in Defendant’s pocket was of such a size and density to reasonably be
considered a weapon. As a result, Officer Crafton did not have a reasonable basis for
the intrusion into Defendant’s privacy and removal of the round object from

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Defendant’s pocket. See id. ¶ 19. Officer Crafton’s conduct exceeded the scope of
a protective pat-down for weapons, and the district court erred in concluding that the
evidence was admissible based on the pat-down exception to the warrant requirement.
2. 	The Inevitable Discovery Doctrine
{17} 	We now address whether the district court properly denied Defendant’s motion
to suppress based upon an application of the inevitable discovery doctrine. Section
31-1-7(A) authorizes a warrantless arrest for domestic battery only “when the officer
is at the scene of a domestic disturbance and has probable cause to believe that the
person has committed an assault or a battery upon a household member.” Defendant
argues that his arrest was not “at the scene of a domestic disturbance” because the
altercation between Defendant and Victim occurred at the Tingley Coliseum parking
lot, and the officers did not come into contact with Defendant until after Defendant
and Victim had separated from one another and walked to different business locations
away from the Tingley Coliseum parking lot. Thus, we must determine whether the
district court’s broad interpretation of the “at the scene of a domestic disturbance”
language in Section 31-1-7(A) was error. 	This issue appears to be one of first
impression.
{18} 	The question of whether Defendant was arrested “at the scene” pursuant to
Section 31-1-7(A) is an issue of statutory construction that we review de novo. See
State v. Saiz, 2001-NMCA-035, ¶ 2, 130 N.M. 333, 24 P.3d 365. When interpreting

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statutory language, “our primary goal is to give effect to the intent of the
[L]egislature,” and in so doing, “we look first to the plain language of the statute.”
Id. We will give “effect to the plain meaning of the words of [a] statute, unless this
leads to an absurd or unreasonable result.” State v. Marshall, 2004-NMCA-104, ¶ 7,
136 N.M. 240, 96 P.3d 801. 	Finally, if more than one section of the statute is
involved, we will read all pertinent sections together so that all are given effect. See
Saiz, 2001-NMCA-035, ¶ 2.
{19} 	Section 31-1-7(A) in its totality states:
Notwithstanding the provisions of any other law to the contrary, a peace
officer may arrest a person and take that person into custody without a
warrant when the officer is at the scene of a domestic disturbance and
has probable cause to believe that the person has committed an assault
or a battery upon a household member. 	As used in this section,
“household member” means a spouse, former spouse, family member,
including a relative, parent, present or former step-parent, present or
former in-law, child or co-parent of a child, or a person with whom the
victim has had a continuing personal relationship. Cohabitation is not
necessary to be deemed a household member for purposes of this section.
{20} 	The State asserts that the plain language of the statute and the “broad range of
remedies for domestic violence” support the district court’s broad interpretation of
Section 31-1-7(A) and do not suggest a narrow construction. 	It argues that the
Legislature enacted Section 31-1-7(A) for the purpose of expanding police authority
to make warrantless arrests for misdemeanor domestic battery where probable cause
has been established. The State relies on NMSA 1978, Section 66-8-125 (1978) to

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provide support for its argument. The State’s reliance on this motor vehicle statute
to support its argument is misplaced.
{21} 	Section 66-8-125(A)(1) authorizes law enforcement to “arrest without [a]
warrant any person . . . present at the scene of a motor vehicle accident.” Notably
missing from this statutory language is any requirement that the arrest by made when
the officer is at the scene of the accident. It is the required presence of the arresting
officer to be at the scene of a domestic violence disturbance that distinguishes the
statutory requirements under Section 31-1-7(A) from the more flexible language in
Section 66-8-125. As a result, once reasonable grounds have been established under
Section 66-8-125(B), an officer may proceed with reasonable promptness to arrest a
person who had been present at the scene of the accident, but who left the scene before
the arrest is made. 	State v. Calanche, 91 N.M. 390, 393, 574 P.2d 1018, 1021 (Ct.
App. 1978). 	The broader discretion allowed under Section 66-8-125 was also
recognized by the Supreme Court when it validated the arrest of a person made at a
house “near the scene of the accident” once the officer also established reasonable
grounds that a crime had been committed. 	City of Las Cruces v. Sanchez,
2009-NMSC-026, ¶¶ 10, 18, 146 N.M. 315, 210 P.3d 212 (noting that the individual
had fled the scene of the accident before the officers arrived). Calanche and Sanchez
confirm that Section 66-8-125 authorizes an officer who is not present at the scene of
an accident to make an arrest at a location that is away from the scene of the accident

