January 2, 2026- State of New Mexico v. Edgar Guzman, No. A-1-CA-41682

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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF NEW MEXICO	1
Opinion Number:__________	2
Filing Date: January 2, 2026	3
No. A-1-CA-41682	4
STATE OF NEW MEXICO,	5
Plaintiff-Appellant,	6
v.	7
EDGAR GUZMAN,	8
Defendant-Appellee.	9
APPEAL FROM THE DISTRICT COURT OF SANTA FE COUNTY	10
T. Glenn Ellington, District Court Judge	11
Raúl Torrez, Attorney General	12
Teresa Ryan, Assistant Solicitor General	13
Santa Fe, NM	14
for Appellant	15
Bennett J. Baur, Chief Public Defender	16
Caitlin C.M. Smith, Assistant Appellate Defender	17
Santa Fe, NM	18
for Appellee	19
Court of Appeals of New Mexico
Filed 1/2/2026 8:44 AM

OPINION	1
WRAY, Judge.	2
{1} Our Supreme Court has established a legal framework for district courts to	3
apply in order to impose “extreme” sanctions, like exclusion of a witness or	4
dismissal. State v. Harper, 2011-NMSC-044, ¶¶ 16, 27, 150 N.M. 745, 266 P.3d 25;	5
State v. Le Mier, 2017-NMSC-017, ¶ 15, 394 P.3d 959. District courts must consider	6
culpability, prejudice, and the availability of lesser sanctions (the Harper/Le Mier	7
factors) and must explain the reasoning supporting the sanction imposed. Le Mier,	8
2017-NMSC-017, ¶¶ 15, 20. On appeal, the State argues that the district court’s	9
decision to exclude several late-disclosed witnesses was an abuse of discretion	10
because (1) the district court did not consider or explain its evaluation of lesser	11
sanctions on the record as required by Harper and Le Mier; and (2) the district court	12
improperly weighed and applied the Harper/Le Mier factors. We affirm the district	13
court’s exercise of discretion to impose an extreme sanction because (1) the record	14
demonstrates that the district court considered the Harper/Le Mier factors and	15
explained its reasoning; and (2) the sanction is not contrary to the facts or	16
circumstances of the case.	17
BACKGROUND	18
{2} While on electronic monitoring (EM), Defendant was identified as a suspect	19
in a burglary. Law enforcement’s investigation correlated Defendant’s EM location	20

2
data with a series of burglaries that had been committed by an unknown perpetrator.	1
On June 7, 2022, Defendant was charged with nineteen counts, including larceny,	2
nonresidential burglary, and breaking and entering. Defendant was detained pretrial.	3
{3} On June 13, 2022, the district court entered a scheduling order, which required	4
the State to comply with Rule 5-501 NMRA. Most relevantly, Rule 5-501(A)(5)	5
requires the State to	6
disclose or make available to the defendant . . . a written list of the	7
names and addresses of all witnesses which the prosecutor intends to	8
call at the trial, identifying any witnesses that will provide expert	9
testimony and indicating the subject area in which they will testify,	10
together with any statement made by the witness and any record of prior	11
convictions of any such witness which is within the knowledge of the	12
prosecutor.	13
The State filed a witness list on June 24, 2022, which identified thirty-one specific	14
witnesses and five catch-all categories, including “[a]ny witness not named herein	15
but mentioned in any police report made pursuant to this case.”	16
{4} Trial was reset multiple times. The original trial date was for February 2023,	17
which was continued to April 2023. At a status hearing in March 2023, Defendant	18
noted that “the GPS or electronic monitoring data seems like it’s been lost or	19
destroyed” and requested a continuance to “file the appropriate motion.” The district	20
court reset trial for May 2023 and after that, reset trial twice more. Before the	21
September 2023 trial setting, on August 16, 2023, Defendant filed a motion to	22
exclude “any testimony of any witness not properly listed pursuant to . . . Rule 5-	23

