June 29, 2026- State of New Mexico v. Raymond R. Pacheco, No. A-1-CA-41693

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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF NEW MEXICO	1
Opinion Number: __________	2
Filing Date: June 29, 2026	3
No. A-1-CA-41693	4
STATE OF NEW MEXICO,	5
Plaintiff-Appellee,	6
v.	7
RAYMOND R. PACHECO,	8
Defendant-Appellant.	9
APPEAL FROM THE DISTRICT COURT OF DOÑA ANA COUNTY	10
Douglas R. Driggers, District Court Judge	11
Raúl Torrez, Attorney General	12
Peadar Séamas Ó Conchobhair, Assistant Solicitor General	13
Santa Fe, NM	14
for Appellee	15
Bennett J. Baur, Chief Public Defender	16
Caitlin C.M. Smith, Assistant Appellate Defender	17
Santa Fe, NM	18
for Appellant	19
Court of Appeals of New Mexico
Filed 6/29/2026 9:11 AM

OPINION	1
BACA, Judge.	2
{1} 	The primary question presented by this case is one of statutory interpretation	3
examining whether emailing oneself child sexual abuse material (“CSAM”) 1
4
constitutes 	“copying 	by 	any 	means” 	for 	purposes 	of 	New 	Mexico’s 	Sexual	5
Exploitation of Children Act (the Act), NMSA 1978, §§ 30-6A-1 to -4 (1984, as	6
amended through 2016). Following a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of eleven	7
counts of manufacturing a visual or print medium, contrary to Section 30-6A-3(E).	8
Defendant appealed. On appeal, Defendant argues that: (1) emailing oneself CSAM	9
does not qualify as manufacturing for purposes of the Act; (2) the State improperly	10
introduced hearsay evidence linking an IP address to Defendant’s physical address;	11
and (3) Defendant was sentenced to an illegal term of parole. For the reasons	12
discussed below, we conclude that by emailing himself CSAM, Defendant copied—	13
and thereby manufactured—obscene visual or print medium depicting a prohibited	14
1The author elects to use the term “CSAM” rather than “child pornography”
to keep with the current practice among professional organizations that recognize
the term CSAM “better reflects the abuse that is depicted in the images and videos
and the resulting trauma to the child.” U.S. Dep’t of Just. 1, Child Sexual Abuse Material,
(June 2023), https://www.justice.gov/d9/2023-06/child_sexual_abuse_material_2.pdf; see Moretti
v. Thorsdottir, 157 F.4th 352, 365 (4th Cir. 2025) (Thacker, J. and Berner, J.,
concurring) (“I would follow the lead of child advocates around the globe and
acknowledge the alleged crime here for what it is—the sexual abuse of a child.
Toward that end, I would use the preferred terminology “child sexual abuse
material.”).

2
sexual act.2 We further conclude that even if the evidence at issue was erroneously	1
admitted, such error was harmless; and that Defendant was erroneously sentenced.	2
Accordingly, we affirm Defendant’s convictions and remand to the district court for	3
correction of Defendant’s judgment and sentence.	4
BACKGROUND	5
{2} 	This case began when law enforcement received a cyber tip from the National	6
Center 	for 	Missing 	and 	Exploited 	Children 	(NCMEC), 	which 	contained 	an	7
allegation from an email service provider that an email account with a particular	8
username “kingworld_15@yahoo.com” was “believed to be in possession and also	9
emailing suspected [CSAM].” The cyber tip contained several of the images at issue	10
and the internet protocol (IP) address associated with the email account. Through	11
“open-source information,” NCMEC determined that the IP address was assigned to	12
an access point in Las Cruces, New Mexico, and referred the cyber tip to New	13
Mexico law enforcement.	14
{3} 	After reviewing the cyber tip, law enforcement served a search warrant upon	15
the email service provider and received all emails associated with the username	16
“kingworld_15@yahoo.com.” A return of the search warrant revealed that the	17
2 Because the central and primary issue before us in this appeal concerned
whether emailing oneself CSAM constitutes manufacturing under the Act—and
because we conclude that it does—we need not and do not consider whether
downloading or acquiring the initial electronic CSAM from the internet constitutes
manufacturing under the Act.

