In re Interest of Johnny H.

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Nebraska Supreme Court Advance Sheets
320 Nebraska Reports
IN RE INTEREST OF JOHNNY H.
Cite as 320 Neb. 675
In re Interest of Johnny H., a child
under 18 years of age.
State of Nebraska, appellee, v.
Johnny H., appellant.
___ N.W.3d ___
Filed January 16, 2026. 	Nos. S-25-137 through S-25-141.
1. Statutes: Appeal and Error. Statutory interpretation presents a ques-
tion of law which an appellate court reviews independently of the lower
court.
2. Juvenile Courts: Appeal and Error. Ordinarily, an appellate court
reviews juvenile cases de novo on the record and reaches a conclusion
independent of the juvenile court’s findings.
3. ____: ____. A juvenile court’s determination of amenability under Neb.
Rev. Stat. § 43-2,106.03 (Reissue 2016) involves the sort of broad
discretion that warrants appellate review de novo on the record for an
abuse of discretion.
4. Juvenile Courts: Jurisdiction: Appeal and Error. In a juvenile case,
as in any other appeal, before reaching the legal issues presented for
review, it is the duty of an appellate court to determine whether it has
jurisdiction over the matter before it.
5. Juvenile Courts: Appeal and Error. In juvenile cases, the determina-
tion of appealability is a fact-intensive inquiry.
6. Final Orders: Words and Phrases. A substantial right is an essential
legal right, not a mere technical right.
7. Final Orders. It is not enough that the right itself be substantial; the
effect of the order on that right must also be substantial.
8. Final Orders: Appeal and Error. Whether the effect of an order is
substantial depends on whether it affects with finality the rights of the
parties in the subject matter.
9. Statutes: Appeal and Error. When construing a statute, a court’s analy-
sis always begins with the text; statutory language is given its plain and
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Nebraska Supreme Court Advance Sheets
320 Nebraska Reports
IN RE INTEREST OF JOHNNY H.
Cite as 320 Neb. 675
ordinary meaning, and an appellate court will not resort to interpretation
to ascertain the meaning of statutory words which are plain, direct, and
unambiguous.
10. Statutes: Legislature: Intent. Courts must determine and give effect
to the purpose and intent of the Legislature as ascertained from the
entire language of the statute considered in its plain, ordinary, and popu-
lar sense.
11. ____: ____: ____. It is the court’s duty to discover, if possible, legisla-
tive intent from the statute itself.
12. Statutes: Intent. A court must look at the statutory objective to be
accomplished, the problem to be remedied, or the purpose to be served,
and then place on the statute a reasonable construction which best
achieves its purpose.
13. Juvenile Courts: Minors. Because the foremost purpose and objective
of the Nebraska Juvenile Code is to promote and protect the juvenile’s
best interests, statutes under the juvenile code must be liberally con-
strued to serve the best interests of the juveniles who fall within it.
14. Statutes: Legislature: Intent. The primary source of insight into the
intent of the Legislature is the language of the statute.
15. Courts: Prosecuting Attorneys: Minors. The primary purpose of Neb.
Rev. Stat. § 43-2,106.03 (Reissue 2016) is to provide prosecutors and
courts with predictive information to consider when making future fil-
ing, charging, and transfer decisions involving the juvenile.
16. Juvenile Courts: Minors: Words and Phrases. The plain and ordi-
nary meaning of the term “amenability” as used in Neb. Rev. Stat.
§ 43-2,106.03 (Reissue 2016) refers to the likelihood that a particular
juvenile will respond effectively in the future to the type of rehabilita-
tive services that can be provided under the Nebraska Juvenile Code.
Relatedly, the phrase “a juvenile who is not amenable to rehabilitative
services” refers to a juvenile who, based on the evidence presented, is
unlikely to respond effectively in the future to the rehabilitative services
that can be provided under the juvenile code.
17. Juvenile Courts: Pleadings: Proof: Minors. When the State files a
motion under Neb. Rev. Stat. § 43-2,106.03 (Reissue 2016) requesting
a finding that a juvenile is not amenable to rehabilitative services, the
State bears the burden of proving nonamenability.
18. Courts: Statutes: Proof. Absent statutory language requiring a differ-
ent standard of proof, Nebraska courts in civil cases generally apply the
preponderance standard.
19. Juvenile Courts: Proof: Minors. In hearings pursuant to Neb. Rev.
Stat. § 43-2,106.03 (Reissue 2016), a juvenile’s amenability to rehabili-
tative services must be established by a preponderance of the evidence.

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Nebraska Supreme Court Advance Sheets
320 Nebraska Reports
IN RE INTEREST OF JOHNNY H.
Cite as 320 Neb. 675
20. Judgments: Words and Phrases. An abuse of discretion occurs when a
trial court’s decision is based upon reasons that are untenable or unrea-
sonable or if its action is clearly against justice or conscience, reason,
and evidence.
21. Juvenile Courts: Appeal and Error. When reviewing a juvenile court’s
decision de novo on the record for an abuse of discretion, if the evidence
is in conflict, an appellate court may give weight to the fact that the
juvenile court observed the witnesses and accepted one version of facts
over the other.
22. Constitutional Law: Juvenile Courts: Statutes: Legislature. Pursuant
to Neb. Const. art. V, § 27, the juvenile court is a statutorily created tri-
bunal established by the Legislature with such powers as the Legislature
may provide.
23. Juvenile Courts: Statutes: Jurisdiction. As a statutorily created court
of limited jurisdiction, a juvenile court has only the authority conferred
upon it by statute.
24. Juvenile Courts: Statutes: Jurisdiction: Appeal and Error. When
considering whether a juvenile court acted within its authority, an appel-
late court will look to the authority conferred by statute.
25. Juvenile Courts: Probation and Parole. Once a juvenile court enters a
dispositional order of probation, it is not authorized to change the terms
or conditions of probation unless the applicable statutory procedures
are followed.
26. Juvenile Courts: Statutes: Jurisdiction: Probation and Parole. There
is no express statutory authority in the Nebraska Juvenile Code for
a juvenile court to terminate probation or jurisdiction based solely
on a finding of nonamenability under Neb. Rev. Stat. § 43-2,106.03
(Reissue 2016).
27. Statutes. It is not within the province of the courts to read meaning
into a statute that is not there or to read anything direct and plain out of
a statute.
Appeals from the Separate Juvenile Court of Sarpy County:
Jonathon D. Crosby, Judge. Affirmed in part, and in part
vacated and remanded for further proceedings.
Todd A. West, Sarpy County Public Defender, and Dennis P.
Marks for appellant.
Andrew T. Erickson, Deputy Sarpy County Attorney, for
appellee.

