Martinez v. Jensen

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Nebraska Supreme Court Advance Sheets
320 Nebraska Reports
MARTINEZ v. JENSEN
Cite as 320 Neb. 996
Mark Martinez, applicant, v. Danielle Jensen, in
her official capacity as Douglas County
election commissioner, respondent, and
the Douglas County Republican
Party, intervenor.
___ N.W.3d ___
Filed March 18, 2026. 	No. S-26-193.
Special proceeding before William B. Cassel, Justice of the
Nebraska Supreme Court. Judgment entered.
Daniel J. Gutman and Shayna Prickett, of Gutman Law
Group, for applicant.
Michael T. Hilgers, Attorney General, Cody S. Barnett,
Zachary B. Pohlman, Donald W. Kleine, Douglas County
Attorney, Timothy M. Coffey, and William E. Rooney III, for
respondent.
Andrew La Grone, of La Grone Slama, L.L.C., for intervenor.
Cassel, J.
INTRODUCTION
As authorized by Neb. Rev. Stat. § 32-624 (Supp. 2025),
this is a special, summary proceeding before a judge of the
Nebraska Supreme Court. When an objection to a candidate
filing form is made and the filing officer has determined the
validity of the objection, an application can be made to a judge
of, among other identified courts, the Supreme Court. 1
1 See § 32-624.
Nebraska Supreme Court Online Library
www.nebraska.gov/apps-courts-epub/
10/18/2026 12:55 AM CDT

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Nebraska Supreme Court Advance Sheets
320 Nebraska Reports
MARTINEZ v. JENSEN
Cite as 320 Neb. 996
Because the deadline for disposition of an objection to
the ballot for the May 2026 primary election is March 18, 2
this proceeding has been expedited. The respondent has filed
a nearly instantaneous response and, through counsel, has
waived service of process. At the same time, the objector
below has intervened in support of the action taken there.
The question presented is whether a candidate for county
sheriff 	who 	possesses 	an 	inactive 	law 	enforcement 	offi-
cer certificate issued by the Nebraska Commission on Law
Enforcement and Criminal Justice satisfies the requirements
of Neb. Rev. Stat. § 23-1701.01(1) (Cum. Supp. 2024).
Because the plain language of the unambiguous statute does
not distinguish between an active and inactive certificate, I
conclude that Mark Martinez satisfies its candidacy require-
ments. Accordingly, Martinez’ name shall be included on
the ballot.
BACKGROUND
Statute on Sheriff Candidates
Section 23-1701.01 addresses qualifications for a candidate
for the office of sheriff. It provides, in relevant part:
(1) Any candidate for the office of sheriff and any
sheriff appointed under subsection (3) of section 23-1701
shall possess a law enforcement officer certificate or
diploma issued by the Nebraska Commission on Law
Enforcement and Criminal Justice. A standardized letter
issued by the director of the Nebraska Law Enforcement
Training Center certifying that the candidate or appointee
was duly issued such certificate or diploma shall be filed
by a candidate with the candidate filing form required
by section 32-607 and by an appointee with the contract
entered into under section 23-1701.
(2) Each sheriff shall attend the Sheriff’s Certification
Course conducted by the Nebraska Law Enforcement
2 See § 32-624(2) (55 days before primary election date).

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Nebraska Supreme Court Advance Sheets
320 Nebraska Reports
MARTINEZ v. JENSEN
Cite as 320 Neb. 996
Training Center and obtain a certificate awarded by the
Nebraska Commission on Law Enforcement and Criminal
Justice . . . unless such sheriff has already been awarded
a certificate by the commission attesting to satisfactory
completion of such course . . . .
(3) Each sheriff shall attend continuing education as
provided in section 81-1414.07 each year following the
first year of such sheriff’s term of office. 3
This proceeding focuses on the italicized language.
Facts
On the record before me, the relevant facts are undisputed.
Martinez submitted a “Democratic Filing” requesting that
his name be placed on the official ballot for the May 12, 2026,
election as a candidate for the office of Douglas County sher-
iff. Martinez also submitted a letter from the director of the
Nebraska Law Enforcement Training Center certifying that
Martinez “possesses an Inactive Nebraska Law Enforcement
Certificate.” According to the letter, Martinez’ certification
was active from November 27, 1984, to March 6, 2009.
The Douglas County Republican Party (county party) filed
an objection to Martinez’ candidacy under § 32-624. It high-
lighted that Martinez’ certificate had been inactive since
2009 and asserted that Martinez would have to complete full
basic certification training—like a new recruit—to possess an
active certification.
The county party attached to its objection a memorandum
that contained a legal analysis concluding that Martinez was
not qualified to run for Douglas County sheriff due to his inac-
tive law enforcement certificate. The memorandum set forth
two arguments. One asserted that § 23-1701.01(1) was ambig-
uous because it was open to two possible interpretations, i.e.,
that a sheriff candidate must possess an active law enforce-
ment certificate at the time of filing and that the candidate
3 § 23-1701.01 (emphasis supplied).

