July 30, 2020- State of New Mexico v. Bernardo Baca, No. A-1-CA-36436

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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF NEW MEXICO	1
STATE OF NEW MEXICO,	2
Plaintiff-Appellee,	3
v. 	No. A-1-CA-36436	4
BERNARDO BACA,	5
Defendant-Appellant.	6
APPEAL FROM THE DISTRICT COURT OF CURRY COUNTY	7
Matthew E. Chandler, District Judge	8
Hector H. Balderas, Attorney General	9
Santa Fe, NM	10
M. Victoria Wilson, Assistant Attorney General	11
Albuquerque, NM	12
for Appellee	13
Bennett J. Baur, Chief Public Defender	14
Kimberly Chavez Cook, Assistant Appellate Defender	15
Santa Fe, NM	16
for Appellant	17
MEMORANDUM OPINION	18
VARGAS, Judge.	19
{1} 	Defendant Bernardo Baca appeals from his conviction for possession of	20
methamphetamine, contrary to NMSA 1978, Section 30-31-23(A) (2011, amended	21
2019), possession of drug paraphernalia, contrary to NMSA 1978, Section 30-31-	22
Court of Appeals of New Mexico
Filed 7/30/2020 9:12 AM

2
25.1(A) (2001, amended 2019), and tampering with evidence, contrary to NMSA	1
1978, Section, 30-22-5(A) (2003). Defendant raises two issues on appeal. First, he	2
contends the district court erred when it denied his motion to suppress the	3
methamphetamine and pipes found after he was ordered to “get up” and come out of	4
a car by police while a passenger during a traffic stop. Second, Defendant claims	5
there was insufficient evidence to support any of his convictions. Finding no error,	6
we affirm.	7
BACKGROUND	8
{2} 	Clovis Police Officer Antonio Orozco stopped a GMC Yukon driving with a	9
malfunctioning brake light and license plate light. As he approached the car, Officer	10
Orozco saw a woman sitting in the driver’s seat and one male passenger in the second	11
row of seats. He called for additional assistance and Officers Travis Loomis and	12
Jared Romero came to the scene. After obtaining the driver’s and passenger’s	13
information, the officers discovered active arrest warrants for both the driver and	14
passenger and arrested them both. Following the removal of the first two occupants	15
from the car, Officer Orozco looked through the window of the car with his flashlight	16
and saw Defendant on the floor of the third row seat under some clothes. Only the	17
top of Defendant’s head and his ear were visible. Officer Orozco testified at the	18
suppression hearing that before seeing Defendant’s head, he did not know that a third	19
person was in the car or that Defendant had been hiding during the entire traffic stop,	20

3
and those facts concerned him. Officer Orozco alerted the other officers that another	1
person was in the car and they began knocking on the window and directing	2
Defendant 	to 	come 	out. 	Officer 	Orozco 	testified 	that, 	“we 	were 	instructing	3
[Defendant] to come out, at this point we did have our guns drawn at him, because	4
we could not see his hands and he was actively reaching underneath the seat.” Officer	5
Orozco explained that while Defendant was still in the car and officers were directing	6
him to come out, they recognized Defendant, ran his name through dispatch, and	7
was advised that he had active arrest warrants.	8
{3} 	Once Defendant came out of the car and was placed under arrest, Officer	9
Romero searched Defendant and found a small bag of a white crystalline substance	10
in Defendant’s shirt pocket, which officers believed to be methamphetamine.	11
Officers obtained a search warrant for the car where they recovered another bag of	12
white crystalline substance and two glass pipes believed to be used to ingest	13
methamphetamine. Defendant was charged and convicted by a jury for possession	14
of 	methamphetamine, 	possession 	of 	drug 	paraphernalia, 	and 	tampering 	with	15
evidence. This appeal followed.	16
DISCUSSION	17
I. 	Suppression of the Evidence	18
{4} 	Defendant first argues that the district court erred in denying his motion to	19
suppress the evidence of the pipes and methamphetamine because the evidence was	20

