September 15, 2020- State of New Mexico v. Ronald Widmer, No. A-1-CA-34272

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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF NEW MEXICO	1
Opinion Number: ________________	2
Filing Date: September 15, 2020	3
NO. A-1-CA-34272	4
STATE OF NEW MEXICO,	5
Plaintiff-Appellee,	6
v.	7
RONALD WIDMER,	8
Defendant-Appellant.	9
APPEAL FROM THE DISTRICT COURT OF BERNALILLO COUNTY	10
Stan Whitaker, District Judge	11
Hector H. Balderas, Attorney General	12
Santa Fe, NM	13
John Kloss, Assistant Attorney General	14
Albuquerque, NM	15
for Appellee	16
Bennett J. Baur, Chief Public Defender	17
C. David Henderson, Appellate Defender	18
Santa Fe, NM	19
for Appellant	20
Court of Appeals of New Mexico
Filed 9/15/2020 9:43 AM

OPINION
HANISEE, Chief Judge.	1
{1} 	This case is before us on remand from our New Mexico Supreme Court to	2
address the arguments raised by Defendant Ronald Widmer that were not addressed	3
in our original opinion filed on March 5, 2018, and in particular, Defendant’s	4
argument concerning the lawfulness of his arrest. State v. Widmer (Widmer I), 2018-	5
NMCA-035, ¶ 1, 419 P.3d 714, rev’d, State v. Widmer (Widmer II), 2020-NMSC-	6
007, ¶¶ 8, 42-44, 461 P.3d 881. The jury convicted Defendant of one count of	7
possession of a controlled substance (methamphetamine), contrary to NMSA 1978,	8
Section 30-31-23(A) (2011, amended 2019). Given our Supreme Court’s decision	9
that Defendant’s pre-Mirandized statements were admissible because the Quarles	10
public safety exception applied to permit the officer’s question to him, we address	11
Defendant’s remaining arguments on appeal: whether (1) the district court erred in	12
not suppressing evidence and statements resulting from an unlawful arrest; (2) the	13
district court erred in admitting lapel camera evidence under Rule 11-106 NMRA;	14
and (3) the district court erred in not granting a continuance. See Widmer II, 2020-	15
NMSC-007, ¶ 1; New York v. Quarles, 467 U.S. 649, 655-56 (1984). We affirm.	16
BACKGROUND	17
{2} 	Defendant’s 	drug 	possession 	charge 	arose 	from 	an 	incident 	in 	which	18
Albuquerque Police Department (APD) officers investigated whether a scooter in	19

2
Defendant’s possession was stolen. Widmer I, 2018-NMCA-035, ¶ 2. Officers ran	1
Defendant’s 	personal 	identification 	information 	and 	the 	scooter’s 	vehicle	2
identification number (VIN) through the National Crime Information Center (NCIC)	3
to check for outstanding warrants and any stolen vehicle reports and discovered that	4
there were two outstanding felony warrants for Defendant’s arrest. Widmer II, 2020-	5
NMSC-007, ¶¶ 2, 15. “Officers placed Defendant in handcuffs while they awaited	6
confirmation that the warrants were valid.” Id. ¶ 2. “As part of the arrest procedures	7
. . . officers put on protective gloves, and Officer Apodaca asked Defendant, ‘Is there	8
anything on your person that I should know about?’ ” 	Id. 	¶ 16. 	“Defendant	9
responded, ‘I have meth[,]’ [and o]fficers collected a white powder from inside a pill	10
container hanging from Defendant’s belt loop.” Id. ¶ 3; Widmer I, 2018-NMCA-035,	11
¶ 7. After the physical evidence was placed in a plastic evidence bag, Defendant	12
muttered, “I’m gonna have another charge now.” Widmer II, 2020-NMSC-007, ¶ 3.	13
“Shortly thereafter, APD dispatch confirmed that the arrest warrant[s] for Defendant	14
[were] outstanding,” Widmer I, 2018-NMCA-035, ¶ 7, and “[t]he white powder	15
recovered from Defendant’s belt loop tested positive for methamphetamine.”	16
Widmer II, 2020-NMSC-007, ¶ 3. As a result, Defendant was charged with felony	17
possession of a controlled substance. At trial, Defendant moved to suppress the	18
evidence and statements resulting from the search incident to the arrest, but the	19

