BOARD OF EDUCATION OF THE WEST WINDSOR-PLAINSBORO REGIONAL SCHOOL DISTRICT, MERCER COUNTY V. BOARD OF EDUCATION OF THE TOWNSHIP OF DELRAN, BURLINGTON COUNTY AND BOARD OF EDUCATION OF THE TOWNSHIP OF NUTLEY, ESSEX COUNTY V. BOARD OF EDUCATION OF THE TOWNSHIP OF DELRAN, BURLINGTON COUNTY, 9/5/00 (287-00)

September 5, 2000
287-00
BOARD OF EDUCATION OF THE WEST 	:
WINDSOR-PLAINSBORO REGIONAL
SCHOOL DISTRICT, MERCER COUNTY, 	:
PETITIONER, 	:
V. 	:
BOARD OF EDUCATION OF THE TOWNSHIP 	:
OF DELRAN, BURLINGTON COUNTY,
:
RESPONDENT.
: 	COMMISSIONER OF EDUCATION
AND
: 	DECISION
BOARD OF EDUCATION OF THE TOWNSHIP
OF NUTLEY, ESSEX COUNTY, 	:
PETITIONER, 	:
V. 	:
BOARD OF EDUCATION OF THE TOWNSHIP :
OF DELRAN, BURLINGTON COUNTY,
:
RESPONDENT.
:
SYNOPSIS
In consolidated matter, Petitioning Boards, West Windsor-Plainsboro and Nutley, sought to
compel Respondent Board Delran to pay transportation costs for two children classified as
autistic, K.H. and S.M., who were placed by the Division of Youth and Family Services (DYFS)
and the Division of Developmental Disabilities (DDD), respectively, in a group home in
respondent’s District. (DYFS was responsible for placing K.H. in a group home in 1987, but in
1990, DDD assumed responsibility for these students.)
The ALJ concluded that, under the general legislative and regulatory scheme for the payment of
costs of education of special education pupils, it is the district where the child’s legal guardian is
domiciled/resides which is responsible for the cost of a free appropriate education, including
related services, one of which is transportation. 	(Chapter 207 of the Laws of 1979; N.J.S.A.
30:4C-26; N.J.S.A. 18A:7b-12) 	Furthermore, the ALJ noted that for special education students
who are residing in the district in which they are domiciled, the costs of transportation are part of

2
the educational services required to be funded by the local district which in turn receives State
aid for such transportation pursuant to N.J.S.A. 18A:7F-25 and 18A:46-23. The ALJ noted that
there was no logical explanation for placing the financial burden of transportation costs upon a
district where a group home happens to be located, except to rely on the 1984 Attorney General’s
Opinion that advised the Commissioner of Education that the word “tuition” in Chapter 207 of
the Laws of 1979 did not include transportation costs. Petitions were dismissed and petitioners
were directed to continue funding transportation costs for the students in question as long as such
students remain domiciled in their districts and eligible for special education services.
Having considered the Initial Decision, the parties’ arguments, and the legal opinions provided
by the Attorney General’s Office, the Commissioner rejected the ALJ’s conclusions of law. The
Commissioner determined that N.J.S.A. 30:4C-26, which authorizes group home placements by
the State and delineates the obligations of school districts, was the statute central to the
resolution of who is responsible for transportation costs for these students. Commissioner noted
that the child’s district of residence is responsible for paying tuition to the school where the child
is placed. 	However, given the absence of any reference to transportation in the provisions of
Chapter 207 of the Laws of 1979, the Commissioner concluded that the term “tuition” does not
encompass transportation. 	Further, the Commissioner found that the express language of
N.J.S.A. 30:4C-26c, stating that children placed in group homes are to be accorded all of the
“educational benefits” of the school district in which the group home sits, includes pupil
transportation. 	The Commissioner also found that the school district where the group home is
located is responsible for providing child study team services (paid for by the resident district) to
children placed in group homes within its borders for reasons expressed in the 1984 Attorney
General’s Opinion. Therefore, the group home school district determines the child’s educational
program and placement, which, in turn, dictates the child’s transportation needs and the district’s
transportation costs. The Commissioner granted petitioners’ motions for summary judgment and
directed that respondent reimburse petitioners for the cost of transportation for the students in
question. 	Since K.H. aged out of West Windsor-Plainsboro, the Board sought reimbursement
solely for past expenditures. 	Moreover, the Commissioner directed respondent to continue the
funding of transportation costs for S.M., as long as the student remains in the group home and is
eligible for special education services.

