Dr. Gina Frasca v. Pinelands Regional School District Board of Education, Ocean County, 5/29/26 (#185-26E)

185-26E
OAL Dkt. No. EDU 06064-26
Agency Dkt. No. 128-04-26
New Jersey Commissioner of Education
Order on Emergent Relief
Dr. Gina Frasca,
Petitioner,
v.
Pinelands 	Regional 	School 	District 	Board 	of
Education, Ocean County,
Respondent.
The record of this emergent matter, the sound recording of the hearing held at the Office of
Administrative Law (OAL), and the recommended Order of the Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) have been
reviewed and considered.
Upon review, the Commissioner concurs with the ALJ that petitioner has failed to demonstrate
entitlement to emergent relief pursuant to the standards enunciated in Crowe v. DeGioia, 90 N.J. 126,
132-34 (1982), and codified at N.J.A.C. 6A:3-1.6.
Accordingly, the recommended Order denying petitioner’s application for emergent relief is
adopted. This matter shall continue at the OAL with such proceedings as the parties and the ALJ deem
necessary to bring it to closure.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
COMMISSIONER OF EDUCATION
Date of Decision: 	May 29, 2026
Date of Mailing: 	May 29, 2026

New Jersey is an Equal Opportunity Employer
State of New Jersey
OFFICE OF ADMINISTRATIVE LAW
ORDER DENYING
EMERGENCY RELIEF
OAL DKT. NO. EDU 06064-26
AGENCY REF. NO. 128-04-26
DR. GINA FRASCA,
Petitioner,
v.
PINELANDS REGIONAL SCHOOL DISTRICT
BOARD OF EDUCATION,
Respondent.
___________________________________
Stephen J. Edelstein, Esq., for petitioner (Weiner Law Group, LLP, attorneys)
John C. Hegarty, Esq., for respondent (Jasinski, P.C., attorneys)
Record Closed: April 30, 2026 Decided: May 4, 2026
BEFORE SUSAN MCCABE, ALJ:
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Respondent, the Pinelands Regional School District Board of Education
(Pinelands), failed to appoint petitioner, Dr. Gina Frasca (Frasca), as acting
superintendent, despite a job description requiring her to serve in the superintendent’s
absence. Must Frasca’s motion for emergent relief be denied if she fails to show

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irreparable harm or favorable equites? Yes. To qualify for emergent relief under N.J.A.C.
6A:3-1.6(b), a petitioner must satisfy all four legal standards.
PROCEDURAL HISTORY
On March 23, 2026, Pinelands placed the superintendent on administrative leave
but failed to appoint Frasca as acting superintendent, disregarding her job description,
which requires her to serve in that capacity during the superintendent’s absence.
On April 6, 2026, Frasca filed a verified petition of appeal with the Commissioner
of the Department of Education, Office of Controversies and Disputes (Commissioner).
In her petition, Frasca alleges that Pinelands breached her employment contract by failing
to name her acting superintendent. Consequently, Frasca seeks to void Dr. Kimberly
Clark’s (Clark) appointment as acting superintendent and requests an order instating her
in that role.
On April 9, 2026, Frasca filed a motion for emergent relief with the Commissioner
seeking to be appointed as acting superintendent.
On April 17, 2026, the Commissioner transmitted the verified petition of appeal to
the Office of Administrative Law, together with the application for emergent relief, where
it was filed as a contested case under N.J.S.A. 52:14B-1 to -15 and N.J.S.A. 52:14F-1 to
-23.
On April 30, 2026, I held oral argument on the motion for emergent relief and
closed the record.
FINDINGS OF FACT
Based on the documents submitted in support of and in opposition to the motion
for emergent relief, I FIND the following as FACT for purposes of this motion only:

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On November 16, 2016, Pinelands issued a job description for the position of
assistant superintendent. The job description details the assistant superintendent’s
duties. The first job duty listed is the requirement that the assistant superintendent serve
as the acting superintendent in the absence of the superintendent.
On February 26, 2019, Pinelands hired Frasca for the position of assistant
superintendent and entered into an employment agreement for the school year. Frasca
and Pinelands entered into yearly employment agreements for each of the school years
thereafter, with the most recent employment agreement executed on May 19, 2025, with
an expiration date of June 30, 2026. The Ocean County Executive County
Superintendent approved the agreement, which states that “the duties of the Assistant
Superintendent shall be set by board policy. Said policy and job description may be
modified from time to time, by mutual agreement, consistent with the intent set forth
above.”
On March 23, 2026, Pinelands placed the then-designated superintendent on
administrative leave for an undetermined period. On that same date, Pinelands appointed
Clark to serve as acting superintendent.
At no time during Frasca’s employment as assistant superintendent did Pinelands
confer with her to modify the assistant superintendent job description.
Clark’s appointment as acting superintendent did not affect Frasca’s current
position as assistant superintendent. Frasca has not been demoted or reassigned to a
lesser position, and she has not suffered a diminishment in salary or tenure rights.
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
The regulations governing controversies and disputes before the Commissioner of
Education provide that “[w]here the subject matter of the controversy is a particular course
of action by a district board of education . . . [,] the petitioner may include with the petition
of appeal, a separate motion for emergent relief or a stay of that action pending the
Commissioner’s final decision in the contested case.” N.J.A.C. 6A:3-1.6(a). The

