February 11, 2022- Mark Van Buskirk v. City of Raton, No. A-1-CA-38641

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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF NEW MEXICO
Court of Appeals of New Mexico

Opinion Number: Filed 2/11/2022 10:49 AM

Filing Date: February 11, 2022 Lh LE
Mark Reynolds

No. A-1-CA-38641

MARK VAN BUSKIRK and LORI
VAN BUSKIRK, husband and wife,

Plaintiffs-A ppellants,
V.

CITY OF RATON, a New Mexico
MumMicpal corporation,

Defendant- Appellee.

APPEAL FROM THE DISTRICT COURT OF COLFAX COUNTY
Melissa A. Kennelly, District J udge

Montgomery & Andrews, P.A.
Stephen S. Hamilton

Kaleb W. Brooks

Santa Fe, NM

for Appellants

Kerry Kieman, P.C.
Kerry Kieman
Albuquerque, NM

Utton & Kery, P.A.
Craig T. Erickson
Susan C. Kery
Albuquerque, NM

Ray A. Floersheim
Raton, NM

for Appellee

OPINION	1
YOHALEM, Judge.	2
{1} 	This is an action for quintuple damages for inverse condemnation brought	3
against the City of Raton, pursuant to NMSA 1978, Section 42A-1-29(B) (1983), by	4
Plaintiffs Mark and Lori van Buskirk. The van Buskirks appeal from the district	5
court’s decision granting summary judgment to the City. We affirm.	6
THE UNDISPUTED MATERIAL FACTS	7
{2} 	The material facts are undisputed. Triangle Dot Ranch, Inc. (TDR), a New	8
Mexico corporation, was the owner of the approximately 300-acre ranch at issue in	9
this case until 1984, when the corporation was dissolved. Mark van Buskirk was a	10
minority shareholder in TDR. In 1980, TDR sold approximately 27 acres at the	11
southwest end of the ranch to the City for use as a landfill, retaining 214 acres of	12
grazing land adjacent to the landfill to the east, and three tracts totaling 64.77 acres,	13
adjacent to both the landfill and the ranch’s grazing land to the southeast.	14
{3} 	Sometime after TDR dissolved (somewhere between 1997 and 1999), the van	15
Buskirks acquired the 214 acres of grazing land as its sole owner. The van Buskirks	16
also held a shared interest with other family members in the three tracts totaling	17
64.77 acres, adjoining both the grazing land and the landfill. Until 2014, when the	18
City closed the landfill, the van Buskirks complained that trash from the landfill	19
blew onto their grazing land. They accused the City of negligence in failing to cover	20

2
the garbage daily with soil. The New Mexico Environment Department fined the	1
City several times for improperly maintaining the landfill.	2
{4} 	In 1997, the van Buskirk family sold the three tracts totaling 64.77 acres	3
(contiguous with both the ranch grazing land and the City landfill) to the City. At	4
the time of purchase, the City intended to use one of the three tracts for a new	5
regional landfill (which was never opened), and another tract as a source of cover	6
soil for the City landfill. From 1998 to 2014, the year the City landfill closed, trash	7
continued to blow onto the van Buskirks’ 214-acre grazing land.	8
THE PROCEDURAL HISTORY IN THE DISTRICT COURT	9
{5} 	The van Buskirks filed a pro se complaint on December 9, 2013, alleging	10
negligence by the City for failing to properly cover the trash in the landfill.	11
Recognizing that their negligence claim was likely barred by the statute of	12
limitations, 	the 	van 	Buskirks 	amended 	their 	complaint 	to 	allege 	inverse	13
condemnation, under Section 42A-1-29(A) (Subsection A). The second complaint	14
continued to seek compensation for alleged damage to their 214-acre grazing land	15
from trash blowing from the landfill.	16
{6} 	After filing their inverse condemnation complaint, the van Buskirks obtained	17
counsel 	and 	filed 	a 	third 	complaint 	(first 	amended 	complaint 	for 	inverse	18
condemnation), dropping their Subsection A inverse condemnation claim, and	19
instead pleading a cause of action for quintuple damages for inverse condemnation	20