20
OAL DKT. NOS. EDU 665-99 AND EDU 3130-99 (CONSOLIDATED)
AGENCY DKT. NOS. 458-10/98 AND 446-10/98
BOARD OF EDUCATION OF THE WEST 	:
WINDSOR-PLAINSBORO REGIONAL
SCHOOL DISTRICT, MERCER COUNTY, 	:
PETITIONER, 	:
V. 	:
BOARD OF EDUCATION OF THE TOWNSHIP 	:
OF DELRAN, BURLINGTON COUNTY,
:
RESPONDENT.
: 	COMMISSIONER OF EDUCATION
AND
: 	DECISION
BOARD OF EDUCATION OF THE TOWNSHIP
OF NUTLEY, ESSEX COUNTY, 	:
PETITIONER, 	:
V. 	:
BOARD OF EDUCATION OF THE TOWNSHIP :
OF DELRAN, BURLINGTON COUNTY,
:
RESPONDENT.
:
The record in this matter and the Initial Decision of the Office of Administrative
Law have been reviewed. Petitioners’ exceptions and respondent’s reply thereto were submitted
in accordance with N.J.A.C. 1:1-18.41 and were duly considered by the Commissioner in
reaching his determination herein. 2
1 Petitioner Nutley timely requested and was granted a four-day extension for submission of its exceptions.
2 Petitioner West Windsor-Plainsboro filed a response to respondent’s reply on April 25, 2000. 	Since
N.J.S.A. 1:1-18.4 does not provide for submission of a response to reply exceptions, West Windsor-Plainsboro’s
additional submission was not considered.

21
In 	its 	exceptions, 	Petitioner 	West 	Windsor-Plainsboro 	(WWP) 	urges 	the
Commissioner to reject the analysis of the Administrative Law Judge (ALJ). 	WWP avers that
the ALJ’s conclusion that the term “tuition” in N.J.S.A. 30:4C-26c includes transportation
contradicts the plain language of the statute as previously interpreted by the Office of the New
Jersey Attorney General 3 and enforced by both the Department of Education and the Department
of Human Services. (WWP Exceptions at 10)
WWP further argues that the ALJ’s opinion was based on an analysis of N.J.S.A.
18A:7B-12 and N.J.S.A. 18A:46-18.1, despite the ALJ’s acknowledgment that those statutes are
not directly relevant. 	The ALJ’s reasoning in support of her reading of N.J.S.A. 30:4C-26c,
WWP concludes, appears to be that, since a district of residence generally must provide
transportation for classified students, it can be inferred, based on the Legislature’s silence in
Chapter 207 of the Laws of 1979 as to transportation costs, that the Legislature’s intent was that
the district of residence was to be responsible for such costs. WWP avers that this analysis is in
error because, although it is true that the transportation of classified students would normally be
provided by the district of residence, N.J.S.A. 30:4C-26c transfers that responsibility to the
district where the group home is located by providing that a child so placed shall be entitled to
the educational benefits of such district. (Id. at 4-5)
WWP further contends that the prime indicator of legislative intent is the plain
language of the statute, State v. Sutton, 132 N.J. 471, 479 (1993). Therefore, since the
Legislature carefully distinguished between tuition which is to be paid by the district of residence
and all other educational benefits in N.J.S.A. 30:4C-26c, the reading of transportation costs into
the obligation to pay tuition is tantamount to legislating by the ALJ. (Id. at 6)
3 WWP notes that the March 13, 1984 Attorney General’s Opinion was authored by then Deputy Attorney General
LaVecchia, who is now Supreme Court Justice LaVecchia.