3
account had been accessed 513 times in a seven-month period. Law enforcement	1
reviewed the emails associated with the username and identified twelve emails	2
containing CSAM. Each of the emails had been sent to and received by the same	3
account; i.e., the sender of the email emailed the CSAM to themselves.	4
{4} 	Law enforcement served a search warrant to the internet service provider that	5
issued the IP address. The return of the search warrant enabled law enforcement to	6
identify the physical address to which the IP address was assigned. After learning	7
the physical address, law enforcement obtained and executed a search warrant at the	8
residence to which the IP address was assigned. Defendant lived alone at the	9
residence but told law enforcement that his girlfriend and his daughter had moved	10
out of the residence approximately two weeks before.	11
{5} 	While executing the warrant, law enforcement seized an HTC cell phone they	12
found in a closet of the residence. This phone was subsequently forensically	13
examined. While examining the cell phone, law enforcement discovered that the	14
email 	address 	previously 	identified 	as 	containing 	CSAM,	15
“kingworld_15@yahoo.com,” was stored as an auto-login credential for several	16
applications on the device. Defendant was subsequently indicted for twelve counts	17
of manufacturing an obscene visual or print medium, contrary to Section 30-6A-	18
3(E). The State dismissed Count 12 of the indictment and prosecuted the remaining	19
counts at a jury trial.	20

4
{6} 	While discussing the elements for manufacturing during closing arguments,	1
the State told the jury that Defendant copied the CSAM when he emailed each image	2
to himself. The jury convicted Defendant of eleven counts of manufacturing.	3
Defendant appeals.	4
DISCUSSION	5
I. 	The Manufacturing Convictions	6
{7} 	Although Defendant frames his argument as a challenge to the sufficiency of	7
the evidence, “his argument fundamentally challenges whether the evidence in this	8
case constitutes the charged offense.” See State v. Quintin C., 2019-NMCA-069, ¶ 6,	9
451 P.3d 901. Defendant does not argue that the State failed to establish that he	10
emailed himself CSAM, rather, he argues that emailing oneself a digital image does	11
not 	constitute 	manufacturing 	as 	that 	term 	is 	used 	in 	Section 	30-6A-3(E). 3
12
Consequently, we are left to interpret Section 30-6A-3(E) in combination with	13
Section 30-6A-2(D) to determine whether Defendant’s emailing himself CSAM, as	14
charged, constituted the prohibited conduct of manufacturing an obscene visual or	15
print medium under the Act.	16
3 Similarly, Defendant does not contest that (1) the CSAM depicted a
prohibited sex act; (2) the participants of the acts were under the age of eighteen; or
(3) that the depictions were obscene.

5
A. 	Standard of Review and Rules of Statutory Interpretation	1
{8} 	The interpretation of a statute “is a question of law, which we review de	2
novo.” Quintin C., 2019-NMCA-069, ¶ 6 (internal quotation marks and citation	3
omitted). “[The] primary goal when interpreting statutes is to further legislative	4
intent.” Jordan v. Allstate Ins. Co., 2010-NMSC-051, ¶ 15, 149 N.M. 162, 245 P.3d	5
1214. In furtherance of this goal, we first consider the plain meaning of the statute.	6
See State v. Rael, 2024-NMSC-010, ¶ 39, 548 P.3d 66 (“The starting point in every	7
case involving the construction of a statute is an examination of the language utilized	8
by the Legislature in drafting the pertinent statutory provisions.” (internal quotation	9
marks 	and 	citation 	omitted)). 	“Under 	the 	plain 	meaning 	rule 	of 	statutory	10
construction, when a statute contains language which is clear and unambiguous, we	11
must give effect to that language and refrain from further statutory interpretation,”	12
State v. Rivera, 2004-NMSC-001, ¶ 10, 134 N.M. 768, 82 P.3d 939 (text only)	13
(citation omitted), at least where the plain-meaning interpretation “does not lead to	14
injustice, 	absurdity, 	or 	contradiction.” 	Rael, 	2024-NMSC-010, 	¶ 41 	(internal	15
quotation marks and citation omitted). “In looking at the words chosen by the	16
Legislature and the plain meaning of the Legislature’s language, we also consider	17
the context in which it was enacted, taking into account its history and background.”	18
See State v. Valerio, 2026-NMCA-010, ¶ 9, 584 P.3d 1027 (internal quotation marks	19
and citation omitted), cert. granted, 2025-NMCERT-009 (S-1-SC-40981).	20