3
district court denied the motion, and Defendant was ultimately convicted for felony	1
possession of methamphetamine. Defendant appeals.	2
DISCUSSION	3
I. 	The District Court Did Not Err in Denying Defendant’s Motion to	4
Suppress Evidence and Statements Because Defendant’s Arrest Was	5
Lawful, 	and 	a 	Contemporaneous 	Search 	Incident 	to 	Arrest 	Was	6
Permitted	7
{3} 	Defendant’s challenge to the district court’s denial of the motion to suppress	8
focuses on the legality of the arrest itself. Defendant argues that his arrest was	9
unlawful because local police department policy prohibits making an arrest based on	10
dispatch’s preliminary report regarding the existence of an outstanding warrant until	11
such warrant is confirmed. Because Defendant was arrested before the reported	12
warrants were confirmed minutes later, he contends that the arrest was unlawful, and	13
thus, the district court should have suppressed the evidence (the red pill container	14
from his belt loop) as well as Defendant’s statements resulting from the search	15
incident to the allegedly “unlawful” arrest. We disagree.	16
{4} 	“Appellate review of a district court’s decision regarding a motion to suppress	17
evidence involves mixed questions of fact and law.” State v. Urioste, 2002-NMSC-	18
023, ¶ 6, 132 N.M. 592, 52 P.3d 964. “The [district] court’s denial of a motion to	19
suppress will not be disturbed on appeal if it is supported by substantial evidence,	20
unless it appears that the determination was incorrectly premised.” State v. Jacobs,	21
2000-NMSC-026, ¶ 34, 129 N.M. 448, 10 P.3d 127; accord State v. Trangucci,	22

4
1990-NMCA-009, ¶ 13, 110 N.M. 385, 796 P.2d 606. We review the application of	1
law to the facts de novo but view the facts in the light most favorable to the State, as	2
the prevailing party. State v. Jones, 2002-NMCA-019, ¶ 9, 131 N.M. 586, 40 P.3d	3
1030.	4
{5} 	In support of his argument that his arrest was illegal, Defendant cites primarily	5
to Officer Frank Baca’s testimony on local police department policy, which suggests	6
that officers may not make an arrest based on a preliminary warrant report until the	7
warrant is secondarily confirmed. However, our appellate courts have never held	8
that arrest upon a NCIC-reported felony arrest warrant may only follow some	9
secondary confirmation that the warrant is accurate or remains active. See Widmer	10
I, 2018-NMCA-035, ¶ 43 (Hanisee, J., dissenting) (“While ensuring the accuracy of	11
known arrest warrants is laudable, it is not a constitutional mandate.”). We decline	12
to embrace such a standard today. That is because a police officer’s non-adherence	13
to a given police department policy does not in and of itself suffice to establish a	14
constitutional violation. See Virginia v. Moore, 553 U.S. 164, 176 (2008) (“[W]hile	15
[s]tates are free to regulate . . . arrests however they desire, state restrictions [on	16
arrests] do not alter the Fourth Amendment’s protections.”); Tanberg v. Sholtis, 401	17
F.3d 1151, 1163-64 (10th Cir. 2005) (“That an arrest violated police department	18
procedures does not make it more or less likely that the arrest implicates the Fourth	19
Amendment[.]”); United States v. Wilson, 699 F.3d 235, 243 (2d Cir. 2012) (“[T]he	20

