December 07, 2015 – National Roofing, Inc. v. Midtown Metals, LLC and Building Envelope Services, LLC v. Alstate Steel, Inc., Hughes & Associates, Inc., Reid & Associates, LLC, Mason Corporation, Merillat LP, Masco Cabinetry, LLC, John Dow, and Studio Southwest Architects, Inc., formerly known as Design Collaborative Southwest, No. 34,006

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF NEW MEXICO
Opinion Number: _______________
Filing Date: 	December 7, 2015
NO. 34,006
NATIONAL ROOFING, INC.,
MIDTOWN METALS, LLC, and
BUILDING ENVELOPE SERVICES, LLC,
Plaintiffs-Appellants,
v.
ALSTATE STEEL, INC., HUGHES &
ASSOCIATES, INC., REID & ASSOCIATES,
LLC, MASON CORPORATION, MERILLAT
LP, MASCO CABINETRY, LLC, JOHN DOE,
and STUDIO SOUTHWEST ARCHITECTS,
INC., formerly known as DESIGN
COLLABORATIVE SOUTHWEST,
Defendants-Appellees.
APPEAL FROM THE DISTRICT COURT OF BERNALILLO COUNTY
Nan G. Nash, District Judge
Law Offices of Daymon B. Ely
Damon B. Ely
Albuquerque, NM
Calvert Menicucci P.C.
Michael F. Menicucci
Albuquerque, NM
for Appellants

Dixon, Scholl, & Bailey, P.A.
Gerald G. Dixon
Dennis W. Hill
James C. Wilkey
Albuquerque, NM
for Appellee Alstate Steel, Inc.
The Law Offices of Robert Bruce Collins
Holly R. Harvey
Albuquerque, NM
for Appellee Reid & Associates, LLC and Hughes & Associates, LLC
Modrall, Sperling, Roehl, Harris & Sisk, P.A.
Earl E. DeBrine
Anna E. Indahl
Albuquerque, NM
for Appellee Merillat LP and Masco Cabinetry, LLC
Guebert Bruckner P.C.
Terry Guebert
Robert F. Gentile
Albuquerque, NM
for Appellee Mason Corporation

OPINION
VANZI, Judge.
{1} 	Subject to various exceptions, “[a]n action for damages resulting from a tort can
only be sustained by the person directly injured thereby, and not by one claiming to
have suffered collateral or resulting injuries.” Loucks v. Albuquerque Nat’l Bank,
1966-NMSC-176, ¶¶ 46-47, 76 N.M. 735, 418 P.2d 191. Nevertheless, National
Roofing (Plaintiff) has sued several defendants in strict liability and negligence for
damages allegedly resulting from physical injuries to its employees. The district court
dismissed Plaintiff’s claims against all Defendants on the ground that no duty exists.
Plaintiff argues on appeal that the district court impermissibly relied on principles of
foreseeability in dismissing its claims, contrary to Rodriguez v. Del Sol Shopping
Center Associates, 2014-NMSC-014, 326 P.3d 465. We hold that the principle stated
in Loucks remains good law, entirely consistent with the duty analysis set forth in
Rodriguez, and we affirm.
I. 	BACKGROUND
{2} 	Plaintiff has alleged the following facts, which we accept as true. See Envtl.
Improvement Div. v. Aguayo, 1983-NMSC-027, ¶ 10, 99 N.M. 497, 660 P.2d 587
(“[I]f a district court grants a motion to dismiss pursuant to Rule [1-0]12(b)(6)
[NMRA], then the allegations pleaded in the complaint must be taken as true for

1 It has been conceded on appeal that National Roofing’s affiliates are not
proper parties to this action, and they are hereby dismissed.
2
purposes of an appeal.”). In March 2010 employees of Plaintiff were injured while
repairing the deck of a canopy at a cabinet manufacturing facility owned by Masco
Cabinetry, LLC and Merillat LP. The canopy was designed and manufactured by
Mason Corporation and/or Studio Southwest Architects, Inc., and installed by Alstate
Steel, Inc., Hughes & Associates, Inc., and/or Reid & Associates, LLC. Plaintiff and
its affiliates sued all seven entities (collectively Defendants) in strict liability and
negligence for damages Plaintiff sustained as a result of the injuries to its
employees—specifically, increased workers’ compensation premiums, sums paid to
reduce its insurance rating or modifier, and “los[t] income and future income”
resulting from its now deficient safety record.1 Because Plaintiff itself suffered no
physical injury or property damage, the district court granted Defendants’ motion to
dismiss all counts, precipitating this appeal. Plaintiff now asserts as a matter of law
that Rodriguez precludes dismissal. Our review is de novo. Delfino v. Griffo, 2011-
NMSC-015, ¶ 9, 150 N.M. 97, 257 P.3d 917.
II. 	DISCUSSION
{3} 	In Rodriguez, our Supreme Court held that “foreseeability is not a factor for
courts to consider when determining the existence of a duty, or when deciding to limit
or eliminate an existing duty in a particular class of cases.” 2014-NMSC-014, ¶ 1. In

