April 17, 2014 – State of New Mexico v. Rebecca Vigil-Giron, No. 32,615

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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF NEW MEXICO

Opinion Number:

Filing Date: April 17, 2014

NO. 32,615

STATE OF NEW MEXICO,
Plaintiff-A ppellant,

V.

REBECCA VIGIL-GIRON,
Defendant-A ppellee.

APPEAL FROM THE DISTRICT COURT OF BERNALILLO COUNTY
Reed S. Sheppard, District J udge

Joseph E. CampBell, Special Prosecutor
Edgewood, NM

for Appellant

Gorence & Oliveros, P.C.
Robert J. Gorence

Albuquerque, NM

for Appellee

OPINION
SUTIN, Judge.
{1} 	On August 19, 2009, Defendant Rebecca Vigil-Giron was indicted on fifty
counts of fraud, money laundering, embezzlement, and other offenses relating to her
use of election funds during her tenure as Secretary of State. On November 14, 2012,
following two hearings on Defendant’s motion to dismiss for a violation of her right
to a speedy trial, the district court entered an order of dismissal of the case on speedy
trial grounds. The State appeals from the order of dismissal. We conclude that the
district court properly ruled that Defendant’s constitutional right to a speedy trial was
violated, and we affirm the order of dismissal.
BACKGROUND
{2} 	The following factual background is, in large part, adopted from the district
court’s undisputed findings of fact. Defendant was indicted on August 19, 2009. The
case against Defendant was initially joined with those against co-defendants Armando
Gutierrez, 	Joseph 	Carl 	Kupfer, 	and 	Elizabeth 	Kupfer 	(collectively 	“the 	co-
defendants”). On September 4, 2009, Defendant entered a waiver of arraignment and
a plea of not guilty and filed a motion requesting the court to dismiss the case pursuant
to Rule 5-204 NMRA “until a fair and impartial prosecutor could be secured.” See id.
(governing the amendment or dismissal of a complaint, indictment, or information).

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The district court referred to this motion as one to disqualify the attorney general (a
characterization that is not a point of contention in this appeal) and for ease of
reference and clarity in this Opinion, we do the same. Prior to filing the motion to
disqualify the attorney general, Defendant, through her counsel, sent a letter dated
August 5, 2009, to Attorney General Gary King stating the reasons that, in her view,
the Attorney General’s Office had a duty to recuse itself from investigating or
prosecuting the case.
{3} 	From August to October 2009, a series of district court judges were excused or
recused from presiding over the case. 	Judge Neil Candelaria was excused by Ms.
Kupfer on August 27, 2009; Judge Stan Whitaker was excused by Defendant on
September 4, 2009; Judge Charles Brown was excused by the State on September 15,
2009; and Judge Robert Schwartz recused himself from the case on October 16, 2009.
On October 19, 2009, Judge Albert Murdoch was assigned to the case. On January
13, 2010, without having heard Defendant’s motion to disqualify the attorney general,
the court set a jury trial for July 19, 2010. On January 29, 2010, pursuant to Rule 5-
604 NMRA (2010, prior to May 12, 2010, amendment), the State filed a petition to
extend the time in which to commence trial to September 30, 2010. 	See Rule 5-
604(B)(1) (2010) (requiring the commencement of a trial six months after the waiver
of arraignment in district court). The State’s motion was premised, in part, on the fact

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that because Defendant waived arraignment on September 4, 2009, the trial date of
July 19, 2010, was “beyond the six[-]month rule[.]” 	Defendant objected to the
extension. The court granted the Rule 5-604 petition on February 2, 2010, ordering
that the time to commence trial was extended “to and including” September 30, 2010.
{4} 	On May 28, 2010, the State filed a motion requesting the court to clarify the
status of the case. Among other things, in its motion to clarify, the State pointed to
the fact that no hearing had yet been scheduled on Defendant’s motion to disqualify
the attorney general. On June 18, 2010, the court held a status conference. Also on
June 18, 2010, over Defendant’s objection, the court formally vacated the July 19,
2010, trial setting; it later reset the trial to commence on January 3, 2011.
{5} 	On August 13, 2010, Defendant filed a motion for severance of her case from
those against the co-defendants, alleging, in part, that the co-defendants could offer
exculpatory testimony that would be useful at trial. 	Included in the motion for
severance, Defendant requested that she be tried after Mr. Gutierrez so that he would
be prompted “to testify justly without fear of attorney general retribution.” 	Later,
however, Defendant withdrew her request to be tried after the co-defendants,
requesting instead that she be tried first so that her right to a speedy trial was
preserved. Defendant’s motion for severance was finally granted on May 18, 2012,
approximately twenty-one months later.

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{6} 	On October 12, 2010, the State filed another motion for clarification of status.
In its motion, the State pointed to the fact that there were a number of pending
motions, including, among others, Defendant’s motion to disqualify the attorney
general. 	The State requested that the court address the outstanding motions at its
“earliest opportunity[.]” On November 5, 2010, the court held a status conference.
The court vacated the January 3, 2011, date, but did not set a new trial date.
{7} 	Defendant filed her first motion to dismiss for a speedy trial violation on
January 4, 2011. 	In support of her claim of prejudice as a result of the delay in
bringing the matter to trial, Defendant attached an affidavit in which she stated that,
as a result of not having received a speedy trial, she had suffered a loss of
employment, an inability to find new employment, various health issues, and “extreme
public humiliation.” Also attached to the January 4, 2011, speedy trial motion were
four letters addressed to Judge Murdoch from Robert Gorence, Defendant’s counsel.
The first letter, dated November 12, 2010, read, in part:
This letter is in response to your directive issued during the November
5, 2010[, p]retrial [c]onference that [Defendant], on a weekly basis,
assert her request for a speedy trial and inform the [c]ourt of her
readiness to proceed on the January 3, 2011[,] trial setting. 	As I
informed the [c]ourt during the last status conference, [Defendant] is
ready to proceed to trial, she asserts her right to a speedy trial, and
continued delay will cause her further prejudice.