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if all the other statutory requirements have been met.
{22} 	Section 31-1-7(A) is more narrowly drafted than its motor vehicle counterpart.
This statute only allows a warrantless arrest to take place “when the officer is at the
scene of the domestic disturbance.” This express limitation prohibits the arresting
officer’s ability to effectuate a warrantless arrest at locations away from the scene of
a domestic disturbance. We therefore conclude that the unambiguous language set
forth in Section 31-1-7(A) does not authorize an officer to make a warrantless arrest
of a suspect at another location away from the scene of a domestic disturbance.
{23} 	The policy reasons behind the broader language in the motor vehicle statute also
compels us to conclude that Defendant’s arrest was improper even though it occurred
with reasonable promptness and only a few blocks away from the location of the
domestic disturbance. 	As discussed in Sanchez, officers must be able to promptly
locate and investigate a DWI suspect because the evidence of intoxication fades over
time. 2009-NMSC-026, ¶ 15. In addition, it is also important to minimize the danger
that a drunk driver poses to the members of the public at large. See City of Santa Fe
v. Martinez, 2010-NMSC-033, ¶ 16, 148 N.M. 708, 242 P.3d 275 (addressing the
immediate and continuing danger that a drunk driver poses to the public); State v.
Contreras, 2003-NMCA-129, ¶¶ 2, 14-15, 21, 134 N.M. 503, 79 P.3d 1111
(recognizing that the exigency of the threat to public safety posed by a drunk driver
will justify an investigatory stop based upon an anonymous 911 tip from a concerned

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motorist who witnessed erratic driving).
{24} 	The State has not provided any authority recognizing policy concerns about the
dissipation of evidence outside the DWI context. 	The record in this case does not
contain any evidence that justifies an interpretation of Section 31-1-7(A) that would
support a Legislative intent to preserve dissipating evidence in order to allow
warrantless arrests of suspects at a location away from the scene of a domestic
disturbance. While a person suspected of committing a misdemeanor domestic battery
may pose a threat to the victim or others nearby, the Legislature did not express any
intent to expand an officer’s arresting authority based upon that consideration. In fact,
the Legislature specifically granted the officer statutory authority to undertake
alternative measures in order to protect the victim. NMSA 1978, § 31-1-7(C) (1995)
(authorizing officers to protect victims by assisting them with obtaining medical
attention and finding shelter). 	It follows that the imminent threat that typically
persists in a domestic violence situation would be the threat to the safety to the victim
or other related family members and acquaintances. 	Thus, the statute attempts to
address these victim safety concerns. As a result, once the incident has concluded and
the suspect leaves the scene of a domestic disturbance, care for the victim has been
identified by the Legislature as a policy consideration rather than any need to
effectuate a warrantless arrest of the suspect at another location.
{25} 	In summary, the dangers posed to the public by DWI are specific to that crime

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and its severity, and the evidence in a DWI investigation, following a motor vehicle
accident, is uniquely time sensitive because a suspect may avoid prosecution by
avoiding arrest for a period of time. See Martinez, 2010-NMSC-033, ¶ 13; Sanchez,
2009-NMSC-026, ¶ 15.
These policy concerns are less imminent in a domestic violence investigation when
the aggressor has left the scene. To accept the State’s argument that a warrentless
arrest in the general vicinity of the previous domestic battery is “near enough” even
though both parties have left the place where the battery occurred effectively renders
the “at the scene” language of Section 31-1-7(A) unnecessary. Cf. State v. Javier M.,
2001-NMSC-030, ¶ 32, 131 N.M. 1, 33 P.3d 1 (rejecting the state’s interpretation of
one portion of a statute when to do so would render another part redundant or
unnecessary, which is inconsistent with the rules of statutory interpretation that no
portion of a statute be rendered superfluous); State v. Johnson, 1998-NMCA-019,
¶ 22, 124 N.M. 647, 954 P.2d 79 (recognizing that this Court rejects interpretations
of statutes that render parts of them meaningless or mere surplusage). As a result, we
decline to interpret the language of Section 31-1-7(A) as broadly as Section 66-8-125
has been interpreted. We hold that an officer may not arrest a suspect for domestic
battery under Section 31-1-7(A) without a warrant unless the officer is conducting the
arrest at the scene where the domestic disturbance occurred. See Webster’s Third New
International Dictionary 2028 (unabridged ed. 2002) (defining the word “scene,” in

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the contest of this case, as “the place of occurrence or action”).
{26} 	In this case, Victim and Defendant had separated and were located in two
different public places away from the scene of the domestic battery when they
encountered the officers. Victim specifically told the officers that she no longer felt
threatened by Defendant and no further incidents occurred. Because the officers here
encountered and arrested Defendant at a location other than the Tingley Coliseum
parking lot, Section 31-1-7(A) did not provide authority for the officers to arrest
Defendant for misdemeanor domestic battery without a warrant. See State v. Romero,
2001-NMCA-046, ¶ 13, 130 N.M. 579, 28 P.3d 1120 (concluding that Section 31-1-
7(A) did authorize a warrantless arrest where each of three deputies observed signs
of domestic violence at the location of the arrest). Thus, the district court erred in
concluding that the evidence would have been inevitably discovered during a search
incident to a legal arrest for misdemeanor domestic battery because such an arrest
could only have been effectuated at the scene where the domestic battery occurred.
See § 31-1-7(A).
CONCLUSION
{27} 	For the foregoing reasons, we reverse the district court’s order denying
Defendant’s motion to suppress.
{28} 	IT IS SO ORDERED.

WE CONCUR:

TIMOTHY L. GARCIA, Judge

JONATHANB. SUTIN, Judge

MICHAEL E. VIGIL, Judge

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