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Nebraska Supreme Court Advance Sheets
320 Nebraska Reports
IN RE INTEREST OF JOHNNY H.
Cite as 320 Neb. 675
Funke, C.J., Cassel, Stacy, Papik, Freudenberg, and
Bergevin, JJ., and Welch, Judge.
Stacy, J.
In five different cases, the separate juvenile court of Sarpy
County entered postdispositional orders pursuant to Neb. Rev.
Stat. § 43-2,106.03 (Reissue 2016), finding that an adjudicated
juvenile was not amenable to rehabilitative services and further
ordering that the juvenile’s probation and the court’s jurisdic-
tion be “terminated unsuccessfully.”
In these consolidated appeals, the juvenile challenges the
court’s finding of nonamenability under § 43-2,106.03 and its
termination of probation and jurisdiction based on that find-
ing. For reasons we will explain, we affirm the juvenile court’s
finding of nonamenability but conclude it was plain error for
the juvenile court to change the dispositional orders based
solely on such finding. We therefore affirm the orders in part,
and in part vacate the orders and remand the causes to the juve-
nile court for further proceedings.
I. BACKGROUND
Johnny H. was born in 2007. At the age of 14, he was
adjudicated in a truancy case and subsequently placed on an
indefinite term of probation. In the years that followed, he was
adjudicated in four separately docketed delinquency cases and
was placed on indefinite terms of probation in each case. It
does not appear from the appellate record that Johnny appealed
from any of the original dispositional orders.
In January 2025, while Johnny was still on juvenile proba-
tion in all five cases, the State filed a felony criminal complaint
against him in the county court for Sarpy County, charging
attempted robbery. One week later, the State filed identical
motions in all five pending juvenile cases. The motions sought
a finding, pursuant to § 43-2,106.03, that Johnny was not ame-
nable to rehabilitative services available under the Nebraska
Juvenile Code. The motions also asked the court to “terminate
jurisdiction [in each juvenile case] as unsuccessful.”

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Nebraska Supreme Court Advance Sheets
320 Nebraska Reports
IN RE INTEREST OF JOHNNY H.
Cite as 320 Neb. 675
Section 43-2,106.03 provides:
Any time after the disposition of a juvenile described in
subdivision (1), (2), (3)(b), or (4) of section 43-247, upon
the motion of any party or the court on its own motion,
a hearing may be held regarding the amenability of the
juvenile to the rehabilitative services that can be provided
under the Nebraska Juvenile Code. The court may enter
an order, based upon evidence presented at the hearing,
finding that a juvenile is not amenable to rehabilitative
services that can be provided under the Nebraska Juvenile
Code. The reasons for such a finding shall be stated
in the order. Such an order shall be considered by the
county attorney in making a future determination under
section 43-276 regarding such juvenile and by the court
when considering a future transfer motion under section
29-1816 or 43-274 or any future charge or petition
regarding such juvenile.
1. Nonamenability Hearing
On January 31, 2025, the juvenile court held a consolidated
hearing on the State’s § 43-2,106.03 motions. The only wit-
ness called by the State was Johnny’s probation officer, who
testified about the rehabilitative services Johnny had been pro-
vided over the years, how Johnny responded to those services,
and which community-based services remained available to
Johnny. The court also received into evidence selected plead-
ings, orders, evaluations, and reports from all five of Johnny’s
juvenile court cases, as well as a certified copy of the felony
criminal complaint and the affidavit of probable cause filed in
the county court. We summarize that evidence in the sections
that follow.
(a) Truancy Adjudication
In June 2022, a juvenile petition was filed against Johnny
in the Sarpy County Separate Juvenile Court alleging he was
habitually truant from school. Johnny admitted the allegations

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Nebraska Supreme Court Advance Sheets
320 Nebraska Reports
IN RE INTEREST OF JOHNNY H.
Cite as 320 Neb. 675
and was adjudicated under Neb. Rev. Stat. § 43-247(3)(b)
(Reissue 2016). After a dispositional hearing, he was placed on
juvenile probation “for an open ended period of time” and was
ordered to participate in rehabilitative services, including indi-
vidual therapy, cooperating with a community youth coach,
and participating in prosocial activities. He was also ordered
to “attend school daily, without unexcused absences or tardies,
work to his potential,[] display appropriate behavior and coop-
erate with informal supports the faculty find necessary to help
him be successful.”
(b) Theft Adjudication
In December 2023, while Johnny was still on probation
in the truancy case, a delinquency petition was filed in the
Douglas County Separate Juvenile Court alleging two counts.
The first count alleged Johnny committed an act which would
constitute assault in the third degree, and the second count
alleged he had committed an act which would constitute theft
by unlawful taking in an amount less than $500. In February
2024, Johnny admitted the theft allegation and, pursuant to
a plea agreement, the assault allegation was dismissed. He
was adjudicated pursuant to § 43-247(1), and the case was
transferred to the Sarpy County juvenile court. After a dis-
positional hearing, Johnny was placed on probation “for an
open ended period of time” and was ordered to comply with
the probation order in the truancy case. He was also ordered
to complete summer school and to complete an anger manage-
ment program.
(c) Assault Adjudication
In July 2024, another juvenile petition was filed in the
Douglas County Separate Juvenile Court alleging Johnny had
committed an act which would constitute assault in the third
degree by mutual consent. Johnny was adjudicated pursuant
to § 43-247(1) (Cum. Supp. 2024), and the case was trans-
ferred to the Sarpy County juvenile court. After a disposi-
tional hearing, the juvenile court ordered Johnny to remain on

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Nebraska Supreme Court Advance Sheets
320 Nebraska Reports
IN RE INTEREST OF JOHNNY H.
Cite as 320 Neb. 675
probation “for an open ended period of time” and to comply
with all previous probationary orders.
(d) Second Theft Adjudication
In August 2024, another juvenile petition was filed in the
Sarpy County Separate Juvenile Court alleging Johnny had
committed an act which would constitute burglary and an
act which would constitute theft by unlawful taking ($500 to
$1,500). Prior to adjudication, the court ordered that Johnny
be detained at the Juvenile Justice Center in Sarpy County,
Nebraska, “until further order of the Court,” based on a find-
ing that “the physical safety of persons within the community
would be seriously threatened if he were not detained today.”
In September 2024, Johnny was released from the Juvenile
Justice Center and placed in a shelter, but he lost that place-
ment 1 week later when he was cited for a new law violation.
As an alternative to detention, Johnny was released to his
father and placed in the custody of the Sarpy County sheriff for
participation in the “C.A.R.E.” program.
At Johnny’s adjudication hearing in November 2024, he
admitted the theft allegation, and the State dismissed the bur-
glary allegation pursuant to a plea agreement. Johnny was
adjudicated pursuant to § 43-247(2), and, after a dispositional
hearing, he was ordered to remain on juvenile probation “for
an open ended period of time,” subject to the terms and condi-
tions of the prior probationary orders.
(e) Robbery Adjudication
In October 2024, a petition was filed in the Sarpy County
Separate Juvenile Court alleging Johnny had committed an
act which would constitute the felony of robbery. Johnny
admitted the allegations and was adjudicated pursuant to
§ 43-247(2). After a dispositional hearing, the court ordered
that Johnny continue on probation “for an open ended period
of time,” subject to the terms and conditions of the prior proba-
tionary orders.

