In re Interest of Jordon B.

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Nebraska Supreme Court Advance Sheets
321 Nebraska Reports
IN RE INTEREST OF JORDON B.
Cite as 321 Neb. 315
In re Interest of Jordon B., a child
under 18 years of age.
State of Nebraska, appellee, v.
Leah B., appellant.
___ N.W.3d ___
Filed May 1, 2026. 	No. S-25-551.
1. Juvenile Courts: Appeal and Error. An appellate court reviews juve-
nile cases de novo on the record and reaches its conclusions inde-
pendently of the juvenile court’s findings.
2. Equity: Appeal and Error. In an appeal of an equity action, where the
credible evidence is in conflict on a material issue of fact, the appellate
court considers and may give weight to the fact that the trial judge heard
and observed the witnesses and accepted one version of the facts rather
than another.
3. Parental Rights. A natural parent who relinquishes parental rights to a
child by a valid written instrument gives up all rights to the child at the
time of the relinquishment.
4. ____. A valid relinquishment of parental rights is irrevocable.
5. Parental Rights: Adoption. In the absence of threats, coercion, fraud,
or duress, a properly executed relinquishment of parental rights and
consent to adoption signed by a natural parent knowingly, intelligently,
and voluntarily is valid.
6. Parental Rights: Proof. The burden is on the natural parent challenging
the relinquishment to prove it is invalid.
7. Equity: Evidence: Proof. Generally, in an equitable action, the party
with the burden of proof must meet that burden by clear and convinc-
ing evidence.
8. Equity: Jurisdiction: Child Custody: Adoption. Disputes over
child custody and challenges to adoption lie within a court’s equity
jurisdiction.
Nebraska Supreme Court Online Library
www.nebraska.gov/apps-courts-epub/
10/18/2026 12:41 AM CDT

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Nebraska Supreme Court Advance Sheets
321 Nebraska Reports
IN RE INTEREST OF JORDON B.
Cite as 321 Neb. 315
9. Parental Rights: Evidence: Proof. A parent’s burden of proof in
seeking to invalidate a relinquishment of parental rights is by clear and
convincing evidence.
10. Evidence: Proof: Words and Phrases. Clear and convincing evidence
is evidence which produces in the trier of fact a firm belief or conviction
about the existence of the fact to be proved.
11. Parental Rights: Mental Competency. Impaired mental powers do not
necessarily render someone incapable of knowingly, intelligently, and
voluntarily executing a relinquishment of parental rights; the question is
whether the parent was capable of understanding the meaning, design,
and effect of the act of relinquishment.
12. Duress: Words and Phrases. To constitute duress, there must be an
application of such pressure or constraint as compels a person to go
against that person’s will and takes away that person’s free agency,
destroying the power of refusing to comply with the unjust demands
of another.
13. Parental Rights: Duress. Stress alone, whether financial or per-
sonal, does not rise to the level of duress that would negate a valid
relinquishment.
14. Duress. A threat to do what one has a legal right to do cannot consti-
tute duress.
15. Contracts: Duress: Words and Phrases. Coercion is a social or
domestic force exerted on a party, which is not sufficient to amount to
duress but controls the free action of that party’s will and prevents vol-
untary action in the making of a contract.
16. Fraud. What constitutes fraud is a matter of fact in each case and may
consist of either fraud in the inducement or fraud in the execution,
through words, acts, or the suppression of material facts with the intent
to mislead and deceive.
17. Parental Rights. Noncompliance with communication and contact
agreements in any form is not an invalidating condition of a relinquish-
ment of parental rights.
18. ____. Noncompliance with any communication and contact agreements
may not be the basis for revoking a relinquishment to the Department of
Health and Human Services.
19. ____. A change of attitude subsequent to signing a relinquishment is
insufficient to invalidate it.
Appeal from the County Court for Dodge County: Thomas J.
Klein, Judge. Affirmed.
Lisa M. Gonzalez, of Johnson & Pekny, L.L.C., for appellant.