2 This section was approved by the membership of the American Law Institute
(ALI) at the 2012 Annual Meeting. The related section specific to economic loss from
3
so holding, the Court expressed concern that a determination of “no duty” based on
an improbable or remote nature of risk invites a court to weigh the particular facts of
a case, usurping the jury’s role in determining legal cause and breach. See id. ¶¶ 18-
19, 22. In short, foreseeability is simply not subject to categorical analysis by a court
because “[w]hat may not be foreseeable under one set of facts may be foreseeable
under a slightly different set of facts[,]” id. ¶ 1, and facts are appropriately weighed
by the jury, see Romero v. Philip Morris Inc., 2010-NMSC-035, ¶ 9, 148 N.M. 713,
242 P.3d 280. Nonetheless, “[c]ourts are not powerless to dismiss cases as a matter of
law[.]” Rodriguez, 2014-NMSC-014, ¶ 24. A court may still (1) articulate policy
reasons (unrelated to foreseeability) that justify a categorically limited duty, or no
duty rule, id. ¶ 5; or (2) decide, as a matter of law, that no reasonable jury could find
legal cause or breach, id. ¶ 24.
{4} 	This framework was adopted from the Restatement (Third) of Torts: Liability
for Physical and Emotional Harm § 7 cmt. j (2010). Rodriguez, 2014-NMSC-014, ¶ 1.
Cases that do not involve physical or emotional harm to the plaintiff are treated
separately in the Restatement. See Restatement (Third) of Torts: Liability for
Economic Harm § 1(a) (Tentative Draft No. 1, 2012) (“An actor has no general duty
to avoid the unintentional infliction of economic loss on another.”). 2 Comments to

injury to a third person or property not belonging to the plaintiff, which will be
discussed in this Opinion, was approved by the ALI’s membership at the 2014 Annual
Meeting. According to the Institute, both sections represent the most current
statements of the ALI’s position on the subject and may be cited in opinions or briefs
until the official text is published. Torts: Liability for Economic Harm, American Law
Institute, https://www.ali.org/projects/show/torts-liability-economic-harm-3rd/ (last
visited October 22, 2015).
4
Section 1 recognize that “[a]n actor ordinarily has a duty of care when engaged in any
activity that creates a risk of physical harm to others[,]” but that “[d]uties to avoid the
negligent 	infliction 	of 	economic 	loss 	are 	notably 	narrower.” 	Id. 	cmt. 	a.
Thus—specifically relevant to this case—a plaintiff normally cannot recover for
economic loss caused by “unintentional injury to another person[,] or unintentional
injury to property in which the [plaintiff] has no proprietary interest.” Restatement
(Third) of Torts: Liability for Economic Harm § 7 (Tentative Draft No. 2, 2014).
These limits
are related applications of the same principle, and they apply to facts that
usually have certain features in common. The plaintiff and defendant
typically are strangers. The defendant commits a negligent act that
injures a third party’s person or property, and indirectly though perhaps
foreseeably—causes various sorts of economic loss to the plaintiff: lost
income or profits, missed business opportunities, expensive delays, or
other disruption. The plaintiff may suffer losses, for example, because
the defendant injured someone with whom the plaintiff had a contract
and from whom the plaintiff had been expecting performance, such as an
employee or supplier. Or the plaintiff may be unable to make new
contracts with others, such as customers who cannot conveniently reach
the plaintiff’s business because the defendant’s negligence has damaged
property that now blocks the way. The common law of tort does not
recognize a plaintiff’s claim in such circumstances.