3
under Section 42A-1-29(B) (Subsection B). Subsection B provides a cause of action	1
for damages for inverse condemnation under limited circumstances. Damages	2
pursuant to Subsection B are calculated at “the greater of the fair market value or a	3
unit rate of five times that of the compensation or consideration [the condemnee or	4
grantor] received for the land [originally] taken[.]” Section 42A-1-29(B)(3).	5
{7} 	The City filed a motion for summary judgment asking the district court to	6
dismiss for failure state a claim under Subsection B. The City contended that unlike	7
Subsection A, which creates a cause of action for either the original owner or “any	8
subsequent grantee” of property that is taken or damaged by a government entity,	9
Subsection B focuses on a prior, original transaction and expressly limits the right	10
of action to the “condemnee or grantor” of previously taken contiguous property.	11
The district court granted summary judgment to the City, finding that the van	12
Buskirks were not the “grantors or condemnees” of the property previously taken	13
for the landfill: TRD was the grantor. The district court agreed with the City that the	14
van Buskirks were not the real parties in interest and that the van Buskirks did not	15
have standing to sue on TDR’s behalf.	16
{8} 	Rather than appealing the district court’s dismissal of their third complaint,	17
the van Buskirks filed a second amended complaint (fourth complaint). The second	18
amended complaint again sought compensation under Subsection B. This time the	19
van Buskirks claimed standing and real party in interest status based on their 1997	20

4
sale of the 64.77-acre tract to the City. They claimed that that the City’s purchase of	1
the 64.77 acres met the Subsection B(3) requirements for “contiguous to property	2
previously taken” owned by the same “condemnee or grantor.” Section 42A-1-	3
29(B)(3). They sought more than $5 million in compensation for the damage to their	4
214-acre grazing land, five times the per-acre price paid by the City for the 64.77-	5
acre tract.	6
{9} 	The City again filed a motion for summary judgment, contending that the van	7
Buskirks’ second amended complaint failed to state a Subsection B claim because	8
there was no damage to their land caused by the public use of the 64.77 acres	9
purchased by the City; any damage arose from the landfill, which was purchased by	10
the City from a different grantor seventeen years before the van Buskirks acquired	11
the adjoining property. The City contended that Subsection B was intended by the	12
Legislature to deter the government from shortchanging a private property owner by	13
purchasing less of his or her property than the government knows will subsequently	14
be 	damaged 	or 	taken 	for 	the 	intended 	public 	use. 	Subsection 	B 	provides	15
compensation to the private property owner whose property was subsequently	16
damaged by the public use of adjoining property purchased or taken in the original	17
transaction.	18
{10} 	The van Buskirks responded to the City’s motion for summary judgment,	19
claiming that Subsection B, by its plain language, requires only that the City “take[]	20

5
or damage[] property contiguous to property previously taken or granted from	1
the . . . grantor without making just compensation[.]” Section 42A-1-29(B)(3). The	2
van Buskirks claimed that they met the requirements of that statutory phrase,	3
pointing to the City’s purchase of their 64.77-acre tract, and the damage to their	4
contiguous 214 acres of grazing land. Again relying on this phrase from Subsection	5
B(3), the van Buskirks disputed the City’s argument that the damage to the	6
contiguous land must be related to the original under-purchase or taking of property	7
from the grantor or condemnee. See id.	8
{11} 	The district court granted summary judgment to the City, agreeing with the	9
City that the Legislature did not intend to provide a cause of action for quintuple	10
compensation under the circumstances of this case. The district court focused on the	11
deterrent intent behind the quintuple compensation authorized by Subsection B,	12
concluding 	that 	the 	Legislature’s 	purpose 	is 	to 	use 	the 	threat 	of 	quintuple	13
compensation to deter “conduct in which the government seeks to save money and	14
shortchange a private property owner by purchasing less than the amount of property	15
actually needed for its public purpose.” The district court found that, because the	16
governmental conduct in this case was neither different from nor more reprehensible	17
than the conduct ordinarily involved in a claim for inverse condemnation under	18
Subsection A, this was not the kind of conduct Subsection B was intended to deter.	19
The district court granted the City’s motion for summary judgment.	20