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Nebraska Supreme Court Advance Sheets
320 Nebraska Reports
IN RE INTEREST OF JOHNNY H.
Cite as 320 Neb. 675
(f) Probation Revocation
In October 2024, the State filed a motion to revoke proba-
tion or change the disposition previously ordered in at least
one of the pending cases, alleging that Johnny had violated
the probation order by receiving a citation for “refusing to
comply with a lawful order” and “getting into an altercation
with another youth and assaulting a staff member in the pro-
cess.” Johnny admitted the allegations of an amended motion
to revoke, and the court accepted his admission and found
he had violated his probation. After a dispositional hearing
in December 2024, the court found “the best interests of the
juvenile herein would be served by said juvenile remaining
placed on probation,” and it ordered Johnny to continue on
probation “subject to previous terms and conditions . . . for an
open ended period of time.”
(g) Felony Criminal Case
In 	January 	2025, 	the 	State 	filed 	a 	criminal 	complaint
against Johnny in the county court for Sarpy County, charging
attempted robbery. The affidavit of probable cause stated that
on December 31, 2024, a 17-year-old victim was approached
at a party by another juvenile, identified as Johnny, who
demanded $20. When the victim refused, Johnny demanded
the victim’s coat and neck chain. When the victim again
refused, Johnny struck the victim multiple times in the face
and continued to hit and kick the victim after he fell to the
ground. The victim sustained significant bruising and swelling
to his face, eyes, and nose.
Johnny was detained in the Juvenile Justice Center on
the felony charge, but he bonded out and was again placed
in the C.A.R.E. program as an alternative to detention. The
current status of his felony case is not reflected in the appel-
late record.
(h) Probation Officer’s Testimony
Johnny’s juvenile probation officer, Nathan Bohy, was the
only witness to testify at the January 31, 2025, hearing on

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Nebraska Supreme Court Advance Sheets
320 Nebraska Reports
IN RE INTEREST OF JOHNNY H.
Cite as 320 Neb. 675
the State’s § 43-2,106.03 motions. In addition to the evidence
described above, Bohy summarized the rehabilitative services
provided to Johnny in juvenile court since 2022 and Johnny’s
response to those services. The court made an express finding
that Bohy’s testimony was credible.
Bohy 	testified 	that 	out-of-home 	placements 	had 	been
explored but that multiple shelter placements had been denied
because of Johnny’s criminal charges and his aggressive
behaviors. Regarding compliance with the terms and condi-
tions of his probation, Bohy also testified that Johnny had not
completed the anger management program, explaining that he
was removed from the program for lack of attendance, but
was scheduled to restart the program in February 2025 “if
he’s still on probation.” Johnny had been ordered to attend
therapy throughout his time on probation, but his attendance
at therapy was “sporadic.”
Bohy acknowledged that Johnny had complied with some
conditions of his probation, noting that he successfully com-
pleted meetings with two community youth coaches and regu-
larly engaged in two prosocial activities: boxing and football.
Bohy also testified that when Johnny started juvenile proba-
tion, his school credits were significantly deficient but that at
the time of the hearing, he was almost up to grade level and
was on track to graduate from high school.
In sum, Bohy testified that Johnny had completed some
probation conditions but had failed to complete others. And
he testified that while on probation and receiving services,
Johnny continued to violate the law and pick up criminal
charges, noting that after successfully completing the C.A.R.E.
program on December 2, 2024, he picked up new criminal
charges less than 1 month later. And although Johnny’s school
attendance had improved, he was frequently late and was serv-
ing a suspension at the time of the hearing.
Bohy was asked if there were “any other services that you
believe that we could attempt with Johnny . . . that he would be
amenable to?” Bohy replied that the only services “left on the

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Nebraska Supreme Court Advance Sheets
320 Nebraska Reports
IN RE INTEREST OF JOHNNY H.
Cite as 320 Neb. 675
table that Johnny has not been a part of would be in-home ser-
vices through Boys Town or [multi-systemic therapy],” which
Bohy described as “kind of the last effort to keep the youth in
the community and in the home environment.” But Bohy testi-
fied that he did not think these services would be effective for
Johnny, and he could not think of any additional services that
“would help Johnny to rehabilitate in the Juvenile Court.”
In addition to his testimony, Bohy authored a supervision
report that was received into evidence without objection. Bohy
reported that at the time of the hearing, Johnny was out on
bond in his criminal case and was placed back in the C.A.R.E.
program. Bohy’s report and a memorandum from an employee
of the Juvenile Justice Center indicated Johnny had not pro-
gressed beyond the first level of the program because he was
testing positive for THC and because empty alcohol bottles
and “THC vapes” were found in his bedroom. Bohy’s report
and the memorandum stated that Johnny had been suspended
from school twice in January 2025, receiving a 2-day suspen-
sion for a verbal altercation and a 5-day suspension for leaving
school grounds without permission.
Johnny did not offer any exhibits at the hearing and did not
call any witnesses.
2. Nonamenability Finding and Order
At the conclusion of the evidence, and after considering
the parties’ arguments, the court announced its findings from
the bench and later memorialized those findings in written
orders. Because Johnny challenges the accuracy of some of
the court’s oral remarks, we quote those remarks here before
summarizing the court’s written rulings.
After the court remarked on the felony charge of attempted
robbery that had been filed in the county court, the following
exchange occurred:
THE 	COURT: 	They’re 	allegations. 	You’re 	right,
they’re allegations, but [you’re] charged with robbery in
adult court, a felony. The second felony robbery. We’ve

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Nebraska Supreme Court Advance Sheets
320 Nebraska Reports
IN RE INTEREST OF JOHNNY H.
Cite as 320 Neb. 675
adjudicated 	one 	[robbery] 	here. You 	got 	a 	burglary
charge. Nearly each of your offenses includes crimes of
violence. . . .
Johnny: Yes, sir.
. . . .
THE COURT: This Court is not equipped to respond
to repeated violent behaviors by a 17 and a half year old.
Johnny: Yes, sir.
. . . .
THE COURT: . . . [Y]ou’ve been in Juvenile Court for
over two years. We have exhausted lots of resources. I’m
not convinced that any decision making class will have
any impact on you. You have consistently demonstrated
that you’re going to do what you want to do. When you’re
on [C.A.R.E.] and at home, you’re out and about on the
streets whenever you want to. You continue to break
the law. We had a detention hearing and a disposition
on a motion to revoke your probation in mid November.
Less than six weeks later you’re allegedly involved in
another felony crime involving violence.
So based on your age, being 17 and a half years old,
based on your prior adjudications in this court, based
on the services we’ve already used, and based on the
totality of the circumstances, I’m going to find that
you’re non-amenable to services in the Juvenile Court.
I’m going to terminate your probation, terminate this case
unsuccessfully. Your record will not be sealed.
The court’s oral ruling was memorialized in written orders
entered January 31, 2025, in all five juvenile cases. Those
written orders included the court’s reasons for finding noname-
nability and then ruled as follows:
IT [IS] THEREFORE ORDERED that [Johnny] is non-
amenable to the rehabilitative services of the Nebraska
Code pursuant to . . . §[ ]432,106.03 and the Court hereby
terminates jurisdiction on the above-captioned matters as
unsuccessful.