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Nebraska Supreme Court Advance Sheets
321 Nebraska Reports
IN RE INTEREST OF JORDON B.
Cite as 321 Neb. 315
Michael T. Hilgers, Attorney General, Jennifer D. Joakim,
and Leslie E. Remus, and Steven J. Twohig, of Twohig Law,
L.L.C., guardian ad litem, for appellee.
Funke, 	C.J., 	Cassel, 	Stacy, 	Papik, 	Freudenberg,
Bergevin, and Vaughn, JJ.
Freudenberg, J.
I. INTRODUCTION
Leah B., the biological mother of Jordon B., appeals from
the juvenile court’s order denying her motion to rescind her
relinquishment of parental rights to Jordon. Leah was repre-
sented by counsel but not by a guardian ad litem during the
relinquishment process. She argues the juvenile court erred by
finding she voluntarily executed the relinquishment, despite
evidence of her having a mild intellectual disability and her
testimony that threats and promises made by family members
influenced her decision.
II. BACKGROUND
Leah is the biological mother of three living children: Jacob
B., Lucas B., and Jordon. According to a report from the
Department of Health and Human Services (DHHS), Leah
had a fourth biological child who had died due to a failure to
thrive. Allen B. is the biological father of all four children and
was married to Leah until 2024.
Jacob and Lucas were removed from Leah and Allen’s home
as infants in 2014 and 2016, respectively. Leah relinquished
her parental rights to Jacob and Lucas, as did Allen, and Leah’s
father and stepmother adopted them. Leah was represented
by counsel for the relinquishments. She was not appointed a
guardian ad litem. Leah receives disability benefits for her
back and mental health conditions.
In September 2020, Jordon, a newborn, was removed from
Leah and Allen’s home due to concerns about Leah and Allen’s
ability to care for him and maintain safe living conditions.

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Nebraska Supreme Court Advance Sheets
321 Nebraska Reports
IN RE INTEREST OF JORDON B.
Cite as 321 Neb. 315
Leah admitted to the allegations of the juvenile petition, and
Jordon was adjudicated under Neb. Rev. Stat. § 43-247(3)(a)
(Reissue 2016).
Jordon was initially placed with Leah’s father and step-
mother. Leah’s father and stepmother later expressed they
were unable to care for Jordon’s needs in addition to those
of his older siblings, and he was placed with another family.
Following a multiday trial and an appeal 1 over a change of
placement, Jordon was placed with Allen’s cousin, Rita P., in
November 2021, where he has since remained.
1. Relinquishment
The permanency plan for Jordon was reunification with a
concurrent plan of adoption. Nevertheless, in November 2022,
when Jordon was 2 years old, Leah relinquished her parental
rights to Jordon by completing and signing a DHHS form titled
“Relinquishment of Child by Parent,” as did Allen.
Leah’s 	relinquishment 	was 	notarized 	by 	Leah’s 	court-
appointed attorney, who attested at the bottom of the form that
Leah “executed the foregoing relinquishment and acknowl-
edged the same to be a voluntary act and deed.” Allen and
three DHHS employees were also present at the relinquish-
ment. Leah neither requested nor was appointed a guardian ad
litem in relation to Leah’s relinquishment of her parental rights
to Jordon.
In January 2023, DHHS issued Leah a “Relinquishment
Acceptance Letter,” confirming that she had voluntarily relin-
quished her parental rights to Jordon in the presence of her
attorney and that all documents were explained to her by a
DHHS representative. The letter stated that acceptance of the
relinquishment was effective from the date of relinquishment
in November 2022.
Rita adopted Jordon in June 2023.
1 See In re Interest of Jordon B., 312 Neb. 827, 981 N.W.2d 242 (2022).

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Nebraska Supreme Court Advance Sheets
321 Nebraska Reports
IN RE INTEREST OF JORDON B.
Cite as 321 Neb. 315
2. Motion Challenging Validity of
Relinquishment and Appeal
In May 2023, approximately 1 month before Rita adopted
Jordon, Leah filed a pro se motion asserting either that she
signed the relinquishment involuntarily, under threat, coercion,
or duress, or that she did not sign it knowingly, intelligently,
and voluntarily. She alleged she was developmentally disabled
and should have been appointed a guardian ad litem. She set
forth several allegations of coercion and duress by Allen and
extended family members, including Rita, but also alleged the
“entire state team” knew of her disability and manipulated and
lied to her.
Following a hearing in which Leah appeared pro se and
no evidence was proffered, the court denied the motion. Leah
appealed. In a decision issued in June 2024, 2 we reversed the
court’s order and remanded the cause for a meaningful evi-
dentiary hearing on the validity of Leah’s relinquishment of
parental rights.
3. Evidentiary Hearing on Remand
At the hearing on remand, which took place in March
2025, Leah was represented by counsel. Additionally, the court
appointed her a guardian ad litem. At the time of the hearing,
Jordon was 4 years old.
(a) Leah’s Testimony
Leah generally testified that Allen and his family made
false promises and pressured her to sign the relinquishment.
She testified she was vulnerable to that pressure because of
intellectual challenges and emotional abuse by Allen and
his mother.
Leah testified that when they were married, Allen manip-
ulated her. She described that Allen did not permit her to
have any contact with her parents, sister, or grandparents, and
2 See In re Interest of Jordon B., 316 Neb. 974, 7 N.W.3d 894 (2024).