6
DISCUSSION	1
{12} 	The van Buskirks argue on appeal that they have stated a cause of action under	2
the plain language of Subsection B(3). The van Buskirks claim that because the	3
64.77 acres purchased from them by the City (seventeen years after the landfill was	4
purchased from TDR) is contiguous to their 214 acres of grazing land, the facts of	5
this case fit squarely within the plain language of Subsection B(3)’s requirement of	6
damage by the City to land contiguous to land previously purchased from the same	7
grantor.1 They contend that the district court erred in looking beyond the plain	8
language to legislative intent. Finally, they claim that even if the legislative purpose	9
of Subsection B is considered, their reading of the statute facilitates the statutory	10
goal of broadly deterring the government from purchasing less property from a	11
private landowner than actually needed for public use.	12
{13} 	The City contests the van Buskirks’ construction of the statutory language.	13
The City points out that the van Buskirks’ “plain meaning” argument relies on a	14
single phrase in Subsection B(3), taken out of context, arguing that the plain meaning	15
of a statute must be determined by looking to the language as a whole. Reading the	16
statute as a whole, the City contrasts the cause of action for inverse condemnation	17
1 Subsection B applies, by its terms, to property acquired by a government
entity with the power of eminent domain either through condemnation or by
purchase. Because all of the properties at issue in this case were acquired by the City
by purchase from a grantor, we use the term “grantor” in our discussion, rather than
the phrase “condemnee or grantor” to simplify the discussion.

7
adopted 	by the 	Legislature 	in 	Subsection 	A, 	with 	Subsection 	B’s 	focus 	on	1
compensating 	a 	particular 	landowner 	involved 	in 	a 	transaction 	where 	the	2
government under-purchases the grantor’s land, for the damage subsequently caused	3
to that landowner’s remaining property by the adjoining public use. The City argues	4
that the van Buskirks’ interpretation of the statute—to not require any causal	5
connection between the under-purchase of a grantor’s land in a prior transaction and	6
the subsequent damage to that same grantor’s adjoining land—is not supported by	7
the statute’s language or its purpose.	8
{14} 	We 	agree 	with 	the 	City. 	We 	construe 	Subsection 	B 	of 	the 	inverse	9
condemnation statute to create a right of action, which provides a statutory measure	10
of “just compensation” to a private landowner when the government uses its power	11
of eminent domain to take or purchase less property than it needs for the intended	12
public use, resulting in damage to the grantor’s adjoining property.	13
I. 	The Guiding Principles of Statutory Interpretation	14
{15} 	This case raises a question of statutory interpretation concerning Subsection	15
B of New Mexico’s inverse condemnation statute, Section 42A-1-29(A), (B). The	16
construction of Subsection B is an issue of first impression. Neither the parties, the	17
district court, nor this Court have found a comparable statute in any other state. We,	18
therefore 	turn 	to 	the 	principles 	of 	statutory 	construction, 	with 	the 	goal 	of	19
“ascertain[ing] and giv[ing] effect to the intent of the Legislature.” State v. Smith,	20