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320 Nebraska Reports
IN RE INTEREST OF JOHNNY H.
Cite as 320 Neb. 675
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that [Johnny’s] probation
and the jurisdiction of the Court in this matter be and
same is hereby terminated unsuccessfully.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the responsibility
of the probation officer in this matter be and the same is
hereby terminated.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the adjudication
shall not be set aside and [Johnny’s] record in this matter
shall not be sealed at this time.
Johnny filed timely notices of appeal in all five juvenile
cases, and the Nebraska Court of Appeals consolidated the
appeals for briefing and disposition. We moved the consoli-
dated appeals to our docket on our own motion to address sev-
eral issues of first impression relating to the proper construc-
tion and application of § 43-2,106.03.
II. ASSIGNMENTS OF ERROR
Johnny assigns, restated and consolidated, that the juvenile
court erred in (1) finding he was not amenable to rehabilitative
services under the Nebraska Juvenile Code and (2) terminating
probation and jurisdiction based on that finding.
III. STANDARD OF REVIEW
[1] Statutory interpretation presents a question of law which
an appellate court reviews independently of the lower court. 1
[2] Ordinarily, an appellate court reviews juvenile cases de
novo on the record and reaches a conclusion independent of
the juvenile court’s findings. 2 Both parties suggest that is the
standard appellate courts should apply when reviewing a find-
ing of nonamenability under § 43-2,106.03.
But in some juvenile appeals, we have said the proper
standard of review is “de novo on the record for an abuse of
1 State v. Aldana Cardenas, 314 Neb. 544, 990 N.W.2d 915 (2023).
2 In re Interest of Victor L., 309 Neb. 21, 958 N.W.2d 413 (2021). See In re
Interest of Jeovani H., 316 Neb. 723, 6 N.W.3d 539 (2024).

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IN RE INTEREST OF JOHNNY H.
Cite as 320 Neb. 675
discretion.” 3 We have applied that standard of review when
the Legislature has granted the juvenile courts broad discretion
to act or not to act, 4 such as decisions to transfer a juvenile
delinquency case to the county court or district court 5; deter-
minations that a juvenile was denied the statutory right to a
prompt adjudication 6; determinations that a juvenile’s waiver
of counsel was voluntary, knowing, and intelligent 7; and deci-
sions about whether a juvenile petition should be dismissed
because the juvenile lacks competency. 8
[3] Because a juvenile court’s determination of amenability
under § 43-2,106.03 involves the sort of broad discretion that
warrants appellate review de novo on the record for an abuse
of discretion, we apply that standard of review in these consoli-
dated appeals.
IV. ANALYSIS
One of the many statutory factors a court must consider
when determining whether to transfer a case involving a juve-
nile is “whether a juvenile court order has been issued for the
juvenile pursuant to section 43-2,106.03.” 9 Although Nebraska
appellate opinions have often observed that no order pursu-
ant to § 43-2,106.03 had been issued regarding the subject
juvenile, 10 there are no published appellate opinions constru-
ing or applying the provisions of § 43-2,106.03. Because these
3 In re Interest of Victor L., supra note 2, 309 Neb. at 27, 958 N.W.2d at
419.
4 In re Interest of J.K., 265 Neb. 253, 656 N.W.2d 253 (2003).
5 See In re Interest of Steven S., 299 Neb. 447, 908 N.W.2d 391 (2018).
6 See In re Interest of Shaquille H., 285 Neb. 512, 827 N.W.2d 501 (2013).
7 See In re Interest of Dalton S., 273 Neb. 504, 730 N.W.2d 816 (2007).
8 See In re Interest of Victor L., supra note 2.
9 See Neb. Rev. Stat. § 43-276(1)(m) (Cum. Supp. 2024).
10 See, e.g., State v. Jeremiah T., 319 Neb. 133, 21 N.W.3d 313 (2025);
Aldana Cardenas, supra note 1; In re Interest of Steven S., supra note 5;
State v. Hunt, 299 Neb. 573, 909 N.W.2d 363 (2018).

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IN RE INTEREST OF JOHNNY H.
Cite as 320 Neb. 675
consolidated appeals present our first opportunity to con-
sider such orders, we requested supplemental briefing on sev-
eral issues, including: (1) what legal standard juvenile courts
should apply to determine amenability under § 43-2,106.03;
(2) who bears the burden of proof when a motion is made pur-
suant to § 43-2,106.03 and what quantum of proof is required
to carry that burden; and (3) when an order is issued pursu-
ant to § 43-2,106.03 finding that a juvenile is not amenable
to rehabilitative services, is the juvenile court authorized to
change the disposition based on such finding?
We have considered the parties’ supplemental briefing on
these issues of statutory construction, and we address their
arguments later in the opinion. But first, we address our juris-
diction to review the orders from which Johnny has appealed.
1. Appellate Jurisdiction
[4] In a juvenile case, as in any other appeal, before reach-
ing the legal issues presented for review, it is the duty of an
appellate court to determine whether it has jurisdiction over
the matter before it. 11 Here, both parties describe the orders of
nonamenability as “final orders,” 12 but neither party explains
why that is so, and we have not previously addressed the issue.
[5] Neb. Rev. Stat. § 43-2,106.01(1) (Reissue 2016) autho-
rizes appeals from “[a]ny final order or judgment entered
by a juvenile court . . . .” No one contends the orders at
issue rendered a judgment, 13 and because we consistently
describe proceedings before a juvenile court as special pro-
ceedings for appellate purposes, 14 the threshold jurisdictional
11 In re Interest of Jordon B., 316 Neb. 974, 7 N.W.3d 894 (2024).
12 Brief for appellant at 5. See brief for appellee at 4.
13 See Neb. Rev. Stat. § 25-1301(1) and (2) (Cum. Supp. 2024) (defining
“judgment” as “the final determination of the rights of the parties in an
action” and “[r]endition of a judgment” as court’s act of signing “a single
written document stating all of the relief granted or denied in an action”).
14 See, e.g., In re Interest of Victor L., supra note 2; In re Interest of Noah B.
et al., 295 Neb. 764, 891 N.W.2d 109 (2017).

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IN RE INTEREST OF JOHNNY H.
Cite as 320 Neb. 675
question is whether the juvenile court’s orders of nonamena-
bility were orders “affecting a substantial right made during
a special proceeding” within the meaning of Neb. Rev. Stat.
§ 25-1902(1)(b) (Cum. Supp. 2024). The determination of
appealability in this case, as in other juvenile cases, is a fact-
intensive inquiry. 15
[6-8] A “substantial right” is an essential legal right, not
a mere technical right. 16 And we have said it is not enough
that the right itself be substantial; the effect of the order on
that right must also be substantial. 17 Whether the effect of an
order is substantial depends on whether it affects with finality
the rights of the parties in the subject matter. 18
Here, when determining if the orders affected a substantial
right with finality, it is significant that those orders did more
than just find that Johnny was not amenable to rehabilitative
services under § 43-2,106.03. The orders also changed the dis-
position in each case by directing that “[Johnny’s] probation
and the jurisdiction of the Court in this matter be and same is
hereby terminated unsuccessfully.” Later in this opinion, we
address whether a juvenile court has the authority to modify a
dispositional order based solely on a finding of nonamenabil-
ity. But for purposes of determining appellate jurisdiction, we
conclude that because the orders at issue effectively changed
the disposition in each juvenile case, they affected a substan-
tial right and did so with the type of finality required to create
a final, appealable order under § 25-1902(1)(b). We express
no opinion on whether an order that contains only a finding of
nonamenability under § 43-2,106.03, but does not modify the
disposition, would be a final order.
Having confirmed that appellate jurisdiction exists on this
record, we turn to the merits of Johnny’s assignments of error.
15 In re Interest of Zachary B., 299 Neb. 187, 907 N.W.2d 311 (2018).
16 In re Interest of Becka P. et al., 296 Neb. 365, 894 N.W.2d 247 (2017).
17 Noland v. Yost, 315 Neb. 568, 998 N.W.2d 57 (2023).
18 Id.