22
Citing State v. Wallach, 296 N.J. Super. 93, 98 (Law Div. 1996) and Peper v.
Princeton University Board of Trustees, 77 N.J. 55 (1978), WWP maintains that the informal
opinion of the Attorney General and the interpretation given a statute by the agency charged with
its enforcement based on that opinion should be accorded deference. 	Further, it is argued that
the ALJ’s inference that the Attorney General’s Opinion (Opinion) would have been given more
deference if it was a formal opinion is flawed since the opinions relied upon in Wallach, supra,
were informal. (Id. at 6-8)
In its exceptions, Petitioner Nutley (Nutley) agrees with WWP that although
Chapter 207 of the Laws of 1979 may have been silent on the issue of who pays transportation
costs of individuals placed in group homes, two separate administrative agencies and the
Attorney General’s Office were not silent, and the ALJ failed to appropriately defer to the
Opinion and the subsequent agency decisions relying on that Opinion. 	(Petitioner Nutley’s
Exceptions at 5)
Nutley also argues that the ALJ’s determination that the Legislature’s silence in
Chapter 207 of the Laws of 1979 demonstrates that there was no intention to shift transportation
costs from the district of residence is flawed, because it is clear from prior decisions on this issue
that the Legislature left a vacuum which was subsequently filled by administrative interpretations
of the Department of Education and the Department of Human Services. 	Nutley avers that there
can be no shifting of costs that were never designated, and that it is appropriate to rely on the
interpretation by the agencies responsible for providing for the delivery of services because those
agencies are best able to apply the Legislature’s intent to maximize services to children. 	(Id.
at 9)

23
Nutley also maintains that the ALJ improperly relied upon an erroneous equitable
determination in reaching her conclusion that it is responsible for transportation and, therefore,
the ALJ’s ultimate conclusion of law is flawed. 	Arguing that it was the Department of Human
Services which made both the group home placement and the educational placement, and not
petitioner as inferred by the ALJ, Nutley concludes that both Nutley and respondent are victims
of circumstances created by the State. 	Contrary to the ALJ’s finding, Nutley argues, since
neither district played a role in incurring the expenses, neither district is more unfairly treated in
being assessed those expenses. 	(Id. at 12, 13) 	Therefore, Nutley urges the Commissioner to
reverse the ALJ, find respondent responsible for the transportation costs of the student in
question, and order that respondent reimburse Nutley for the costs of transportation it has
assumed since July 1, 1998.
In its reply exceptions, respondent argues with respect to WWP’s exceptions that
the Opinion of March 13, 1984 is no longer relevant to the question of which district has
responsibility for the payment of transportation costs for the times at issue herein. 	Respondent
notes that in her analysis, the Deputy Attorney General relied on N.J.S.A. 18A:46-18.1, which
was repealed by P.L. 1992, c. 129, § 2, effective July 1, 1993, and thus has no relevance to this
matter, which arose in 1998. 	(Respondent’s Reply Exceptions at 2) 	Respondent further avers
that when the Opinion was issued, the Deputy Attorney General could find no special
authorization for a charge back of transportation costs to the school district of residence, and
thus, she concluded that those costs must be born by the district in which the group home was
located. 	Respondent argues that this is no longer an accurate conclusion based on current
statutes and rules. (Id. at 3) 	Respondent claims that the relevant statutes and rules for
determination of responsibility for transportation services are the following:

24
[1. N.J.S.A. 18A:46-23. Transportation of pupils; handicapped
children; state aid.]
The board of education shall furnish transportation to all children
found under this chapter to be handicapped who shall qualify
therefor pursuant to law and it shall furnish the transportation for a
lesser distance also to a handicapped child, if it finds upon the
advice 	of 	the 	examiner, 	the 	handicap 	to 	be 	as 	to 	make
transportation necessary or advisable.
The board of education shall furnish transportation to all children
being sent by local boards of education to an approved 12-month
program pursuant to N.J.S. 18A:46-14 [, or any other program
approved pursuant to N.J.S. 18A:46-14] and who qualify therefor
pursuant to law, during the entire time the child is attending the
program. 	The board shall furnish transportation for a lesser
distance also to a handicapped child if it finds upon the advice of
the examiner, [his] handicap to be [such] as to make transportation
necessary or advisable.
The 	school 	district 	shall 	be 	entitled 	to 	State 	aid 	for 	the
transportation 	pursuant 	to 	section 	25 	of 	P.L. 	1996, 	c.138
(C.18A:7F-25) when the necessity for the transportation and the
cost and method thereof have been approved 	by the 	county
superintendent of the county in which the district paying the cost
of the transportation is situated. (emphasis in text) (Id. at 3-4)
***
[2. N.J.S.A. 18A:7B-12. Determination of residence for funding
purposes.]
For school funding purposes the [C]ommissioner of education
shall determine district of residence as follows:
***
b. The district of residence for children who are in residential
State facilities, or who have been placed by State agencies in
group homes, skill development homes, private schools or
out-of-State 	facilities, 	shall 	be 	the 	present 	district 	of
residence of the parent… (emphasis in text) (Id. at 4)
***
[3. N.J.A.C.. 6A:14-1.3 Definitions]
“Related services” means transportation…services as are required
to 	assist 	a 	student 	with 	a 	disability to 	benefit 	from 	special
education as specified in the student’s IEP…
-and-