4
obtained after a warrantless seizure, violating Defendant’s rights under the Fourth	1
Amendment of the United States Constitution and Article II, Section 10 of the New	2
Mexico Constitution.	3
{5} 	“Appellate review of a motion to suppress presents a mixed question of law	4
and fact.” State v. Paananen, 2015-NMSC-031, ¶ 10, 357 P.3d 958 (internal	5
quotation marks and citation omitted). “In reviewing a district court’s ruling denying	6
a motion to suppress, the appellate courts draw all reasonable inferences in favor of	7
the ruling and defer to the district court’s findings of fact as long as they are	8
supported by substantial evidence.” State v. Murry, 2014-NMCA-021, ¶ 10, 318	9
P.3d 180. We review the district court’s legal conclusions de novo. Paananen, 2015-	10
NMSC-031, ¶ 10. We note that the district court did not make any written factual	11
findings and made only a few oral findings in this case. We presume that the district	12
court believed the uncontradicted testimony of Officer Orozco, the only witness to	13
testify at the suppression hearing. “Where the testimony is unclear, we will decide	14
in favor of the district court’s ruling, unless the ruling is wrong as a matter of law.”	15
Murry, 2014-NMCA-021, ¶ 15.	16
{6} 	Defendant argues that the motion to suppress should have been granted	17
because (1) Defendant was seized when officers saw Defendant and commanded	18
him to “get up,” and (2) the seizure was unreasonable because the officers lacked	19
individualized reasonable suspicion to expand the scope of the investigatory traffic	20

5
stop. Defendant argues that since the seizure was unreasonable, his rights under the	1
Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution and Article II, Section 10 of	2
the New Mexico Constitution were violated and any evidence discovered after he	3
was seized should be suppressed.	4
A. 	Defendant’s Fourth Amendment Rights Were Not Violated	5
{7} 	The Fourth Amendment guarantees “[t]he right of the people to be secure in	6
their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and	7
seizures[.]” U.S. Const. amend. IV. “A search and seizure conducted without a	8
warrant is unreasonable unless it is shown to fall within one of the exceptions to the	9
warrant requirement.” State v. Diaz, 1996-NMCA-104, ¶ 8, 122 N.M. 384, 925	10
P.2d 4. 	“Recognized 	exceptions 	to 	the 	warrant 	requirement 	include 	exigent	11
circumstances, searches incident to arrest, inventory searches, consent, hot pursuit,	12
open field, and plain view.” State v. Weidner, 2007-NMCA-063, ¶ 6, 141 N.M. 582,	13
158 P.3d 1025. “The burden of showing reasonableness is on the [s]tate.” State v.	14
Leyva, 2011-NMSC-009, ¶ 30, 149 N.M. 435, 250 P.3d 861.	15
{8} 	Defendant contends that he was seized when officers ordered him to get up	16
from the floor of the third row passenger seat and that they did not have reasonable	17
suspicion to seize him at the time they gave him this directive because they lacked	18
individualized particularized suspicion that he was engaged in criminal activity. The	19
State does not appear to disagree with Defendant’s characterization of the time of	20