3 The parties and the district court have conflated this doctrine with the
“economic loss rule.” In New Mexico, that term has been relegated to a different (but
related) context that calls for doctrinally policing the line between tort and contract.
Utah Int’l, Inc. v. Caterpillar Tractor Co., 1989-NMCA-010, ¶ 17, 108 N.M. 539, 775
P.2d 741 (“[I]n commercial transactions, when there is no great disparity in bargaining
power of the parties, economic losses from injury of a product to itself are not
recoverable in tort actions; damages for such economic losses in commercial settings
in New Mexico may only be recovered in contract actions.” (citation omitted)).
Compare Restatement (Third) of Torts: Liability for Economic Harm § 3: Preclusion
of Tort Liability Arising from Contract (Economic Loss Rule) (Tentative Draft No.
1, 2012), which is paradigmatically rooted in products liability and has its own section
in the Restatement, with Restatement (Third) of Torts: Liability for Economic Harm
§ 7, titled “Economic Loss from Injury to a Third Person or to Property Not Belonging
to the Claimant.” See also Dan B. Dobbs, An Introduction to Non-Statutory Economic
Loss Claims, 48 Ariz. L. Rev. 713, 714 (2006) (identifying two distinct rules limiting
recovery of stand-alone economic loss). Professor Dobbs would call the principle
discussed in this Opinion the “stranger economic loss rule.” Dobbs, supra, at 714. It
is an often unstated principle of tort law, tethered to rationales that have little to do
with doctrinal policing, and it applies with equal force when the plaintiff and
defendant are strangers without any contractual relationship. Dobbs, supra, at 715.
5
Id. cmt. a. (citations omitted) 3
{5} 	The ALI’s position, while often framed in different ways, is not novel. The rule
against recovery for harm to another is typically associated with Robins Dry Dock &
Repair Co. v. Flint, where the plaintiffs—time charterers of a ship owned and
possessed by a third party—sued the defendant for negligently damaging the ship’s
propeller, and thereby causing them to lose profits while the propeller was being
repaired. 275 U.S. 303, 307 (1927), superseded by statute on other grounds as stated
in Slaven v. BP America, Inc., 786 F. Supp. 853 (C.D. Cal. 1992). The United States
Supreme Court held that the plaintiffs lacked standing to sue in negligence because

6
they had no proprietary interest in the damaged ship. Id. at 308-09. Thus, Justice
Holmes famously wrote, even assuming that the plaintiffs’ loss “flowed directly” from
the injury to the propeller, “a tort to the person or property of one man does not make
the tort-feasor liable to another merely because the injured person was under a
contract with that other unknown to the doer of the wrong. The law does not spread
its protection so far.” Id. at 309 (citation omitted).
{6} 	The dominant justification for the continued reliance on this general rule is
pragmatic: liability for indirect (but foreseeable) consequences to third parties
resulting from negligent harm could be limitless given society’s proliferation of
commercial relationships and the corresponding potential for unbounded actual and
prospective economic harm flowing from a single negligent act. See, e.g., Barber
Lines A/S v. M/V Donau Maru, 764 F.2d 50, 54 (1st Cir. 1985) (“The number of
persons suffering foreseeable financial harm in a typical accident is likely to be far
greater than those who suffer traditional (recoverable) physical harm.”); Restatement
(Third) of Torts: Liability for Economic Harm § 7 cmt. b (“Recognizing claims for
those sorts of losses would greatly increase the number, complexity, and expense of
potential lawsuits arising from many accidents. In some cases, recognition of such
claims would also result in liabilities that are indeterminate and out of proportion to
the culpability of the defendant.”); see generally Fleming James, Jr., Limitations on

