A.H., on behalf of minor child, N.Z. v. Edison Board of Education, Middlesex County, 9/2/26 (#344-26E)

Decision No. 344-26E
OAL Dkt. No. EDU 13662-26
Agency Dkt. No. 356-08-26
New Jersey Commissioner of Education
Final Decision on Emergent Relief
A.H., on behalf of minor child, N.Z.,
Petitioner,
v.
Edison Board of Education, Middlesex County,
Respondent.
The record of this emergent matter and the Order Granting Emergent Relief of the
Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) have been reviewed. Upon such review, the Commissioner concurs
with the ALJ that petitioner has demonstrated entitlement to emergent relief pursuant to the
standards enunciated in Crowe v. DeGioia, 90 N.J. 126 (1982), and codified at N.J.A.C. 6A:3-1.6.
Accordingly, the petitioner’s application for emergent relief is granted. 	This matter shall
continue at the OAL with such proceedings as the parties and the ALJ deem necessary to bring it to
closure.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
COMMISSIONER OF EDUCATION
Date of Decision: 	September 2, 2026
Date of Mailing: 	September 2, 2026

New Jersey is an Equal Opportunity Employer
State of New Jersey
OFFICE OF ADMINISTRATIVE LAW
ORDER GRANTING
EMERGENT RELIEF
OAL DKT. NO. EDU 13662-2026
AGENCY DKT. NO. 356-08-26
A.H. ON BEHALF OF N.Z.
Petitioner,
v.
EDISON BOARD OF EDUCATION,
MIDDLESEX COUNTY,
Respondent.
________________________________________
A.H., petitioner, pro se
Lucas Smith, Esq., for respondent, Edison Board of Education (Lenox, Law
Firm, attorneys)
BEFORE SARAH G. CROWLEY, ALJ:
Petitioner seeks an Order requiring respondent Edison Board of Education
(Board or District) to provide subscription transportation for a non-remote student
attending its school who had previously been provided courtesy busing under the
hazardous-route designation. In addition, petitioner seeks a waiver of fees based on

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financial hardship for subscription busing.1 Respondent opposes this action on the
grounds that the District has no legal obligation to provide transportation to remote
students. Moreover, although courtesy busing had been provided to remote students
designated in hazardous areas, all courtesy busing was eliminated in the 2026–2027
budget. However, the issue before me is not the obligation to provide courtesy busing
but rather the obligation to provide subscription busing. The petitioner filed an
application for subscription busing on June 22, 2026. The District advised in the
opposition that no decision has been made with respect to subscription busing. The
child begins kindergarten on Friday, August 28, 2026.
PROCEDURAL HISTORY
A petition was filed by petitioner on August 12, 2026, requesting that the Edison
Board of Education provide subscription busing to A.H.’s child who is starting
kindergarten. The matter was transmitted to the Office of Administrative Law on August
18, 2026. N.J.S.A. 52:14B-1 to B-15; N.J.S.A. 52:14F-1 to F-3. Respondent filed
opposition to the petition, and oral argument was heard on August 26, 2026, and the
record closed on that date. The underlying due process case will proceed on a non-
emergent track with the undersigned.
FINDINGS OF FACT
Having reviewed the papers in support of and in opposition to the request for
emergent relief, I FIND the following FACTS:
1. Petitioner is a resident of Edison, New Jersey, and has filed an emergent
application seeking to have the Edison Board of Education provide subscription
busing to N.Z.
1 The petitioner has submitted a brief and certification in opposition to this motion but fails to address the
key legal issue raised in the petitioner’s application which is the availability of subscription busing and the
financial hardship waiver of fees for such busing.