6
Defendant’s seizure, and we accept for purposes of this opinion that Defendant was	1
seized at or before officers ordered him out of the car. See, e.g., id. ¶ 10 (“A law	2
enforcement officer who stops a car to investigate a traffic violation seizes the	3
occupants.”); State v. Portillo, 2011-NMCA-079, ¶ 12, 150 N.M. 187, 258 P.3d 466	4
(same). The State argues instead that seizure was permissible because officer safety	5
concerns raised exigent circumstances that obviated the need for a warrant.	6
{9} 	Defendant asserts that his seizure was “unconstitutional and his subsequent	7
search incident 	to arrest, and 	the search of the car” were therefore illegal.	8
Specifically, Defendant claims that before police were permitted to order him to “get	9
up” and get out of the car, they were required to have individualized suspicion that	10
Defendant was engaged in criminal activity. We disagree.	11
{10} 	The United States Supreme Court has long held that, “during a lawful traffic	12
stop an officer may order a passenger out of the car as a precautionary measure,	13
without reasonable suspicion that the passenger poses a safety risk.” Brendlin v.	14
California, 551 U.S. 249, 258 (2007) (citing Maryland v. Wilson, 519 U.S. 408, 414-	15
15 (1997)). Balancing “the same weighty interest in officer safety” against the	16
personal liberty of a passenger “already stopped by virtue of the stop of the car,”	17
Wilson, 519 U.S. at 413-414, the Wilson Court concluded that the “danger to an	18
officer from a traffic stop is likely to be greater when there are passengers” in the	19
car and, “the additional intrusion on the passenger is minimal.” Id. at 414-15; see	20

7
Arizona v. Johnson, 555 U.S. 323, 330 (2009) (observing that “traffic stops are	1
especially fraught with danger to police officers [and t]he risk of harm . . . is	2
minimized if officers exercise unquestioned command of the situation” (internal	3
quotation marks and citation omitted)). In this case, Officer Orozco testified that	4
during the initial period of the traffic stop, he believed that there were only two	5
people in the car: the driver and the passenger seated in the second row of seats. He	6
explained that he became concerned when he discovered that Defendant had been	7
hiding underneath clothing in the car during the entire stop,1 at which point officers	8
knocked on the window and tried to get Defendant to come out of the car. Under the	9
Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution, individualized suspicion was	10
not required to order Defendant out of the car.	11
{11} 	We note that once the officers were able to see Defendant’s face, which	12
occurred while he was still in the car, they recognized him, ran his name through	13
dispatch, and were advised that he had active arrest warrants. It was during the search	14
incident to Defendant’s arrest pursuant to the active warrants that officers found	15
methamphetamine on his person. See State v. Rowell, 2008-NMSC-041, ¶ 13, 144	16
1 We recognize that Defendant contends that he was not hiding on the floor of
the third row of seats, but instead was sleeping and “sleeping in the back seat did not
provide reasonable suspicion” for his seizure. While the district court did not make
any findings as to whether Defendant was hiding or sleeping, we note that our
standard of review requires that we resolve all factual issues in favor of the district
court’s ruling. Murry, 2014-NMCA-021, ¶ 15.

8
N.M. 371, 188 P.3d 95 (recognizing search incident to arrest as an exception to the	1
warrant requirement). We conclude that the officers’ seizure of Defendant was not	2
a violation of his Fourth Amendment rights and the district court did not err in	3
denying Defendant’s motion to suppress on these grounds.	4
B. 	Defendant’s Rights Under Article II, Section 10 Were Not Violated	5
{12} 	Defendant claims that, should we conclude that his rights under the Fourth	6
Amendment were not violated, we must find that his rights under Article II, Section	7
10 of the New Mexico Constitution were infringed upon. In response, the State	8
contends that Defendant failed to preserve his claims under the New Mexico	9
Constitution but, even if preserved, they are without merit. Assuming, without	10
deciding whether Defendant properly preserved his state constitutional claims, we	11
conclude 	that 	under 	the 	totality 	of 	the 	circumstances, 	Defendant’s 	state	12
constitutional rights were not violated when he was directed to “get up” and	13
subsequently ordered out of the car by police.	14
{13} 	Citing State v. Gomez, 1997-NMSC-006, ¶¶ 36-40, 122 N.M. 777, 932 P.2d	15
1, Defendant argues that, “under the New Mexico Constitution, automobiles [like	16
homes] also provide a heightened expectation of privacy beyond that of a public	17
place and are subject to the warrant requirement.” Defendant is correct that our state	18
courts interpret Article II, Section 10 of the New Mexico Constitution “more broadly	19
than its federal counterpart, and specifically apply that broader protection to	20