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The letter also addressed the prejudice suffered including Defendant’s having been
“ostracized in the community and [unable to] obtain employment”; having been
“castigated in the press”; and suffering health issues caused “by the stress of a
scurrilously inaccurate indictment.” By the letter, Defendant “demand[ed] her right
to a speedy trial[.]”
{8} 	A letter dated November 19, 2010, reiterated Defendant’s “read[iness] to go to
trial” and the continued prejudice suffered as a result of the delay in bringing her case
to trial, particularly calling the court’s attention to Defendant’s suffering “financial
hardship” as the result of being unemployable in light of the pending indictment. A
letter dated November 24, 2010, indicated Defendant’s “readiness to go to trial”;
noted her “continued assertion of her right to a speedy trial”; and indicated that
“[n]othing ha[d] changed from [the] first two letters.” A fourth letter, dated December
3, 2010, reasserted Defendant’s readiness to go to trial and her right to a speedy trial,
and it further noted that defense counsel had “kept [his] calendar open for the month
of January[] 2011, in anticipation of [the] trial[.]” 	On January 20, 2011, the State
responded to Defendant’s January 4, 2011, speedy trial motion.
{9} 	On March 14 and continuing through March 17, 2011, the court held an
evidentiary hearing on Defendant’s motion to disqualify the attorney general. 	On
March 17, 2011, the court entered an order disqualifying the Attorney General’s

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Office from prosecuting the case. 	On March 30, 2011, the court entered an order
giving the attorney general until April 29, 2011, to name a special prosecutor.
{10} 	On May 11, 2011, Defendant filed her second motion to dismiss based on a
violation of her right to a speedy trial, and on May 12, 2011, she filed an amended
version of this motion. The motion referred to Defendant’s steadfast assertion of her
right to a speedy trial, and it referenced the reasons supporting dismissal set forth in
the first speedy trial motion. The State responded to this motion on June 6, 2011.
{11} 	On June 21, 2011, Defendant and the co-defendants filed a joint motion to
dismiss based on the State’s failure to designate an independent prosecutor by the date
ordered by the court. The State responded on June 30, 2011. A hearing was held on
the joint motion, and the motion was apparently denied, although the record in this
case does not include a copy of the court’s order. 	On July 27, 2011, special
prosecutor Joseph CampBell was appointed to prosecute the case.
{12} 	On July 29, 2011, Judge Murdoch retired. Judge Sam Winder was appointed
to replace him in September 2011, and on December 7, 2011, Judge Winder recused
from the case. 	In the meantime, on December 1, 2011, Defendant filed her third
motion to dismiss based on a speedy trial violation. This December 1, 2011, motion
referenced the lapse of nearly twenty-seven months since Defendant was indicted, the
dozens of pending motions, some of which were filed over two years earlier, and

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stated that Defendant “should not be the recipient of the prejudice she suffers by not
being afforded a speedy trial.” The State filed its response on December 15, 2011.
{13} 	Judge Ross Sanchez was assigned to the case on January 9, 2012; he recused
the same day. Judge Reed Sheppard was assigned to the case on January 13, 2012,
and on March 30, 2012, Judge Sheppard scheduled a status conference to be held on
April 11, 2012. 	In the court’s order granting Defendant’s motion to dismiss for a
speedy trial violation, Judge Sheppard observed that by the time he was assigned to
the case, “dozens of motions had been filed by Defendant and [the] co-defendants that
had not yet been set or heard, including the three separate speedy trial motions.” On
May 18, 2012, in a letter to counsel, the court stated that it would decide outstanding
motions upon written submissions except for the speedy trial motions, unless either
party requested otherwise. 	In response to the responsive letters from counsel, the
court set two days for evidentiary hearings on five of the motions, including
Defendant’s three speedy trial motions.
{14} 	At the first hearing, on August 13, 2012, Defendant offered, and within a few
days of the court requesting them, provided medical records for the court’s in camera
review to corroborate her claims of prejudice resulting from the delay. 	As noted,
Defendant’s affidavit filed on January 4, 2011, describing the prejudice that
Defendant had suffered as a result of the delay was already before the district court

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at this time. The State provided no evidence to controvert Defendant’s claims, it did
not call Defendant as a witness in order to cross-examine her on her affidavit, nor did
it call any other witnesses. At a second hearing, held on October 19, 2012, Defendant
was the sole witness called to testify. She testified to prejudice suffered as a result of
the delay, which we discuss in greater detail later in this Opinion.
{15} 	On November 14, 2012, the court entered an order dismissing the case against
Defendant for a violation of her constitutional right to a speedy trial. On appeal, the
State requests that we reverse the court’s order of dismissal. The State’s overarching
contention is that the court erred in weighing the speedy trial factors and that those
errors resulted in an erroneous dismissal on speedy trial grounds. The State makes a
number of sub-arguments in support of its contention, which are discussed in greater
detail throughout this Opinion. After considering each of the State’s arguments, we
conclude that the district court did not err in its speedy trial analysis. Accordingly, we
affirm.
DISCUSSION
A. 	Standard of Review
{16} 	Under the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution, a person who
is accused of a crime has a fundamental right to a speedy trial. State v. Garza, 2009-
NMSC-038, ¶ 10, 146 N.M. 499, 212 P.3d 387. 	At the heart of this right is

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“preventing prejudice to the accused.” 	Id. ¶ 12. In effect, the right is intended “to
prevent oppressive pretrial incarceration[,]” to minimize anxiety accompanying public
accusation, and “to limit the possibility that the defense will be impaired.” 	State v.
Spearman, 2012-NMSC-023, ¶ 34, 283 P.3d 272 (internal quotation marks and
citation omitted); accord Garza, 2009-NMSC-038, ¶ 12.
{17} 	Determining whether a defendant’s speedy trial right has been violated requires
a review of the particular circumstances of each case including consideration of the
conduct of the prosecution, that of the defendant, and “the harm to the defendant from
the delay.” Garza, 2009-NMSC-038, ¶ 13. Our analysis in this regard is guided by
considering four factors: “(1) the length of delay[;] (2) the reasons for the delay[;]
(3) the defendant’s assertion of [her] right[;] and (4) the actual prejudice to the
defendant that, on balance, determines whether a defendant’s right to speedy trial has
been violated.” Id. (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).
{18} 	On appeal from an order of dismissal for a violation of a defendant’s right to
a speedy trial, “we give deference to the district court’s factual findings,” but we
review the speedy trial factors de novo. Spearman, 2012-NMSC-023, ¶ 19 (alteration,
internal quotation marks, and citation omitted).