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2. N.Z. lives 1.3 miles from the school and is not covered by the statutory busing
provisions.
3. Courtesy busing had been provided to N.Z. under N.J.A.C. 6A:27-1.4(a) and
N.J.S.A. 18A:39-1.8 but was eliminated for the 2026-2027 school year.
4. Petitioner’s child is registered in the District and is scheduled to commence
kindergarten at Benjamin Franklin Elementary School, with school starting on
August 28, 2026.
5. Petitioner filed an application for subscription busing on June 22, 2026, as well
as a documented request for a waiver of fees for such service.
6. The District has conceded that petitioner qualifies for a waiver of fees for
subscription busing.
7. The certification from the District Business Administrator, Jonathan Toth,
submitted in opposition to the application on August 21, 2026, confirms that the
petitioner did in fact submit an application for subscription busing and that
determinations have not been made yet.
8. The District filed a certification and brief addressing the issue of courtesy busing
but failed to address the main issue in this case regarding subscription busing,
and why no determination was made regarding subscription busing.
9. Following an inquiry from the undersigned regarding the status of the
subscription busing application of the petitioner, counsel for the District, Patrick
Carrigg, Esq. responded as follows:
It’s resolved. She’s entitled to free bussing due to economic
status. It was wrong for this parent to burden the court and
counsel with a premature filing. This application should be
denied as moot and the parent should be counseled to not
file when an application remains pending before it’s denied.
If parents can do that, then there could be hundreds of
emergent applications from parents that want a decision
before it is time.

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4
10. It is unclear to the undersigned why it was “wrong for this parent” to file this
application, one week before the start of school regarding an application for
subscription busing that was submitted on June 22, 2026, which by their
business administrator’s own admission has not been determined.
11. Notwithstanding the Certification filed by Mr. Toth on August 21, 2026, and the
email from Mr. Carrigg, the District sought to submit a certification at 1:26 pm, for
the argument scheduled at 1:30 pm, which contradicts his initial certification and
the email from Mr. Carrigg. Moreover, it fails to address what, if any process was
followed for determinations with respect to subscription bussing.2
DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
Under N.J.S.A. 18A:6-9, the Commissioner’s jurisdiction is defined and is limited
to “controversies and disputes arising under the school laws.” In Dunellen Board of
Education v. Dunellen Education Association, 64 N.J. 17, 23 (1973), the New Jersey
Supreme Court concluded that “the Legislature enacted provisions entrusting school
supervision and management to local school boards . . . subject to the supervisory
control [of] . . . the State Commissioner of Education.”
The regulations governing such disputes before the Commissioner of Education
provide that “[w]here the subject matter of the controversy is a particular course of
action by a district board of education or any other party subject to the jurisdiction of the
Commissioner, the petitioner may include with the petition of appeal, a separate motion
for emergent relief or a stay of that action pending the Commissioner’s final decision in
the contested case.” N.J.A.C. 6A:3-1.6(a). The regulations further provide that the
Commissioner may “[t]ransmit the motion to the OAL for immediate hearing on the
motion.” N.J.A.C. 6A:3-1.6(c)(3).
2 The amended certification advises that the petitioner qualifies for a financial waiver but for the first time
states that subscription busing is not being provided to this student. Not only is this untimely but it fails to
address when and why this decision was reached, when the petitioner was advised of this, and how such
decision on subscription busing was reached. Moreover, it is entirely inconsistent with the email from
counsel for the District one hour earlier which advises the undersigned the matter “was resolved and
petitioner is entitle to free busing.”