9
motorists.” State v. Bricker, 2006-NMCA-052, ¶ 15, 139 N.M. 513, 134 P.3d 800	1
(alteration, internal quotation marks, and citation omitted); see State v. Cardenas-	2
Alvarez, 2001-NMSC-017, ¶ 15, 130 N.M. 386, 25 P.3d 225 (“The extra layer of	3
protection from unreasonable searches and seizures involving automobiles is a	4
distinct characteristic of New Mexico constitutional law.”); Gomez, 1997-NMSC-	5
006, ¶¶ 39, 44 (rejecting federal automobile exception to warrant requirement in	6
favor of greater protections under Article II, Section 10). Nonetheless, when	7
considering the propriety of police actions under Article II, Section 10, “the key	8
inquiry is still one of reasonableness, which depends on the balance between the	9
public interest and the individual’s interest in freedom from police intrusion upon	10
personal liberty.” State v. Tapia, 2018-NMSC-017, ¶ 46, 414 P.3d 332 (internal	11
quotation marks and citation omitted).	12
{14} 	To evaluate whether a search and seizure violates the protections of the New	13
Mexico Constitution, we “evaluate, on the one hand, the degree to which the seizure	14
intruded upon [the d]efendant’s privacy and, on the other, the degree to which the	15
seizure was needed for the promotion of legitimate governmental interests.” State v.	16
Wright, 2019-NMCA-026, ¶ 13, 458 P.3d 604 (alterations, internal quotation marks,	17
and citation omitted); see also Tapia, 2018-NMSC-017, ¶ 46 (explaining that “courts	18
judge the facts of each case by balancing the degree of intrusion into an individual’s	19
privacy against the interest of the government in promoting crime prevention and	20

10
detection” (internal quotation marks and citation omitted)); State v. Lovato, 1991-	1
NMCA-083, ¶ 25, 112 N.M. 517, 817 P.2d 251 (“[W]e look to whether the officer’s	2
actions were reasonable under the circumstances as juxtaposed against [the]	3
defendants’ right to be free of arbitrary interference by the officer.”).	4
{15} 	Applying the balancing test to Defendant’s state constitutional claims, we	5
conclude that the officers’ actions were reasonable under the circumstances. Officer	6
Orozco testified at the suppression hearing that he believed they had removed all of	7
the occupants of the car when he noticed Defendant “hiding” inside the car. At trial,	8
Officer Loomis explained that when Officer Orozco advised him that there was a	9
third person in the car, they were concerned because “we had somebody we didn’t	10
know hiding in the [car] we had been dealing with for quite some time now. [We	11
d]idn’t know if the person was armed, what they were doing, or why they were	12
concealing themselves. We just didn’t know what was going on and that was an	13
officer safety issue.” The lapel camera video of the stop shows that when officers	14
realized Defendant was in the car, Officer Orozco initially shined his flashlight into	15
the car, knocked on the window and directed Defendant to “get up.” 2 When	16
2 While the lapel camera video and testimony from Officer Loomis were not
presented at the suppression hearing, we note that our review “is not limited to the
record made on a motion to suppress,” but may include a review of “the entire record
to determine whether there was sufficient evidence to support the trial court’s denial
of the motion[.]” State v. Johnson, 1996-NMCA-117, ¶ 21, 122 N.M. 713, 930 P.2d
1165; see also State v. Monafo, 2016-NMCA-092, ¶ 10, 384 P.3d 134 (same).