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He challenges both the juvenile court’s finding of nonamena-
bility under § 43-2,106.03 and its reliance on that finding to
terminate his probation and terminate the court’s jurisdiction.
To analyze these assignments, we must first construe the rel-
evant provisions of § 43-2,106.03.
2. Construing § 43-2,106.03
[9] When construing a statute, a court’s analysis always
begins with the text; statutory language is given its plain
and ordinary meaning, and an appellate court will not resort
to interpretation to ascertain the meaning of statutory words
which are plain, direct, and unambiguous. 19
[10-12] Courts must also determine and give effect to the
purpose and intent of the Legislature as ascertained from the
entire language of the statute considered in its plain, ordi-
nary, and popular sense. 20 It is the court’s duty to discover,
if possible, legislative intent from the statute itself. 21 A court
must look at the statutory objective to be accomplished, the
problem to be remedied, or the purpose to be served, and
then place on the statute a reasonable construction which best
achieves its purpose. 22
[13] In addition to these settled general principles of statu-
tory interpretation, there are certain principles that apply when
a court is construing statutes under the Nebraska Juvenile
Code. 23 The Legislature has directed that statutes within the
juvenile code should be construed to effectuate certain goals,
including, “[t]o remove juveniles who are within the Nebraska
Juvenile Code from the criminal justice system whenever pos-
sible and to reduce the possibility of their committing future
19 See State v. Anders, 311 Neb. 958, 977 N.W.2d 234 (2022).
20 See In re Interest of Victor L., supra note 2.
21 McCoy v. Albin, 298 Neb. 297, 903 N.W.2d 902 (2017).
22 See id.
23 See, Neb. Rev. Stat. § 43-246 (Cum. Supp. 2024); Neb. Rev. Stat.
§ 43-2,128 (Reissue 2016).

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law violations through the provision of social and rehabilita-
tive services to such juveniles and their families.” 24 Because
the foremost purpose and objective of the Nebraska Juvenile
Code is to promote and protect the juvenile’s best interests, we
have recognized that statutes under the juvenile code must be
liberally construed to serve the best interests of the juveniles
who fall within it. 25
With these principles in mind, we turn to the provisions
of § 43-2,106.03 and recite them in full for the convenience of
the reader:
Any time after the disposition of a juvenile described in
subdivision (1), (2), (3)(b), or (4) of section 43-247, upon
the motion of any party or the court on its own motion,
a hearing may be held regarding the amenability of the
juvenile to the rehabilitative services that can be provided
under the Nebraska Juvenile Code. The court may enter
an order, based upon evidence presented at the hearing,
finding that a juvenile is not amenable to rehabilitative
services that can be provided under the Nebraska Juvenile
Code. The reasons for such a finding shall be stated
in the order. Such an order shall be considered by the
county attorney in making a future determination under
section 43-276 regarding such juvenile and by the court
when considering a future transfer motion under section
29-1816 or 43-274 or any future charge or petition
regarding such juvenile.
Johnny does not challenge the State’s ability to request an
amenability hearing under § 43-2,106.03, since he is a juvenile
as described in subdivisions (1), (2), and (3)(b) of § 43-247
and the motions at issue were filed after dispositional orders
had been entered in his juvenile cases. But he contends it was
error for the juvenile court to find him nonamenable and to
terminate probation and jurisdiction based on such finding.
24 § 43-246(3).
25 See In re Interest of Jeovani H., supra note 2.

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The State disagrees; it contends that the finding of noname-
nability was supported by the evidence, and it argues that the
unsuccessful termination of probation and jurisdiction was
“the logical result” 26 of such findings.
In arguing their respective positions, the parties disagree
regarding the proper meaning, scope, and application of
§ 43-2,106.03. They urge different interpretations of the term
“amenability” as used in § 43-2,106.03 and disagree on the
meaning of the phrase “not amenable to rehabilitative ser-
vices.” And although they agree that the State had the burden
to prove nonamenability on this record, they disagree as to
the quantum of proof required to carry that burden. Finally,
the parties’ reasoning differs on whether a finding of noname-
nability under § 43-2,106.03 can support a change in disposi-
tion. We address each of these legal questions in our analysis.
(a) Meaning of Amenability to
Rehabilitative Services
The Nebraska Legislature has not defined the term “amena-
bility” for purposes of § 43-2,106.03, nor has it identified any
factors to be considered when determining whether a juvenile
is “not amenable to rehabilitative services” under that stat-
ute. 27 At oral argument before this court, both parties referred
to dictionary definitions of “amenable,” and we have observed
26 Supplemental brief for appellee at 10.
27 Cf. 42 Pa. Stat. and Cons. Stat. Ann. § 6355(a)(4)(iii) (West 2013) (listing
nine factors to consider when determining whether child is “amenable to
treatment, supervision or rehabilitation as a juvenile”). See, also, State v.
J.D.S., 723 P.2d 1278, 1279 (Alaska 1986) (noting Alaska statute defined
phrase “‘not amenable to treatment’” to mean minor “‘probably cannot
be rehabilitated by treatment under this chapter before reaching 20 years
of age’” and holding that when making such determination, courts may
consider “‘the seriousness of the offense the minor is alleged to have
committed, the minor’s history of delinquency, the probable cause of the
minor’s delinquent behavior, and the facilities available to the division of
youth and adult authority for treating the minor’”).

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that courts often turn to dictionaries to ascertain a word’s plain
and ordinary meaning. 28
Section 	43-2,106.03 	was 	enacted 	in 	2008. 29 	At 	that
time, Black’s Law Dictionary defined the term “amenable”
to mean “[l]egally answerable; liable to being brought to
judgment.” 30 The Oxford English Dictionary defined “ame-
nable” as “[d]isposed to answer, respond, or submit (to influ-
ence); responsive, tractable; capable of being won over.” 31 And
the Webster’s II New College Dictionary defined “amenable”
as “[w]illing to follow advice or suggestion,” “[o]bedient,”
“tractable,” and “[r]esponsible to authority.” 32
Although 	current 	dictionary 	definitions 	of 	“amenable”
include more detail, the meaning of the term has not sub-
stantively changed. Black’s Law Dictionary currently defines
“amenable” as “[a]cknowledging authority[,] ready and willing
to submit,” or “[s]uitable for a particular type of treatment.” 33
And The Oxford English Dictionary currently defines “ame-
nable” as “[i]nclined to be influenced or controlled.” 34 Finally,
Merriam-Webster dictionary currently defines “amenable” to
mean “having or showing willingness to agree or to accept
something that is wanted or asked for” or “readily yielding,
submitting, or cooperating,” and it cites the example of a
defendant’s being “amenable to rehabilitation.” 35
28 See, e.g., State v. Bryant, 311 Neb. 206, 971 N.W.2d 146 (2022); State v.
Gilliam, 292 Neb. 770, 874 N.W.2d 48 (2016) (and cases cited therein).
29 See Introduced Copy, L.B. 1160, Judiciary Committee, 100th Leg., 2d
Sess. (Jan. 23, 2008) (amended into 2008 Neb. Laws, L.B. 1014).
30 Black’s Law Dictionary 89 (8th ed. 2004).
31 1 The Oxford English Dictionary 394 (2d ed. 1989) (emphasis omitted).
32 Webster’s II New College Dictionary 36 (3d ed. 2005).
33 Black’s Law Dictionary 101 (12th ed. 2024).
34 “Amenable,” Oxford English Dictionary Online, https://www.oed.com/
search/dictionary/?scope=Entries&q=amenable (last visited Jan. 8, 2026).
35 “Amenable,” Merriam-Webster.com, https://www.merriam-webster.com/
dictionary/amenable (last visited Jan. 8, 2026) (emphasis in original).