3
501 and [Rule] 5-505” NMRA, which governs the parties’ continuing duty to	1
disclose witnesses. The State did not respond.	2
{5} The district court granted the motion at an October 2, 2023 hearing, but did	3
not preclude the State from filing a supplemental witness list. At that point, jury	4
selection was set for November 14, 2023, and the district court ordered the State to	5
identify any supplemental witnesses by October 11, 2023. The State did not identify	6
any additional witnesses within the deadline, and on October 11, 2023, the parties	7
indicated that they were ready for trial.	8
{6} On October 20, 2023, Defendant filed a motion in limine to exclude any	9
evidence related to EM because the State had not identified a foundational witness.	10
Substitute counsel for the State entered an appearance the following business day.	11
This marked the fourth entry of appearance on behalf of the State.1 After this fourth	12
substitution of counsel, the State quickly filed a supplemental witness list naming	13
the records custodian for the EM records (EMR custodian). Defendant moved to	14
exclude the EMR custodian based on the State’s failure to timely disclose the witness	15
by October 11, 2023. The State responded to both motions. In response to	16
Defendant’s motion in limine, the State (1) argued that the police report gave	17
Defendant “ample notice that the State intended to introduce evidence of electronic	18
1On appeal, the State notes that one of these entries occurred within two days
of the filing of charges and that the Defendant also had changes in counsel.

4
monitoring data”; and (2) informed the district court that a pretrial interview had	1
been scheduled with the witness for November 8, 2023. In response to Defendant’s	2
motion to exclude the EMR custodian, the State declared that (1) Defendant had not	3
been prejudiced, (2) the omission was unintentional, (3) the name of the EMR	4
custodian had been in the police report, 2 and (4) exclusion would be a	5
disproportionate sanction to the infraction. The State proposed “an oral reprimand	6
as an appropriate remedy.”	7
{7} The day before jury selection, Defendant filed a “Conditional Motion to	8
Sever.” The next day, the State filed a second supplemental witness list that	9
identified five additional witnesses. The same day, the district court vacated jury	10
selection for the trial because of building maintenance issues, reset the jury trial for	11
December 27, 2023, and heard Defendant’s motions.	12
{8} At the hearing, Defendant noted that the witness identification issue was	13
“clearly a Le Mier situation” and that decisions had been made “about trial	14
preparations.” Although Defendant did not want a severance, he explained that he	15
had stated that he was ready for trial based on the “understanding of the evidence of	16
what we expected the State to be able to present at trial, based on the fact that	17
2The police report does not appear to be in our record, and on appeal, the State
argues that the EMR custodian was “named indirectly through the police report
category.” From this, we conclude that EM evidence was referenced in the police
report but not the identity of an EMR custodian.

5
[defense counsel] was actually urging them to look at their witness list to make a	1
decision about what [defense counsel] need[ed] to do.” If the district court did not	2
grant the motion to exclude the EMR custodian, Defendant stated that he would	3
pursue the motion to sever the seventeen counts that were reliant on EM evidence	4
from the two that were not.	5
{9} The district court granted Defendant’s motion to exclude. In the written order,	6
the district court found that as of Defendant’s August 2023 motion, the State was	7
“on notice of the deficiencies of its witness list”; the deadline to identify additional	8
witnesses had been extended to October 11, 2023; and the State did not identify	9
additional witnesses by the new deadline even though the absence of the EMR	10
custodian “was a material defect in the State’s ability to proceed with its case.” The	11
incomplete witness list both “prejudiced the defense’s ability to prepare for trial, all	12
the while [Defendant] sat in custody awaiting trial,” and put Defendant in a position	13
where he “had to forego a motion to sever counts based on other legal theories.” The	14
order states that exclusion of the EMR custodian was “the appropriate sanction for	15
the material harm caused by the State’s failure to supplement its witness list by the	16
[c]ourt’s deadline.”	17
{10} The State filed a motion to reconsider the district court’s exclusion of the	18
EMR custodian, and Defendant filed a motion to exclude the State’s second	19
supplemental witness list. The State again noted that Defendant had conducted an	20

6
interview of the EMR custodian on November 8, 2023, that the identity of the	1
witness was not intentionally withheld, and that the centrality of the EM evidence	2
was always apparent. The prejudice to Defendant, the State argued, was mitigated	3
by the interview and by the resetting of trial to late December. The State also	4
suggested other, lesser sanctions: “oral or written admonishment, monetary sanction,	5
release of Defendant from custody, or dismissal”—presumably dismissal without	6
prejudice. At the hearing, the State noted that the exclusion of the EMR custodian	7
was “an extreme sanction, because the State did not attempt to hide this witness” and	8
asked for “a lesser sanction, which [is] available.” The district court denied the	9
State’s motion to reconsider and granted Defendant’s motion to exclude the State’s	10
second supplemental witness list. The written order noted that the State’s	11
supplemental witness list had been filed more than sixteen months after the criminal	12
information, the State’s charging decisions complicated the case, multiple attorneys	13
had represented the State, and Defendant had remained in custody. The State	14
appealed.	15
DISCUSSION	16
{11} The State argues that the district court abused its discretion by (1) not	17
considering the third Harper/Le Mier factor on the record or explaining its decision;	18
and (2) incorrectly applying the law to the facts by imposing the sanction of	19
exclusion. See State v. Ferry, 2018-NMSC-004, ¶ 2, 409 P.3d 918 (explaining that	20