11
Defendant neither responded nor complied and forty-five seconds had passed,	1
Officer Orozco opened the rear passenger side door slightly and again directed	2
Defendant to “get up.” After another ninety seconds passed with no response from	3
Defendant, another officer went to the other side of the car, opened the driver’s door	4
and directed Defendant to “get up.” Defendant then began to move around in the	5
third row seat and both officers began repeatedly ordering him to “get up,” “get [his]	6
hands up,” and “keep [his] hands where [officers] could see them.” At this point,	7
officers had drawn their weapons.	8
{16} 	We have previously held that, “[e]ven in routine traffic stops, police may	9
adopt precautionary measures addressed to reasonable fears.” Lovato, 1991-NMCA-	10
083, ¶ 26. In this instance, officers were dealing with the presence of a person who,	11
whether sleeping, as Defendant contends, or hiding, as officers surmised, had been	12
concealed inside the car for a long period of time without officers’ knowledge.	13
Officers did not know the person’s motives or intentions or whether he was armed.	14
These facts, taken together, raise reasonable concerns for officer safety. Balancing	15
the degree to which the seizure intruded upon Defendant’s privacy when he was	16
directed to “get up” and to “get his hands up” against the governmental interest in	17
keeping officers safe while they perform their duties, we conclude that the officers’	18
actions were objectively reasonable under the circumstances and Defendant’s rights	19
under Article II, Section 10 were not violated.	20

12
II. 	Sufficiency of the Evidence	1
{17} 	We now turn to Defendant’s arguments that his convictions for possession of	2
methamphetamine, possession of drug paraphernalia, and tampering with evidence	3
were not supported by sufficient evidence.	4
{18} 	“The test for sufficiency of the evidence is whether substantial evidence of	5
either a direct or circumstantial nature exists to support a verdict of guilty beyond a	6
reasonable doubt with respect to every element essential to a conviction.” State v.	7
Montoya, 2015-NMSC-010, ¶ 52, 345 P.3d 1056 (internal quotation marks and	8
citation omitted). Substantial evidence is defined as “such relevant evidence a	9
reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion[,]” State v.	10
Salgado, 1999-NMSC-008, ¶ 25, 126 N.M. 691, 974 P.2d 661 (internal quotation	11
marks and citation omitted), and the “[j]ury instructions become the law of the case	12
against which the sufficiency of the evidence is to be measured.” State v. Smith,	13
1986-NMCA-089, ¶ 7, 104 N.M. 729, 726 P.2d 883. The reviewing court “view[s]	14
the evidence in the light most favorable to the guilty verdict, indulging all reasonable	15
inferences and resolving all conflicts in the evidence in favor of the verdict.” State	16
v. Cunningham, 2000-NMSC-009, ¶ 26, 128 N.M. 711, 998 P.2d 176. We disregard	17
all evidence and inferences that support a different result. See State v. Rojo, 1999-	18
NMSC-001, ¶ 19, 126 N.M. 438, 971 P.2d 829. “The reviewing court does not weigh	19
the evidence or substitute its judgment for that of the fact[-]finder as long as there is	20

13
sufficient evidence to support the verdict.” State v. Chavez, 2009-NMSC-035, ¶ 11,	1
146 N.M. 434, 211 P.3d 891 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).	2
A. 	Conviction for Possession of Drug Paraphernalia	3
{19} 	Defendant argues that there was insufficient evidence to convict him for	4
possession of drug paraphernalia because (1) the pipes seized were broken and could	5
not be considered paraphernalia, and (2) there was insufficient evidence that	6
Defendant controlled the paraphernalia.	7
{20} 	The jury was instructed that to find Defendant guilty for the charge of	8
possession of drug paraphernalia, the jury must find that the State proved beyond a	9
reasonable doubt each of the following elements of the crime:	10
1. 	[D]efendant had two glass pipes in his possession;	11
2. 	The pipes were intended to be used to ingest, inhale or	12
otherwise introduce a methamphetamine to the human body;	13
[and]	14
3. 	This happened in New Mexico on or about the 28th day of	15
April, 2016.	16
This jury instruction follows the Uniform Jury Instruction on possession of drug	17
paraphernalia and the elements laid out in our state statute. See UJI 14-3107 NMRA;	18
Section 30-31-23(A).	19
{21} 	Defendant first argues that because the pipes were broken, the State failed to	20
prove that Defendant intended to use these pipes to ingest, inhale, or otherwise	21
introduce methamphetamine into the body. We note the record and Defendant’s	22