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Nebraska Supreme Court Advance Sheets
321 Nebraska Reports
IN RE INTEREST OF JORDON B.
Cite as 321 Neb. 315
generally isolated her. Leah testified that Allen told her that
she would be incapable of caring for Jordon if they broke
up. Leah said Allen was verbally abusive to her and threat-
ened her life if she did not “switch Jordon to Rita’s place.”
According to Leah, Allen made it clear that if she did not
sign the relinquishment for Jordon, “he would make [her] life
a living hell.” Leah testified that Allen told her Jordon would
be safer with Rita. Leah felt like she had “no control over
what [she] was allowed to do.”
Leah testified that Rita had promised her and Allen that if
they signed the relinquishment, they could move in with Rita
and Jordon and still be Jordon’s “mom and dad.” Alternatively,
“[Rita] would buy a place” for Leah and Allen “and let [them]
still raise Jordon.” In either case, Rita would be there to help
them if they needed help. According to Leah, Rita also prom-
ised her and Allen that she would help them acquire a reliable
vehicle. Leah described that Allen’s mother was involved in
these conversations and that Allen’s mother had a history of
verbally abusing her. She acknowledged that DHHS was not
involved in these discussions.
Leah testified she did not participate in relinquishment coun-
seling because Allen told her and the DHHS representatives
that he and Leah did not need it. Allen said he and Leah “knew
exactly what [they] were doing,” since they had been through
the same process before. According to Leah, Allen was present
during every meeting in the juvenile case, including at meet-
ings with her own attorney. She did not have her own trans-
portation, so it was Allen who drove her to all the meetings,
including the meeting to sign the relinquishment. Leah testified
that DHHS did not offer to give her relinquishment counseling
separately from Allen. Leah believed that if she had been able
to meet with DHHS representatives separately, she would not
have signed the relinquishment.
In January 2023, following DHHS’ acceptance of her relin-
quishment, Leah moved to Arkansas to be with her boyfriend.
After her return, Leah obtained a protection order in April

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Nebraska Supreme Court Advance Sheets
321 Nebraska Reports
IN RE INTEREST OF JORDON B.
Cite as 321 Neb. 315
2023 against Allen. A motion to vacate the protection order
was filed in June 2023, and later that same month, the motion
was denied. According to Leah, Allen and Rita convinced her
to move to vacate the protection order by promising her Rita
would let her see Jordon if she did. Similarly, Rita had asked
Leah to drop her motion to rescind her relinquishment, promis-
ing her that, if she did, she could see Jordon.
Leah acknowledged she had her own attorney present when
she signed the relinquishment. She acknowledged that she was
asked if anyone was forcing or threatening her to relinquish
and that she answered no.
Leah acknowledged she had voluntarily signed the relin-
quishments 	of 	parental 	rights 	to 	Jacob 	and 	Lucas 	after
fully participating in relinquishment counseling. When she
signed those relinquishments, she understood the legal con-
sequences of a relinquishment. Leah conceded that she had
that same full understanding of the legal consequences when
she signed the relinquishment for Jordon. Leah explained
that she sought to rescind her relinquishment of parental
rights to Jordon not because she sought custody of him, but,
rather, to facilitate Jordon’s being placed back with Leah’s
father and stepmother. Leah thought that Jordon should be
with his older brothers.
(b) Allen’s Testimony
At the hearing, Allen denied ever physically and verbally
abusing Leah or attempting to isolate her. He denied making
any threats or promises in relation to Leah’s relinquishing
parental rights to Jordon. Allen testified that no one told him or
Leah that they could see Jordon if Rita adopted him; however,
Allen assumed that they would be able to.
(c) Rita’s Testimony
Rita testified that in approximately 10 years of interacting
with Leah and Allen as a couple, she never observed anything
that led her to believe Allen was abusive toward Leah. Rita

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Nebraska Supreme Court Advance Sheets
321 Nebraska Reports
IN RE INTEREST OF JORDON B.
Cite as 321 Neb. 315
testified it was Leah and Allen’s idea to have Jordon placed in
her home, and she never threatened Leah or promised anything
in exchange for Leah’s eventual relinquishment. Rita testified
she did not tell Leah she could move into Rita’s house and did
not promise a house or vehicle. Further, Rita never promised
Leah that she could see Jordon if he was adopted.
Rita acknowledged she had discussed with Leah and Allen
that they would all likely continue to see each other for family
dinners and holidays and “just be a normal family.” Rita knew
that Leah and Allen wanted her to adopt Jordon because they
thought they could interact with him more in her home than
they would be able to if Leah’s father and stepmother adopted
him. Rita purchased a vehicle for Leah and Allen sometime
after November 2022, after the relinquishment, to facilitate
Allen’s transportation to and from his employment.
Rita testified that, since the adoption, she has never refused
to allow Leah to visit Jordon. Rita’s only conditions are that
Leah find her own transportation and come separately from
Allen if there is a protection order in place. Because of
those conditions, Leah has not continued to have contact
with Jordon.
When Rita heard about Leah’s intention to invalidate her
relinquishment of her parental rights to Jordon, she called
Allen. He was with Leah when Rita called. Leah told Rita that
if she did not invalidate her relinquishment for Jordon, her
father and stepmother would not permit her to visit her two
older children. Rita observed that Allen took Leah to the first
hearing on Leah’s pro se motion to invalidate her relinquish-
ment, even though there was still an active protection order
against Allen at that time.
(d) Allen’s Mother’s Testimony
Allen’s mother testified that she never threatened Leah
or promised her anything if she signed the relinquishment
of parental rights. She testified that she never physically
assaulted Leah but that Leah had once physically assaulted