8
2004-NMSC-032, ¶ 8, 136 N.M. 372, 98 P.3d 1022 (internal quotation marks and	1
citation omitted).	2
{16} 	The interpretation of a statute is an issue of law that is subject to de novo	3
review by our appellate courts. Hovet v. Allstate Ins. Co., 2004-NMSC-010, ¶ 10,	4
135 N.M. 397, 89 P.3d 69. We begin the search for legislative intent by first	5
considering the plain language of the statute. Id. “[W]e look to the plain language of	6
the statute to determine if the statute can be enforced as written.” State v. Vest, 2021-	7
NMSC-020, ¶ 14, 488 P.3d 626 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). In	8
examining the language used by the Legislature, words must be viewed in the	9
context in which they are used in the statute. Every word chosen by the Legislature	10
must be considered and given meaning. See State v. Farish, 2021-NMSC-030, ¶ 11,	11
499 P.3d 622.	12
{17} 	The initial question in this regard is whether the words of the statute are so	13
clear that they rule out any ambiguity, confusion, or uncertainty about the statute’s	14
meaning. In the absence of ambiguity or uncertainty in the language of the statute,	15
we can give effect to the language as written and need not either construe the	16
language or consider the policy implications flowing from the statutory language.	17
See id. As our Supreme Court recognized, however, caution must be exercised in	18
applying this plain meaning rule. State ex rel. Helman v. Gallegos, 1994-NMSC-	19
023, ¶ 23, 117 N.M. 346, 871 P.2d 1352. It is exceedingly rare to find statutory	20

9
language “crystal clear in its meaning[,]” id., “not vague, uncertain, ambiguous, or	1
otherwise doubtful[.]” Id. ¶ 22. Even a statute, “apparently clear and unambiguous	2
on its face, may for one reason or another give rise to legitimate (i.e., nonfrivolous)	3
differences of opinion concerning the statute’s meaning.” Id. ¶ 23. “In such a case,	4
it is part of the essence of judicial responsibility to search for and effectuate the	5
legislative intent—the purpose or object—underlying the statute.” Id.	6
II. 	The 	Plain 	Language 	of 	Subsection B 	Does 	Not 	Support 	Imposing	7
Liability on the Government Without a Causal Connection to a Prior	8
Transaction	9
{18} 	We begin our analysis 	“by looking first to the words chosen by the	10
[L]egislature.” Farish, 2018-NMCA-003, ¶ 6 (internal quotation marks and citation	11
omitted), rev’d in part and remanded, 2021-NMSC-030. Subsection B states as	12
follows:	13
B. 	Notwithstanding the provisions of Subsection A of this	14
section or any other provision of law regarding compensation for	15
damage in the situation described in that subsection:	16
(1) 	if 	the 	person 	authorized 	[to 	exercise 	eminent	17
domain] had taken or been granted for public use, pursuant to a final	18
judgment, an order of immediate possession or private agreement, any	19
property;	20
(2) 	the property subsequently taken or damaged was	21
contiguous to the property taken or granted; and	22
(3) 	the person takes or damages property contiguous to	23
property previously taken or granted from the condemnee or grantor	24
without 	making 	just 	compensation 	or 	without 	instituting 	and	25
prosecuting . . . any proceeding for condemnation; the condemnee or	26

10
grantor shall receive compensation for the land taken or damaged at the	1
greater of fair market value or a unit rate of five times that of the	2
compensation or consideration he received for the land taken; provided	3
that if the width of the property taken or damaged is not equal to the	4
width originally taken or damaged, compensation required pursuant to	5
this subsection shall be increased or reduced ratably in accordance with	6
the relationship of the respective widths.	7
Section 42A-1-29(B).	8
{19} 	The 	van 	Buskirks 	rely 	on 	the 	first 	phrase 	in 	Subsection 	B(3): 	“the	9
[condemning 	authority] 	takes 	or 	damages 	property 	contiguous 	to 	property	10
previously taken or granted from the condemnee or grantor without making just	11
compensation[.]” Section 42A-1-29(B)(3). This language, they argue, “places no	12
limitation on how the condemning authority takes or damages that property so as to	13
be liable for the prescribed statutory damages.” All that need be shown, according	14
to the van Buskirks, is damage to property which happens to be contiguous to	15
property previously acquired from that grantor, regardless of whether the damage	16
results from the public use of the property originally taken. They assert that, had the	17
Legislature intended to limit the cause of action to damages that originate from or	18
are caused by the public use of the originally taken property, it could easily have	19
said so clearly.	20
{20} 	We do not agree. When the words used by the Legislature are viewed in	21
context, they support the construction advanced by the City: that the Legislature	22
intended that the damage to contiguous property compensable under Subsection B	23