6
B. 	Emailing 	CSAM 	to 	Oneself 	Constitutes 	Manufacturing 	of 	an	1
Obscene Visual or Print Medium Under the Act	2
{9} 	We begin our analysis with the legislative intent behind the Act. See Jordan,	3
2010-NMSC-051, ¶ 15 (reiterating that the “primary goal when interpreting statutes	4
is to further legislative intent”). Our Supreme Court has held that “the purpose of the	5
Act is to protect children from the harm that flows from trespasses against the child’s	6
dignity when treated as a sexual object.” State v. Olsson, 2014-NMSC-012, ¶ 27,	7
324 P.3d 1230 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). Our Supreme Court	8
also examined the purpose of the Act in State v. Myers, and noted that “‘[CSAM] is	9
particularly harmful because the child’s actions are reduced to a recording which	10
could haunt the child in future years, especially in light of the mass distribution	11
system for [CSAM].’” 2009-NMSC-016, ¶ 17, 146 N.M. 128, 207 P.3d 1105	12
(quoting People v. Lamborn, 708 N.E.2d 350, 353 (Ill. 1999)); see also New York v.	13
Ferber, 458 U.S. 747, 759 n.10 (1982) (“Pornography poses an even greater threat	14
to the child victim than does sexual abuse or prostitution. Because the child’s actions	15
are reduced to a recording, the pornography may haunt [the child] in future years,	16
long after the original misdeed took place. A child who has posed for a camera must	17
go through life knowing that the recording is circulating within the mass distribution	18
system for [CSAM].” (alteration, internal quotation marks, and citation omitted));	19
United States v. Norris, 159 F.3d 926, 929-30 (5th Cir. 1998) (“Unfortunately, the	20
‘victimization’ of the children involved does not end when the pornographer’s	21

7
camera is put away. The consumer, or end recipient, of pornographic materials may	1
be considered to be causing the children depicted in those materials to suffer as a	2
result of [the pornographer’s] actions in at least three ways[:]” perpetuation of	3
original abuse, invasion of the child’s privacy, and instigation of original production	4
of such materials by supplying economic incentive to create and distribute the	5
materials).	6
{10} 	With the legislative goal in mind, we now turn to examine the language of	7
Section 30-6A-3(E):	8
It is unlawful for a person to intentionally manufacture any obscene	9
visual 	or 	print 	medium 	depicting 	any 	prohibited 	sexual 	act 	or	10
simulation of such an act if one or more of the participants in that act is	11
a child under eighteen years of age.	12
{11} 	Section 	30-6A-2(D) 	specifies 	several 	discrete 	actions 	that 	constitute	13
manufacturing:	14
“manufacture” means the production, processing, copying by any	15
means, printing, packaging or repackaging of any visual or print	16
medium depicting any prohibited sexual act or simulation of such an	17
act if one or more of the participants in that act is a child under eighteen	18
years of age.	19
{12} 	As mentioned, the State told the jury during closing arguments that Defendant	20
copied CSAM each time he emailed an image to himself. Because the State’s theory	21
at trial was solely limited to whether Defendant copied obscene visual or print	22
medium depicting any prohibited sexual act or simulation of such an act, our analysis	23
is accordingly limited to whether Defendant’s conduct in sending himself an email	24

8
with CSAM attached constitutes “copying by any means” for purposes of Sections	1
30-6A-2(D) and -3(E).	2
{13} 	The Act does not provide a definition for the term “copying.” When words	3
are not otherwise defined in a statute, “we give those words their ordinary meaning	4
absent clear and express legislative intention to the contrary. To do so, we consult	5
common dictionary definitions.” State v. Vest, 2021-NMSC-020, ¶ 14, 488 P.3d 626	6
(alteration, internal quotation marks, and citation omitted). The plain meaning of the	7
word “copying” is: to “make a similar or identical version of; reproduce.” New	8
Oxford American English Dictionary 384 (3rd ed. 2010); see also 3 Oxford English	9
Dictionary 916 (2d. ed. 1991) (defining “copying” in a computing specific context	10
as: “To read (data stored in one location), or data in (a disc, etc.) and reproduce it in	11
another”).	12
{14} 	The Act specifically accounts for digital content in defining “visual or print	13
medium”:	14
B. 	“visual or print medium” means:	15
(1) 	any film, photograph, negative, slide, computer diskette,	16
videotape, videodisc or any 	computer or electronically generated	17
imagery; or	18
(2) 	any book, magazine or other form of publication or	19
photographic 	reproduction 	containing 	or 	incorporating 	any 	film,	20
photograph, negative, slide, computer diskette, videotape, videodisc or	21
any computer generated or electronically generated imagery;	22
Section 30-6A-2(B)(1)-(2) (emphasis added).	23