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Nebraska Supreme Court Advance Sheets
321 Nebraska Reports
IN RE INTEREST OF JORDON B.
Cite as 321 Neb. 315
her. Allen’s mother was living at Rita’s house at the time of
the hearing. Allen’s mother testified that since Allen’s divorce
from Leah, he stayed overnight at Rita’s house once or twice
a week.
(e) Case Manager’s Testimony
Jack Leonard, the case manager for Jordon’s case since
shortly after Jordon’s removal from Leah and Allen’s home,
testified that he spoke frequently with Leah over the course of
2½ years. During such conversations, Allen often was not pres-
ent. When Leonard saw Leah and Allen together, he observed
Leah call Allen names and belittle Allen over his attempts at
parenting. Leonard had concerns about Leah and Allen’s ability
to coparent.
Leonard described that the case file for the family contained
prior intakes over the last 10 years, which noted concerns over
Leah’s behavior toward Allen. In one intake where law enforce-
ment was called, Leah was believed to have been the aggressor
in a physical altercation with Allen. Other intakes reported
Leah’s belittling Allen. Leonard did not believe Leah’s behav-
ior amounted to domestic violence. He testified, “We just kind
of chalked it up to Leah running the household and then Allen
being kind of more of a submissive partner and then doing kind
of what Leah tells him to do.”
Leonard did not personally observe anything that would have
led him to believe Leah was the victim of domestic violence.
Given the amount of contact with the family during the years
between the initial intake and the relinquishment, as well as the
years of appeals related to the case, he would have expected to
see some evidence of domestic violence, if it existed. Nothing
in his training suggested to him that Leah was the victim of
psychological or physical abuse by Allen.
Leonard testified that Leah raised the issue of relinquishing
her parental rights to Jordon shortly after Jordon was placed
with Rita. They had several private conversations on the topic
after their team meetings. Their initial conversations about

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Nebraska Supreme Court Advance Sheets
321 Nebraska Reports
IN RE INTEREST OF JORDON B.
Cite as 321 Neb. 315
relinquishment began in 2021, and the relinquishment did not
occur until November 2022. Leonard repeatedly told Leah that
the plan was reunification, she was making a lot of progress,
and there was no need to consider relinquishment at that stage.
Despite this, Leah repeatedly expressed concerns over her
father and stepmother’s resistance to the change of placement
and her not wanting them to adopt Jordon. She feared that if
her father and stepmother, instead of Rita, adopted Jordon, she
would never be able to see Jordon again.
Leonard testified he and Leah had conversations about this
“quite frequently.” During those conversations, he and other
support workers tried to encourage Leah to keep on the path to
reunification. They discouraged Leah from considering relin-
quishing her parental rights out of fear that if she did not,
Jordon would be adopted by her father and stepmother. Still,
Leah persisted in pursuing relinquishment. By July 2022, Leah
had chosen to “quit participating in visits.”
Leonard recalled speaking with Leah multiple times, without
Allen present, about the need to participate in relinquishment
counseling. According to Leonard, “The team insisted that
[Leah] participate” in the counseling even if she had relin-
quished her rights to her other children. Leah refused to partic-
ipate in the relinquishment counseling, explaining she did not
want to delay relinquishment because she had plans to move
out of state with a new boyfriend. According to Leonard, Leah
“just wanted to get this done and over with” and “made it clear
that she understood everything because she’s already gone
through it before.”
Leonard testified that Leah never expressed any concerns
about Jordon’s placement with Rita, stating that Leah, in fact,
“had nothing but positive things to say” about Rita. Leonard
described that the communication between the caseworkers and
Rita was very open and that he had “absolutely no evidence, no
indication” of anyone making promises to Leah of contact with
Jordon, vehicles, money, housing, or other financial gains in
exchange for the relinquishment. He also noted that Rita “did