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B. 	The Length of the Delay
{19} 	“The length of delay serves two purposes under the speedy trial analysis.” Id.
¶ 20. On the one hand, it triggers an analysis of the speedy trial factors; and on the
other hand it is, itself, a speedy trial factor to be weighed in the balance. 	Id. 	The
speedy trial analysis in the present case was triggered by the passage of thirty-six
months from the date that Defendant was indicted to the date of the first evidentiary
hearing on her motion to dismiss for a speedy trial violation. 	The court, having
determined that this was a complex case, found that the delay exceeded the speedy
trial analysis triggering date of eighteen months by an additional eighteen months.
See Garza, 2009-NMSC-038, ¶ 2 (stating that the length of delay necessary to trigger
the speedy trial inquiry is eighteen months for complex cases). Stated differently, on
February 18, 2011, once eighteen months had passed from the date Defendant was
indicted, the delay in bringing her to trial became presumptively prejudicial. 	See
Spearman, 2012-NMCA-023, ¶ 21 (recognizing that the triggering date preceding a
speedy trial analysis is synonymous with a “presumptively prejudicial” delay); Garza,
2009-NMSC-038, ¶¶ 21, 23 (same).
{20} 	In terms of the weight given to the length of the delay, “the greater the delay[,]
the more heavily it will potentially weigh against the [prosecution].” Garza, 2009-
NMSC-038, ¶ 24. In the present case, based on the passage of an additional eighteen

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months beyond the triggering date, the district court found that the length of the delay
weighed heavily against the State. The State does not attack the court’s finding in this
regard, and as such, the finding is conclusive. See Rule 12-213(A)(4) NMRA (stating
that the appellant’s argument “shall set forth a specific attack on any finding, or such
finding shall be deemed conclusive”).
C. 	The Reasons for the Delay
{21} 	“Closely related to [the] length of delay is the reason the government assigns
to justify the delay.” 	Garza, 2009-NMSC-038, ¶ 25 (internal quotation marks and
citation omitted). A deliberate or bad faith attempt to delay the trial with the goal of
hindering the defense will weigh heavily against the prosecution; whereas delay
caused by a valid reason, such as a missing witness or time spent opposing the
defendant’s pretrial motions, is both inevitable and wholly justifiable. Id. ¶¶ 25, 27.
In the middle of this spectrum is “negligent or administrative delay,” which is delay
caused, for example, by overcrowded courts, the reassignment of judges, or
governmental negligence. Id. ¶¶ 26, 29. Negligent or administrative delay is weighed
against the prosecution because “the ultimate responsibility for such circumstances . . .
rest[s] with the government rather than with the defendant[.]” 	Spearman, 2012-
NMSC-023, ¶ 25 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). 	“The degree of
weight we assign against the [prosecution] for negligent delay is closely related to the

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length of delay”; the longer the delay, or the greater the threat to the fairness to the
defendant, the less tolerant we are of the delay. Garza, 2009-NMSC-038, ¶ 26.
{22} 	The district court parsed the delay in this case into four time frames. The first
was the two-month delay between Defendant’s indictment on August 19, 2009, to the
assignment of the case to Judge Murdoch on October 19, 2009. The court weighed
that two-month time frame neutrally, “against neither party.”
{23} 	The second was the approximately eighteen-month delay between the time that
Defendant filed a motion to disqualify the attorney general on September 4, 2009, to
July 27, 2011, when the special prosecutor, Joseph CampBell was appointed to the
case. The court noted that Defendant’s motion to disqualify the attorney general was
not heard until eighteen months after it was filed, then, following a four-day hearing,
it was “finally granted on March 30, 2011[.]” The court found that “[o]ther than filing
the [m]otion . . . Defendant did nothing to cause this delay.” The court observed that
Rule 5-601(F) NMRA requires all pretrial motions to be disposed of within “a
reasonable time after filing[,]” and it found that six months was a “reasonable” time
frame for the court to have disposed of Defendant’s motion. The court concluded that
[t]he eighteen months it took for the [c]ourt to hear [Defendant’s motion
to disqualify the attorney general] was not reasonable. Two jury trials
had been scheduled before it was determined who would be prosecuting
the case. 	Once the [motion was heard], the [c]ourt entered its ruling
expeditiously, but the State’s motion for reconsideration and the delay
in appointing a special prosecutor extended the time even further.

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Accounting for the two-month overlap of the first and second time-frames from
August 19, 2009, to the assignment of the case to Judge Murdoch on October 19,
2009, that weighed neutrally, the court ruled that the remainder of the delay in the
second time frame, exceeding sixteen months, weighed against the State. 	See
Spearman, 2012-NMSC-023, ¶ 25 (stating that negligent or administrative delay is
weighed against the prosecution).
{24} 	The period of five and one-half months from July 29, 2011, when Judge
Murdoch retired, to January 13, 2012, when the case was assigned to Judge Sheppard,
who ultimately presided over the matter, represented the district court’s third time
frame. The court ruled that the delay caused by Judge Murdoch’s retirement and the
subsequent recusals of Judges Winder and Sanchez fell “within the administrative
burdens on the criminal justice system and in the speedy trial context, is considered
to be negligent delay and weighs against the [S]tate[.]” See Garza, 2009-NMSC-038,
¶ 29 (stating that “multiple reassignments of judges in the district court . . . falls within
the administrative burdens on the criminal justice system” and is weighed against the
prosecution accordingly).
{25} 	Finally, the court noted that its fourth time frame, extending from January 13,
2012, when the case was assigned to Judge Sheppard, to November 14, 2012, the date
of its speedy trial dismissal order, was neutral, weighing against neither party, because

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“the case was proceeding normally during that time frame.” 	See State v. Valencia,
2010-NMCA-005, ¶ 18, 147 N.M. 432, 224 P.3d 659 (stating that “where a case
moves toward trial with customary promptness, the period of time is to be weighed
neutrally” (internal quotation marks and citation omitted)).
{26} 	The State argues that the district court erred in weighing the sixteen-month
delay in hearing Defendant’s motion to disqualify the attorney general against the
State. The State attributes this error to what it views as the court’s failure to address
three delay-causing factors that should not have weighed against the State. 	We
address each of these in turn.
1. 	The Co-Defendants’ Substitution of Counsel
{27} 	The State argues that in weighing the reasons for the delay in the second time
frame, the district court overlooked the allegedly delay-causing acts of the co-
defendants replacing their counsel. 	Specifically, the State asserts that Ms. Kupfer
changed attorneys on May 10, 2010, thereby necessitating a continuance of the trial
scheduled to commence on July 19, 2010; and Mr. Gutierrez changed attorneys on
October 1, 2010, thereby necessitating a continuance of the trial scheduled to
commence on January 3, 2011. 	Contrary to the Rules of Appellate Procedure, the
State fails to provide record proper citations supporting its assertion that these
activities necessitated continuances of the trial; however, even assuming this to be