7
the district court’s discretionary decisions are first evaluated according to whether	1
the district court applied the correct legal principles and second whether those	2
principles were properly applied). Before proceeding further, we note that the State	3
asserts that the district court erroneously excluded both the EMR custodian and the	4
witnesses listed on the second supplemental witness list. The State’s arguments,	5
however, focus solely on the EMR custodian and do not address the second	6
supplemental witness list. We therefore focus our own analysis on the EMR	7
custodian. To do that, we consider (1) whether the district court used the correct	8
analysis under Harper/Le Mier; and (2) whether the district court’s application of	9
the Harper/Le Mier factors properly resulted in the exclusion of the EMR custodian.	10
I. The District Court Applied the Harper/Le Mier Framework and	11
Adequately Explained Its Decision to Exclude the State’s Witnesses	12
{12} The State maintains that the correct legal principles were not applied because	13
the district court (1) did not consider lesser sanctions, and (2) failed to explain its	14
decision to exclude the witness. The district court is required to “evaluate the	15
considerations identified in Harper—culpability, prejudice, and lesser sanctions”	16
and “must explain [the] decision to exclude or not to exclude a witness within” that	17
framework. Le Mier, 2017-NMSC-017, ¶ 20; cf. State v. Lente, 2005-NMCA-111,	18
¶ 3, 138 N.M. 312, 119 P.3d 737 (“The threshold question of whether the trial court	19
applied the correct evidentiary rule or standard is subject to de novo review on	20
appeal.” (alteration, internal quotation marks, and citation omitted). The district	21

8
court did not refer explicitly to Harper or Le Mier. For this reason, we turn to the	1
parties’ arguments and the record of the district court’s reasoning in order to evaluate	2
the State’s contention that the district court wholly failed to consider the third	3
Harper factor or explain the reasons for the sanction that was imposed. This record	4
review resolves both threshold questions and shows that the district court considered	5
all three Harper/Le Mier factors and adequately explained its reasoning.	6
{13} Both parties raised Le Mier either in briefing and/or in argument and the	7
district court responded to the parties’ arguments. In briefing, the State requested	8
multiple alternative sanctions, and at the hearing, Defendant indicated that if the	9
EMR custodian was not excluded, he would seek severance as an alternate remedy.	10
To provide the entire context and to avoid interpretation by summary, we set forth	11
nearly the entire oral explanation that the district court provided at the hearing on	12
Defendant’s motion to exclude. The court stated:	13
I won’t go through the history again because we’ve already had that as	14
part of this discussion. The State was placed on notice of a potential	15
problem in its presentation by the motion filed by [Defendant] in	16
August. We heard—we heard that motion at that point in time that the	17
State—the court denied that, but set a deadline. The harm to	18
[Defendant] is not just additional time sitting in jail, it’s the ability to	19
prepare for the trial. It was clear from the State’s position, and who had	20
identified in its witness list, who the State intended to call. The	21
vagueness of the State’s statement is other people that are noticed in—	22
other people that are identified somehow in a police report or something	23
else.	24
The court gave the State to the opportunity to clarify and to specify who	25
those individuals might be and that did not occur. The defense is left in	26