14
briefing are not sufficient to allow us to ascertain the extent to which the pipes were	1
broken and whether the damage was such that they were unusable. Whether the pipes	2
were so broken that they could not be used to ingest methamphetamine is a factual	3
matter for the jury to consider in determining whether Defendant intended to use the	4
pipes to ingest methamphetamine. In light of Officer Loomis’s testimony that he	5
recovered two pipes, that the pipes contained burnt methamphetamine residue, and	6
that officers discovered the methamphetamine on Defendant and in the car in the	7
area of the pipes, and disregarding all other contrary evidence and inferences, there	8
was sufficient evidence for the jury to logically infer and conclude that the pipes	9
were intended to ingest, inhale, or otherwise introduce methamphetamine into the	10
body. See State v. Bankert, 1994-NMSC-052, ¶ 17, 117 N.M. 614, 875 P.2d 370 (“A	11
conviction will be upheld if based upon a logical inference from circumstantial	12
evidence.”). To the extent Defendant argues that this is a question of statutory	13
interpretation, this argument was not raised below and the record is insufficient for	14
us to review. See State v. Jim, 1988-NMCA-092, ¶ 3, 107 N.M. 779, 765 P.2d 195	15
(“It is [the] defendant’s burden to bring up a record sufficient for review of the issues	16
he raises on appeal.”). Therefore, we decline to address it.	17
{22} 	Next, Defendant contends that the State failed to prove that Defendant had	18
constructive possession of the pipes, arguing that the State only provided evidence	19
that the pipes were found in the vicinity of Defendant and that the driver and other	20

15
passenger had equal access to the pipes. See UJI 14-3130 NMRA (“A person’s	1
presence in the vicinity of the substance or his [or her] knowledge of the existence	2
or the location of the substance, is not, by itself, possession.”). However, Defendant	3
fails to acknowledge Officer Loomis’s testimony that he saw Defendant reaching	4
and grabbing the pipes and pushing them under the seat. Further, the lapel footage	5
captures Officers Orozco and Loomis telling Defendant to stop reaching and pushing	6
the pipes under the seat. Disregarding all other evidence and inferences to the	7
contrary, the officers’ testimony and exhibits are sufficient to support a reasonable	8
jury’s conclusion that Defendant had knowledge of the pipes and exercised control	9
over them. See State v. Phillips, 2000-NMCA-028, ¶ 8, 128 N.M. 777, 999 P.2d 421	10
(recognizing that “[c]onstructive possession exists when the accused has knowledge	11
of drugs or paraphernalia and exercises control over them” and that “[t]he accused’s	12
own 	conduct 	may 	afford 	sufficient 	additional 	circumstances 	for 	constructive	13
possession”). Therefore, we hold that there was sufficient evidence for a reasonable	14
jury to find Defendant guilty of possession of drug paraphernalia.	15
B. 	Conviction for Possession of Methamphetamine	16
{23} 	Defendant also contends that there was insufficient evidence to support his	17
conviction for possession of methamphetamine. Defendant argues that the State	18
failed to prove that the items seized from Defendant and the car were in fact	19
methamphetamine, particularly because there was a discrepancy between the amount	20

