PATERSON EASTSIDE HIGH SCHOOL PARENT/ALUMNI COMMITTEE, AND MYRON BAUGH V. STATE-OPERATED SCHOOL DISTRICT OF THE CITY OF PATERSON, PASSAIC COUNTY, DR. MICHAEL GLASCOE AND TOMMIE PATTERSON, 7/13/07, (#285-07)

#285-07 (OAL Decision: Not yet available online)
PATERSON EASTSIDE HIGH SCHOOL 	:
PARENT/ALUMNI COMMITTEE AND
MYRON BAUGH, 	:
PETITIONERS, 	:
V. 	: 	COMMISSIONER OF EDUCATION
STATE OPERATED SCHOOL DISTRICT 	: 	DECISION
OF THE CITY OF PATERSON, PASSAIC
COUNTY, DR. MICHAEL GLASCOE, STATE 	:
DISTRICT SUPERINTENDENT, AND
TOMMIE PATTERSON, 	:
RESPONDENTS. 	:
SYNOPSIS
Petitioners claim that the appointment of Tommie Patterson as the head basketball coach for Paterson
Eastside High School is not in conformance with the law, alleging that: there were qualified and
certified applicants for the position pursuant to N.J.A.C. 6A:9-5.19; Patterson is not properly
certified; and no application for waiver was made to – or granted by – the State district
superintendent to allow his hiring, as is required by N.J.A.C. 6A:9-5.19(c).
The ALJ found that: the petitioners have standing to bring the lawsuit; the November 2006 petition
was timely filed, as the 90-day limitation period began with the State district superintendent’s
approval – on August 31, 2006 – of the 	decision to hire Patterson; 	Patterson does not hold a
New Jersey teaching certificate, and therefore does not meet the first criteria of N.J.A.C. 6A:9-5.19;
Tony Reed was properly certified and qualified for the position of head basketball coach; therefore
the respondent district is prohibited by N.J.A.C. 6A:9-5.19 from hiring Patterson over Reed.
The ALJ vacated the appointment of Patterson as head basketball coach, and appointed Reed to the
position.
The Commissioner concurs with the ALJ that: the petitioners had standing to challenge the hiring of
Patterson by virtue of their interest as taxpayers, and parents and alumni actively involved with the
student athletes at Eastside High School; the petition was timely filed; Patterson had no New Jersey
teaching credentials at the time of his hiring as head coach; 	Reed possessed all requisite
requirements for the head coaching position, as the job description did not expressly require
candidates to have previous experience as a head high school coach. Accordingly, the Commissioner
vacated the appointment of Patterson to the position of head basketball coach; however, she declined
to appoint Reed to the position as part of this decision because he was not a party to this matter, and
petitioners did not request his appointment as part of their demand for relief in the petition.
This synopsis is not part of the Commissioner’s decision. It has been prepared for the convenience of the
reader. It has been neither reviewed nor approved by the Commissioner.
July 13, 2007

OAL DKT. NO. EDU 11847-06
AGENCY DKT. NO. 415-11/06
PATERSON EASTSIDE HIGH SCHOOL 	:
PARENT/ALUMNI COMMITTEE AND
MYRON BAUGH, 	:
PETITIONERS, 	:
V. 	: 	COMMISSIONER OF EDUCATION
STATE OPERATED SCHOOL DISTRICT 	: 	DECISION
OF THE CITY OF PATERSON, PASSAIC
COUNTY, DR. MICHAEL GLASCOE, STATE 	:
DISTRICT SUPERINTENDENT, AND
TOMMIE PATTERSON, 	:
RESPONDENTS. 	:
__________________________________________
The record of this matter, the Initial Decision, and respondent’s exceptions have
been reviewed.1
The facts in this case have been sufficiently set forth by the Administrative Law
Judge (ALJ) in the Initial Decision, and need only be summarized. 	Three individuals,
Michael Baker, Tommie Patterson and Tony Reed, applied for the position of head basketball
coach in respondent’s district. 	All three candidates had significant experience coaching
basketball, but only Reed possessed a standard teaching certification. 	Baker possessed a
certificate of eligibility to seek provisional employment. Patterson had no New Jersey teaching
credentials at the time he applied for the coaching position, but received county substitute
1 According to correspondence between the parties, petitioners received respondents’ exceptions on June 8, 2007.
Petitioners were thus required – under N.J.A.C. 1:1-18.4(d), together with N.J.A.C. 1:1-1.4 – to file any reply
exceptions with the Commissioner by June 15, 2007, five business days after their receipt of the initial exceptions.
However, the Commissioner did not receive petitioners’ reply exceptions until June 18, 2007. Because they were
untimely, they were not considered.
1