11
is damage caused by or resulting from the under-purchase of land in an earlier	1
transaction.	2
{21} 	Subsection B sets forth three requirements. It begins, in Subsection B(1), by	3
requiring an original transaction between a government entity having the power of	4
eminent domain and a private landowner, where the government acquires property	5
either by way of a grant for public use or by condemning the land. It then requires,	6
in Subsection B(2), “subsequent damage” to land contiguous to the land taken in the	7
original transaction. Subsection B(3) then ties the “subsequent damage” to adjoining	8
land to the public use of the property taken in the original transaction in three ways.	9
See § 42A-1-29(B)(2)(3). First, Subsection B(3) describes the damage it intends to	10
compensate as damage to “property contiguous to property previously taken or	11
granted from the condemnee or grantor” in the original transaction. Section 42A-1-	12
29(B)(3). Second, it measures the damages authorized by Subsection B with	13
reference to the compensation received by the grantor in the original transaction. In	14
particular, Subsection B authorizes damages at the greater of “a unit rate of five	15
times that of the compensation or consideration [the landowner’] received for the	16
land taken” in the original transaction, or the fair market value of the land, whichever	17
is greater. 	Id. 	Third, the last sentence of Subsection B(3) indicates that the	18
compensation can be adjusted “if the width of the property taken or damaged is not	19
equal to the width originally taken.” Id. (emphasis added). Taken together, this	20

12
language indicates that the Legislature intended Subsection B to address situations	1
where the public use of property previously acquired from a landowner causes	2
damage to the landowner’s remaining adjacent parcel. The parties agree that the	3
example used by the district court of a utility, which acquires only the six-inch width	4
of land it needs for its line and fails to acquire the greater width of land that will be	5
damaged by laying and maintaining the line, is the type of conduct the Legislature	6
seeks to discourage.	7
{22} 	Having carefully reviewed the language of Subsection B, we do not agree with	8
the van Buskirks’ claim that the plain meaning of its language is to allow quintuple	9
compensation without regard to a causal connection between the original transaction	10
and the damage to the landowner’s contiguous property. To the contrary, when the	11
plain language of Subsection B is read as a whole, it indicates legislative intent to	12
require a causal connection between the government’s use of property originally	13
acquired from the landowner and the subsequent injury to the landowner’s remaining	14
contiguous land.	15
{23} 	We are not persuaded by the van Buskirks’ argument that, because the	16
Legislature could easily have added an explicit requirement that the subsequent	17
damage originate on or be caused by the public use of the land originally purchased,	18
the omission of that language rules out a causation requirement. The Court’s	19
responsibility is to carefully assess the words actually used by the Legislature and to	20

13
look to the purpose and objectives of the statute’s language if that language is less	1
than clear. See Perea v. Baca, 1980-NMSC-079, ¶ 22, 94 N.M. 624, 614 P.2d 541	2
(“A statute must be read and given effect as it is written by the Legislature, not as	3
the court may think it should be or would have been written if the Legislature had	4
envisaged all the problems and complications which might arise in the course of its	5
administration.” (internal quotation marks and citation omitted)).	6
{24} 	Although our analysis of the language of Subsection B alone leads us to	7
conclude that Subsection B is intended to compensate a landowner whose adjoining	8
property has been damaged by the public use of property previously purchased or	9
taken from that landowner, we acknowledge that the statutory language is awkward,	10
and therefore, arguably less than crystal clear. We therefore review the purpose,	11
background, and history of the statue to ensure that our analysis of the language does	12
not lead to “injustice, absurdity, or contradiction[.]” State v. Padilla, 2008-NMSC-	13
006, ¶ 7, 143 N.M. 310, 176 P.3d 299 (internal quotation marks and citation	14
omitted).	15
III. 	An Analysis of the Background, Purpose, and History of the Legislative,	16
as Well as Its Place in the Statutory Scheme, Supports Our Reading of	17
the Statutory Language	18
{25} 	We now proceed to examine the statutory language in the broader context of	19
the Legislature’s purpose, looking to the “spirit or reason” of the statute. Vest, 2021-	20
NMSC-020, ¶ 21 (holding that if statutory language is “doubtful, ambiguous, or an	21