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regulations further provide that the Commissioner may “[t]ransmit the motion to the OAL
for immediate hearing on the motion.” N.J.A.C. 6A:3-1.6(c)(3).
In a motion for emergent relief, petitioners must show that they satisfy each of the
following four standards: (1) that the petitioner will suffer irreparable harm if emergent
relief is not granted; (2) that the legal right underlying the petitioner’s claim is settled; (3)
that the petitioner has a likelihood of prevailing on the merits of the underlying claim; and
(4) that when the equities and interests of the parties are balanced, the petitioner will
suffer greater harm than the respondent will suffer if the emergent relief is not granted.
N.J.A.C. 6A:3-1.6(b)(1)–(4) (citing Crowe v. DeGioia, 90 N.J. 126 (1982)).
Irreparable Harm
Under Crowe, the New Jersey Supreme Court held that a preliminary injunction
cannot be issued except when necessary to prevent irreparable harm. Crowe, 90 N.J. at
132 (citing Citizens Coach Co. v. Camden Horse R.R. Co., 29 N.J. Eq. 299, 303 (E. & A.
1878)). A petitioner must demonstrate irreparable harm above and beyond a mere risk
of that harm with a clear showing of immediate irreparable injury, not a remote future
injury. Cont’l Grp., Inc. v. Amoco Chemicals Corp., 614 F.2d 351, 359 (3d Cir. 1980).
Harm is considered irreparable if it cannot be properly rectified with monetary damages.
Crowe at 132–133.
Here, Frasca has failed to demonstrate by clear and convincing evidence that
Pinelands’ refusal to appoint her as acting superintendent irreparably harms her. Frasca
has not been demoted or reassigned to a lesser position and has not suffered a
diminishment in salary or tenure rights. Further, any salary loss Frasca may or may not
suffer can be rectified monetarily if Frasca prevails in her underlying appeal. Frasca’s
assertion that her professional reputation and future career ambitions will be damaged
with Clark’s appointment is speculative and is the very definition of a remote future injury.
As such, I CONCLUDE that Frasca will not suffer irreparable harm if emergent relief is
not granted.

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Well-settled Legal Right
Emergent relief “should be withheld when the legal right underlying plaintiff’s claim
is unsettled.” Crowe, 90 N.J. at 133 (citing Citizens Coach Co., 29 N.J. Eq. at 304–05).
While a breach of contract invokes a well-settled legal right, a board of education’s
actions are entitled to a presumption of lawfulness and good faith, and when challenged,
the movant bears the burden of proving that such actions were unlawful, arbitrary,
capricious, or unreasonable. Schnick v. Westwood Bd. of Educ., 60 N.J. Super. 448 (App.
Div. 1960). Actions of a board of education “which lie[] within the area of its discretionary
powers may not be upset unless patently arbitrary, without rational basis or induced by
improper motives.” Kopera v. W. Orange Bd. of Educ., 60 N.J. Super. 288, 294 (App.
Div. 1960).
In this case, Frasca’s job description delineates her duties. Among them are that
the assistant superintendent will serve as the acting superintendent in the absence of the
superintendent. Pinelands, however, did not appoint Frasca as the acting superintendent
in the superintendent’s absence. Pinelands appointed Clark instead. As such, there is
at least a preliminary showing of a breach of contract, and Pinelands has failed to
demonstrate that its breach was not patently arbitrary or that there was a rational basis
for Pinelands to circumvent the terms of Frasca’s employment agreement.
Therefore, I CONCLUDE that Frasca has satisfied the well-settled legal right
standard under N.J.A.C. 6A:3-1.6(b)(2).
Likelihood of Success on the Merits
Under this standard, petitioners must make a preliminary showing of a “reasonable
probability of ultimate success on the merits.” Crowe, 90 N.J. at 133 (citing Ideal Laundry
Co. v. Gugliemone, 107 N.J. Eq. 108, 115–16 (E. & A. 1930)). Determining the likelihood
of success “‘involves a prediction of the probable outcome of the case’ based on each
party’s initial proofs, usually limited to documents.” Brown v. City of Paterson, 424 N.J.