9
{15} 	Here, we conclude that Defendant’s conduct of emailing the CSAM to	1
himself, which results in duplication of the CSAM, qualifies as copying—and	2
thereby 	manufacturing—for 	purposes 	of 	Sections 	30-6A-2(D) 	and 	-3(E).	3
Considering the purpose of the Act and our Supreme Court’s articulation in Myers	4
regarding the harm that CSAM causes, it follows that the Act is also meant to reduce	5
the number of depictions of CSAM in existence by punishing the manufacturing of	6
CSAM. Cf. Rael, 2024-NMSC-010, ¶ 48 (stating that “[t]he specific deterrent	7
purpose of [Section 30-6A-3(E)] is to prohibit manufacturing [CSAM]”). Thus,	8
because an individual who copies CSAM is creating another unit of CSAM,	9
concluding that emailing oneself CSAM constitutes “copying by any means”	10
furthers the Act’s purpose by punishing each depiction that is brought into existence	11
when the material is copied. Cf. State v. Leeson, 2011-NMCA-068, ¶ 17, 149 N.M.	12
823, 255 P.3d 401 (concluding that the plain language of the Act clearly indicates	13
that each photograph a defendant takes of a child victim is a discrete violation of the	14
statute).	15
{16} 	Defendant argues that the State’s theory that “emailing an image from the	16
internet, without first saving it to a phone or a computer, constitutes manufacturing	17
because it copies the image from the internet to the email” is untenable because it	18
“would 	render 	any 	act 	of 	downloading, 	saving, 	or 	sending 	a 	digital 	image	19
manufactur[ing]” and such a “novel theory has never been adopted by New Mexico’s	20

10
courts.” We do not consider this argument further because, as we previously	1
mentioned, our review here is limited to evaluating whether the act of sending an	2
email message to anyone, be it oneself or another, with CSAM attached or included	3
constitutes manufacturing in violation of the Act. Stated otherwise, the actus reus at	4
issue here is only the act of sending an email message that contains CSAM, not the	5
manner in which Defendant obtained CSAM and attached it to the emails.	6
{17} 	Defendant 	next 	argues 	that 	our 	caselaw 	implicitly 	establishes 	that	7
manufacturing requires a transfer of digital media between devices, because no cases	8
have treated the conduct at issue here as manufacturing. While we have not been	9
required to evaluate this issue until now, we disagree that our cases can be construed	10
as limiting manufacturing to situations where digital media is transferred between	11
devices. In fact, in State v. Smith, although we established that “manufacture” under	12
the Act includes copying of digital images to a portable storage device because this	13
“creates a new digital copy of the prohibited image,” 2009-NMCA-028, ¶ 2, 145	14
N.M. 757, 204 P.3d 1267, we did not limit our holding to those facts. We simply	15
interpreted the definition of “manufacture” under the Act to include the transfer of	16
pornographic images from a computer to a flash drive or a compact disc. Here, as in	17
Smith, we are simply interpreting the Act to determine whether emailing oneself	18
CSAM constitutes manufacturing.	19