15
true, it has no persuasive value in the context of the circumstances of this case. See
Rule 12-213(A)(4) (requiring the brief in chief to contain citations to the record proper
with respect to each argument raised therein).
{28} 	As noted in the background section of this Opinion, by the time the July 19,
2010, and January 3, 2011, trial dates were vacated, the district court had yet to rule
on a number of motions. 	Among those unresolved motions was Defendant’s
September 4, 2009, motion to disqualify the attorney general, which was finally
granted on March 30, 2011. 	In the district court’s view, the lack of resolution
regarding whether the attorney general would be disqualified from prosecuting the
case was the relevant fact in weighing the delay against the State as administrative
delay. See Spearman, 2012-NMSC-023, ¶ 25 (“Negligent or administrative delay is
weighed 	against 	the 	[prosecution], 	since 	the 	ultimate 	responsibility 	for 	such
circumstances must rest with the government rather than with the defendant[.]”
(internal quotation marks and citation omitted)). As noted earlier in this Opinion, the
district court observed that “[t]wo jury trials had been scheduled before it was
determined[,] [on July 27, 2011,] who would be prosecuting the case.” We interpret
the court’s order as reflecting its view that, in the absence of a resolution of
Defendant’s motion to disqualify the attorney general, the July 2010 and January 2011
trial dates were untenable. We agree with the court’s assessment. It seems obvious

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that while the disqualification motion, along with many other motions, was pending,
the case against Defendant could not have gone to trial as scheduled. Because the
matter of who would be prosecuting the case was not resolved until July 27, 2011,
when a special prosecutor was finally appointed, we see no basis on which to conclude
that the trial could have commenced earlier.
{29} 	Thus, considering the surrounding circumstances, the substitutions of counsel
that the State points to, both of which occurred prior to the appointment of the special
prosecutor, were essentially irrelevant in the court’s speedy trial analysis. The State
does not provide any persuasive argument or authority to demonstrate that the co-
defendants’ counsel-substituting activities, which occurred within the period of
negligent or administrative delay during which a number of motions were pending,
should be weighed neutrally. As such, we are not persuaded that the court erred in
excluding the co-defendants’ substitutions of counsel from its speedy trial analysis.
Further, we observe that Defendant’s motion to sever her case from those against the
co-defendants was filed on August 13, 2010, and was finally granted on May 18,
2012. Had Defendant’s motion to sever been heard and decided earlier, any delay in
bringing her to trial that may have been caused by the activities of her co-defendants
could have been avoided.
2. 	The Co-Defendants’ Various Motions

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{30} 	The State also makes a general argument, substantially lacking supporting
citations to the record, that “the [d]efendants . . . filed no less [than] forty-five . . .
substantive motions in this case,” including eleven filed by Defendant, and that the
delay caused by these motions should have weighed against Defendant. The State
does not develop an argument demonstrating how the motions contributed to the
delay; instead, the State generally asserts that “[c]learly, . . . filing . . . these motions
caused delay in bringing this matter to trial.” This argument by the State, insofar as
it is undeveloped, unclear, and in large part lacking supporting citations, does not
facilitate review, and will not be considered further. 	See State v. Fuentes, 2010-
NMCA-027, ¶ 29, 147 N.M. 761, 228 P.3d 1181 (noting that we will “not review
unclear or undeveloped arguments [that] require us to guess at what a part[y’s]
arguments might be”).
3. 	The State’s Argument Regarding Defendant’s Contribution to the Delay
{31} 	The State further argues that the court erred in ruling that, beyond filing a
motion to disqualify the attorney general, Defendant did nothing to contribute to the
delay. The State identifies what it contends are two contributions to the delay made
by Defendant. The first is Defendant’s failure to request a hearing on the motion to
disqualify the attorney general, and the second is Defendant’s having actually filed the
motion.

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{32} 	As noted earlier, the district court relied on Rule 5-601(F) for the proposition
that the length of time that passed between the filing of the motion to disqualify and
a hearing on that motion weighed against the State because it was the result of
negligence or overcrowded courts and was “not reasonable.” According to the State,
however, the court “failed to consider” the fact that, contrary to Local Rule 2-123
NMRA, Defendant did not request a hearing on her motion to disqualify, and, as a
result, the court was not notified of the motion until August 2, 2010, when Ms. Kupfer
filed a similar motion, in an unrelated criminal case (D-202-CR-2009-03019), and
requested a hearing under Local Rule 2-123. See LR2-123(A)(2) (stating that “[a]s
a condition of filing, all opposed motions . . . shall be presented to the clerk with . . .
[a]n original request for hearing . . . along with a copy of the request for the assigned
judge”).
{33} 	As an initial matter, the State’s citation to a motion filed in an unrelated
criminal case and not included in the record on appeal in this case is improper and will
not bear on our analysis. See In re Aaron L., 2000-NMCA-024, ¶ 27, 128 N.M. 641,
996 P.2d 431 (“This Court will not consider and counsel should not refer to matters
not of record in their briefs.”). Further, the State fails to demonstrate preservation of
its argument that Defendant violated Local Rule 2-123 or that the violation resulted
in the district court being unaware of the motion. See State v. Varela, 1999-NMSC-

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045, ¶ 25, 128 N.M. 454, 993 P.2d 1280 (“In order to preserve an error for appeal, it
is essential that the ground or grounds of the objection or motion be made with
sufficient specificity to alert the mind of the trial court to the claimed error or errors[]
and that a ruling thereon then be invoked.” (internal quotation marks and citation
omitted)); see also Rule 12-213(A)(3), (4) (requiring an appellant to provide citations
to the record proper and a statement of preservation in regard to each argument
presented). Therefore, we have no obligation to consider this argument. See State v.
Lucero, 1999-NMCA-102, ¶ 45, 127 N.M. 672, 986 P.2d 468 (declining to address
an argument where the appellant failed to comply with Rule 12-213).
{34} 	Moreover, there is no indication from its order that the district court considered
the alleged violation of Local Rule 2-123 to be a factor in the delay. As noted, the
court premised its ruling on a violation of Rule 5-601(F), determining that six months
was a “reasonable” amount of time for the court to have disposed of the motion, but
that any length of time beyond that was “not reasonable.” The State does not argue
that the court erred in its application of Rule 5-601(F), and we see no basis on which
to conclude that the court erred in this regard. In sum, we are not persuaded by the
State’s unpreserved assertion of error premised on Local Rule 2-123.
{35} 	Nor are we persuaded that the court erred in weighing the sixteen additional
months that passed before the court decided Defendant’s motion to disqualify the

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attorney general against the State. 	The State relies on State v. Wittgenstein, 1995-
NMCA-010, 119 N.M. 565, 893 P.2d 461, for the proposition that delay resulting
from a defendant’s own motion may not be weighed against the State. 	Although
Wittgenstein, having addressed the delay caused by judicial review, does not stand for
this proposition, we recognize the validity of the notion that the time required to
respond to or hear a defendant’s motion generally does not count against the
government. 	See id. ¶ 14 (addressing the delay caused by the defendant’s having
sought collateral review of a matter in federal court); see also Garza, 2009-NMSC-
038, ¶ 27 (weighing neutrally the time taken to oppose pretrial motions); State v.
Grissom, 1987-NMCA-123, ¶ 34, 106 N.M. 555, 746 P.2d 661 (recognizing that
“[d]elay 	arising 	from 	hearing 	[the] 	defendants’ 	motions, 	not 	caused 	by 	the
prosecution” is not weighed against the prosecution in a speedy trial analysis).
{36} 	In this case, however, the district court subtracted the six months that it deemed
“reasonable” to hear the motion from the approximately twenty-two months that
passed between the time the motion was filed and the time that it was decided.
Having thus subtracted six months from the overall filed-to-decided span of time that
the motion was before the court, the court concluded that the remaining sixteen-plus
months during which the motion should have been but was not decided weighed
against the State. The State has not cited any authority to suggest that protracted or