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[14,15] 	Because 	courts 	construing 	a 	statute 	must 	also
determine and give effect to the purpose and intent of the
Legislature, and because “the primary source of insight into
the intent of the Legislature is the language of the statute,” 36
we also look to the plain language of § 43-2,106.03 to discern
its purpose. Section 43-2,106.03 mandates how, when, and
by whom any orders finding nonamenability must be consid-
ered, and it directs that county attorneys shall consider such
orders “in making a future determination under section 43-276
regarding such juvenile” and that courts shall consider such
orders “when considering a future transfer motion under sec-
tion 29-1816 or 43-274 or any future charge or petition regard-
ing such juvenile.” (Emphasis supplied.) We discern from
this language that the primary purpose of § 43-2,106.03 is to
provide prosecutors and courts with predictive information
to consider when making future filing, charging, and transfer
decisions involving the juvenile. 37 The legislative history,
while not dispositive, 38 also supports this purpose. 39
[16] Considering the common definitions of the term “ame-
nable” and the Legislature’s purpose for enacting § 43-2,106.03,
we hold the plain and ordinary meaning of the term “amena-
bility” as used in § 43-2,106.03 refers to the likelihood that
36 See Arthur v. Microsoft Corp., 267 Neb. 586, 593-94, 676 N.W.2d 29, 35
(2004) (internal quotation marks omitted).
37 See § 43-276(1)(a) and (m).
38 See Salem Grain Co. v. City of Falls City, 302 Neb. 548, 564, 924 N.W.2d
678, 692 (2019) (noting that when construing statutes, courts need look no
further than plain text but may inquire into legislative history either “when
a statute is open to construction because its terms require interpretation or
may reasonably be considered ambiguous”).
39 See Judiciary Committee Hearing, L.B. 1160, 100th Leg., 2d Sess. 24
(Feb. 14, 2008) (proponent of bill stating amenability provisions were
intended to help criminal courts in counties with separate juvenile courts
“ascertain the real benefit of transferring a case from adult court back to
juvenile court” and better understand whether juvenile court “has basically
exhausted all the available resources at its disposal to try to support the
rehabilitation of that juvenile”).

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a particular juvenile will respond effectively in the future to
the type of rehabilitative services that can be provided under
the juvenile code. Relatedly, “a juvenile [who] is not amenable
to rehabilitative services” 40 refers to a juvenile who, based on
the evidence presented, is unlikely to respond effectively in
the future to the rehabilitative services that can be provided
under the juvenile code.
In addition to briefing the meaning of “amenability” under
§ 43-2,106.03, the parties have proposed specific factors they
think juvenile courts should, and should not, consider when
ruling on such motions. The Legislature sometimes identi-
fies factors that juvenile courts should consider when making
certain determinations, 41 but it has not prescribed any specific
factors to be considered when determining amenability under
§ 43-2,106.03, and we find it unnecessary to judicially limit
the court’s analysis to a specific list of factors. A finding
of nonamenability is necessarily fact specific, and because
§ 43-2,106.03 requires the juvenile court to state the reasons
for any such finding in its order, the specific factors relied
upon by the court in each case will be apparent from the order
itself and available for review by all who are required to con-
sider the order, including any appellate court.
(b) Burden and Quantum of Proof
Section 43-2,106.03 authorizes “any party” or “the court on
its own motion” to move for an evidentiary hearing “regarding
the amenability of the juvenile to the rehabilitative services
that can be provided” under the juvenile code. But the statute
is silent regarding who bears the burden of proof at such a
40 § 43-2,106.03.
41 See, e.g., § 43-276 (setting out factors to be considered when making
juvenile transfer decisions); Neb. Rev. Stat. § 43-286.02 (Supp. 2025)
(setting out factors court should consider when deciding whether juvenile
“is unlikely to respond effectively to graduated response sanctions” and
thus should be designated as “comprehensive supervision probationer”).

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hearing, and it does not address the degree of proof required to
carry that burden.
[17] In these consolidated appeals, the parties contend that
because the State was the party that filed the motions seeking
a finding of nonamenability, it was the State’s burden to prove
the same. We agree and hold that when the State files a motion
under § 43-2,106.03 requesting a finding that a juvenile is not
amenable to rehabilitative services, the State bears the burden
of proving nonamenability. We leave for another day consider-
ation of which party bears the burden of proof when either the
court or the juvenile requests a hearing on amenability, as that
issue is not before us.
The parties also disagree on the quantum of proof required
at an amenability hearing under § 43-2,106.03. Johnny argues
that a juvenile’s amenability should be established by clear and
convincing evidence, reasoning that proof beyond a reasonable
doubt is “too high of a hurdle” 42 and a preponderance of the
evidence standard is “too low.” 43 The State argues that a juve-
nile’s amenability under § 43-2,106.03 should be established
by the same “preponderance standard used in other civil-type
juvenile proceedings.” 44
[18,19] Although § 43-2,106.03 does not expressly iden-
tify the quantum of proof required in a postdispositional
hearing to determine a juvenile’s amenability to rehabilita-
tive services, guidance can be found in other provisions of
the juvenile code addressing similar hearings. For instance,
Neb. Rev. Stat. § 43-286(1) (Cum. Supp. 2024) governs post-
dispositional hearings to determine whether a juvenile “has
exhausted all levels of probation supervision and options for
community-based services” and should be placed at a youth
rehabilitation and treatment center, and it states “the burden
is upon the [S]tate by a preponderance of the evidence” at
42 Supplemental brief for appellant at 11.
43 Id.
44 Supplemental brief for appellee at 9.