11
{18} 	Defendant also argues that the Legislature did not intend this result because	1
treating this conduct as manufacturing will lead to serious consequences for	2
defendants. As support for this argument, Defendant notes that the Legislature	3
increased the penalty for possession to ten years of imprisonment after our Supreme	4
Court held that possession of numerous images of CSAM could only be charged as	5
one crime in Olsson, 2014-NMSC-012. Defendant maintains that the lack of	6
amendment to include a definition for possession indicates that the Legislature	7
understood this type of conduct to qualify as possession, rather than manufacturing.	8
{19} 	We 	do 	not 	view 	the 	Legislature’s 	decision 	to 	omit 	a 	definition 	for	9
“possession” as evidence of its intent to distinguish certain behaviors as possession	10
rather than manufacturing. The Act criminalizes the possession, distribution, and	11
manufacturing of “obscene visual or print medium[s].” Section 30-6A-3(A)-(G). In	12
1993, the Act was amended to provide that “any computer or electronically	13
generated imagery” constitutes a “visual or print medium.” Section 30-6A-2(B)(1)-	14
(2). Given that the internet and the World Wide Web4 existed in 1993, see Alan S.	15
4It is important to note that the “World Wide Web” and “the internet” are not
the same thing. See generally William F. Patry, Patry on Fair Use § 3:54, Westlaw
PATRYFAIR 	(database 	updated 	May 	2026). 	“The 	Internet 	is 	a 	networking
infrastructure, a network of networks that connects millions of computers together
using the [IP].” Id. “The World Wide Web (“Web”) is an open network, information-
sharing service that operates over the Internet using the HTTP (“Hypertext Transfer
Protocol”) format.” Id. The differences can be explained by way of analogy: “Think
of the internet as the roads that connect towns and cities together. The world wide
web contains the things you see on the roads like houses and shops. And the vehicles

12
Gutterman, 2 Legal Compliance Checkups § 25:55, Westlaw LCOMPLC (database	1
updated Sept. 2025) (explaining that “[i]n 1969, a government-sponsored program	2
called the ARPA Net created the Internet”); William F. Patry, Patry on Fair Use	3
§ 3:54, Westlaw PATRYFAIR (database updated May 2026) (explaining that the	4
World Wide Web was created in 1989), we presume the Legislature considered how	5
the Act would be applied to conduct involving digital CSAM. See Valerio, 2026-	6
NMCA-010, ¶ 9 (“In looking at the words chosen by the Legislature and the plain	7
meaning of the Legislature’s language, we also consider the context in which it was	8
enacted, taking into account its history and background.” (internal quotation marks	9
and citation omitted)).	10
{20} 	The Legislature surely contemplated that it could not—and still cannot—	11
predict or account for the myriad ways in which people might acquire digital CSAM.	12
Given the 1993 amendment to account for digital CSAM, we believe the Legislature	13
intended to define “manufacture” broadly so that the Act may continue to achieve	14
its purpose as it exists in tandem with an evolving digital landscape. See § 30-6A-	15
2(D). Thus, we do not view the Legislature’s decision to omit a definition for	16
are the data moving around—some go between websites and others will be
transferring your emails or files across the internet, separately from the web.” What’s
the 	difference 	between 	the 	internet 	and 	the 	world 	wide 	web?, 	BBC,
https://www.bbc.co.uk/newsround/av/47523993 (last visited March 5, 2026).

13
“possession” as evidence of its intent to distinguish behaviors that necessarily	1
require one to “copy” CSAM to be possession rather than manufacturing.5
2
{21} 	Lastly, Defendant argues that our construal of the statute will lead to unjust	3
results because, going forward, defendants who acquire CSAM through digital	4
channels will be charged with manufacturing rather than possession. There is no	5
doubt that the continuously evolving digital landscape in today’s world poses a	6
challenge for jurists as it relates to the Act. See State v. Myers, 2011-NMSC-028,	7
¶ 19, 150 N.M. 1, 256 P.3d 13 (stating that “[d]ivining the meaning of certain	8
elements of the Act and applying the elements to differing fact situations will	9
challenge our courts for years to come”), accord Rael, 2024-NMSC-010, ¶ 1. Yet	10
even if Defendant correctly asserts that the State may begin charging offenses	11
differently than it has historically, our holding today cannot hinge upon what the	12
State might charge tomorrow.	13
{22} 	The Act contains clear and unambiguous language that “manufacture” means,	14
in part, “copying by any means.” Section 30-6A-2(D). It is true that “courts must	15
exercise caution in applying the plain meaning rule.” State ex rel. Helman v.	16
Gallegos, 1994-NMSC-023, ¶ 23, 117 N.M. 346, 871 P.2d 1352. However, “[o]ur	17
5We also fail to see how the Legislature’s action (or inaction) in response to
Olsson is significant for purposes of our analysis. The holding in Olsson relates to
the sentencing of possession under Section 30-6A-3(A), and thus we find it to be of
limited value in guiding our interpretation of Section 30-6A-3(E).