21
unreasonable delay in hearing and resolving a defense motion should be weighed
neutrally. To the contrary, relevant authority supports the conclusion that the court
properly weighed the unreasonable delay from the court’s untimely ruling upon the
motion 	against 	the 	State. 	See 	Garza, 	2009-NMSC-038, 	¶ 	29 	(stating 	that
administrative delay is weighed against the prosecution).
D. 	Assertion of the Right
{37} 	The district court found that “Defendant ha[d] vociferously asserted her right
to a speedy trial[,]” and, as such, it weighed the assertion factor “heavily in favor of
Defendant.” See id. ¶ 32 (stating that “we accord weight to the ‘frequency and force’
of the defendant’s objections to the delay”). 	The court found that not only had
Defendant filed three separate speedy trial motions at sixteen months, twenty months,
and twenty-seven months, respectively, but that Defendant had also objected to
extensions of time to take the case to trial. Cf. Spearman, 2012-NMSC-023, ¶¶ 9, 32-
33 (stating that, although the defendant did not assert his right to a speedy trial in an
“impressive or aggressive” manner, it was nevertheless adequate and should be
weighed against the prosecution where the defendant asserted his right shortly after
the charges were filed, then once again more than fifteen months later, and, in the
interim, did not oppose initial delays requested by the prosecution). Having already
provided an overview, in the background section of this Opinion, of the history of the

22
case including Defendant’s various assertions of her right to a speedy trial, we do not
repeat them here. 	We conclude that the court’s finding of Defendant’s vociferous
assertion of the right is supported by the record.
{38} 	At the August 13, 2012, speedy trial hearing, the prosecutor stated “I agree with
[defense counsel], this is one of the best cases I’ve ever seen where . . . Defendant has
asserted [her] right to speedy trial. I cannot argue with that.” Moments later, also in
regard to the assertion of the right, the prosecutor stated, “[s]o the assertion of the
right by [Defendant], I agree, she’s asserted that. There’s no issue there.” Now, on
appeal, the State contends not only that Defendant waived her right to a speedy trial,
but that the State argued in the August 13, 2012, hearing that she had waived the right
and that the court erred by failing to consider the waiver. The record contradicts the
State’s argument. We will not consider this argument further.
E. 	Actual Prejudice to Defendant
{39} 	The district court found that Defendant suffered two distinct forms of prejudice
as a result of the delay in this case: (1) undue anxiety and stress, and (2) an impaired
defense. 	Protection from both of these forms of prejudice are at the crux of an
accused’s right to a speedy trial. 	See id. ¶ 34 (stating that the speedy trial right is
intended to “minimize anxiety . . . of the accused” and to “limit the possibility that the
defense will be impaired” (internal quotation marks and citation omitted)).

23
{40} 	The State argues that any adversity or prejudice suffered by Defendant prior to
February 18, 2011, the presumptively prejudicial triggering date, cannot be weighed
against the State in the speedy trial analysis. The State argues that Defendant was
required, but failed, to show that the prejudice she suffered as a result of the pending
charges continued beyond February 18, 2011. Additionally, the State argues that the
court erred in ruling that Defendant was prejudiced by the death of a witness. Having
reviewed the record, we disagree with the State on all accounts.
1. 	Anxiety-Related Prejudice
{41} 	We begin by discussing the State’s argument regarding the range of time within
which we may consider the prejudice suffered by Defendant. We then turn to actual
anxiety-based prejudice followed by prejudice to the defense.
a. 	The Triggering Date Issue
{42} 	As an initial matter, we disagree with the State’s legal assertion that because
February 18, 2011, represented the eighteen-month mark upon which the delay in
bringing Defendant to trial became presumptively prejudicial, anything that occurred
before that date is not considered in our analysis of the prejudice suffered by
Defendant. 	The State’s argument in this regard rests, primarily, on the following
excerpt from Grissom.
[The d]efendants also argue they were prejudiced through the destruction
of documents in the fire of [a potential witness’s] residence in August

24
1984. The Barker analysis does not call for balancing where the length
of delay is not presumptively prejudicial. The fire occurred during the
period following the filing of the indictment and at a time when there
was no presumption of prejudicial delay.
1987-NMCA-123, ¶ 41. Viewed within the context of Grissom, it is evident that the
State’s reliance on Grissom is misplaced.
{43} 	In Grissom, the defendants were charged by indictment with a number of crimes
in November 1983. Id. ¶ 4. On October 30, the district court dismissed the charges
without prejudice owing to “grand jury irregularities.” 	Id. 	In May 1985, a new
complaint containing similar charges to the indictment was filed against the
defendants, followed by a criminal information that was filed in March 1986. Id. In
September 1986, the district court dismissed the criminal information on the basis of
a speedy trial violation. Id. ¶ 25. The district court held that the relevant time frame
for a speedy trial analysis was the thirty-four-month period spanning from the original
filing of the indictment through the conclusion, in August 1986, of the speedy trial
hearing. Id. ¶¶ 24, 27.
{44} 	Contrary to the district court’s ruling in Grissom, this Court held that the speedy
trial factors did not apply to the entire thirty-four-month period because “the time
during which an indictment is dismissed should not be considered under a speedy trial
analysis where [the] defendants are free of restrictions on their liberty.” Id. ¶¶ 31-32.
Instead, this Court held that the relevant time frame for a speedy trial analysis was the

25
sixteen-month period extending from the date of the criminal complaint to the date of
dismissal. Id. ¶ 33. And, because the sixteen-month period following the filing of the
criminal complaint was presumptively prejudicial, the balancing of the speedy trial
factors applied to those sixteen months. Id.
{45} 	Against that backdrop, this Court made two conclusions in Grissom that are
relevant to the State’s argument in this appeal. First, as we have already shown to
underlay the State’s argument, this Court held that loss of evidence that occurred
“during the period following the filing of the indictment and at a time when there was
no presumption of prejudicial delay” would not affect the balance in the speedy trial
analysis. Id. ¶ 41 (emphasis added). Second, this Court held that the death, twenty-
three days after the complaint was filed, of a potential defense witness was properly
discussed within the speedy trial analysis because the witness’s death fell “within the
speedy[]trial sequence[.]” Id. ¶¶ 43, 59.
{46} 	Thus, contrary to the State’s view, Grissom does not stand for the proposition
that our consideration of the prejudice suffered by Defendant must be limited to the
events that occurred after the speedy trial analysis triggering date. Rather, Grissom
supports the conclusion that once the speedy trial analysis is triggered by the passage
of time sufficient to cause presumptive prejudice we may examine the prejudice
suffered by Defendant from the filing of the charging document until the district court