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such a hearing. Absent statutory language requiring a differ-
ent standard of proof, Nebraska courts in civil cases generally
apply the preponderance standard. 45 We therefore hold that in
hearings pursuant to § 43-2,106.03, which are civil in nature, a
juvenile’s amenability to rehabilitative services must be estab-
lished by a preponderance of the evidence, which is equivalent
to the greater weight of the evidence. 46 The greater weight of
the evidence means evidence sufficient to make a claim more
likely true than not true. 47
3. Arguments on Appeal
Having construed the plain meaning of the relevant statu-
tory language in § 43-2,106.03 and identified the applicable
burden and quantum of proof, we turn now to the assignments
of error on appeal. Johnny assigns error to the juvenile court’s
nonamenability determination and to its decision to terminate
probation and jurisdiction “unsuccessfully” based on the nona-
menability determination.
[20,21] As stated, we will review the juvenile court’s nona-
menability decision de novo on the record to determine if
there has been an abuse of discretion. 48 An abuse of discretion
occurs when a trial court’s decision is based upon reasons
that are untenable or unreasonable or if its action is clearly
against justice or conscience, reason, and evidence. 49 And
when reviewing a juvenile court’s decision de novo on the
45 See, e.g., In re Application No. OP-0003, 303 Neb. 872, 906-07, 932
N.W.2d 653, 678 (2019) (noting general rule that when act “does
not specify a standard of proof, unless an exception applies, only a
preponderance of evidence is required in civil cases”). Accord Burgardt v.
Burgardt, 304 Neb. 356, 934 N.W.2d 488 (2019).
46 See In re Interest of T.W., 314 Neb. 475, 991 N.W.2d 280 (2023)
(recognizing that preponderance of evidence and greater weight of
evidence are same standard).
47 Id.
48 See In re Interest of Victor L., supra note 2.
49 Id.

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record for an abuse of discretion, if the evidence is in conflict,
an appellate court may give weight to the fact that the juvenile
court observed the witnesses and accepted one version of facts
over the other. 50
(a) No Abuse of Discretion in
Nonamenability Determination
Johnny argues the juvenile court erred in finding him nona-
menable, but he does not challenge the sufficiency of the
evidence as it regards the type of rehabilitative services that
can be provided in the juvenile court. Instead, he argues the
evidence showed that he either “completed, or was in the pro-
cess of completing, every rehabilitative service and condition
ordered by the [juvenile] court as part of his probation,” 51 and
he suggests this shows that he “would have been amenable to
completing” 52 additional “in-home services” 53 in the future.
Johnny argues that the juvenile court’s emphasis on evidence
of his continued criminal conduct and new law violations while
on probation was improper for two reasons. First, he argues the
juvenile court “inaccurately” 54 described some of his adjudi-
cated and charged offenses and mischaracterized some of his
behavior as “violent” 55 when it was merely “‘aggressive.’” 56
Alternatively, he argues that his criminal conduct while on
probation was “irrelevant” 57 to an amenability determination
under § 43-2,106.03.
The State disagrees. It argues that the purpose of the ame-
nability hearing was to evaluate “whether the rehabilitative
50 See In re Interest of Steven S., supra note 5.
51 Brief for appellant at 11.
52 Id. 15.
53 Id.
54 Id. at 16.
55 Id. at 18.
56 Id.
57 Id. at 17.

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services available under the Juvenile Code had any reason-
able chance of success” 58 with Johnny. According to the State,
“[h]ow a juvenile has progressed or failed while being offered
juvenile services is the best evidence and indicator in deter-
mining whether they’ll be amenable to additional or alterna-
tive services” 59 in the juvenile court in the future. The State
argues that the evidence adduced at the hearing established that
despite being provided rehabilitative services, Johnny “was not
making progress towards meaningful rehabilitation and was
continuing to commit further crimes” 60 and that therefore, the
juvenile court did not err in its nonamenability determination
under § 43-2,106.03.
Our de novo review makes it unnecessary to address any
of Johnny’s arguments that are focused on alleged misstate-
ments or mischaracterizations of the record by the juvenile
court. Instead, having reviewed the record de novo, we focus
on whether the juvenile court’s nonamenability determination
was based on reasons that are untenable or unreasonable or was
clearly against justice or conscience, reason, and evidence. 61
In its written orders, the juvenile court stated several reasons
for finding that Johnny is not amenable to the rehabilitative
services that can be provided in the juvenile court, including
the following:
• Johnny’s “adjudicated offenses included acts of violence.”
• The juvenile court had been providing resources and services
“for more than two years in an attempt to rehabilitate the
juvenile.”
• While on probation, Johnny had numerous periods of deten-
tion, and he “continues to violate court orders, the conditions
of his probation, and has had his juvenile probation revoked
in the past.”
58 Brief for appellee at 12.
59 Id. at 13.
60 Id. at 14.
61 See In re Interest of Victor L., supra note 2.

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• While on probation, Johnny was “placed out of home, but
lost that placement due to violent and aggressive behaviors.”
Additional out-of-home placement options were denied due to
Johnny’s behavior, and the juvenile court “currently lacks any
possible out-of-home placement options” for Johnny.
• Despite “extensive efforts to rehabilitate [Johnny],” he “con-
tinues to engage in criminal activity to include violent and
felony level offenses,” and he “has a new felony Robbery case
in adult court involving allegations of violence that occurred
on December 31, 2024.”
• Johnny “has a pro-criminal ideation and negative attitude
towards individuals of authority,” and “the public safety of the
community and the safety of [Johnny] requires intervention
and services not available to the juvenile court.”
• At the time of the hearing, Johnny was “17 and a-half years old
and will be turning 18 in August, 2025.”
These reasons are supported by a preponderance of the evi-
dence, and they are sufficiently probative of an amenabil-
ity determination under § 43-2,106.03, which is focused on
the likelihood that the juvenile will respond effectively in
the future to the type of rehabilitative services available in the
juvenile court. On this record, we cannot say the juvenile
court’s determination of nonamenability was based on rea-
sons that were untenable or unreasonable, nor can we say its
determination of nonamenability was clearly against justice,
conscience, reason, or evidence.
Because our de novo review shows no abuse of discretion
in the juvenile court’s nonamenability determination under
§ 43-2,106.03, we reject Johnny’s first assignment of error.
But that does not end our analysis, because the juvenile court
relied on the nonamenability finding to modify the disposition
in each of Johnny’s pending juvenile cases. We turn to that
issue next and ultimately conclude the juvenile court plainly
erred in changing the dispositional orders based solely on a
finding of nonamenability under § 43-2,106.03.

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(b) Plain Error in Changing Dispositions
[22-24] Before addressing the dispositional changes, we
recall several foundational principles that govern our analysis.
Pursuant to Neb. Const. art. V, § 27, the juvenile court is a
statutorily created tribunal established by the Legislature “with
such . . . powers as the Legislature may provide.” As a statu-
torily created court of limited jurisdiction, a juvenile court has
only the authority conferred upon it by statute. 62 Consequently,
when considering whether a juvenile court acted within its
authority, an appellate court will look to the authority con-
ferred by statute. 63 With these principles in mind, we consider
whether the juvenile court’s finding of nonamenability under
§ 43-2,106.03 authorized it to modify the dispositions by ter-
minating probation and jurisdiction.
Where, as here, a juvenile has been adjudicated under
§ 43-247(1), (2), or 3(b), the dispositional options available to
the juvenile court are set out in § 43-286(1)(a) and (3). 64 And
once a dispositional order has been entered, the juvenile court’s
authority to modify that disposition is limited by § 43-286(6),
which provides:
(6)(a) Except as provided in subdivision (6)(b) of this
section, the court shall not change a disposition unless
the court finds that the juvenile has violated a term or
condition of probation or supervision or an order of the
court and the procedures in subdivision (5)(b) of this
section have been satisfied.
(b) Upon motion of the juvenile, the court may modify
the terms or conditions of probation or supervision or
modify a dispositional order if:
62 See, In re Interest of Jordon B., 312 Neb. 827, 981 N.W.2d 242 (2022);
In re Interest of Kamille C. & Kamiya C., 302 Neb. 226, 922 N.W.2d 739
(2019); In re Interest of Josue G., 299 Neb. 784, 910 N.W.2d 159 (2018).
63 See In re Interest of Josue G., supra note 62.
64 See § 43-246(1), (2), and (3).