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Nebraska Supreme Court Advance Sheets
320 Nebraska Reports
MARTINEZ v. JENSEN
Cite as 320 Neb. 996
may meet the requirements by possessing an inactive certifi-
cate. The other, premised upon the statute’s purported ambigu-
ity, relied on legislative history and statements to the effect
that a candidate for sheriff needed to have an active certificate
when filing to run for office.
The county party also included a letter written by the intro-
ducer of a 2024 legislative bill addressing the certification
requirement. The letter stated, in part, “In 2024, I introduced
LB 894 which requires a candidate running for the office of
County Sheriff to be a certified law enforcement officer when
filing for the position.”
On Friday, March 13, 2026, Danielle Jensen, the Douglas
County 	election 	commissioner 	(commissioner), 	informed
Martinez of her decision regarding the objection. She deter-
mined that Martinez “d[id] not meet the candidacy require-
ments for Douglas County Sheriff.”
Application and Petition
On Monday, March 16, 2026, Martinez filed an emergency
application for leave to commence a special proceeding under
§ 32-624. It observed that because the primary election in
Douglas County is May 12, any order by a judge must be
made on or before March 18—the “fifty-fifth day preceding
the election.” 4 The application was granted, and the special
proceeding was docketed.
With the application, Martinez submitted an emergency
verified petition for a special proceeding and summary order.
He requested an order overruling the commissioner’s decision,
compelling her to place Martinez’ name on the general election
ballot for the office of Douglas County sheriff, and awarding
him costs of this action.
Response and Intervention
The commissioner concentrates on the first sentence of
§ 23-1701.01(1), focusing on the verb “possess” and the noun
4 § 32-624(2).

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Nebraska Supreme Court Advance Sheets
320 Nebraska Reports
MARTINEZ v. JENSEN
Cite as 320 Neb. 996
phrase “law enforcement officer certificate.” She relies on
a legal dictionary definition of “possess,” which states, “To
have in one’s actual control; to have possession of.” 5 The
commissioner argues that “[a] credential previously held but
no longer legally operative is not ‘possessed’ within the ordi-
nary meaning of the term.” 6 She contends that this reading
is reinforced by the noun phrase and points to a definition
of “certificate” in a legal dictionary. That term is defined as
“[a] document certifying the bearer’s status or authorization
to act in a specified way; esp., an official paper stating that
one has completed a course of study or passed an examination
. . . .” 7 According to the commissioner, “[A] certificate does
more than record a past event—it certifies present status or
authorization.” 8 Reading these definitions together, the com-
missioner argues that § 23-1701.01(1) requires that a candi-
date for sheriff must hold a certificate that authorizes him or
her to act as a law enforcement officer when he or she files
for office.
The 	county 	party 	filed 	a 	complaint 	in 	intervention. 	It
asserted that it was an interested party within the meaning
of § 32-624(2). The county party opposed Martinez’ petition,
arguing that the controlling statute is ambiguous and that leg-
islative history showed a clear intent to require an active law
enforcement certificate in order to file as a candidate for sher-
iff. The county party asserts that in the context of law enforce-
ment licensure, “it is not clear whether an inactive certificate is
sufficient, or whether an active certificate is required.” Relying
on the legislative history of 2024 Neb. Laws, L.B. 894, the
county party asserts that it shows the Legislature intended
sheriff candidates to have active certificates when they file to
run for office.
5 Black’s Law Dictionary 1407 (12th ed. 2024).
6 Response of respondent at 7.
7 Black’s Law Dictionary 279 (12th ed. 2024).
8 Response of respondent at 7.

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Nebraska Supreme Court Advance Sheets
320 Nebraska Reports
MARTINEZ v. JENSEN
Cite as 320 Neb. 996
Analysis
At issue is whether Martinez qualified to be a candidate for
the office of sheriff under § 23-1701.01(1). The issue involves
statutory interpretation, which presents a question of law. 9
Because this statute pertains to election law, I bear in mind
that statutes relating to election law must be liberally con-
strued so as to promote, rather than defeat, candidacy for the
primary election. 10
The fundamental objective of statutory interpretation is to
ascertain and carry out the Legislature’s intent. 11 Statutory
interpretation begins with the text, and the text is to be given
its plain and ordinary meaning. 12 It is not within the province
of a court to read a meaning into a statute that is not war-
ranted by the language; neither is it within the province of a
court to read anything plain, direct, or unambiguous out of
a statute. 13
For the sake of completeness, I acknowledge other prin-
ciples of statutory interpretation. In construing a statute, the
legislative intention is to be determined from a general con-
sideration of the whole act with reference to the subject matter
to which it applies and the particular topic under which the
language in question is found, and the intent as deduced from
the whole will prevail over that of a particular part considered
separately. 14 Statutes pertaining to the same subject matter
should be construed together; such statutes, being in pari
materia, must be construed as if they were one law, and effect
must be given to every provision. 15 To give effect to all parts
9 See Flinn v. Strode, ante p. 813, 30 N.W.3d 661 (2026).
10 See, Nebraska Republican Party v. Shively, 311 Neb. 160, 971 N.W.2d 128
(2022); Davis v. Gale, 299 Neb. 377, 908 N.W.2d 618 (2018).
11 Flinn v. Strode, supra note 9.
12 Id.
13 Id.
14 Id.
15 Id.