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Super. 176, 182–83 (App. Div. 2012) (quoting Rinaldo v. RLR Inv., LLC., 387 N.J. Super.
387, 397 (App. Div. 2006)).
Here, Frasca has preliminarily demonstrated that her job description designates
her as the acting superintendent in the absence of the superintendent and that any
changes to her job description can only occur with Frasca’s assent. Further, Pinelands
has failed to demonstrate that its breach was not patently arbitrary or that there was a
rational basis for Pinelands to circumvent the terms of Frasca’s employment agreement.
As such, I CONCLUDE that Frasca has demonstrated by clear and convincing
evidence that there is a reasonable probability of success on the merits of her underlying
claim under N.J.A.C. 6A:3-1.6(b)(3).
Balancing the Equites—Greater Harm
The fourth and final emergent relief standard involves “the relative hardship to the
parties in granting or denying relief.” Crowe, 90 N.J. at 134 (citing Isolantite Inc. v. United
Elect. Radio & Mach. Workers, 130 N.J. Eq. 506, 515 (Ch. 1941), mod. on other grounds,
132 N.J. Eq. 613 (E. & A. 1942)).
In balancing the harm, Pinelands’ hardship outweighs Frasca’s. Specifically,
Frasca’s immediate harm is limited to a potential salary loss she may or may not suffer
that can be rectified monetarily if Frasca prevails in her underlying appeal, while
Pinelands’ harm could result in the appointment of an individual that it may have a rational
basis for excluding.
As such, I CONCLUDE that Frasca has not satisfied the greater harm standard
under N.J.A.C. 6A:3-1.6(b)(4).
Jurisdiction
Pinelands argues that Frasca’s motion for immediate relief involves a breach of
contract, not a violation of school law, which deprives the Commissioner of jurisdiction.

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Frasca, on the other hand, asserts that school laws are involved because the executive
county superintendent must review and approve all assistant superintendent employment
contracts.
Generally, contractual disputes are not within the Commissioner’s jurisdiction
because an interpretation of contractual language, rather than school law, is necessary
to determine the outcome of a claim. Picogna v. Bd. of Educ. of Cherry Hill Twp., 249
N.J. Super. 332, 335 (App. Div. 1991).
Further, the executive county superintendent’s review and approval of assistant
superintendents’ employment contracts does not necessarily involve school laws
because there is no law in existence that demonstrates that the initial involvement of the
executive county superintendent extends beyond a contract’s initial approval and
execution. N.J.S.A. 18A:7-8(j).
Here, Pinelands’ contention that this case constitutes a pure breach of contract
over which the Commissioner lacks jurisdiction is not yet ripe for adjudication. Under
N.J.S.A. 18A:6-9, the Commissioner’s jurisdiction extends to all “controversies and
disputes arising under the school laws.” While Pinelands asserts that this is a basic
contractual dispute, legal standards properly invoke the Commissioner’s jurisdiction when
a board of education’s action—even if involving a contract—amounts to arbitrary,
capricious, or unreasonable conduct.
At this emergent stage, the record is devoid of evidence regarding Pinelands’
justification, if any, for bypassing Frasca’s job description. Without such evidence, it is
impossible to determine whether Pinelands’ action was a standard contractual breach or
an exercise of its discretion subject to school law standards.
Because the jurisdictional “fitness” of the issue depends on factual developments
that will occur in the underlying action, and because a premature ruling could prejudice
Frasca’s right to administrative review, I CONCLUDE the jurisdictional challenge to be
unripe.

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ORDER
Given my findings of fact and conclusions of law, I ORDER that Frasca’s
application for emergent relief is DENIED.
I ORDER that the petitioner’s motion for emergent relief is DENIED, and the case will
proceed with the underlying due process petition.
This order on application for emergency relief may be adopted, modified or rejected
by COMMISSIONER OF THE DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION, who by law is authorized
to make a final decision in this matter. The final decision shall be issued without undue delay,
but no later than forty-five days following the entry of this order. If COMMISSIONER OF THE
DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION does not adopt, modify or reject this order within forty-five
days, this recommended order shall become a final decision on the issue of emergent relief
in accordance with N.J.S.A. 52:14B-10.
May 4, 2026
DATE SUSAN MCCABE, ALJ
Date Received at Agency:
Date Emailed to Parties:
SM/dc