14
adherence to the literal use of the words would lead to injustice, absurdity, or	1
contradiction, the court should reject the plain meaning rule in favor of construing	2
the statute according to its obvious spirit or reason” (internal quotation marks and	3
citation omitted)).	4
{26} 	The legislative purpose of Subsection B of the inverse condemnation statute	5
is consistent with our analysis of the statutory language. The van Buskirks, the City,	6
and the district court agree that the Legislature enacted Subsection B both to	7
compensate landowners and to deter the government, in the exercise of its power of	8
eminent domain, from shortchanging a private landowner by taking or purchasing	9
less than the amount of property likely to be subsequently damaged by the intended	10
public use. The van Buskirks contend that their reading of the Subsection B furthers	11
this purpose by broadly punishing any damage to land, which happens to be	12
contiguous with land previously purchased by the government from the same	13
grantor. They claim that the Legislature did not intend to require the grantor to prove	14
that the under-purchase of land in the original transaction caused or resulted in the	15
subsequent damage to the grantor’s adjoining property. We do not agree.	16
{27} 	To discern the Legislature’s purpose, we turn to the history of Subsection B	17
and its function within the context of our inverse condemnation statute, Section 42A-	18
1-29, as a whole. State v. Rivera, 2004-NMSC-001, ¶ 13, 134 N.M. 768, 82 P.3d 939	19
(“[W]e closely examine the overall structure of the statute we are interpreting, as	20

15
well 	as 	the 	particular 	statute’s 	function 	within 	a 	comprehensive 	legislative	1
scheme[.]” (citation omitted)).	2
{28} 	Subsections A and B together address inverse condemnation in New Mexico.	3
A comparison of the two subsections strongly supports the district court’s conclusion	4
that the Legislature intended to establish a cause of action different from the one it	5
enacted in Subsection A two years earlier. (Subsection A was enacted in 1981. See	6
1981 N.M. Laws, ch. 125, § 25. Subsection B was enacted in 1983. See 1983 N.M.	7
Laws, ch. 131, § 1. Subsection A establishes a general cause of action for inverse	8
condemnation, implementing the takings clause of the New Mexico Constitution,	9
N.M. Const. art II, § 20.2 North v. Pub. Serv. Co. of N.M., 1983-NMCA-124, ¶ 9,	10
101 N.M. 222, 680 P.2d 603; see § 42A-1-29(A). Subsection A allows a landowner	11
to initiate an action for compensation for the fair value of the land taken or damaged	12
without waiting for the government to initiate condemnation proceedings. See Pub.	13
Serv. Co. of N.M. v. Catron, 1982-NMSC-050, ¶ 7, 98 N.M. 134, 646 P.2d 561. Fair	14
compensation for damage to land caused by an adjoining public use can be obtained	15
2 Subsection A states as follows: “A person authorized to exercise the right of
eminent domain who has taken or damaged or who may take or damage any property
for public use without 	making 	just 	compensation or without instituting 	and
prosecuting to final judgment in a court of competent jurisdiction any proceeding
for condemnation is liable to the condemnee, or any subsequent grantee thereof, for
the value thereof or the damage thereto at the time the property is or was taken or
damaged[.]”