16
weighed by Officer Orozco and the forensics lab. Tracking the Uniform Jury	1
Instruction and the elements in the statute for possession of a controlled substance,	2
the 	jury 	was 	instructed 	that 	to 	find 	Defendant 	guilty 	of 	possession 	of	3
methamphetamine, the jury must find that the State proved beyond a reasonable	4
doubt each of the following elements of the crime:	5
1. 	[D]efendant had methamphetamine in his possession;	6
2. 	[D]efendant knew it was methamphetamine;	7
3. 	This happened in New Mexico on or about the 28th day of April,	8
2016.	9
See UJI 14-3102 NMRA; Section 30-31-23(A).	10
{24} 	At trial, Officer Romero testified that he removed a clear plastic baggie from	11
Defendant’s shirt pocket that contained a white crystalline substance. Officer Orozco	12
testified that after the officers obtained the search warrant and searched the car, he	13
found another plastic bag wrapped in a napkin containing a white crystalline	14
substance in the backseat, near where Defendant was discovered. Officer Orozco	15
further testified that he secured both baggies and placed them into evidence The	16
State also offered the expert testimony of Sara Holguin, a forensic scientist with the	17
Department of Public Safety Forensic Crime Lab, who tested both bags and opined	18
with scientific certainty that the two bag contained methamphetamine. To the extent	19
Defendant 	asks 	this 	Court 	to 	examine 	the 	weight 	discrepancies 	of 	the	20
methamphetamine, we do not re-examine or reweigh the factual determinations best	21

17
left to the jury or consider contrary evidence. See Chavez, 2009-NMSC-035, ¶ 11.	1
Nor do we reweigh the credibility of witnesses testifying about those discrepancies.	2
See State v. Nichols, 2006-NMCA-017, ¶ 9, 139 N.M. 72, 128 P.3d 500 (“If evidence	3
is in conflict, or credibility is at issue, we accept any interpretation of the evidence	4
that supports the [district] court’s findings.” (alteration, internal quotation marks,	5
and citation omitted)). In addition to the officers’ and Ms. Holguin’s testimony, the	6
State admitted the two bags of methamphetamine and Officer Orozco’s lapel footage	7
into evidence. Therefore, we hold that there was sufficient evidence for the jury to	8
find each element in the instruction and to find Defendant guilty for possession of	9
methamphetamine.	10
C. 	Conviction for Tampering with Evidence	11
{25} 	Defendant challenges his conviction for tampering with evidence, arguing that	12
the State did not provide sufficient evidence that Defendant was hiding the pipes or	13
that he intended to tamper with evidence, and that any movement the officers noticed	14
was Defendant’s attempts at complying with the officers’ orders. On the charge of	15
tampering with evidence, the jury was instructed that to find Defendant guilty, it	16
must find that the State proved beyond a reasonable doubt each of the following	17
elements of the crime:	18

18
1. 	[D]efendant hid methamphetamine and two glass pipes under the	1
seat of a car;	2
2. 	By doing so, [D]efendant intended to prevent the apprehension,	3
prosecution, or conviction of himself for the crime of possession of	4
methamphetamine.	5
The instruction mirrors the Uniform Jury Instruction and our state statute. See UJI	6
14-2241 NMRA; Section 30-22-5.	7
{26} 	In this case, we hold that there was sufficient evidence to support Defendant’s	8
conviction for tampering with evidence. Officer Orozco testified that after the	9
officers found Defendant in the backseat, they directed him several times to get out	10
of the car and show his hands. Rather than comply, Defendant remained on the floor	11
of the car and continued to reach under the seat. Officer Loomis testified that he	12
could see the two pipes on the floor next to Defendant and that Defendant grabbed	13
the pipes and pushed them underneath the seat. Further, Defendant’s arguments that	14
his actions were not intended to tamper with evidence but instead were attempts at	15
complying with the officers commands asks us to reweigh the evidence, which we	16
will not do. Therefore, disregarding the contrary evidence, we hold that Defendant’s	17
conviction for tampering with evidence was supported by sufficient evidence.	18
CONCLUSION	19
{27} 	For the foregoing reasons, we affirm.	20

19
{28} 	IT IS SO ORDERED.	1
_________________________	2
JULIE J. VARGAS, Judge	3
WE CONCUR:	4
____________________________	5
JENNIFER L. ATTREP, Judge	6
____________________________	7
KRISTINA BOGARDUS, Judge	8