9
a position where it is—believes that there is a material defect in the	1
State’s ability to prosecute several of the counts against [Defendant]	2
and prepares accordingly. The State announced that it was ready for	3
trial again and that—then subsequently filed a witness list, really on the	4
verge of this current setting. And we’ve had several settings in this case	5
to add the name of a witness. The court finds that there is material harm	6
to [Defendant] in that sequence of events.	7
. . . .	8
And just to supplement the court’s findings, the lack of attention by the	9
State placed the defense in a position where it bypassed or [had to]	10
forgo this opportunity to file a motion to sever these counts based on	11
other legal theories. Namely that there were multiple dates and times	12
that the alleged crimes took place and that they may not have any	13
relationship to each other, other than potentially the discovery of the	14
identification through the Santa Fe County electronic monitoring	15
program, of [Defendant] being involved in these other incidents. That	16
is exactly the type of issue they’re—I’m not addressing the severance	17
argument that—at this hearing, but that is exactly the type of issue in	18
preparation for a nineteen count information that requires substantial	19
preparation. If there’s going to be a bifurcated trial[] or if there’s going	20
to be argument that somehow they should all remain together in a	21
single—in a single prosecution.	22
At the hearing on the motion to reconsider, the district court provided this additional	23
explanation:	24
This has been a poorly managed prosecution. There were decisions	25
made early on to prosecute multiple alleged burglaries altogether, even	26
though they’re different dates and times. And then in the discovery	27
process—the complexity of that it appears has caused additional	28
problems. Also a rotation in representation for the State. I show that	29
there’s been four prosecutors in this case since its inception.	30
[Defendant] has been in custody for, I believe, almost all of that time.	31
The two remaining charges, standing alone, are fairly straightforward.	32
They don’t appear to be complex. The complexity in this case came	33

10
from the charging decisions and the prosecution decisions and then the	1
lack of discovery.	2
{14} This record, together with the written rulings, demonstrates that the district	3
court (1) considered and rejected the State’s proposed lesser sanctions; and (2)	4
explained the reasons for the exclusion of the witness. The State requested lesser	5
sanctions both in writing and at the hearings. At the November motion hearing, the	6
State argued that excluding the EMR custodian was “an extreme or severe sanction	7
of last resort” that was unwarranted because the failure to identify the witness was	8
an unintentional clerical error. The district court responded, “Why is it	9
unwarranted?” The district court then described its view that the extension of the	10
witness identification deadline to October 11, 2023, put the State on notice that the	11
EMR custodian had to be identified. But until October 27, 2023, the EMR custodian	12
was neither identified nor was “a statement made specifically that there would be a	13
foundational witness from the [EM] program.” The State’s final argument before the	14
district court’s oral ruling was that witness exclusion was unwarranted. Based on	15
this, the district court believed that an extension of time to identify witnesses had	16
already been granted and rejected the State’s proposed alternate remedies that	17
stopped short of excluding the undisclosed witness. In its order, the district court	18
stated that exclusion of the witness was “the appropriate sanction for the material	19
harm caused by the State’s failure to supplement its witness list by the [c]ourt’s	20

11
deadline.” Thus, the district court (1) considered the third Harper/Le Mier factor;	1
and (2) explained its reasons for the sanction.	2
{15} Despite this record, the State contends reversal is required because the district	3
court’s oral and written rulings did not expressly discuss why lesser sanctions were	4
not appropriate. While an analytical process that expressly accounts for each	5
Harper/Le Mier factor would be helpful, in other cases, appellate courts considering	6
this question have looked to the record to determine whether it was possible to	7
conduct a meaningful appellate review of the district court’s application of the	8
Harper/Le Mier factors. See Le Mier, 2017-NMSC-017, ¶¶ 24-29; State v. Lewis,	9
2018-NMCA-019, ¶¶ 4, 12, 16, 413 P.3d 484. The type of explanation provided by	10
the district court in the present case—describing the district court’s belief that the	11
course of the prosecution was affected by the failure to comply with court-imposed	12
schedules or to grasp the opportunity the court gave the State to identify its	13
witnesses—is sufficient to permit appellate courts to evaluate (1) whether the district	14
court applied the required Harper/Le Mier considerations; and (2) the district court’s	15
reasoning. As our Supreme Court stated in Le Mier: “Whether it is proper to exclude	16
a witness is not a simple choice easily resolved by reference to some basic judicial	17
arithmetic. The question requires our courts to navigate an array of concerns and to	18
exercise their discretionary power with practical wisdom and due care.” 2017-	19
NMSC-017, ¶ 20.	20