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Nebraska Supreme Court Advance Sheets
321 Nebraska Reports
IN RE INTEREST OF JORDON B.
Cite as 321 Neb. 315
not have the financial means to provide such or to make those
promises in the first place.”
As was customary with any placement while working on
reunification, Leonard had discussed with Rita that she was
only approved for placement and should not engage in any
discussions with Leah and Allen about relinquishment. Also,
generally, as part of the relinquishment signing process, a case-
worker will ask parents if anyone promised anything to them in
exchange for the relinquishment. Leonard was aware of Leah’s
and Allen’s general expectations that Rita would permit them
to see Jordon if she adopted him. However, he understood that
expectation was simply due to Jordon’s being placed with a
family member who had been “a positive support.”
Due to concerns about Leah’s comprehension, Leonard had
referred Leah for a neuropsychological evaluation to deter-
mine if a guardian ad litem should be appointed for her. The
evaluation report, which was completed in 2021, described
Leah’s intelligence quotient as being below average, which
the evaluation report set forth could potentially qualify Leah
for a diagnosis of mild intellectual disability. The report also
indicated that Leah’s cognitive weaknesses, coupled with her
comparatively quick processing skills, could make her appear
to understand more than she does. The report did not address
whether Leah was incapable of knowingly, intelligently, or vol-
untarily executing a relinquishment or any contractual agree-
ment. Although Leah’s intelligence quotient scores were below
average, following an “extensive conversation” and consul-
tation with the evaluating neuropsychologist, it was deter-
mined that Leah did not require a guardian ad litem. Leonard
explained that Leah had enough support through her attorney,
DHHS, and other providers. Leah “had quite a few services in
place to make sure that she was being advocated for.” Further,
“[s]he was able to comprehend and do tasks specifically given
to her by providers during visits . . . .”
Leonard testified he witnessed Leah sign the relinquish-
ment, and she did not indicate any reluctance. To the contrary,

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321 Nebraska Reports
IN RE INTEREST OF JORDON B.
Cite as 321 Neb. 315
Leah “couldn’t sign it fast enough.” Leah appeared “jovial,
happy,” and “in good spirits.” Leonard testified that based
upon his extensive involvement with all the parties and experi-
ence with the case, he believed Leah gave her relinquishment
freely, knowingly, and without coercion.
(f) Court-Appointed Attorney’s Testimony
Adam Tripp, Leah’s court-appointed attorney from October
2020 through April 2023, testified that Leah informed him she
wished to relinquish her parental rights because she was not in
a position where she could provide for Jordon’s care. Tripp tes-
tified that he met with Leah frequently and that she called his
office often. At times, Allen was present for their meetings. At
other times, he was not. Tripp was aware that Leah had some
mild cognitive functioning problems but did not believe Leah
required a guardian ad litem. He discussed with Leah the con-
sequences of a relinquishment. Leah did not reach out to him
after the relinquishment to express any concerns. As Leah’s
attorney and the notary to her signature on the relinquishment,
Tripp believed Leah was signing her relinquishment freely,
voluntarily, and intelligently.
(g) DHHS Employee’s Testimony
Heather Johnson, a child and family services specialist
with DHHS trained in accepting relinquishments of parental
rights, was the assigned specialist to receive the relinquish-
ment of Leah’s parental rights to Jordon. She testified at the
hearing that when she takes a relinquishment of parental
rights, she observes the participants to screen for any con-
cerns of domestic violence or other issues relevant to vol-
untariness. Johnson said that the relinquishment of parental
rights to Jordon was “calm and . . . pleasant.” Leah was
“engaging and pleasant to work with” and “conveyed no
aggression, no abrupt sadness.” Johnson testified that Leah
mentioned being familiar with the process, because she had

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IN RE INTEREST OF JORDON B.
Cite as 321 Neb. 315
relinquished her rights to two other children. Leah conveyed
that “[s]he was understanding of the process and so it did not
impact her the same way as it would a parent who was com-
pleting this process for the first time.”
Johnson testified that she filled out the relinquishment
questionnaire, transcribing verbatim Leah’s answers. Leah
said that relinquishing Jordon for adoption meant a “more
suitable and safe environment for my son,” she was satisfied
with the information and assistance she received, and she
decided to relinquish Jordon to give him a “more . . . suitable
home than we can give him.” Leah affirmed to Johnson that
she understood her relinquishment could not be revoked and
that it involved the complete loss of all rights and responsibil-
ities. Leah also told Johnson that she had not been promised
anything or threatened in any way regarding relinquishing
Jordon and that her relinquishment was a free and voluntary
act done with her full understanding and knowledge of the
consequences. Johnson believed Leah relinquished her paren-
tal rights voluntarily and with full knowledge of what the
relinquishment entailed.
4. Order Denying Motion to
Rescind Relinquishment
Following the evidentiary hearing on remand, the juvenile
court overruled Leah’s motion to rescind her relinquishment
of parental rights. The court found that Leah’s relinquishment
was not the result of fraud, coercion, duress, threats, or prom-
ises and that Leah freely, voluntarily, intelligently, and know-
ingly executed her relinquishment. Among other facts, the
court highlighted that Leah initiated relinquishing her parental
rights and repeatedly expressed her desire to sign a voluntary
relinquishment, despite Leonard’s insistence that she was on
the path to reunification. Leah also repeatedly refused relin-
quishment counseling because she said she understood the
process. She was calm and showed no signs of being forced or