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N.J.A.C. 6A:3-1.6(b) sets forth the standards governing motions for emergent
relief and instructs:
A motion for a stay or emergent relief shall be accompanied
by a letter memorandum or brief which shall address the
following standards to be met for granting such relief
pursuant to Crowe v. DeGioia, 90 N.J. 126 (1982):
1. The petitioner will suffer irreparable harm if the
requested relief is not granted;
2. The legal right underlying petitioner’s claim is
settled;
3. The petitioner has a likelihood of prevailing on
the merits of the underlying claim; and
4. When the equities and interests of the parties
are balanced, the petitioner will suffer greater harm
than the respondent will suffer if the requested relief is
not granted.
The moving party must demonstrate each element “clearly and convincingly.”
Waste Mgmt. of N.J. v. Union Cnty. Utils. Auth., 399 N.J. Super. 508, 520 (App. Div.
2008). Emergent relief is designed “to ‘prevent some threatening, irreparable mischief,
which should be averted until opportunity is afforded for a full and deliberate
investigation of the case.’” Crowe, 90 N.J. at 132 (citation omitted).
Irreparable Harm
Harm is generally considered irreparable if monetary damages cannot
adequately redress it. Id. at 132–33. In other words, irreparable harm is described as
“‘substantial injury to a material degree coupled with the inadequacy of money
damages.’” Judice’s Sunshine Pontiac, Inc. v. General Motors Corp., 418 F. Supp.
1212, 1218 (D.N.J. 1976) (citation omitted). A claimant must demonstrate more than a
risk of irreparable harm. Continental Group, Inc. v. Amoco Chems. Corp., 614 F.2d
351, 359 (3d Cir. 1980). The requisite for injunctive relief requires a “‘clear showing of
immediate irreparable injury,’” or a “‘presently existing actual threat; (an injunction) may

OAL DKT. NO. EDU 13662-26
6
not be used simply to eliminate a possibility of a remote future injury, or a future
invasion of rights, be those rights protected by statute or by the common law.’” Ibid.
(citation omitted).
Petitioner has a child starting kindergarten and does not have a car. Moreover, it
is undisputed that she qualifies for free busing. Petitioner filed an application for
subscription busing on June 22, 2026, and has received no response. The District
initially advised that the decision on subscription busing had not been determined yet,
and they advised that the matter was resolved and petitioner was entitled to free busing.
Then, four minutes prior to oral argument in this matter, the District submitted an
amended certification which states that subscription busing was not being provided to
this route. There is no explanation as to how this decision was reached, when it was
reached, the process the District went through or why so many contrary positions have
been provided to the undersigned. Finally, there is no discussion of the law with respect
to subscription busing determinations. The lengthy discussion of courtesy busing is not
relevant to the within matter. I FIND and CONCLUDE that these inconsistent positions
are unacceptable and the harm to the petitioner two days before school starts is indeed
irreparable.
Settled Legal Right
Emergent relief “should be withheld when the legal right underlying plaintiff’s
claim is unsettled.” Crowe, 90 N.J. at 133 (citing Citizens Coach Co. v. Camden H. R.
Co., 29 N.J. Eq. 299, 304–05 (E. & A. 1878)). As stated by the district, the of “courtesy
busing” on those routes that were previously designated as “hazardous routes,” is well
settled. Districts have an obligation to provide transportation to public-school students
who reside remote from their assigned school of attendance. Consistent with the
foregoing statute and regulations, Edison provided courtesy busing for a number of
years. However, due to budget constraints, all courtesy busing was eliminated in the
2026–2027 school budget, and there is no continuing obligation to provide such busing
and the 2026-2027 budget eliminated this courtesy busing.