25
“District 	board 	of 	education” 	means 	the 	school 	district 	of
residence… (emphasis in text) (Id. at 5)
***
[4. N.J.A.C.. 6A:14-3.9 Related services]
(a) 	Related 	services…shall 	be 	provided 	to 	a 	student 	with 	a
disability when 	required 	for 	the 	student 	to 	benefit 	from 	the
educational program.
***
7. Transportation shall be provided as follows:
i. The district board of education shall provide transportation
as required in the IEP. …
ii. When out-of-district placement for educational reasons is
made by the district board of education, transportation shall
be 	provided 	consistent 	with 	the 	school 	calendar 	of 	the
receiving school. (emphasis in text) (Ibid.)
[5. N.J.A.C.. 6A:14-4.1 General requirements]***
(a) Each district board of education shall provide educational
programs 	and 	related 	services 	for 	students 	with 	disabilities
required by the individualized educational programs of those
students for whom the district board of education is responsible.
(emphasis in text) (Id. at 6)
***
[6. N.J.S.A.. 18A:7F-3. Definitions.]***
“Resident [e]nrollment” means the number of pupils … who, on
the last school day prior to October 16 of the current school year,
are residents of the district and are enrolled in:…(2)…a…private
school to which the district of residence pays tuition… . …In
addition resident enrollment shall include the number of pupils
who, on the last school day prior to October 16 of the prebudget
year, are residents of the district and are in a state facility in which
they were placed by the state. … (emphasis in text) (Ibid.)
[7. 	N.J.S.A. 	18A:7F-25. 	Calculation 	of 	State 	aid 	for
transportation.]***
P2 is the total number of special education pupils eligible for
transportation 	pursuant 	to 	N.J.S.A. 	18A:46-23 	with 	special
transportation requirements who are resident in the district as of
the last school day prior to October 16 of the prebudget year.
(emphasis in text) (Id. at 7)

26
Respondent further argues that the Commissioner should not focus exclusively
upon N.J.S.A. 30:4C-26c, and should consider principles of statutory construction in making his
determination. 	Respondent avers that the entire statute, including N.J.S.A. 30:4C-26(b), should
be read in pari materia with other relevant statutes in determining responsibility for the
transportation costs of these special education students. (Id. at 7-8) 	Respondent concludes that
N.J.S.A.18A:7F-25 specifically provides for transportation costs for special education students
who are resident in the district pursuant to N.J.S. 18A:46-23. 	(Id. at 10) 	Further, respondent
submits that the transportation costs in dispute are included in tuition liability pursuant to
N.J.A.C. 	6:20-3.1 and N.J.A.C . 6:30-3.1(d)4.vii. (sic) “‘[c]ontracted transportation…which are
part 	of 	the 	instructional 	program’ 	is 	expressly 	included 	in 	that 	sum, 	while 	in 	§5.i
‘[t}ransportation to and from school [***] is paid by the resident district’***.” 	Respondent,
therefore, concludes that these provisions clearly impose liability on WWP for the cost of
transportation either as a component of tuition or as a stand alone cost. (Id. at 10)
Finally, with respect to WWP’s exceptions, respondent avers that WWP’s reliance
on recent administrative decisions which determined that transportation costs to a county
vocational school are the responsibility of the local school district is misplaced since respondent
has no “sending” responsibility to the students at issue. (Id. at 10-12)
In its reply exceptions with respect to Nutley, respondent states that Nutley’s
exceptions essentially mirror WWP’s exceptions, noting that Nutley’s assertion that Nutley is no
more responsible for the incursion of the transportation costs at issue than is respondent
completely misses the issues involved herein. (Id. at 14)
In the course of the review of the above-titled matter, the Director of the Bureau
of Controversies and Disputes, on behalf of the Commissioner, sought guidance from the