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321 Nebraska Reports
IN RE INTEREST OF JORDON B.
Cite as 321 Neb. 315
coerced when she signed the relinquishment, and she demon-
strated she understood the legal consequences of executing a
voluntary relinquishment. She participated in numerous meet-
ings where she was informed of her rights and the repercus-
sions of the relinquishment. She indicated she understood the
consequences of signing the voluntary relinquishment, and the
neuropsychological evaluation did not reach any conclusions
or opinions regarding Leah’s inability to do so. The court
found that Leah had moved to rescind her relinquishment of
parental rights in order to facilitate Jordon’s being placed with
her family members, not to regain custody.
III. ASSIGNMENTS OF ERROR
Leah assigns that the juvenile court erred in finding that her
relinquishment of parental rights (1) did not result from fraud,
coercion, duress, or threats and (2) was knowingly, intelli-
gently, and/or voluntarily executed.
IV. STANDARD OF REVIEW
[1] An appellate court reviews juvenile cases de novo on the
record and reaches its conclusions independently of the juve-
nile court’s findings. 3
[2] In an appeal of an equity action, where the credible evi-
dence is in conflict on a material issue of fact, the appellate
court considers and may give weight to the fact that the trial
judge heard and observed the witnesses and accepted one ver-
sion of the facts rather than another. 4
V. ANALYSIS
The issue presented is whether Leah’s relinquishment was
valid. Leah argues she proved the relinquishment was the
result of threats, coercion, fraud, and/or duress because Allen,
3 Id. See, also, Jesse B. v. Tylee H., 293 Neb. 973, 883 N.W.2d 1 (2016);
Gomez v. Savage, 254 Neb. 836, 580 N.W.2d 523 (1998).
4 See Perkins v. RMR Building Group, 320 Neb. 707, 30 N.W.3d 148
(2026).

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IN RE INTEREST OF JORDON B.
Cite as 321 Neb. 315
Rita, and Allen’s mother made threats and promises to induce
her to sign the relinquishment. She also argues she proved
she did not sign the relinquishment knowingly, intelligently,
and voluntarily due to her mild intellectual disability, in con-
junction with her lack of a guardian ad litem and past trauma
relating to the relinquishment of her parental rights to Jordon’s
two older siblings.
[3,4] Neb. Rev. Stat. § 43-106.01 (Reissue 2016) states, in
part:
When a child shall have been relinquished by written
instrument, as provided by sections 43-104 and 43-106,
to [DHHS] or to a licensed child placement agency and
the agency has, in writing, accepted full responsibility for
the child, the person so relinquishing shall be relieved of
all parental duties toward and all responsibilities for such
child and have no rights over such child.
Accordingly, a natural parent who relinquishes parental rights
to a child by a valid written instrument gives up all rights to
the child at the time of the relinquishment. 5 A valid relinquish-
ment of parental rights is irrevocable. 6
[5,6] In the absence of threats, coercion, fraud, or duress,
a properly executed relinquishment of parental rights and
consent to adoption signed by a natural parent knowingly,
intelligently, and voluntarily is valid. 7 The burden is on the
natural parent challenging the relinquishment to prove it is
invalid. 8
[7-10] Generally, in an equitable action, the party with
the burden of proof must meet that burden by clear and
5 See Monty S. & Teresa S. v. Jason W. & Rebecca W., 290 Neb. 1048, 863
N.W.2d 484 (2015).
6 Id.
7 Id.
8 See id.