OAL DKT. NO. EDU 13662-26
7
However, the issue in this matter is not courtesy busing it is subscription busing,
and the District has failed to adequately address this issue which is by no means moot.
Petitioner has raised an issue regarding subscription busing, and the District has
advised that they have accepted the petitioner’s application, but no determinations have
been made regarding such busing or the fees for same. Then at the eleventh hour the
District advise for the first time “that the issue is resolved and petitioner is entitled to free
busing,” and fifteen minutes later an amended certification that states there is no
subscription busing to the petitioner. No explanation as to when this decision was
reached, how it was reached or any legal authority for potentially arbitrary subscription
busing routes which were rewarded were provided.
I therefore CONCLUDE that petitioner has met the burden of establishing that she
has a legal right to a decision on subscription busing and the basis for such denial, none of
which have been provided by the District.
Likelihood of Success on the Merits
Under the third emergent-relief standard, “a plaintiff must make a preliminary
showing of a reasonable probability of ultimate success on the merits.” Crowe, 90 N.J.
at 133 (citing Ideal Laundry Co. v. Gugliemone, 107 N.J. Eq. 108, 115–16 (E. & A.
1930)). This requirement is often implicitly tied to whether the right to the underlying
claim is settled.
A presumption of lawfulness and good faith applies to a board of education’s
actions. In challenges to board actions, the challenger bears the burden of proving that
such acts were unlawful, arbitrary, capricious, or unreasonable. Schuster v. Bd. of
Educ. of Montgomery Twp., 96 N.J.A.R.2d (EDU) 670, 676 (citing Schnick v. Westwood
Ed. of Educ., 60 N.J. Super. 448 (App. Div. 1960), and Quinlan v. Bd. of Educ. of North
Bergen Twp., 73 N.J. Super. 40 (App. Div. 1962)).
The “arbitrary, capricious and unreasonable” standard of review imposes a heavy
burden on challengers of board actions, and “means having no rational basis.” Piccoli
v. Bd. of Educ. of Ramapo Indian Hills Reg’l Sch. Dist., 1999 N.J. AGEN LEXIS 20,

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Initial Decision (January 22, 1999), adopted, 1999 N.J. AGEN LEXIS 1314 (March 10,
1999) (citing Bayshore Sewage Co. v. Dep’t of Envtl. Protection, 122 N.J. Super. 184,
199–200 (Ch. Div. 1973), aff’d, 131 N.J. Super. 37 (App. Div. 1974)).
The fact that the District has taken three different positions in this matter in a
short period of time and provided no rational for any determinations with respect to
providing subscription busing to the petitioner renders it clearly arbitrary and capricious.
Therefore, I CONCLUDE that petitioner has meet the third prong of the
emergent-relief standard.
Balancing of the Equities
Lastly, petitioner fails to meet the fourth emergent-relief standard, which involves
“the relative hardship to the parties in granting or denying relief.” Crowe, 90 N.J. at 134
(citing Isolantite, Inc. v. United Elect. Radio & Mach. Workers, 130 N.J. Eq. 506, 515
(Ch. 1941), mod. on other grounds, 132 N.J. Eq. 613 (E. & A. 1942)).
Petitioner argues that N.Z. should prevail on the balancing of the equities, as the
District has failed to advise regarding the availability of subscription busing in a timely
manner, nor have they articulated the reason for any decisions on subscription busing.
Working families and families without means to transport children to school have a right
to know what the status of subscription busing in the district is and the District has an
obligation to address such issues in a timely fashion. I CONCLUDE that in balancing the
equity favors the petitioner in this matter.
ORDER
It is ORDERED that petitioner’s application for emergent relief is GRANTED.
The District shall provide transportation to this child until the underly merits of this
matter are addressed and the District provides the court with documentation to support
any determinations with respect to subscription busing. This case will continue to a

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plenary hearing, the schedule to be determined at a later date, to address the merits of
the underlying petition.
This Order on application for emergency relief may be adopted, modified, or
rejected by the COMMISSIONER OF THE DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION, who by
law is authorized to make a final decision in this matter. The final decision on the
application for emergent relief shall be issued without undue delay, but no later than
forty-five (45) days following the entry of this Order. If the Commissioner of the
Department of Education does not adopt, modify, or reject this Order within forty-five
days, this recommended order shall become a final decision on the issue of emergent
relief in accordance with N.J.S.A. 52:14B-10.
August 27, 2026
DATE SARAH G. CROWLEY, ALJ
Date Received at Agency:
Date Mailed to Parties:
SC/onl/lam
c: Clerk OAL-T

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DOCUMENTS RELIED UPON
- Petitioner’s and Respondent’s petition, opposition, and reply papers