5
Fourth Amendment does not generally incorporate local statutory or regulatory	1
restrictions on seizures and . . . the violation of such restrictions will not generally	2
affect the constitutionality of a seizure supported by probable cause.”). Conversely,	3
an officer’s adherence to a constitutionally flawed police department policy does not	4
suffice to excuse a constitutional violation. See United States v. Brown, 934 F.3d	5
1278, 1296 (11th Cir. 2019) (reasoning that while a jury may consider police	6
department policy as relevant evidence, it may not substitute the policy for the	7
constitutional standard); cf. City of Oklahoma City v. Tuttle, 471 U.S. 808, 812	8
(1985) (explaining that a city may be held liable when the official policy of the city	9
causes an officer to deprive a person of his or her constitutional rights in the	10
execution of such policy). As well, a law enforcement officer’s understanding of the	11
law—something a police department policy is not, in any event—is not dispositive	12
in determining the constitutionality of a search or seizure. See State v. Martinez,	13
1997-NMCA-048, ¶ 15, 123 N.M. 405, 940 P.2d 1200 (“The state of mind of the	14
law enforcement officer is not dispositive in determining the constitutionality of a	15
search or seizure. Ordinarily, the propriety of an officer’s action is based on the	16
information known to the officer, not on the officer’s motive or understanding of the	17
law.”).	18
{6} 	We conclude that Defendant was legally arrested when a NCIC database	19
search 	revealed 	the 	existence 	of 	two 	outstanding 	felony 	arrest 	warrants 	for	20

6
Defendant, regardless of police department policy regarding secondary confirmation	1
of the accuracy of the arrest warrant or warrants. That the policy-required secondary	2
confirmation of Defendant’s warrants was ongoing when Defendant was handcuffed	3
and searched during officers’ on-scene investigation does not invalidate the legality	4
of the arrest and constitutionality of the contemporaneous search thereto. Also,	5
Defendant here does not challenge the lawfulness of the initial stop, the NCIC	6
database search, nor the validity of his arrest warrants.	7
{7} 	Our holding in this regard is consistent also with the premise upon which past	8
supportive New Mexico case law rests, which upheld the validity of arrests made	9
pursuant to outstanding warrants, even without physical possession of the underlying	10
warrant, when the validity of the warrant is unchallenged. See State v. Grijalva,	11
1973-NMCA-061, ¶¶ 5, 10-13, 85 N.M. 127, 509 P.2d 894 (holding that arrest and	12
seizure were lawful where dispatch indicated the defendant had an outstanding	13
warrant and that in the absence of a challenge to the validity of an arrest warrant,	14
physical possession of the warrant is not required for a lawful arrest). We similarly	15
hold that Defendant’s arrest, pursuant to valid and unchallenged arrest warrants,	16
irrespective of any secondary confirmation per local police department policy, was	17
lawful.	18
{8} 	In his reply brief, Defendant cites to State v. Yazzie for the proposition that	19
preliminarily indication by dispatch of a possible warrant could not give rise to	20

7
probable cause for an arrest. 2016-NMSC-026, ¶¶ 2, 40, 376 P.3d 858. However,	1
Yazzie is inapposite to the case at bar. There, our Supreme Court held that an	2
“unknown” status designation from a database determining whether drivers were	3
compliant with insurance requirements may form the reasonable suspicion for an	4
investigatory stop. Id. ¶ 40. Also, the evidence in Yazzie demonstrated that “close to	5
ninety percent of vehicles reflecting an ‘unknown’ compliance status” were in fact	6
uninsured in violation of law. Id. ¶ 2. Conversely, here, we review whether officers	7
involved in an already valid stop, investigating whether a scooter was stolen, may	8
rely on outstanding felony warrants—without completed secondary confirmation—	9
to lawfully arrest a defendant. We reiterate that we have never held that secondary	10
confirmation of a warrant is required for an arrest to be lawful, and we cannot	11
consider 	Yazzie, discussing the propriety of an insurance database search as	12
providing reasonable suspicion for an initial stop, to be dispositive on outstanding	13
felony arrest warrants under the facts of this case. Defendant cites no other	14
controlling authority and thus, we assume none exists. See In re Adoption of Doe,	15
1984-NMSC-024, ¶ 2, 100 N.M. 764, 676 P.2d 1329 (“We assume where arguments	16
in briefs are unsupported by cited authority, counsel after diligent search, was unable	17
to find any supporting authority. We therefore will not do this research for	18
counsel.”); Curry v. Great Nw. Ins. Co., 2014-NMCA-031, ¶ 28, 320 P.3d 482	19