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IN RE INTEREST OF JORDON B.
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convincing evidence. 9 Disputes over child custody and chal-
lenges to adoption lie within a court’s equity jurisdiction. 10
Thus, like other jurisdictions, we hold that a parent’s burden
of proof in seeking to invalidate a relinquishment of parental
rights is by clear and convincing evidence. 11 Clear and con-
vincing evidence is evidence which produces in the trier of
fact a firm belief or conviction about the existence of the fact
to be proved. 12
[11] In our de novo review, we agree with the juvenile
court that Leah failed to prove that she executed the relin-
quishment unknowingly, unintelligently, or involuntarily. We
base our analysis of Leah’s claim of mental incapacity to
relinquish parental rights consistently with the law regarding
mental incapacity to execute a contract generally. 13 Impaired
mental powers do not necessarily render someone incapa-
ble of knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily executing a
9 See, Malousek v. Meyer, 309 Neb. 803, 962 N.W.2d 676 (2021); Goff v.
Weeks, 246 Neb. 163, 517 N.W.2d 387 (1994); Pruss v. Pruss, 245 Neb.
521, 514 N.W.2d 335 (1994); Bock v. Bank of Bellevue, 230 Neb. 908, 434
N.W.2d 310 (1989); In re Estate of Price, 223 Neb. 12, 388 N.W.2d 72
(1986); Qualsett v. Abrahams, 23 Neb. App. 958, 879 N.W.2d 392 (2016).
Compare, e.g., In re Adoption of Kate S., 315 Neb. 795, 1 N.W.3d 502
(2024), with In re Interest of Johnny H., 320 Neb. 675, 29 N.W.3d 808
(2026). But see State, ex rel. Bize, v. Young, 121 Neb. 619, 237 N.W. 677
(1931).
10 See Jesse B. v. Tylee H., supra note 3.
11 See, In re J.W.B., 659 Pa. 561, 232 A.3d 689 (2020); In re Adoption of
S.R.T., 362 Mont. 39, 260 P.3d 177 (2011); In re Cesar L., 221 W. Va.
249, 654 S.E.2d 373 (2007); Hagy v. Pruitt, 339 S.C. 425, 529 S.E.2d 714
(2000); In re Adoption of B.T.D., 68 P.3d 1021 (Utah App. 2003); D.C. v.
J.C., 842 So. 2d 17 (Ala. Civ. App. 2002); Matter of Navajo County Juv.
A. JA-691, 171 Ariz. 369, 831 P.2d 368 (Ariz. App. 1991). See, also, Colo.
Rev. Stat. Ann. § 19-5-104 (West Supp. 2025); N.C. Gen. Stat. § 48-3-707
(2007). But see In re N.P.T., 169 S.W.3d 677 (Tex. App. 2005).
12 Malousek v. Meyer, supra note 9.
13 See, e.g., Faulkenberry v. Elkins, 213 Ga. App. 472, 445 S.E.2d 283
(1994).

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relinquishment of parental rights 14; the question is whether the
parent was capable of understanding the meaning, design, and
effect of the act of relinquishment. 15
Leonard, Tripp, and Johnson all testified as to their obser-
vations that Leah understood the meaning, design, and effect
of her act of signing the relinquishment. Leonard testified he
had extensive conversations and consultations with Leah and
was confident that Leah understood the implications of a relin-
quishment and that she did not require a guardian ad litem.
Tripp also consulted with Leah regularly and, although he was
aware of her mild cognitive functioning issues, he expressed no
concerns that Leah did not fully understand the consequences
of the relinquishment. Tripp did not believe Leah required a
guardian ad litem. Johnson testified she was trained to make
observations related to cognitive abilities and indicated she
would not have recommended accepting Leah’s relinquishment
if there had been any concerns.
Leah told Johnson during the questionnaire process that she
understood her relinquishment could not be revoked and that
it involved the complete loss of all rights and responsibilities
relating to Jordon. Leah herself testified at the hearing that she
had the same understanding when she executed the relinquish-
ment of her rights to Jordon as she did when she relinquished
her rights to his older siblings and that she had voluntarily
relinquished her rights to her older children with a full under-
standing that she would no longer have any parental rights.
While there was some evidence Leah was upset by her father’s
and stepmother’s actions after they adopted her two older chil-
dren, there was no evidence Leah experienced a level of trauma
from the past relinquishments that rendered her incapable of
acting knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily in executing her
relinquishment of her parental rights to Jordon.
14 See Marston v. Drobny, 166 Neb. 747, 90 N.W.2d 408 (1958).
15 See, In re Estate of Disney, 250 Neb. 703, 550 N.W.2d 919 (1996);
Marston v. Drobny, supra note 14.