27
Attorney General’s Office as to the continued validity of the 1984 Opinion concerning school
district liability for transportation for students in group homes. 	By letter of June 21, 2000, the
Deputy Attorney General advised the Commissioner that the analysis and conclusions in the
1984 Opinion remain valid.
The 	parties 	were 	noticed 	of 	the 	above 	communication 	from 	the 	Attorney
General’s Office, and provided an opportunity to respond.
In its response, respondent argues, inter alia, that the Deputy Attorney General’s
reliance on N.J.S.A. 30:4C-26 is misplaced and erroneous because that statute has no relevancy
whatsoever to Division of Developmental Disabilities (DDD) group home placements. 	The
express terms of N.J.S.A. 30:4C-26, respondent avers, are specifically applicable to placements
made by DYFS, and by its plain language, cannot be expanded to include placements by State
entities other than DYFS. (Respondent’s Memorandum of Law, July 8, 2000 at 2) Respondent
further argues that both “[t]he Attorney General and the ALJ erred in believing that an expansion
of the coverage of N.J.S.A. 30:4C-26 to placements by the DDD was warranted.” (emphasis
added) (Id. at 3) 	Respondent submits that prior to 1985, the Division of Mental Retardation
(DMR) was the agency having jurisdiction over those who are autistic, such as the children at
issue herein. 	When DDD came into being in 1985, respondent states that the functions of DMR
were transferred to the new entity. 	(Id. at 4) 	Respondent asserts that before and at the time of
the creation of DDD in 1985, the State divided responsibility for certain populations between
DYFS and DMR. 	With respect to the DMR/DDD population, respondent argues, N.J.S.A.
30:6D-3a(5) expressly defines those included in the service population as persons with “‘severe
disabilities attributable to’…‘autism.’” 	(Id. at 6) 	Accordingly, respondents aver, separate
statutory 	jurisdictions 	are 	established 	for 	DYFS 	(N.J.S.A. 	30:4C) 	and 	DMR/DDD

28
(N.J.S.A. 30:6D), such that the distinct population for which DMR/DDD is responsible is not
somehow transferred to DYFS by a group home setting. (Id. at 6-7)
Additionally, 	respondent 	repeats 	its 	arguments 	advanced 	below 	and 	in 	its
exceptions to the Initial Decision, urging the Commissioner to adopt the conclusions of the ALJ,
dismissing the Petitions of Appeal and determining that the contested transportation costs are the
responsibility of petitioners. 4
In their responses, Petitioners WWP and Nutley essentially reiterate arguments
advanced in their exceptions, urging the Commissioner to accept the legal opinions provided by
the Attorney General’s Office, and to reject the ALJ’s analysis which determined that petitioners
are responsible for the transportation costs for the students at issue. 5
Upon consideration of the Initial Decision, the arguments advanced by the parties,
the March 13, 1984 Attorney General’s Opinion and the June 20, 2000 advice from the Attorney
General’s Office, the Commissioner determines to reject the ALJ’s conclusions of law for the
reasons set forth below.
Initially, the Commissioner agrees that the statute central to the resolution of the
question as to who is responsible for the cost of transportation services for students placed in
group homes is N.J.S.A. 30:4C-26, which authorizes group home placements by the State and
delineates the obligations of school districts involved in such placements. 	Further, the statute
explicitly states that, for all purposes except school funding, the placed child is to be deemed a
resident of the municipality and county where the group home is situated and, as such, is entitled
4 Although respondent objects to the Commissioner’s consideration of the Deputy Attorney General’s letter of
June 20, 2000, arguing that it serves to supplant the Commissioner’s authority to make a decision with respect to this
matter, the Commissioner notes the appropriateness of his consideration of advice of counsel upon taking judicial
notice of such advice.
5 The parties were provided with an opportunity to concurrently submit a letter brief or memorandum of law in
response to the communication by Deputy Attorney General Thomas Russo. 	To the extent that both WWP and
Nutley included reply arguments to respondent’s submission in their briefs, these arguments were not considered.