8
(“Where a party cites no authority to support an argument, we may assume no such	1
authority exists.”).	2
{9} 	Moreover, given the lawfulness of the arrest, we also conclude that the district	3
court properly denied the motion to suppress Defendant’s statements and the	4
evidence seized from the search incident to that lawful arrest. We briefly explain.	5
Searches incident to arrests are the well-established exception to the generally	6
applicable warrant requirement. See State v. Paananen, 2015-NMSC-031, ¶ 29, 357	7
P.3d 958 (“One of the most firmly established exceptions to the warrant requirement	8
is the right on the part of the government, always recognized under English and	9
American law, to search the person of the accused when legally arrested.” (internal	10
quotation 	marks 	and 	citation 	omitted)). 	Our 	jurisprudence 	permits 	a	11
contemporaneous search incident to an arrest when an outstanding warrant forms the	12
basis of the arrest. See State v. Weidner, 2007-NMCA-063, ¶ 18, 141 N.M. 582, 158	13
P.3d 1025 (stating that the search incident to an arrest exception requires the state to	14
prove that “the search occurs as a contemporaneous incident to the lawful arrest of	15
the defendant and is confined to the area within the defendant’s immediate control”	16
(internal quotation marks and citation omitted)). Defendant’s outstanding arrest	17
warrants resulted in his arrest, and the methamphetamine seized from Defendant’s	18
belt loop in the search incident to the arrest, which lead to the controlled substance	19
possession charge at issue, were not necessary to justify that arrest. See id. ¶ 19	20

9
(“This Court has stated that even if a search occurs before the formal arrest, the	1
search is lawful as long as the fruits of the search were not necessary to justify the	2
arrest and the formal arrest followed quickly on the heels of the challenged search.”	3
(internal 	quotation 	marks 	and 	citation 	omitted)). 	In 	addition, 	although 	not	4
dispositive, the outstanding warrants were confirmed within minutes of Officer	5
Apodaca arresting Defendant and searching him incident to the arrest. For these	6
reasons, we conclude that the district court properly denied the motion to suppress	7
the evidence and statements resulting from a search incident to a lawful arrest.	8
II. 	The District Court Did Not Abuse Its Discretion in Admitting the Lapel	9
Video Evidence of Defendant’s Incriminating Statements Under the Rule	10
of Completeness	11
{10} 	Defendant argues that the district court erred by allowing the jury to receive	12
evidence of his incriminating statements under the rule of completeness. “We review	13
the admission of evidence under an abuse of discretion standard and will not reverse	14
in the absence of a clear abuse.” State v. Candelaria, 2019-NMCA-032, ¶ 41, 446	15
P.3d 1205 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted), cert. denied, 2019-	16
NMCERT-___ (No. S-1-SC-37644, May 9, 2019). “An abuse of discretion occurs	17
when a ruling is against logic and is clearly untenable or not justified by reason.” Id.	18
(internal 	quotation 	marks 	and 	citation 	omitted). 	Given 	the 	presumption 	of	19
correctness in the district court’s ruling, the party claiming error bears the burden of	20

10
showing such error. See State v. Aragon, 1999-NMCA-060, ¶ 10, 127 N.M. 393, 981	1
P.2d 1211.	2
{11} 	At trial, Defendant sought to introduce a portion of Officer Apodaca’s lapel	3
video evidence to impeach Officer Apodaca on his statements regarding the	4
evidence collected at the scene, alleging that the sample tested was not retrieved	5
from Defendant and instead belonged to the female suspect, Linda Alvarez. 1
6
Defendant was unable to properly admit the relevant portion of the video however,	7
because it was not prepared in a form that the jury could review without extraneous	8
content also being admitted. As a consequence, Defendant agreed to lay a foundation	9
for the entire video, including the accompanying audio, from Officer Apodaca’s	10
lapel camera and moved to admit it into evidence, waiving any objection to the	11
statements contained therein. The State then argued that a piecemeal presentation of	12
evidence, highlighting certain portions of video with audio, would confuse the	13
witnesses and the jury and that for the sake of completeness Officer Baca’s lapel	14
1 During the State’s case in chief, Officer Apodaca clarified that a plastic
baggie containing methamphetamine was also seized from Alvarez, but that the
white powder loose in Defendant’s red pill container was separately sealed into “the
larger [of the two] bag[s].” The samples were then tagged into the same evidence
bag because both samples field-tested as methamphetamine. The forensics expert
who analyzed the evidence in the larger baggie also testified and confirmed that the
sample was methamphetamine. The district court in reviewing Officer Apodaca’s
lapel camera evidence noted that the footage was unclear on the question of which
baggie (and its contents) belonged to whom.