credentials in August 2006, after being selected by respondent for the job (subject to the approval
of the district superintendent).
Petitioners appealed the hiring of Patterson, and respondents moved for summary
decision. 	The ALJ determined that the position should have been awarded to Reed. 	More
specifically, the ALJ reviewed the provisions of N.J.A.C. 6A:9-5.19 and found that they allow
individuals with substitute teaching credentials to serve as athletic coaches only if there are no
qualified and certified applicants. N.J.A.C. 6A:9-5.19 (c) provides in pertinent part:
(c) In the event there is no qualified and certified applicant, the
holder of a county substitute credential pursuant to N.J.A.C. 6A:9-
6.5 is authorized to serve as an athletic coach in the district in
which he or she is employed for a designated sports season,
provided that:
1. The district chief school administrator demonstrates to the
county superintendent that:
i. The vacant coaching position had been advertised; and
ii. There was no qualified applicant based on the written
standards of the district board of education;
2. The district chief school administrator provides a letter to the
county 	superintendent 	attesting 	to 	the 	prospective 	employee's
knowledge and experience in the sport in which he or she will
coach; and
3. 	The 	district 	board 	of 	education 	obtains 	the 	county
superintendent's approval prior to such employment. The 20-day
limitation noted in N.J.A.C. 6A:9-6.5(b) shall not apply to such
coaching situations.
(Emphasis added)
While respondents do not dispute that Reed was the only candidate with standard
certification, they contend in their exceptions that Reed was unqualified for the advertised
coaching position because he had never served as the head basketball coach in a high school.
This argument is, on this record, without merit. 	Reed had extensive coaching experience.
His experience as an assistant coach in college may well have been more significant than
2

experience as a high school head coach. 	More important, however, is the fact that the job
description did not expressly require candidates to have previous experience as a head high
school coach. It required only that the candidate “show evidence of successful experience in the
assigned sport.”
Two other legal issues required resolution, i.e., respondents’ assertion that
petitioners’ appeal was untimely, and respondent’s claim that petitioners were without standing
to bring the appeal. As to the first issue, which respondents did not challenge in their exceptions,
the Commissioner concurs with the ALJ that petitioners’ appeal was timely. It was filed within
90 days of the district superintendent’s approval of Patterson’s employment. 	Without that
approval, Patterson’s employment would not have been secured. N.J.A.C. 6A:9-5.19(c)3.
Nor can the Commissioner disagree with the ALJ’s conclusion that petitioners
had standing to file the appeal. 	At the outset, the Commissioner agrees with respondents’
contention, in their exceptions, that one of the cases upon which petitioners and the ALJ relied,
i.e., Richard Harris and Kenton Garay v. Board of Education of the Hunterdon Central Regional
High School District, 96 N.J.A.R. 2d (EDU) 312, is not sufficiently apposite to the present case
to support petitioners’ arguments about standing. 	In that case, teachers Harris and Garay were
unsuccessful applicants for a coaching job. There can be little doubt that they had direct interests
in the propriety of the district’s appointment to the coaching position of an individual who did
not have standard teaching certification. 	By way of contrast, the petitioners in the present case
cannot allege direct, personal harm from Patterson’s employment.
However, the Commissioner cannot agree that Ridgewood Education Association
et al. v. Ridgewood Board of Education, 284 N.J. Super. 427 (App. Div. 1995), another case
relied upon by petitioners and the ALJ, is unhelpful to petitioners. In Ridgewood, an Education
3

Association (REA) and two individuals challenged a rule promulgated by the local board of
education limiting the employment of supplemental teachers to two consecutive years – barring
the accrual of tenure. 	Because none of the current members of the REA were untenured
supplemental teachers, the REA was deemed by the Commissioner not to have a direct interest in
the challenged rule and, consequently, not to have standing. 	Further, the Commissioner agreed
with the ALJ that the REA members’ status as taxpayers did not provide the REA with standing
absence a showing that a public interest was implicated in the challenge.
The State Board of Education affirmed the Commissioner, but the Appellate
Division reversed. 	It observed – citing Crescent Park Tenants Ass’n v. Realty Equity Corp. of
N.Y., 58 N.J. 98, 101, 107-11 (1971) – that New Jersey has “a venerable tradition of liberal
application 	of 	standing 	criteria,” 	and 	found 	that 	N.J.S.A. 	52:14B-8,2 the 	provision 	of
New Jersey’s Administrative Procedure Act permitting any interested person to challenge the
applicability of any statute or rule enforced or administered by an agency, is grounded in that
tradition. 	Ridgewood Education Association, supra, 284 N.J. Super. at 431. 	It also cited
Bell v. Stafford Tp., 110 N.J. 384, 390-91 (1988), for the proposition that the liberal application
of standing criteria has been particularly applied “to taxpayer suits and the like.” 	Ridgewood
Education Association, supra, 284 N.J. Super. at 431.
In finding that the REA had standing, the Appellate Division referred to the test
which is set forth in New Jersey State Chamber of Commerce v. New Jersey Election Law
2 N.J.S.A. 52:14B-8 provides, in pertinent part:
Subject to the provisions of section 4(b) and 4(e) of Chapter 20, laws of 1944, as
amended and supplemented . . .an agency upon the request of any interested
person may in its discretion make a declaratory ruling with respect to the
applicability to any person, property or state of facts of any statute or rule
enforced or administered by that agency. 	A declaratory ruling shall bind the
agency and all parties to the proceedings on the state of facts alleged. 	Full
opportunity for hearing shall be afforded to the interested parties. Such ruling
shall be deemed a final decision or action subject to review in the Appellate
Division of the Superior Court.
4