14
role in statutory interpretation is not to sculpt the most just law possible out of the	1
words used by the Legislature or to attribute the meaning to a statute that	2
contemporary ideals would deem preferable. Our role is to determine the intent of	3
the Legislature.” State v. Cleve, 1999-NMSC-017, ¶ 15, 127 N.M. 240, 980 P.2d 23	4
(citation omitted). That is why, unless the plain-meaning interpretation of a statute	5
would result in injustice, absurdity, or contradiction, “if the meaning of a statute is	6
truly clear—not vague, uncertain, ambiguous, or otherwise doubtful—it is of course	7
the responsibility of the judiciary to apply the statute as written and not to second-	8
guess the [L]egislature’s selection from among competing policies or adoption of	9
one of perhaps several ways of effectuating a particular legislative objective.”	10
Helman, 1994-NMSC-023, ¶ 22.	11
{23} 	For these reasons, we conclude that by emailing himself CSAM, Defendant	12
duplicated the image, similarly to the defendant in Smith, when the defendant there	13
made an additional copy—and thereby manufactured—obscene visual or print	14
mediums depicting a prohibited sexual act. See 2009-NMCA-028, ¶ 2. And because	15
we do not believe that such a result can be characterized as either absurd or unjust,	16
we are not persuaded that the Legislature must have intended a different result, and	17
we must therefore give effect to the Act’s plain language and “refrain from further	18
statutory interpretation.” Rivera, 2004-NMSC-001, ¶ 10 (internal quotation marks	19
and citation omitted). Accordingly, we affirm Defendant’s convictions.	20

15
II. 	The Admission of Hearsay Evidence was Harmless	1
{24} 	Defendant next argues that the district court erred in admitting testimony from	2
the 	investigating 	detective 	that 	linked 	the 	IP 	address 	associated 	with 	the	3
“kingworld_15@yahoo.com” 	email 	account 	with 	the 	physical 	address 	of 	the	4
residence where Defendant was living. Defendant contends that the detective’s	5
statement constitutes inadmissible hearsay, and that the admission of such testimony	6
prejudiced him because the evidence “made it less likely that one of the ‘randoms’	7
who had stayed with [Defendant] after his girlfriend had moved out had used the	8
phone and then left it at [Defendant]’s house.”	9
{25} 	“We review the admission of hearsay evidence for an abuse of discretion.”	10
State v. Sisneros, 2013-NMSC-049, ¶ 18, 314 P.3d 665. When reviewing the district	11
court’s admission of evidence, we recognize that “trial courts have broad latitude in	12
exercising their discretion.” State v. Chavez, 2008-NMCA-125, ¶ 9, 144 N.M. 849,	13
192 P.3d 1226. An abuse of discretion occurs when the district court’s decision is	14
clearly untenable, not justified by reason, or against the logic and effect of the facts	15
and circumstances before the court. State v. Ervin, 2008-NMCA-016, ¶ 9, 143 N.M.	16
493, 177 P.3d 1067.	17
{26} 	The statement at issue arose during the State’s direct examination of Detective	18
Wilber. Detective Wilber testified that NCMEC identified the state where the	19
organization believes the exploitation is occurring, and forwarded the cyber tip to	20

16
the local state authorities. Detective Wilber then testified that the IP address “came	1
back to 358 Jasper Drive” in Las Cruces, New Mexico. Defendant argues that this	2
statement is inadmissible hearsay because Comcast provided the physical address	3
associated with the IP address, but the State never introduced business records or	4
witnesses from Comcast.	5
{27} 	Even if we were to assume without deciding that admission of Detective	6
Wilber’s statement was an abuse of discretion, we conclude that any such error was	7
harmless. Defendant does not assert that admission of the statement at issue	8
implicates 	his 	constitutional 	rights, 	therefore, 	we 	review 	this 	issue 	for	9
nonconstitutional harmless error. See State v. Barr, 2009-NMSC-024, ¶ 53, 146	10
N.M. 301, 210 P.3d 198 (explaining the difference between constitutional and	11
nonconstitutional error and the analysis to be used for each of those types of error	12
for purposes of harmless error review), overruled on other grounds by State v.	13
Tollardo, 2012-NMSC-008, ¶ 37, 275 P.3d 110.	14
{28} 	“[N]on[]constitutional 	error 	is 	harmless 	when 	there 	is 	no 	reasonable	15
probability 	the error affected the verdict.” 	Tollardo, 2012-NMSC-008, ¶ 36,	16
(internal quotation marks and citation omitted). In determining “the likely effect of	17
the error” under this standard, “courts should evaluate all of the circumstances	18
surrounding the error. This requires an examination of the error itself, which [may]	19
. . . include an examination of the source of the error and the emphasis placed upon	20