11
camera evidence presented during the State’s case in chief should also be admitted	1
with audio, having previously been admitted without audio. 	After prolonged	2
discussions, the court ruled that Defendant’s request to admit Officer Apodaca’s	3
lapel video evidence with 	audio constituted a waiver of his earlier objection	4
regarding the audio on Officer Baca’s lapel video evidence and permitted both	5
officers’ lapel camera evidence with audio to be admitted for the jury to review.	6
{12} 	Under the rule of completeness, “a party may move for the admission of any	7
writing 	or 	recorded 	statement 	that 	should, 	in 	fairness, 	be 	considered	8
contemporaneously with a writing or recorded statement introduced by another	9
party.” State v. Baca, 1995-NMSC-045, ¶ 24, 120 N.M. 383, 902 P.2d 65; see Rule	10
11-106 (“If a party introduces all or part of a writing or recorded statement, an	11
adverse party may require the introduction, at that time, of any other part—or any	12
other writing or recorded statement—that in fairness ought to be considered at the	13
same time.”). The rule permits parties “to introduce recorded statements to place in	14
context other evidence that, when viewed alone, may be misleading.” Baca, 1995-	15
NMSC-045, ¶ 24. Based on our review of the record—specifically, the bench	16
discussion regarding the admission of both officers’ lapel camera footage—the	17
district court ruled that highlighting certain segments of video which included audio	18
from Officer Apodaca’s lapel camera during the defense’s presentation would likely	19
confuse the jury when considered alongside Officer Baca’s video-only recording,	20

12
previously admitted during the State’s case in chief. Thus, the district court ruled	1
that the jury should be permitted to fully review both videos, avoiding any	2
misleading or deceptive impressions of the evidence.	3
{13} 	Defendant argues that admission of Officer Baca’s lapel camera video	4
evidence with audio was an abuse of discretion because it was unrelated to the	5
purpose for which he had offered Officer Apodaca’s lapel camera evidence—to	6
show the jury which bag was collected from Alvarez. Defendant cites State v. Barr	7
for its proposition that the introduction of additional video evidence was improper	8
under the rule of completeness because “defense counsel had not created a	9
misleading or deceptive impression of the videotaped statement and because the	10
[s]tate had not shown that the entire video was both relevant and explained or	11
qualified the portions initially referenced by defense counsel[.]” 2009-NMSC-024,	12
¶ 32, 146 N.M. 301, 210 P.3d 198, overruled on other grounds by State v. Tollardo,	13
2012-NMSC-008, ¶ 37, 275 P.3d 110. We disagree.	14
{14} 	Our review of the videos is consistent with the district court’s conclusion that	15
Officer Apodaca’s lapel camera evidence was inconclusive on the question of which	16
baggie belonged to whom. Unlike Barr, here, there was legitimate concern that a	17
barrage of unconnected video segments would confuse the jury, and thus, admission	18
of the videos under the rule of completeness was proper. Moreover, Defendant	19
waived his earlier objections to out-of-court statements by admitting Officer	20