Enforcement Comm’n, 82 N.J. 57, 68 (1980), that where a plaintiff association has an obvious,
albeit indirect, interest in the effect upon others of statutory and administrative regulations,
requirements 	for 	standing 	are 	met. 	Ridgewood 	Education 	Association, 	supra, 	284
N.J. Super. at 432. In the Appellate Division’s view, the REA’s relationship to the board policy
under attack was “not that of a total stranger or casual interloper.” Ibid. The REA‘s interest in
the challenged policy would be triggered by future members who were supplemental teachers
without tenure.
Finally, relying upon Silverman v. Board of Ed., Twp. of Millburn, 134 N.J.
Super. 	253, 	257-58 	(Law 	Div.), aff’d 	o.b. 136 	N.J. 	Super. 	435 (App. 	Div. 	1975), 	the
Appellate Division stated:
“We see no reason why this State’s historic liberal approaches to
the issue of standing in general . . . should not apply to taxpayer
suits challenging the quasi-legislative actions of local boards of
education. . . . The official actions of boards of education are
identical in the public interest sense to those of local governing
bodies. . . . Although the route of review is different . . . , the
principles 	of 	standing 	governing 	facial 	challenges 	to 	official
conduct are the same in either context.”
Ridgewood Education Association, supra, 284 N.J. Super. 433
The Commissioner finds that the foregoing principles are germane to the present
case. 	The record includes a certification by Myron Baugh that he and most of the members of
the petitioning organization – which has existed for ten years – are residents and taxpayers of
Paterson 	who 	have 	expressed 	a 	strong 	interest 	in 	the 	workings 	of 	the 	high 	school.
(Baugh certification, #2) 	According to the certification, the organization’s members have
manifested that interest by supporting the athletic program, by fundraising, by mentoring
students, and by generally assisting student athletes in gaining entrance to college. (Ibid.) These
facts, which were not rebutted by respondent, support the conclusion that petitioners are
5

taxpayers who have an interest in the respondent district’s challenged action and are not
strangers or casual interlopers as regards same.
Baugh’s 	certification 	explained 	that 	“the 	experience 	and
demeanor 	of 	a 	coach 	is 	crucial 	to 	maximize 	the 	opportunities 	for 	student 	athletes.”
(Baugh certification, #8) 	He continued as follows:
“We are familiar with Mr. Patterson’s background. 	He was a
coach 	at 	a 	private 	school 	and 	had, 	unfortunately, 	what 	we
considered to be significant disciplinary infractions while he was
coaching there (he was suspended twice). There were instances of
unsportsmanlike conduct known to us. We did not believe it likely
that a certified teacher would have those problems.”
Baugh certification, #9.
In summary, the petitioners can be reasonably deemed to have a sufficient interest both as
taxpayers and persons actively involved with the high school athletes to have standing to
challenge respondent’s action as a violation of N.J.A.C. 6A:9-5.19(c).
Even more significant, however, is the fact that Baugh certified that many of the
members of the petitioning organization are parents of students at the high school – as the name
of the organization suggests. 	(Baugh certification, #2) 	As such, they have an obvious, albeit
indirect, interest in the effect upon their children of respondent’s action and respondent’s
adherence, vel non, to N.J.A.C. 6A:9-5.19(c). 	Thus, in the context of New Jersey’s liberal
tradition concerning standing, and in light of the facts of this case, the Commissioner finds that
petitioners had standing to challenge the hiring of Patterson.
Accordingly, the appointment of Patterson to the position of head basketball
coach at Paterson Eastside High School is vacated. 	While the evidence in the record suggests
that Reed is qualified for the coaching position, Reed is not a party to this matter, and petitioners
did 	not 	request 	his 	appointment 	as 	part 	of 	their 	demand 	for 	relief 	in 	the 	petition.
6

7
The Commissioner consequently declines, as part of this decision, to appoint Reed to the position
of head basketball coach of Paterson Eastside High School.
IT IS SO ORDERED.3
COMMISSIONER OF EDUCATION
Date of Decision: July 13, 2007
Date of Mailing: 	July 13, 2007
3 This decision may be appealed to the State Board of Education pursuant to N.J.S.A. 18A:6-27 et seq. and
N.J.A.C. 6A:4-1.1 et seq.