12
{16} Le Mier models this analysis. In Le Mier, our Supreme Court reviewed the	1
record—the history of the case, its own view of the prejudice to the defendant and	2
to the court, and, most importantly, its own evaluation of whether the Court was	3
“persuaded that witness exclusion was the least severe sanction in light of the	4
circumstances of this case.” Id. ¶¶ 24-29. For that factor, the Court (1) relied on the	5
principle that the district court need not consider every sanction, (2) examined the	6
multiple opportunities—evident in the record—that would have permitted the state	7
to cure its violation, and (3) assessed whether the sanction was tailored to the	8
infraction. Id. ¶¶ 27-29.	9
{17} This Court, in Lewis, mirrored the analysis in Le Mier but with the opposite	10
result. This Court could not discern “the district court’s reasons” for dismissing the	11
case with prejudice based on what we characterized as “an apparently unremarkable	12
fact pattern.” Lewis, 2018-NMCA-019, ¶ 12. In other words, the record of the	13
discovery violation in Lewis appeared to be ordinary, which did not explain the	14
severe sanction imposed, and the district court’s decision referred only to prejudice	15
and the state’s ongoing duty to disclose. Id. ¶¶ 4, 12. The insufficiency of the record	16
prevented proper appellate review of “the evidence and all inferences in the light	17
most favorable to the district court’s decision,” and as a result, the sanction was	18
reversed because it was not clear from the record that the district court applied the	19
proper legal principles. Id. ¶ 16.	20

13
{18} In the present case, the district court’s rulings and on-the-record statements	1
are adequate to demonstrate that all three Harper/Le Mier factors were considered	2
and to explain its bases for excluding the EMR custodian. We therefore conclude the	3
district court applied the proper legal principles to exclude the State’s witness. The	4
question remains whether the sanction that the district court selected was	5
nevertheless an abuse of discretion.	6
II. The District Court Did Not Abuse Its Discretion in Its Application of the	7
Harper/Le Mier Factors	8
{19} The State maintains that the proper application of the Harper/Le Mier factors	9
should not result in exclusion of the EMR custodian based on its view that the	10
findings on all three Harper/Le Mier factors were unsupported. When it comes to	11
whether the appropriate sanction was imposed, district courts “possess broad	12
discretionary authority.” Le Mier, 2017-NMSC-017, ¶ 22. In this context, “[a]n	13
abuse of discretion occurs when the ruling is clearly against the logic and effect of	14
the facts and circumstances of the case” and a district court does not “abuse[] its	15
discretion by its ruling unless [an appellate court] can characterize it as clearly	16
untenable or not justified by reason.” Id. (internal quotation marks and citation	17
omitted). With this standard in mind, we consider in turn culpability, prejudice, and	18
the appropriateness of the sanction to evaluate whether witness exclusion was a	19
correct outcome in the present case. See id. ¶ 20 (rejecting the proposition that	20
“witness exclusion is justified only if all of the Harper considerations weigh in favor	21

14
of exclusion”); Ferry, 2018-NMSC-004, ¶ 2 (explaining that a district court decision	1
will be affirmed if it selects “the only correct outcome” or “[i]f proper legal	2
principles correctly applied may lead to multiple correct outcomes”).	3
A. Culpability	4
{20} The State argues the culpability for the late disclosure “can only be described	5
as a negligent failure to comply” with the district court’s order to identify witnesses	6
by October 11, 2023. The district court agreed, made no finding of intentional	7
misconduct, and determined that the State poorly managed a complicated case and	8
ignored an opportunity to investigate and correct an oversight regarding essential	9
evidence. The State argues that under Harper, the conduct must be “especially”	10
culpable, akin to “bad faith,” and that “negligent failure to comply” with a discovery	11
order “is not enough.” To explain why we disagree with the State’s stark application	12
of Harper to the facts of the present case, we consider the relationship between	13
Harper and Le Mier.	14
{21} Harper and Le Mier mark points on a spectrum of conduct. In Harper, the	15
state made “efforts to comply with the district court’s order,” and the conduct	16
therefore was “not characterized by the degree of culpability that gives rise to an	17
exclusionary sanction.” 2011-NMSC-044, ¶¶ 22, 23. To reach this conclusion, the	18
Harper Court distinguished the state’s nonculpable conduct from conduct in other	19
cases that had affirmed the exclusion of a witness—cases that involved “especially	20