7
Liability for Economic Loss Caused by Negligence: A Pragmatic Appraisal, 25 Vand.
L. Rev. 43, 45, 48-55 (1972).
{7} 	For its part, the Restatement (Second) of Torts treated the type of claim for lost
profits advanced in Robins as a nonactionable assertion of negligent interference with
contracts and prospective contractual relations. See Restatement (Second) of Torts
§ 766C (1979). In essence, one cannot typically sue another in negligence for conduct
that causes a third person to breach a contract with the plaintiff; or that causes the
plaintiff’s performance of a contract to be more expensive or burdensome; or that
interferes with the plaintiff’s ability to acquire potential contractual relationships with
third persons—e.g., lost profits. Id. Applying Section 766C, for example, the Supreme
Court of Iowa has concluded that an employer’s claim in negligence for increased
workers’ compensation premiums resulting from injuries to its employees caused by
a third party tortfeasor was nonactionable. Anderson Plasterers v. Meinecke, 543
N.W.2d 612, 613-14 (Iowa 1996). Indeed, such actions, whether the harm alleged is
foreseeable or not, have been “almost universally denied.” Id. at 614; accord Ore-Ida
Foods, Inc. v. Indian Head Cattle Co., 627 P.2d 469, 473 (Or. 1981) (en banc)
(rejecting employer’s claim to recover workers’ compensation benefits based on the
prevailing rule “that a plaintiff may not recover for economic loss resulting from
negligent infliction of bodily harm to a third person”).

8
{8} 	Consistent with Robins and the Restatements, our Supreme Court recognizes
both the distinction between negligent and intentional interference with contractual
relations, see Anderson v. Dairyland Ins. Co., 1981-NMSC-130, ¶ 11, 97 N.M. 155,
637 P.2d 837 (“[E]ither an improper motive (solely to harm plaintiff), or an improper
means is required for liability” (internal quotation marks and citation omitted)), and
the general rule that “[a]n action for damages resulting from a tort can only be
sustained by the person directly injured thereby, and not by one claiming to have
suffered collateral or resulting injuries[,]” Loucks, 1966-NMSC-176, ¶ 46. As recently
as 2003, the Court acknowledged “the prevailing rule in America[,]” that “a plaintiff
may not recover in negligence for economic loss resulting from bodily harm to
another.” Berlangieri v. Running Elk Corp., 2003-NMSC-024, ¶ 22, 134 N.M. 341,
76 P.3d 1098 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).
{9} 	There are numerous “exceptions” to this principle of negligence law—which
are probably better described as situations in which the pragmatic justification for
limiting liability is simply absent. For instance, claims alleging intentional (as
opposed to negligent) interference with contractual relations are actionable, but
liability in those instances is inherently limited by the doctrine’s intent requirement.
See Anderson, 1981-NMSC-130, ¶ 11. Similarly, a loss-of-consortium claimant can
sue for physical harm to another by demonstrating, in part, that “the claimant and the
injured party shared a sufficiently close relationship,” a requirement that itself

9
categorically 	limits 	liability 	to 	a 	particular 	class 	of 	relationships 	of 	mutual
dependence. See Wachocki v. Bernalillo Cty. Sheriff’s Dep’t, 2011-NMSC-039, ¶¶ 5,
10, 150 N.M. 650, 265 P.3d 701. Recovery for wrongful death is provided for and
carefully circumscribed by statute. See NMSA 1978, § 41-2-3 (2001). And while an
insurer may claim as subrogee, the claim is brought in the “shoes of the insured,” and
the defendant is not subject to potentially infinite strings of liability. Amica Mut. Ins.
Co. v. Maloney, 1995-NMSC-059, ¶ 9, 120 N.M. 523, 903 P.2d 834. “[I]n insurance
subrogation cases . . . there is but one cause of action for the entire recovery, including
the subrogated amount, and that cause of action lies in the name of the insured.” Id.
¶ 11.
{10} 	At common law, the English cause of action per quod servitium amisit provided
a remedy in the employment context for a master to recover for the loss of services of
a servant injured by a third party. See B.V. Merrow Co. v. Stephenson, 300 N.W.2d
734, 735 (Mich. Ct. App. 1980) (per curiam) (citing Mary’s Case, 9 Coke 111b (5
Coke’s Reports 201, 204); 77 Eng. Rep. 895 (1612)). But the action was based on the
outdated social concept that domestic servants were the property of their masters, id.,
and the assertion of such claims has long since been abandoned. See Restatement
(Second) of Agency § 316 cmt. b (1958) (“For several hundred years . . . there have
been few cases in which a master has brought an action for negligent harm to a servant
not a member of his family.”); see also Cont’l Cas. Co. v. P.D.C., Inc., 931 F.2d 1429,