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Nebraska Supreme Court Advance Sheets
320 Nebraska Reports
MARTINEZ v. JENSEN
Cite as 320 Neb. 996
of a statute, a court will attempt to reconcile different provi-
sions so they are consistent, harmonious, and sensible and
will avoid rejecting as superfluous or meaningless any word,
clause, or sentence. 16
I return to the statutory requirements regarding a certificate.
One comes from the first sentence of § 23-1701.01(1), and the
other from its second sentence.
The first sentence requires that “[a]ny candidate for the
office of sheriff . . . shall possess a law enforcement officer
certificate . . . issued by the Nebraska Commission on Law
Enforcement and Criminal Justice.” 17 Martinez possesses a
law enforcement officer certificate. The commissioner and
the county party would have me insert the word “active” in
the first sentence’s noun phrase. I have already recited the prin-
ciple that precludes me from doing so.
The second sentence mandates that the candidate file “[a]
standardized letter issued by the director of the Nebraska Law
Enforcement Training Center certifying that the candidate . . .
was duly issued such certificate.” 18 Martinez submitted such
a letter. The arguments advanced by the commissioner and
the county party implicitly disregard the backward-looking
function of the certification. If the director agreed that such
certifications applied only to active certificates, presumably
he would have declined to issue the letter certifying issuance
of the certificate. But the director did issue the letter. This
demonstrates a rejection of the commissioner’s and the county
party’s premise.
The commissioner and the county party also rely on leg-
islative history. In order for a court to inquire into a statute’s
legislative history, the statute in question must be open to
construction, and a statute is open to construction when its
16 Id.
17 § 23-1701.01(1).
18 Id.

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Nebraska Supreme Court Advance Sheets
320 Nebraska Reports
MARTINEZ v. JENSEN
Cite as 320 Neb. 996
terms require interpretation or may reasonably be considered
ambiguous. 19 A statute is ambiguous if it is susceptible of more
than one reasonable interpretation, meaning that a court could
reasonably interpret the statute either way; otherwise, the stat-
ute is unambiguous. 20
But here, the language of the statute is plain. It does not
distinguish between an active or inactive certificate. It merely
requires that the candidate “possess” a certificate. I decline to
rely upon legislative history where a party urges me to detect
ambiguity by initially resorting to legislative history. That
places the cart before the horse. Because there is no statutory
ambiguity, there is no reason to consider legislative history. 21
Likewise, I see no reason to consult regulations establishing
“definitions and criteria for different statuses regarding law
enforcement certification.” 22 Where a statute is unambiguous,
a regulation plays no role in its interpretation. 23
CONCLUSION
Like the situation in a similar ballot qualification case, 24
I address only the statutory qualification to be placed on the
ballot. Whether to support a candidate lacking an active certi-
fication status is for the electorate to decide.
I emphasize that nothing in this opinion would preclude any
other challenge to candidacy or eligibility to assume public
office. Nor should anything be taken to suggest that any other
challenge is viable.
19 Amorak v. Cherry Cty. Bd. of Comrs., 318 Neb. 723, 18 N.W.3d 782
(2025).
20 Nebraska Journalism Trust v. Dept. of Envt. & Energy, 316 Neb. 174, 3
N.W.3d 361 (2024).
21 See Amorak v. Cherry Cty. Bd. of Comrs., supra note 19.
22 See 79 Neb. Admin. Code, ch. 4, § 001 (2025).
23 See Beatrice Manor v. Department of Health, 219 Neb. 141, 362 N.W.2d
45 (1985).
24 See Nebraska Republican Party v. Shively, supra note 10.

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Nebraska Supreme Court Advance Sheets
320 Nebraska Reports
MARTINEZ v. JENSEN
Cite as 320 Neb. 996
I conclude that because Martinez possesses a law enforce-
ment certification, he meets the qualification requirements
of § 23-1701.01(1) to be a candidate for election as sheriff.
Accordingly, I order that his name appear on the ballot as a
candidate for the office of sheriff subject to the operation of
Neb. Rev. Stat. § 32-811(1)(b) (Supp. 2025).
Judgment entered.