15
culpable” conduct, bad faith, and blocking access to evidence. Id. ¶¶ 17-18, 22-23.	1
In Le Mier, on the other hand, the state “repeatedly failed to comply” with the district	2
court’s “clear and unambiguous orders,” and exclusion of the witness was justified.	3
2017-NMSC-017, ¶¶ 24, 30. This sanction was in line with the district courts’	4
general authorization to use “witness exclusion to proactively manage their dockets,	5
achieve efficiency, and ensure that judicial resources—which are greatly limited—	6
are not wasted.” Id. ¶ 19. Our Supreme Court explained that “Harper in no way	7
circumscribed our courts’ authority to exercise” the power to “impose meaningful	8
sanctions to effectuate their inherent power and promote efficient judicial	9
administration,” Le Mier, 2017-NMSC-017, ¶ 19, and that Harper did not “embrace	10
standards so rigorous that courts may impose witness exclusion only in response to	11
discovery violations that are egregious, blatant, and an affront to their authority,” Le	12
Mier, 2017-NMSC-017, ¶ 16. As a result, the inquiry is whether, on a case-by-case	13
basis, “a finding of culpability” is supported by “proof of culpable conduct,” which	14
in other cases has included multiple infractions, bad faith, or violations of clear	15
orders. Id. ¶ 24; see id. ¶ 16 (“Harper did not establish a rigid and mechanical	16
analytical framework.”).	17
{22} Considering the present case in that light, the State’s conduct supported the	18
finding of culpability. The State did not identify the EMR custodian among the	19
thirty-one specific witnesses that appear on the initial witness list and used “catch-	20

16
all” categories, despite the requirement of Rule 5-501(A)(5) to list witnesses by	1
name. Defendant moved to exclude the “testimony of any witness not properly	2
listed” as required by Rules 5-501 and 5-505. The district court granted the motion	3
but after argument, allowed additional time for the State to supplement the witness	4
list. The district court’s oral order to identify supplemental witnesses by October 11,	5
2023 was “clear and unambiguous,” but the State identified no additional witnesses	6
until Defendant specifically noted the absence of the EMR custodian and asked for	7
exclusion of EM evidence. See Le Mier, 2017-NMSC-017, ¶ 24 (agreeing that the	8
state was sufficiently culpable after violating “clear and unambiguous orders”). The	9
record does not indicate any justification for the failure to identify—for example,	10
difficulties identifying or locating the witness or lack of cooperation by the witness.	11
See id. ¶ 23 (noting that late disclosure may be “understandable . . . in certain	12
circumstances”); Harper, 2011-NMSC-044, ¶ 23 (noting that the state lacked	13
culpability when the interview was scheduled but the witness did not appear). The	14
district court’s determination that the State was culpable was therefore not an abuse	15
of discretion. See Le Mier, 2017-NMSC-017, ¶ 22 (“We cannot say the trial court	16
abused its discretion by its ruling unless we can characterize it as clearly untenable	17
or not justified by reason.” (internal quotation marks and citation omitted)).	18

17
B. Prejudice	1
{23} The State challenges, on multiple fronts, the prejudice resulting from the late	2
disclosure and argues that across the board, “more [was] needed.” The prejudice	3
inquiry focuses on the tangible harm caused by the state’s conduct, whether that	4
harm be to the defendant, the court, or the justice system. See Harper, 2011-NMSC-	5
044, ¶ 16 (“The assessment of sanctions depends upon the extent of the	6
[g]overnment’s culpability weighed against the amount of prejudice to the defense.”	7
(omissions, internal quotation marks, and citation omitted)); Le Mier, 2017-NMSC-	8
017, ¶¶ 25-26 (identifying prejudice when a party’s culpable conduct causes the	9
“other parties and the justice system as a whole” to suffer). In other cases, prejudice	10
has been identified as the late disclosure of material evidence that undermines the	11
defendant’s trial preparation, see Harper, 2011-NMSC-044, ¶ 20, delayed trial	12
settings, trial by surprise, waste of resources, and disruption to the docket, see Le	13
Mier, 2017-NMSC-017, ¶¶ 25-26. In the present case, the State’s overarching	14
position is that Defendant was not prejudiced but instead was engaged in a strategy	15
to capitalize on an oversight by the State, particularly when the EM evidence was	16
always a central feature of the State’s case.	17
{24} The district court, however, did not view the proceedings this way. The district	18
court determined that the State charged the case in a complicated way and then did	19
not pursue the necessary evidence. The State suggests that Defendant should have	20