10
1431 (10th Cir.1991) (concluding that New Mexico would reject a claim that an
employer faced with a diminished work force due to employee injury has a cause of
action against the tortfeasor).
{11} 	While Plaintiff’s injured employees might state a claim against Defendants for
their physical injuries, Plaintiff itself, which has suffered neither a physical injury nor
property damage, is alleging collateral or resulting harm—increased premiums, an
increased ratings modifier, and lost profits resulting from unsuccessful bids on new
jobs—based on its status as employer of those injured, and on its commercial
relationships 	with 	existing 	and 	potential 	customers 	and 	with 	its 	workers’
compensation insurance carrier. Plaintiff has made no allegation that Defendants
intentionally and improperly interfered with these contractual relations, see Anderson,
1981-NMSC-130, ¶ 11; Plaintiff certainly has made no claim on damages for loss of
consortium; and this is not a claim on any subrogated interest—nor could it be.
Liberty Mut. Ins. Co. v. Salgado, 2005-NMCA-144, ¶ 9, 138 N.M. 685, 125 P.3d 664
(“[O]ur courts have historically held that an employer/insurer does not have a
statutory assignment or subrogation interest in a worker’s third-party claim.”).
{12} 	Despite the requirements of these settled doctrines, Plaintiff argues that our
Supreme Court’s adoption of the Restatement’s duty analysis in Rodriguez now
authorizes it to sue in negligence and strict liability for economic loss based entirely
on physical harm to another. For the reasons stated herein, we do not believe

4 The ALI is apparently in accord with our conclusion that the doctrine
prohibiting recovery for economic loss resulting from physical injury to another,
applied by our Supreme Court in Loucks, is entirely consistent with the duty analysis
set forth in Rodriguez. As discussed above, the Institute has included both doctrines
in the Restatement (Third) of Torts, without yet noting any conflict between them. See
Restatement (Third) of Torts: Liability for Economic Harm § 1 cmt. a (“Duties to
avoid the negligent infliction of economic loss are notably narrower.”); Id. § 7 cmt.
b (“A collision that sinks a ship will cause a well-defined loss to the ship’s owner; but
it also may foreseeably cause economic losses to wholesalers . . . and then to
suppliers, employees, and customers of the retailers, and so on. Recognizing claims
for those sorts of losses would greatly increase the number, complexity, and expense
of potential lawsuits arising from many accidents.”).
11
Rodriguez contemplated such a result. See Dominguez v. State, 2015-NMSC-014,
¶ 16, 348 P.3d 183 (“The general rule is that cases are not authority for propositions
not considered.” (alteration, internal quotation marks, and citation omitted)).4 We
agree 	with 	the 	district 	court 	that 	public 	policy 	has 	historically—and
appropriately—justified a categorical no duty rule under the present circumstances,
and we conclude that application of the rule stated in Loucks and subsequently
recognized in Berlangieri defeats Plaintiff’s claims as a matter of law.
{13} 	Indeed Rodriguez itself provides that there are “exceptional cases, when an
articulated countervailing principle or policy warrants denying or limiting liability in
a particular class of cases,” and in those cases “a court may decide that the defendant
has no duty or that the ordinary duty of reasonable care requires modification.” 2014-
NMSC-014, ¶ 13 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). Cases alleging
liability in negligence or strict liability arising only from physical harm to another,

12
constitute one such class of cases. Loucks, 1966-NMSC-176, ¶¶ 46-47. No fact-
specific analysis is necessary to dismiss them. See La. ex rel. Guste v. M/V Testbank,
752 F.2d 1019, 1023 (5th Cir. 1985) (en banc) (describing the rule as a pragmatic
limitation on liability even when losses to third parties without a proprietary interest
are “certainly foreseeable”); Aikens v. Debow, 541 S.E.2d 576, 592 (W. Va. 2000)
(“It is a question of public policy.”).
{14} 	For a number of reasons, and without exception, other jurisdictions have
uniformly rejected the precise claims Plaintiff advances. Some have held that an
employer’s lost profits and/or increased workers’ compensation premiums resulting
from a third party tortfeasor’s injuries to employees are harms that are not foreseeable
or are otherwise too remote to be subject to liability. See Crab Orchard Improvement
Co. v. Chesapeake & O. Ry. Co., 115 F.2d 277, 282-83 (4th Cir. 1940) (applying West
Virginia law); Fischl v. Paller & Goldstein, 282 Cal. Rptr. 802, 804 (Ct. App. 1991);
RK Constructors, Inc. v. Fusco Corp., 650 A.2d 153, 157 (Conn. 1994); Southland
Constr., Inc. v. Greater Orlando Aviation, 860 So. 2d 1031, 1033-34, 1036 (Fla. Dist.
Ct. App. 2003) (too remote and foreclosed by Pennsylvania’s workers’ compensation
scheme); Unique Paint Co. v. Wm. F. Newman Co., 411 S.E.2d 352, 353 (Ga. Ct. App.
1991); N. States Contracting Co. v. Oakes, 253 N.W. 371, 372 (Minn. 1934); Whirley
Indus., Inc. v. Segel, 462 A.2d 800, 804 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1983) (“[A]n increase in an
employer’s [W]orkmen’s [C]ompensation premiums following an automobile accident