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[12-14] Likewise, the juvenile court did not err in finding
that Leah failed to prove threats, coercion, fraud, or duress
invalidated her relinquishment. To constitute duress, there must
be an application of such pressure or constraint as compels a
person to go against that person’s will and takes away that per-
son’s free agency, destroying the power of refusing to comply
with the unjust demands of another. 16 Stress alone, whether
financial or personal, does not rise to the level of duress that
would negate a valid relinquishment. 17 Threats are closely
related to duress and must be sufficient to “‘overcome the
mind and will of an ordinary man.’” 18 A threat to do what one
has a legal right to do cannot constitute duress. 19
[15,16] Coercion has been described by this court as a social
or domestic force exerted on a party, which is not sufficient to
amount to duress but controls the free action of that party’s will
and prevents voluntary action in the making of a contract. 20
What constitutes fraud is a matter of fact in each case and may
consist of either fraud in the inducement or fraud in the execu-
tion, through words, acts, or the suppression of material facts
with the intent to mislead and deceive. 21
It is clear from the court’s order that it accepted Allen’s,
Rita’s, and Allen’s mother’s versions of events over Leah’s
claims of abuse, threats, and false promises. In other words,
the juvenile court found that no one threatened, promised,
deceived, or otherwise overcame Leah’s free agency to induce
her to sign the relinquishment. We will defer to the juvenile
16 See Haumont v. Security State Bank, 220 Neb. 809, 374 N.W.2d 2 (1985).
17 Hensman v. Parsons, 235 Neb. 872, 458 N.W.2d 199 (1990).
18 Unangst v. Southwick, 80 Neb. 112, 118, 113 N.W. 989, 992 (1907),
modified on rehearing 80 Neb. 119, 116 N.W. 864 (1908). See, also,
Farmers State Bank v. Dowler, 112 Neb. 262, 199 N.W. 528 (1924).
19 Malec v. ASCAP, 146 Neb. 358, 19 N.W.2d 540 (1945).
20 See Hartnett v. Hartnett, 42 Neb. 23, 60 N.W. 362 (1894).
21 See, Cullinane v. Beverly Enters. - Neb., 300 Neb. 210, 912 N.W.2d 774
(2018); Peter v. Peter, 262 Neb. 1017, 637 N.W.2d 865 (2002).

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court’s credibility determinations for these witnesses, 22 giv-
ing weight to the fact that the judge heard and observed the
witnesses and accepted one version of the facts rather than
another. 23
[17,18] Further, as the juvenile court noted, even if Rita had
made promises of continued contact that she has not honored,
noncompliance with communication and contact agreements in
any form is not an invalidating condition of a relinquishment of
parental rights. 24 Thus, noncompliance with any communica-
tion and contact agreements may not be the basis for revoking
a relinquishment to DHHS. 25
[19] The facts of this case share some similarities to those
presented in Auman v. Toomey, 26 wherein we affirmed the
lower court’s determination that a biological mother’s relin-
quishment of parental rights and consent to adoption of her
22-month-old child was valid. The mother had initiated the
process of relinquishment and told the attorney who was repre-
senting the prospective adoptive couple that she had been con-
sidering relinquishing her parental rights for some time. She
was repeatedly advised that signing the relinquishment would
deprive her of all rights to the child and that it was final and
irrevocable. She was also advised of the availability of foster
care, which she rejected as unworkable, as well as her right to
an attorney. She appeared coherent and participated actively
in the meetings with the attorney about the relinquishment.
After the mother relinquished her parental rights, her parents
voiced their opposition and offered to take the child for 5 years
to allow the mother and the child’s biological father to work
22 See Tegra Corp. v. Boeshart, 317 Neb. 100, 8 N.W.3d 786 (2024).
23 See Perkins v. RMR Building Group, supra note 4.
24 See Maria T. v. Jeremy S., 300 Neb. 563, 915 N.W.2d 441 (2018). See,
also, Neb. Rev. Stat. §§ 43-162 to 43-166 (Reissue 2016 & Cum. Supp.
2024).
25 See id.
26 Auman v. Toomey, 220 Neb. 70, 368 N.W.2d 459 (1985).

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out their problems, and the mother attempted to revoke her
relinquishment. At the trial in her action for a writ of habeas
corpus, the mother’s therapist testified that the mother had
impaired judgment and was unable to correctly assess the con-
sequences of her actions when she signed the relinquishment.
Furthermore, the mother testified she believed she had 2 weeks
after signing the relinquishment to change her mind. She also
described financial stress and a lack of support from the child’s
father. We found that the evidence showed the mother changed
her mind and succumbed to the influence of relatives only after
the relinquishment had been signed. And we held that a change
of attitude subsequent to signing a relinquishment is insuffi-
cient to invalidate it. 27
Leah proposed the idea of relinquishment and insisted on
proceeding with the relinquishment process, despite contrary
advice. She did not seek to invalidate her relinquishment of
parental rights until approximately 6 months after she signed
it. Even then, she did not wish to regain custody. Rather, she
sought to regain her parental rights to facilitate a change of
placement due to a change of attitude toward her family mem-
bers and Rita.
The evidence supports the conclusion that Leah had a change
of attitude subsequent to the relinquishment. Leah did not
prove by clear and convincing evidence that the relinquishment
was the product of threats, coercion, fraud, or duress.
VI. CONCLUSION
Because Leah failed to prove her relinquishment was invalid,
we affirm the order of the juvenile court.
Affirmed.
27 Id. See, also, Monty S. & Teresa S. v. Jason W. & Rebecca W., supra note
5.