18
asked “directly and early on” if the State intended to call a witness to provide the	1
foundation for the EM evidence. Rules 5-501(A) and 5-505, however, impose a	2
continuing duty on the State to identify witnesses. The rules include no provision for	3
Defendant to clarify if the State does not comply. We therefore disagree that in order	4
to show prejudice resulting from the failure to identify witnesses, Defendant was	5
responsible for first clarifying the State’s intentions regarding the EM evidence. As	6
late as March 2023, the status of the EM evidence was in question—Defendant	7
indicated at a hearing that the data may have been lost. Defendant made efforts to	8
generally alert the State to the problem. With trial rapidly approaching and after	9
multiple continuances, Defendant formulated a strategy based on the state of the	10
evidence at that time and did not pursue other strategies that might have been	11
appropriate if the EM evidence were admitted. Those preparations were disrupted	12
by the State’s late disclosure, which prejudiced Defendant. From this perspective,	13
the district court reasonably viewed the circumstances as Defendant acting to clarify	14
the State’s intentions and proceeding forward based on the State’s representations.	15
{25} The State points to other facts in order to minimize the prejudice resulting	16
from late disclosure: Defendant had the opportunity to interview the EMR custodian,	17
trial was postponed for other reasons, severance remained a possibility, and	18
Defendant’s pretrial incarceration was extended for more reasons than the late-	19
disclosed witness. These mitigating facts do not erase the prejudice that resulted	20

19
from the need to change strategies. Nor are we persuaded that the extension of	1
Defendant’s pretrial incarceration was wholly unrelated to litigating the late	2
disclosure of the EMR custodian. That prejudice extended to the district court.	3
Multiple delays had already occurred throughout the proceedings, which the district	4
court had carefully monitored, in order to safeguard Defendant’s speedy trial rights,	5
and the district court was required to accommodate the motions related to the late	6
filing and additional postponement of trial. See Le Mier, 2017-NMSC-017, ¶ 26. As	7
a result, the finding of prejudice was not “clearly against the logic and effect of the	8
facts and circumstances of the case.” See id. ¶ 22 (internal quotation marks and	9
citation omitted).	10
C. Lesser Sanctions	11
{26} Last, the State argues that the exclusion of the EMR custodian was an	12
“illogically disproportionate sanction” based on the culpability and prejudice	13
Harper/Le Mier factors as well as the impact of the sanction on the evidence and	14
merits of the trial. The State cites State v. Garcia, 2025-NMSC-030, ¶ 34, 578 P.3d	15
1073, which noted that “the trial court should seek to apply sanctions that affect the	16
evidence at trial and the merits of the case as little as possible.” But a “court [is] only	17
required to fashion the least severe sanction that best fit[s] the situation and which	18
accomplishe[s] the desired result.” Le Mier, 2017-NMSC-017, ¶ 27. Thus, the	19
district court has discretion to impose a particular sanction when called for by the	20

20
circumstances. See id. ¶ 16 (“[C]ourts must be able to avail themselves of, and	1
impose, meaningful sanctions where discovery orders are not obeyed and a party’s	2
conduct injects needless delay into the proceedings.”).	3
{27} Much like the determination in Le Mier, in the present case, (1) the State was	4
given an additional opportunity to identify the witness but did not; and (2) “the	5
district court responded to the specific violation at issue with a sanction tailored to	6
fit that violation” because the witness who was excluded was the witness who was	7
disclosed late. See 2017-NMSC-017, ¶¶ 3, 27-29 (affirming the choice of sanction	8
applying similar principles). The district court found the State to be culpable, not	9
only in missing the witness deadline but in the overall prosecution of the case, and	10
determined Defendant to be prejudiced. Under these circumstances, witness	11
exclusion was one of many correct outcomes of the application of the law to these	12
facts. See id. ¶ 27 (“[T]he district court was not obligated to consider every	13
conceivable lesser sanction before imposing witness exclusion.”). For that reason,	14
we defer to the district court’s judgment about “the most effective and least severe	15
way to achieve the desired ends.” See id. ¶ 29; see also Ferry, 2018-NMSC-004, ¶ 2	16
(explaining that deference is owed to the district court where “reasonable minds”	17
could “differ regarding the outcome”).	18
CONCLUSION	19
{28} We affirm.	20

21
{29} IT IS SO ORDERED.	1
__________________________________	2
KATHERINE A. WRAY, Judge	3
WE CONCUR:	4
_________________________________	5
MEGAN P. DUFFY, Judge	6
_________________________________	7
JANE B. YOHALEM, Judge	8