13
is not reasonably foreseeable by a driver.”); Higbie Roth Constr. Co. v. Houston Shell
& Concrete, 1 S.W.3d 808, 812-13 (Tex. App. 1999).
{15} 	Other courts have held that the exclusivity provisions of the various workers’
compensation acts impliedly forbid such recovery. Erie Castings Co. v. Grinding
Supply, Inc., 736 F.2d 99, 103-104 (3d Cir. 1984) (applying Pennsylvania law);
Southland Constr., Inc., 860 So. 2d at 1035-36; Pro-Staffers, Inc. v. Premier Mfg.
Support Servs., Inc., 651 N.W.2d 811, 815-16 (Mich. Ct. App. 2002); Multiplex
Concrete Co. v. Besser Co., 380 A.2d 708, 710 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1977) (per
curiam) (action prohibited in both strict liability and negligence); M.B. Haynes Corp.
v. Strand Electro Controls, Inc., 487 S.E.2d 819, 820-21 (N.C. Ct. App. 1997);
Schipke v. Grad, 1997 SD 38, ¶ 13, 562 N.W.2d 109, 112 (“[W]e find ourselves in
agreement with those courts that have denied recovery on the ground that the
employer, having no more rights under the workers’ compensation statutes against a
negligent third party than the employee injured by the third party’s negligence, has no
right to sue for increased premiums.”).
{16} 	While we join these jurisdictions, we do so in agreement with courts that have
ruled on the more basic ground that public policy categorically prohibits recovery
under these circumstances. Am. River Transp. Co. v. KAVO KALIAKRA SS, 206 F.3d
462, 465 (5th Cir. 2000) (stating that an employer cannot recover in admiralty for
increased workers’ compensation premiums resulting from injuries to employees

14
because “economic damages are not recoverable in negligence untethered to an injury
to a property interest”); Anderson Plasterers, 543 N.W.2d at 613-14 (discussed
above); R.L. Whipple Co. v. Pondview Excavation Corp., 887 N.E.2d 1095, 1097
(Mass. App. Ct. 2008) (stating that an employer cannot maintain a negligence claim
to recover increased workers’ compensation premiums from the third party who
injured its employee because “purely economic losses are unrecoverable in tort . . .
actions in the absence of personal injury or property damage” (alteration in original)
(internal quotation marks and citation omitted)); Cincinnati Bell Tel. Co. v. Straley,
533 N.E.2d 764, 771 (Ohio 1988) (“We do not find that a duty to an injured
employee’s employer exists by virtue of the pronouncements of common law, by
legislative enactment, or by operation of law. It would appear that such a duty could
only exist based on contract or warranty.”); Ore-Ida Foods, Inc., 627 P.2d at 473
(citing the prevailing rule “that a plaintiff may not recover for economic loss resulting
from negligent infliction of bodily harm to a third person”); Vogel v. Liberty Mut. Ins.
Co., 571 N.W.2d 704, 708 (Wis. Ct. App. 1997) (holding, as a matter of public policy,
that allowing damages to an employer for economic consequences arising from
injuries to an employee would “enter a field with no sensible stopping point”).
{17} 	This conclusion is consistent with both Loucks, 1966-NMSC-176, ¶¶ 46-47, and
Rodriguez, 2014-NMSC-014, ¶¶ 24-25, and therefore, the district court appropriately
dismissed Plaintiff’s claims.

15
III. 	CONCLUSION
{18} 	Affirmed.
{19} 	IT IS SO ORDERED.
_______________________________
LINDA M. VANZI, Judge
WE CONCUR:
_________________________________
MICHAEL E. VIGIL, Chief Judge
_________________________________
MICHAEL D. BUSTAMANTE, Judge