16
by a landowner in an inverse condemnation action brought under Subsection A	1
without any additional requirements, apart from a showing of damage from a public	2
use. See UJI 13-704 NMRA (providing for damages for a partial taking). A claim	3
for compensation for damage to land adjoining a public use brought under	4
Subsection A does not depend upon an original transaction where the government	5
purchased less land from the same grantor than it needed: any landowner can bring	6
a claim for the fair market value of property that is taken for public use, or for the	7
reduction in market value caused by damage to the property caused by a public use.	8
Mesich v. Bd. of Comm’rs of McKinley Cnty., 1942-NMSC-054, ¶ 12, 46 N.M. 412,	9
129 P.2d 974 (“[I]n this state . . . the right to damages runs with the land, and a	10
subsequent purchaser may recover such damages if not paid to his predecessor in	11
title.”).	12
{29} 	Subsection B does something quite different: it creates a private cause of	13
action for a particular grantor. It is aimed at fairly compensating a grantor who	14
suffered additional uncompensated damage following a previous transaction. The	15
cause of action is intended, by its terms, to both compensate that grantor for	16
subsequent damage to his or her adjoining property and to encourage the government	17
to fairly evaluate the amount of land necessary for the public use of the property	18
originally purchased.	19

17
{30} 	The van Buskirks’ reading of Subsection B, which removes from the	1
Subsection B cause of action both the requirements that the government have under-	2
purchased land in the original transaction and that the damage to the grantor’s land	3
resulted from or was caused by that under-purchase of land, is inconsistent with the	4
spirit and reason of this statute. There is no reasonable basis for providing such	5
generous additional compensation to a landowner based solely on the happenstance	6
that land damaged by a public use is contiguous to an unrelated purchase of land	7
years later from the same landowner. To so conclude would subject the public to	8
potential liability well beyond that contemplated by our Legislature in this statute,	9
which 	is 	targeted 	at 	fairly 	compensating 	grantors 	who 	suffer 	subsequent,	10
uncompensated damage to their adjoining land. Subsection A, rather than Subsection	11
B, provides the van Buskirks and those in a similar position with a cause of action	12
in inverse condemnation for the fair value of the damage to their land if it was caused	13
by a public use. Allowing the van Buskirks additional compensation above that	14
permitted in a Subsection A inverse condemnation action does not serve the dual	15
legislative purposes of fairly compensating a landowner who suffered additional,	16
uncompensated damage following an original transaction and encouraging the fair	17
evaluation by the government of the amount of land needed for a public use. We will	18
not assume that the Legislature acted unreasonably. See Citation Bingo, Ltd. v.	19
Otten, 1996-NMSC-003, ¶ 22, 121 N.M. 205, 910 P.2d 281 (“[T]his [C]ourt must	20

18
presume that the [L]egislature acted reasonably.” (internal quotation marks and	1
citation omitted)).	2
{31} 	It is undisputed in the summary judgment record that the van Buskirks were	3
not the grantors from whom the City purchased the landfill that caused the damage	4
alleged in this case. Likewise, there is no evidence of subsequent damage resulting	5
from the original transaction the van Buskirks rely on here—the sale of 64.77 acres	6
to the City. Accordingly, the van Buskirks have failed to state a cause of action under	7
Subsection B.	8
IV. 	We Do Not Address the City’s Remaining Arguments	9
{32} 	Given our decision affirming the district court’s grant of summary judgment,	10
we do not reach and do not comment on the merits of the City’s two remaining	11
arguments: (1) that the Legislature never intended to authorize the sort of multi-	12
million dollar damages sought by the van Buskirks; and (2) that the Legislature	13
intended Subsection B to apply only to the purchase by a utility of too narrow a strip	14
of land to lay and service its lines, where the “width” damaged and the “unit” price	15
are both easily measurable.	16
CONCLUSION	17
{33} 	For the reasons stated, we affirm the district court’s grant of summary	18
judgment and the dismissal of this action.	19

19
{34} 	IT IS SO ORDERED.	1
__________________________________	2
JANE B. YOHALEM, Judge	3
WE CONCUR:	4
_______________________________	5
J. MILES HANISEE, Chief Judge	6
_______________________________	7
MEGAN P. DUFFY, Judge	8