29
to the use of all health, recreational, vocational and other facilities of said municipality and
county. Section “c” goes on to specify that the child is also entitled to the education benefits of
that district with the exception that the child’s “district of residence,” as determined by the
Commissioner of Education pursuant to law, shall be responsible for paying “tuition” to the
district in which the child is placed.
Although this statute specifically refers to placements made by DYFS, the
Commissioner agrees with the ALJ that it should be construed as also covering placements made
by DDD. Both DYFS and DDD are divisions within the Department of Human Services which
have been entrusted by the Legislature with the responsibility of delivering services to children
with disabilities which will enable them to lead as normal and productive lives, as possible. See
N.J.S.A. 30:6D et seq. and N.J.S.A. 30:4C et seq. 	Although N.J.S.A. 30:4C-26c makes no
reference to placements by DDD, it is clear from the June 15, 1998 letter from Human Services
Deputy Director, Debra Coniglio, informing Delran that “[b]oth the West Windsor School
District for (K.H.) and the Nutley School District for (S.M.) have been reminded of their
responsibility to assume educational expenses for their respective pupils, beginning July 1,
1998,” that DHS, the Department overseeing these two divisions, has read N.J.S.A. 30:4C-26c as
applying to residential placements by DDD.
Additionally, except for the matter of tuition, N.J.S.A. 30:4C-26 fixes liability for
the cost and provision of all governmental services available to children placed in group homes.
As stated above, the child’s district of residence is responsible for paying tuition to the school
where the child is placed. 	Pursuant to N.J.S.A. 18A:7B-12b the “district of residence” is “the
present district of residence of the parent or guardian with whom the child lived prior to his most
recent admission to a State facility or most recent placement by a State agency.” In the pending

30
matters, it is undisputed that the respective districts of residence, which are responsible for
paying the cost of tuition, are, therefore, West Windsor-Plainsboro and Nutley.
Given the absence of any reference to transportation in the provisions of
P.L. 1979, c. 207, the Commissioner concludes that the term “tuition” does not encompass
transportation. At the time of the enactment of P.L. 1979, c. 207, the Legislature was aware of
the matter of pupil transportation as evidenced by a separate provision dealing with “day
training,” in which it specifically allocated this cost to the State of New Jersey. N.J.S.A. 18A:46-
18.1 (repealed see now N.J.S.A. 18A:46-13). The existence of this provision shows that if it had
desired to impose transportation costs upon the “district of residence,” in the case of a group
home placement, the Legislature could have easily drafted N.J.S.A. 30:4C-26c in such a way that
included this cost.6
The Commissioner further finds that the express language of N.J.S.A. 30:4C-26c,
stating that children placed in group homes are to be accorded all of the “educational benefits” of
the school district in which the group home sits, includes pupil transportation. In this regard, the
ALJ properly noted that a special education pupil may qualify for transportation as a “related
service” within the meaning of the special education laws. 	It must be noted, however, that
nothing in those laws alters the Commissioner’s conclusion regarding cost allocation. 	Since
N.J.A.C. 6A:14-3.9 only references the “district board of education” as bearing these costs and
there is no specific provision for group home placements, the regulation must, therefore, be
viewed in light of, and subject to, the cost allocation set forth in N.J.S.A. 30:4C-26c.
The Commissioner also finds that the school district where the group home is
located is responsible for providing child study team services (paid for by the resident district) to
6 To the extent that the parties seek further clarification of this statute, the Commissioner notes that the appropriate
remedy is legislative.

31
children placed in group homes within its borders for reasons expressed in the 1984 Opinion.
Therefore, the current scheme provides that the group home school district will determine the
child’s educational program and placement, which, in turn, will dictate the child’s transportation
needs and the district’s transportation costs. 7
Accordingly, for the reasons set forth above, the Commissioner grants petitioners’
motions for summary judgment and directs that respondent reimburse Petitioners WWP and
Nutley for the cost of transportation for the students in question. Respondent is further directed
to continue the funding of transportation costs for S.M., as long as the student remains in the
group home and is eligible for special education services. 8
IT IS SO ORDERED. 9
COMMISSIONER OF EDUCATION
Date of Decision: 	September 5, 2000
Date of Mailing: 	September 5, 2000
7 It is noted that, pursuant to the Comprehensive Educational Improvement and Financing Act, transportation aid is
provided to school districts. N.J.S.A. 18A:7F-25.
8 K.H. has aged out of WWP, so that the only relief sought by WWP is the reimbursement for past expenditures.
9 This decision, as the Commissioner’s final determination, may be appealed to the State Board of Education
pursuant to N.J.S.A. 18A:6-27 et seq. and N.J.A.C. 6A:4-1.1 et seq., within 30 days of its filing. Commissioner
decisions are deemed filed three days after the date of mailing to the parties.