26
hears the speedy trial motion. See id. ¶ 59 (stating that the death of a witness twenty-
three days after the charging document was filed was appropriately considered in a
speedy trial analysis).
{47} 	Moreover, a comprehensive view of the speedy trial analysis supports the
Grissom Court’s consideration, in a speedy trial analysis, of prejudicial events that
occurred prior to the date of presumptive prejudice. 	The date of presumptive
prejudice is merely a triggering date requiring analysis of the additional factors. See
Spearman, 2012-NMSC-023, ¶¶ 20-21 (stating that a presumptively prejudicial delay
triggers inquiry into the speedy trial factors). Therefore, unless the triggering date is
surpassed, we have no occasion to consider prejudice to the defendant, or, for that
matter any of the four speedy trial factors because defendants do not have a viable
speedy trial violation claim prior to the date of presumptive prejudice. 	See State v.
Stock, 2006-NMCA-140, ¶ 12, 140 N.M. 676, 147 P.3d 885 (“When a speedy trial
claim is made, the defendant must make a threshold showing that the length of delay
is presumptively prejudicial.” (internal quotation marks and citation omitted)).
{48} 	The effect of a “triggering date” comports with the notion that pending criminal
charges are naturally associated with some degree of stress, anxiety, and adverse
social and familial effects, and therefore, until that suffering is protracted beyond the
date that it is reasonable to expect a resolution, such suffering will not be weighed in

27
the defendant’s favor. 	See Spearman, 2012-NMSC-023, ¶¶ 37-38 (discussing the
various forms of prejudice associated with pending criminal charges); Salandre v.
State, 1991-NMSC-016, ¶ 32, 111 N.M. 422, 806 P.2d 562 (“The operative question
is whether the anxiety . . ., once proved, has continued for an unacceptably long
period.”). 	It is unreasonable to assume, however, that the type of suffering that a
criminal defendant experiences during the first several months following an
indictment is naturally distinguishable from that which she experiences after the
triggering date has passed. Common sense dictates a conclusion that, normally, the
stress and anxiety, and employment and social problems associated with a pending
criminal indictment, can continue and even worsen over time. 	Thus, to attempt to
parse the prejudice that a defendant has suffered by designating it as occurring pre-
or post-triggering date would be to attempt to technically measure something that is
properly viewed on a continuum. In accord with these considerations, our case law
demonstrates that once the date of presumptive prejudice has passed, we may consider
indicia of prejudice spanning from the date that the charges were filed through the
date of the case’s resolution. 	See Stock, 2006-NMCA-140, ¶ 12 (stating that the
speedy trial right attaches when the defendant becomes an accused); see also, e.g.,
State v. Moreno, 2010-NMCA-044, ¶¶ 2-4, 37, 148 N.M. 253, 233 P.3d 782
(evaluating the prejudice factor in light of the almost two years that the defendant

28
spent in jail from the time he was arrested to the time his case was resolved); State v.
Rivera, 2009-NMCA-132, ¶¶ 4, 46, 147 N.M. 406, 223 P.3d 951 (evaluating the
prejudice factor associated with the delay between the defendant’s arrest in October
2003 to the resolution of his case in April 2006); State v. Talamante, 2003-NMCA-
135, ¶ 19, 134 N.M. 539, 80 P.3d 476 (considering the prejudice factor in terms of the
defendant’s circumstances from the time he was arraigned).
{49} 	Spearman, upon which the State also relies for the proposition that we may only
consider indicia of prejudice that occurred after the date of presumptive prejudice,
does not support the proposition. In Spearman, the defendant’s counsel asserted that,
as a result of pending charges, the defendant lost employment, filed for bankruptcy,
and was forced to move as a result of his lost employment. 2012-NMSC-023, ¶ 38.
The Court observed that the allegations of prejudice, if true, demonstrated that the
defendant “suffered some prejudice as a result of the pending charges against him.”
Id. Yet, the Court’s review was hampered by the absence of any “actual evidence in
the form of affidavits, testimony, or documentation in support of the allegations” of
prejudice. 	Id. ¶ 39. 	Accordingly, the Court remanded the case for an evidentiary
hearing to be held in which the defendant would have the opportunity to submit
evidence establishing “a causal link” between the delay in bringing him to trial and
the prejudice he suffered. Id.

29
{50} 	The State relies on the Spearman Court’s statement that “[s]uch evidence could
have established that the delay in trial beyond the presumptive period caused the
alleged prejudice as opposed to the original indictment.” Id. In our view, however,
the State’s reliance on the Court’s dicta is misplaced. 	We do not believe that the
Spearman Court’s statement was intended to espouse a principle that prejudice
suffered after the indictment but prior to the speedy trial triggering date has no bearing
on our analysis. Rather, insofar as the Spearman Court was focused on the question
whether the allegations of prejudice could be substantiated by evidence, we believe
the Court’s statement was intended to convey that the defendant must prove with
specificity whether and how he was prejudiced by the pending charges. See id. ¶¶ 38-
39. That is all that can reasonably be read into the Court’s dicta in this regard.
b. 	Evidence of Actual Anxiety-Based Prejudice
{51} 	In this case, we look at the alleged circumstances of prejudice from indictment
to the date of dismissal. Yet, even were we to limit our discussion to the prejudice
suffered by Defendant after the date of presumptive prejudice, we would nevertheless
affirm the district court’s ruling. 	At the October 19, 2012, evidentiary hearing,
Defendant testified that, as a result of the indictment, and continuing through October
19, 2012, she suffered hypertension, insomnia, and joint pain stemming from an
“acute reaction to stress[.]” 	She characterized the stress she was experiencing as