17
the error.” Id. ¶ 43; see State v. Leyba, 2012-NMSC-037, ¶ 24, 289 P.3d 1215 (“To	1
put the error in context, we often look at the other, non[]objectionable evidence of	2
guilt, not for a sufficiency-of-the-evidence analysis, but to evaluate what role the	3
error played at trial.”).	4
{29} 	Here, although the testimony about the IP address was meaningful in	5
establishing that CSAM was being accessed via an electronic device at the physical	6
address where Defendant was living, the jury also heard evidence that several people	7
frequented the residence within the past year, and thus was still required to decide,	8
whether it was Defendant or one of the other individuals who frequented the home	9
who used the phone to access the CSAM. Ultimately, the jury was not required to	10
accept Defendant’s theory that the phone belonged to another individual. See	11
generally State v. Sosa, 2000-NMSC-036, ¶ 8, 129 N.M. 767, 14 P.3d 32 (stating	12
that it is the jury’s function to assess the credibility of witnesses, and we defer to	13
their decision on such matters); State v. Rojo, 1999-NMSC-001, ¶ 19, 126 N.M. 438,	14
971 P.2d 829 (stating that the jury need not accept the defendant’s version of events).	15
Thus, we view Defendant’s argument that Detective Wilber’s testimony prejudiced	16
him because it “made it less likely that one of the ‘randoms’ who had stayed with	17
[Defendant] after his girlfriend had moved out had used the phone and then left it at	18
[Defendant]’s house” as an invitation to reweigh the evidence, which we cannot do	19

18
on appeal. See State v. Johnson, 2026-NMCA-036, ¶ 9, 585 P.3d 1057 (noting that	1
this Court does not weigh the evidence).	2
{30} 	Moreover, in addition to the evidence outlined above in the background	3
section 	of 	this 	opinion, 	Detective 	Wilber 	testified 	that 	the 	account	4
“kingworld_15@yahoo.com” sent an email containing a photograph of Defendant’s	5
girlfriend 	and 	his 	daughter 	to 	an 	account 	with 	the 	username	6
“raypacheco2825@gmail.com.” The jury also listened to Defendant’s recorded	7
interview with law enforcement wherein Defendant stated that his email address was	8
“raypacheco2825@gmail.com.” Thus, even if Detective Wilber had not testified that	9
the IP address came back to Defendant’s address, it is unlikely that the jury would	10
have reached a different result based on the evidence presented at trial. Accordingly,	11
we conclude that any error in admitting Detective Wilber’s statement was harmless.	12
III. 	Defendant was Incorrectly Sentenced	13
{31} 	Lastly, Defendant argues that the district court erred in sentencing him to an	14
indeterminate term of parole of five years to life for each count of which Defendant	15
was convicted. Defendant contends that the term of parole on Count 1 and Counts 3	16
through 11, all of which were run concurrently, should have been five to twenty	17
years. The State concedes this point and agrees that the matter should be remanded	18
to the district court for correction of Defendant’s judgment and sentence. Although	19
we are not bound by the State’s concession, we accept it here. See generally State v.	20

19
Palmer, 1998-NMCA-052, ¶ 12, 125 N.M. 86, 957 P.2d 71 (stating the appellate	1
court must review the record regardless of the state’s concession).	2
CONCLUSION	3
{32} 	Based on the foregoing, we affirm Defendant’s convictions but remand this	4
case to the district court for correction of Defendant’s judgment and sentence.	5
{33} 	IT IS SO ORDERED.	6
_________________________	7
GERALD E. BACA, Judge	8
WE CONCUR:	9
____________________________________	10
MEGAN P. DUFFY, Judge	11
____________________________________	12
SHAMMARA H. HENDERSON, Judge	13