13
Apodaca’s redacted lapel camera footage, which also included audio containing	1
statements of Defendant. Considered in sum, we cannot conclude that the district	2
court abused its discretion by admitting Officer Baca’s lapel camera video with	3
audio, alongside Officer Apodaca’s, despite the former’s inclusion of certain	4
incriminating statements by Defendant, on grounds that the admission of both better	5
enabled the jury to evaluate the collective footage and avoid any misleading	6
impressions therefrom.	7
III. 	The District Court Did Not Err in Refusing to Grant a Continuance	8
{15} 	Defendant next contends that the district court erred in its denial of a	9
continuance, finding that defense counsel was responsible for his unpreparedness	10
but refusing to also find counsel “ineffective” given his unpreparedness. “The grant	11
or denial of a continuance is within the sound discretion of the trial court, and the	12
burden of establishing abuse of discretion rests with the defendant.” State v. Salazar,	13
2007-NMSC-004, ¶ 10, 141 N.M. 148, 152 P.3d 135. There will be no grounds for	14
reversal unless the defendant demonstrates abuse of discretion that resulted in	15
prejudice to the defendant. See State v. Sanchez, 1995-NMSC-053, ¶ 17, 120 N.M.	16
247, 901 P.2d 178.	17
{16} 	We initially note that Defendant’s arguments in this section are particularly	18
difficult to follow as they were inadequately developed and conclusory. See State v.	19
Guerra, 2012-NMSC-014, ¶ 21, 278 P.3d 1031 (explaining that appellate courts are	20

14
under no obligation to review unclear or undeveloped arguments); Corona v.	1
Corona, 2014-NMCA-071, ¶ 28, 329 P.3d 701 (“This Court has no duty to review	2
an argument that is not adequately developed.”). Nevertheless, to the extent we	3
understand Defendant’s arguments, we briefly address them.	4
{17} 	Defendant contends that the late disclosure of the drug-analysis evidence and	5
the officers’ lapel video evidence undermined defense counsel’s preparedness for	6
trial. The State responded that the evidence at issue was available to Defendant when	7
defense counsel received discovery in the case, but defense counsel neglected to	8
retrieve the video from APD evidence. Here, contrary to the district court’s pretrial	9
scheduling order stating that all discovery and/or motions to suppress or other	10
substantive motions should be filed thirty days before the first day of trial,	11
Defendant’s motion to continue and motion to suppress were filed only fifteen days	12
before the first day of trial, and Defendant’s motion to compel the production of	13
video evidence filed only ten days before the first day of trial. See State v.	14
Candelaria, 2008-NMCA-120, ¶ 14, 144 N.M. 797, 192 P.3d 792 (explaining that a	15
trial court has the inherent authority to control its docket and the proceedings before	16
it); see also Gonzales v. Atnip, 1984-NMCA-128, ¶ 20, 102 N.M. 194, 692 P.2d	17
1343 (“Trial courts have inherent power to manage their own affairs so as to achieve	18
the orderly and expeditious disposition of cases.” (internal quotation marks and	19
citation omitted)). We decline to consider a denial of a continuance based on	20

15
counsel’s unpreparedness for trial and failure to timely raise discovery issues as	1
amounting to an abuse of discretion by the court. Instead, we consider these issues	2
to fall squarely within the court’s inherent authority to manage its docket and ensure	3
orderly and expeditious disposition of cases. See Candelaria, 2008-NMCA-120,	4
¶ 14. In addition, Defendant’s allegation that the district court’s comment that	5
defense counsel’s request to be found ineffective was contemptuous, alongside its	6
finding that defense counsel was unprepared, is self-contradictory, and therefore an	7
abuse of discretion, is similarly tenuous, considering Defendant’s failure to adhere	8
to the pretrial scheduling order in the immediate days preceding trial. Accordingly,	9
we conclude that the district court did not err in its denial of a continuance.	10
CONCLUSION	11
{18} 	For the foregoing reasons, we affirm Defendant’s conviction.	12
{19} 	IT IS SO ORDERED.	13
_________________________________	14
J. MILES HANISEE, Chief Judge	15
WE CONCUR:	16
_________________________________	17
KRISTINA BOGARDUS, Judge	18
_________________________________	19
JACQUELINE R. MEDINA, Judge	20