30
“unbelievably extreme[,]” and she stated that her level of stress had “gotten so bad
that I have now developed an autoimmune disease as well[.]” Defendant also testified
that she suffered insomnia from the time of the indictment and continuing through the
date of the October 19, 2012, hearing. 	And she testified further that although her
physicians have told her to avoid stress, she was unable to do so while the indictment
was pending.
{52} 	Additionally, in terms of employment, Defendant testified that she lost her job
in January 2010, as a result the indictment, and, owing to the pending indictment, had
not been able to find new employment since then. Defendant testified that she had
applied for employment at an estimated 156 different businesses and that her efforts
in that regard were documented. 	She further testified that she had a desire to be a
public servant again, but that she could not run for office or become a public servant
because she would not pass a background check in light of the pending indictment and
the nature of the charges.
{53} 	The foregoing testimony indicates that Defendant continued to suffer adverse
health and employment effects past the February 18, 2011, date of presumptive
prejudice through October 19, 2012, when she testified about her then-ongoing
adversities as a result of the delay. The court found Defendant’s testimony in regard
to her health to be “substantially” supported by her medical records. Those medical

31
records were viewed in camera by the district court. The records were not included
in the record on appeal. The State does not attack the district court’s reliance on the
medical records or the court’s findings and conclusions as unsupported by the medical
records.
{54} 	The court concluded that Defendant suffered “ongoing ‘extreme’ stress[,]”
hypertension, insomnia, increased joint pain, and rheumatoid arthritis; and, although
she had been told by her doctors to avoid stress, she had been unable to do so with the
indictment still pending. Additionally, the court concluded that Defendant suffered
“extreme public humiliation[,]” and, notwithstanding having “put in over 150
applications[,]” she had been unable to find employment since 2010 because of the
pending indictment. 	In summary, the court concluded that Defendant’s affidavit,
medical records, and testimony demonstrated that she had “suffered actual prejudice
in the form of undue anxiety and stress, which [was] a result of the delay in bringing
her case to trial.” 	Importantly, the State does not attack the court’s conclusions
regarding Defendant’s conditions. Nor does the State attack the court’s finding that
“[t]he State offered no evidence to rebut the evidence of actual prejudice introduced
by Defendant.”
{55} 	The State focuses on the fact that, in testifying about the prejudice she suffered,
Defendant referenced “the indictment” rather than “the delay” as the cause of her

32
stress. Viewed in context, it is clear that Defendant’s references to the indictment as
the cause of her medical and employment adversities were references to the lack of
resolution of the charges against her. The semantic distinction made by the State does
not warrant further consideration. The State also focuses on the fact that Defendant’s
suffering began or existed well before the date of presumptive prejudice. 	In the
State’s view, because these issues “predate the presumptive period of prejudice which
began on February 19, 2011[,]” they are attributed to the initial filing of the indictment
and not to any delay in prosecuting the case. 	As we noted earlier in this Opinion,
Defendant testified, and the court found, that the medical and employment adversities
continued through the date of the October 19, 2012, evidentiary hearing. 	Indeed,
according to Defendant, some of her stress-related maladies worsened over time.
Thus, even accounting for the anxiety naturally associated with the filing of criminal
charges, we are not persuaded the district court erred in concluding that Defendant’s
extended period of suffering from stress and anxiety was “undue.” 	See Valencia,
2010-NMCA-005, ¶ 29 (recognizing the inherent anxiety associated with pending
criminal charges).
{56} 	Defendant’s anxiety, loss of employment, continued inability to find work, and
the public humiliation that she suffered as a result of the pending indictment are forms
of prejudice that the speedy trial right is intended to curtail. 	See Spearman, 2012-

33
NMSC-023, ¶¶ 37-38 (recognizing that an un-incarcerated defendant “is still
disadvantaged by restraints on [her] liberty and by living under a cloud of anxiety,
suspicion, and often hostility” and further recognizing that “[l]oss of employment,
especially being unable to work in one’s . . . profession, is a consequence of delay that
a reviewing court cannot ignore” (internal quotation marks and citation omitted)).
Thus, the court appropriately considered these factors in analyzing the prejudice
suffered by Defendant, and the court did not err in concluding that Defendant suffered
prejudice as a result of the delay.
c. 	Prejudice to the Defense
{57} 	The court also concluded that Defendant’s defense was impaired by the delay
in that the period of delay encompassed the death, in August 2012, of Hoyt Clifton
who was Defendant’s former director of elections. The court found that Mr. Clifton
was an important witness whom both the State and Defendant intended to call at trial.
The court noted that Defendant testified that Mr. Clifton was the head of the selection
committee for the contract that was the basis for many of the claims at issue in the
case and that Mr. Clifton had been “ ‘intricate’ to the process of piecing together the
state plan to use the allocated federal funds” at issue. The court provided a transcribed
account of the testimony that it found relevant to the issue of Mr. Clifton’s importance
to the defense. 	And it further noted that Defendant testified that Mr. Clifton “was

34
involved in the formation of the contract [at issue,]” and Mr. Clifton “helped in the
later administration of the contract.” The court concluded that
[g]iven the [details of the relevant testimony] as to [Mr. Clifton’s]
importance in the decision-making process at issue in this case, the fact
[that] both parties had listed [Mr.] Clifton as a witness, and [Mr.]
Clifton’s death in 2012, the [c]ourt agrees with Defendant [that] her
defense has been impaired by the delay in [bringing] her case to trial.
{58} 	In Garza, our Supreme Court stated that the death of a witness during a delay
in bringing the case to trial is the “most serious” form of prejudice to the defense and
that the prejudice resulting therefrom is “obvious.” 2009-NMSC-038, ¶ 36 (internal
quotation marks and citation omitted). 	The Garza Court further explained that a
defendant asserting this form of prejudice “must state with particularity what
exculpatory testimony would have been offered, and the defendant must also present
evidence that the delay caused the witness’s unavailability.” Id. (alterations, internal
quotation marks, and citation omitted). In support of the foregoing, the Garza Court
parenthetically noted that other courts had expressed the defendant’s burden as a
requirement to show “ ‘that the missing witness[] could have supplied material
evidence for the defense’ ” or that the claimed prejudice “ ‘must relate to a material
fact in issue.’ ” Id. (quoting United States v. Richards, 707 F.2d 995, 998 (8th Cir.
1983), and State v. Davis, 474 A.2d 776, 780 (Conn. 1984)).

35
{59} 	Relying on Garza’s parenthetical notations of foreign authorities that include
the term “material,” the State reaches into summary judgment case law for the
definition of a material fact, and, applying the summary judgment standard, argues
that Defendant failed to “testify to any material facts to which [Mr.] Clifton would be
able to testify[.]” The State relies on Romero v. Philip Morris Inc., 2010-NMSC-035,
¶ 11, 148 N.M. 713, 242 P.3d 280, for its definition of a material fact. In relevant
part, Romero states:
In addition to requiring reasonable inferences, New Mexico law requires
that the alleged facts at issue be material to survive summary judgment.
To determine which facts are material, the court must look to the
substantive law governing the dispute[.] The inquiry’s focus should be
on whether, under substantive law, the fact is necessary to give rise to a
claim.
Id. (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). According to the State, because
the district court failed to apply this standard by focusing on whether “under
substantive law, the fact [was] necessary to give rise to a claim[,]” the court “should
not have been allowed to weigh [Mr.] Clifton’s death in the [speedy trial] analysis.”
(Internal quotation marks and citation omitted.)
{60} 	The State provides no authority, nor are we aware of any, that requires or
permits the summary judgment standard discussed in Romero to be imported as the
State attempts here in an analysis of the prejudice suffered by a defendant from the
loss of a witness in the context of a speedy trial analysis. 	We assume no such

36
authority exists. See In re Adoption of Doe, 1984-NMSC-024, ¶ 2, 100 N.M. 764, 676
P.2d 1329 (noting that the appellate courts will not consider an issue if no authority
is cited in support of the issue and that, given no cited authority, we assume no such
authority exists). 	Thus, rather than attempt to apply the civil law-based summary
judgment standard to a question related to whether Defendant’s constitutional right
to a speedy trial was violated, we adhere to the language of Garza, which requires
particularity. See 2009-NMSC-038, ¶ 36.
{61} 	To the extent that the State’s argument may be construed as a contention that
Defendant failed to “state with particularity what exculpatory testimony would have
been offered,” we are not persuaded. 	Id. (alteration, internal quotation marks, and
citation omitted). 	As a basis for concluding that the defense was impaired by the
presumptively prejudicial delay, during which period Mr. Clifton died, the court
observed that “[Mr.] Clifton was the head of the selection committee for . . . the
contract that [was] the basis for many of the claims at issue in this case.”
{62} 	The contract at issue involved the use of federal funds allocated for voter
education. Pursuant to a state plan for New Mexico, the voter education was to be
accomplished via a media campaign including television and radio advertisements.
Defendant testified that she turned over “the duties of voting and voter education” to
Mr. Clifton. 	She testified further that Mr. Clifton, as the head of a three-person

37
committee, “spearheaded” the project and that she did not “do anything, other than be
in the office and be the Secretary of State and sign off on what [she] needed to sign
off on.” According to Defendant, Mr. Clifton recommended selecting Mr. Gutierrez
as the contractor to produce the radio and television advertisements, while Defendant
herself had nothing to do with the process of selecting the contractor.
{63} 	In the district court’s view, Mr. Clifton’s importance in the decision-making
process at issue in this case and his further involvement in the formation and
administration of the at-issue contract was such that his absence from trial constituted
an impairment to the defense. 	The State’s attempt through cross-examination of
Defendant 	to 	negate 	her 	testimony 	generally 	regarding 	what 	Mr. 	Clifton’s
responsibilities did not include was insufficient to negate the evidence demonstrating
that Mr. Clifton would likely have had knowledge of or involvement in the at-issue
activity.
{64} 	In the absence of a direct attack by the State on the district court’s findings,
including a showing that the findings were not supported by substantial evidence, and
including an argument, supported by the record, as to why the court erred in
determining that the defense was impaired by Mr. Clifton’s absence, the court’s
determination in this regard is conclusive. See Rule 12-213(A)(3), (4) (stating that a
contention that a finding is unsupported by substantial evidence requires the appellant

38
to show “the substance of the evidence bearing upon the proposition” and stating the
appellant’s argument “shall set forth a specific attack on any finding, or such finding
shall be deemed conclusive”); see also Spearman, 2012-NMSC-023, ¶ 19 (noting that
the appellate courts “give deference to the district court’s factual findings” (alteration,
internal quotation marks, and citation omitted)); State v. Lowe, 2004-NMCA-054,
¶ 25, 135 N.M. 520, 90 P.3d 539 (rejecting the defendant’s argument where she failed
to specifically attack the relevant findings of the district court).
F. 	Weighing the Factors
{65} 	To summarize, the district court found and the State does not argue differently
that the length of the delay that was eighteen months beyond the presumptively
prejudicial triggering date weighed heavily against the State. 	We agree with the
court’s analysis and conclusion regarding the length of the delay in this case. Thus,
we weigh this factor heavily against the State.
{66} 	The district court concluded that the reason for the delay weighed mostly
against the State, although not heavily; and we reject the State’s argument to the
contrary. The delay here was caused in large part by the administrative failures of the
district court. Of particular significance was the court’s failure for eighteen months
to hear or to rule on Defendant’s motion to disqualify the attorney general. We also
observe that the court failed, until twenty-one months after it was filed, to hear or to

39
rule on Defendant’s motion for severance. Further, the court failed to set or hear the
“dozens of motions [that] had been filed by Defendant and her co-defendants,”
including the three separate speedy trial motions that were finally decided by Judge
Sheppard. While the nature of this particular case rendered it difficult for the parties
and the district court to settle upon a district court judge who was in a position to
preside over the matter, we believe that the court, in dealing with the administrative
issues that arose, failed to act efficiently and expeditiously in view of the speedy trial-
related consequences sure to arise. 	The State did not go far enough in providing
evidence or explanation showing that this case was properly and efficiently managed
or showing that the case could not have been managed considerably better for societal
purposes and to protect Defendant’s right to a speedy trial. 	See Spearman, 2012-
NMSC-023, ¶ 47 (Daniels, J., specially concurring) (recognizing the need to “protect
the accused’s right to a speedy trial without sacrificing society’s interest in
enforcement of its criminal laws”). Under the circumstances of this case, we agree
with the district court’s determination that the reason for the delay weighed against
the State. Thus, we weigh this factor moderately against the State.
{67} 	The district court weighed the assertion of the right heavily in Defendant’s
favor. 	Although the State argues that the court erred in this regard, the record
supports the court’s determination, and we are not persuaded that the court erred.

40
{68} 	Finally, as to the prejudice factor, the district court concluded based on findings
supported in the evidence and not attacked by the State that Defendant established that
she suffered actual prejudice as a result of the delay. 	Defendant’s showing of
prejudice was supported by her affidavit and testimony, and her medical records that
the court found supported her claims relating to her anxiety, stress, and various other
conditions, and the prejudice resulting from excessive delay. As such, this factor was
appropriately weighed against the State.
{69} 	In sum, the district court weighed the assertion of the right factor in favor of
Defendant and weighed all three other factors against the State. We conclude that the
district court did not err in weighing the speedy trial factors in this case and in ruling
that Defendant’s speedy trial right was violated.
CONCLUSION
{70} 	We affirm the district court’s order dismissing the case against Defendant for
a violation of her right to a speedy trial.
{71} 	IT IS SO ORDERED.
__________________________________
JONATHAN B. SUTIN, Judge
WE CONCUR:

MICHAEL D. BUSTAMANTE, Judge

MICHAEL E. VIGIL, Judge

Al