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(i) All parties stipulate to the particular modification;
and
(ii) The juvenile has consulted with counsel or has
waived counsel. Any waiver must be particular to the
modification and shall comply with section 43-3102.
Additionally, Neb. Rev. Stat. § 43-286.01 (Supp. 2025) pro-
vides, in relevant part:
(8) 	During 	the 	term 	of 	probation, 	the 	court, 	on
application of a probation officer or of the juvenile or
on its own motion, may reduce or eliminate any of the
conditions imposed on the juvenile. Upon completion
of the term of probation or the earlier discharge of the
juvenile, the juvenile shall be relieved of any obligations
imposed by the order of the court and his or her record
shall be sealed pursuant to section 43-2,108.04.
[25] Nebraska appellate courts have repeatedly emphasized
the importance of complying with the applicable statutory
procedures when modifying a dispositional order, and our case
law is clear that once a juvenile court enters a dispositional
order of probation, it is not authorized to change the terms or
conditions of probation unless the applicable statutory proce-
dures are followed. 65
In In re Interest of Josue G., 66 the State moved to revoke a
juvenile’s probation based on allegations of a new law viola-
tion but later withdrew the motion before it was heard. The
juvenile court nevertheless modified the disposition to extend
the term of probation, and the juvenile appealed. We held
that “once a court has entered a disposition, it is plain error
to change that disposition in the absence of compliance with
the applicable statutory procedures.” 67 We therefore vacated
65 See, e.g., In re Interest of Josue G., supra note 62; In re Interest of Nowa
K., 33 Neb. App. 446, 16 N.W.3d 896 (2025); In re Interest of Iyana P., 25
Neb. App. 439, 907 N.W.2d 333 (2018).
66 In re Interest of Josue G., supra note 62.
67 Id. at 790, 910 N.W.2d at 163.

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the juvenile court’s order for plain error, finding the juve-
nile court had exceeded its statutory authority by extending
the term of probation without complying with the applicable
statutory procedures.
The Court of Appeals reached a similar conclusion in In re
Interest of Iyana P. 68 There, the juvenile had been adjudicated
under § 43-247(1) (Reissue 2016) and placed on a 6-month
term of probation. Although no motion to revoke probation
had been filed by the State, the juvenile court entered an order
changing the juvenile’s placement and extending the term of
probation to “‘an open ended period of time.’” 69 The juvenile
moved to vacate the modified probation order, arguing the
court lacked authority to change the disposition without fol-
lowing the provisions of § 43-286 (Reissue 2016). The court
overruled the motion to vacate, and the juvenile appealed. The
Court of Appeals noted our settled precedent, holding that
“once a [juvenile] court has entered a disposition, it is plain
error to change that disposition when the State has not com-
plied with the applicable statutory procedures.” 70 Finding that
the juvenile court lacked the authority to modify the terms and
conditions of probation without following the statutory pro-
cedures in § 43-286, the Court of Appeals reversed the order
denying the motion to vacate and remanded the matter with
directions to vacate the modified probation order.
Similar reasoning was applied in the recent case of In re
Interest of Nowa K. 71 There, the juvenile was adjudicated in
three separate cases and was placed on an “open-ended term of
probation.” 72 Thereafter, the juvenile was charged in criminal
court with robbery and theft. The State did not move to revoke
68 In re Interest of Iyana P., supra note 65.
69 Id. at 442, 907 N.W.2d at 336.
70 Id. at 444, 907 N.W.2d at 337.
71 In re Interest of Nowa K., supra note 65.
72 Id. at 447, 16 N.W.3d at 898.

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IN RE INTEREST OF JOHNNY H.
Cite as 320 Neb. 675
the juvenile’s probation, and instead, it made an oral motion
asking the juvenile court to terminate jurisdiction in all three
juvenile cases, arguing there was no need to “‘keep coming
into juvenile court when [the juvenile] is now in . . . adult
[court] facing some pretty significant sentence[s].’” 73 Over the
juvenile’s objection, the juvenile court entered an order in all
three cases “terminating [the juvenile’s] probation as unsatis-
factorily completed, ordering that his record remain unsealed
at that time, and terminating the jurisdiction of the juve-
nile court.” 74 The juvenile appealed, challenging the juvenile
court’s authority to change the dispositions without a motion
to revoke probation under § 43-286 (Cum. Supp. 2024). The
Court of Appeals reviewed the statutes giving juvenile courts
authority to change a disposition and concluded the procedures
either had not been followed or did not apply. It therefore
reversed and remanded with directions to vacate the orders
terminating probation and jurisdiction.
Here, the juvenile court relied exclusively on its nonamena-
bility finding under § 43-2,106.03 as the authority to modify
the dispositional orders in each case by terminating probation,
and the court’s jurisdiction, “unsuccessfully.” But we see no
language in § 43-2,106.03, or in any other statute in the juve-
nile code, that authorizes a juvenile court to modify a disposi-
tion based solely on a finding of nonamenability.
[26] At oral argument before this court, the parties acknowl-
edged there is no express statutory authority in the juvenile
code for a juvenile court to terminate probation or juris-
diction based solely on a finding of nonamenability under
§ 43-2,106.03. But in its supplemental briefing, the State urges
us to infer such authority, arguing:
[T]he logical result of . . . a finding of non-amenability
under § 43-2,106.03 is that the basis for the court’s dispo-
sitional authority, namely the potential for rehabilitation,
73 Id. at 448, 16 N.W.3d at 898.
74 Id. at 448, 16 N.W.3d at 899.

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IN RE INTEREST OF JOHNNY H.
Cite as 320 Neb. 675
has been extinguished. Once the court determines that the
juvenile is non-amenable, the court not only establishes a
record for future proceedings but also provides the func-
tional equivalent of a revocation of the existing proba-
tion. The finding confirms that the juvenile has exhausted
the relief available under the Nebraska Juvenile Code,
necessitating the termination of jurisdiction . . . . 75
[27] It is not within the province of the courts to read mean-
ing into a statute that is not there or to read anything direct and
plain out of a statute. 76 We therefore decline the State’s invita-
tion to read into § 43-2,106.03 a provision that would authorize
juvenile courts to change a disposition based solely on a find-
ing of nonamenability.
In § 43-286(6), the Legislature has expressly prohibited
juvenile courts from changing a disposition unless either the
court finds the juvenile has violated a term or condition of
probation or an order of the court and the procedures in
§ 43-286(5)(b) have been satisfied, or the juvenile has filed a
motion to modify under § 43-286(6)(b) and all parties stipulate
to the particular modification. Neither procedure was followed
in this case. And although the Legislature, in § 43-286.01(8),
has expressly authorized juvenile courts to “reduce or elimi-
nate” a condition of probation upon the application of either
the juvenile, the probation officer, or the court, no such appli-
cation appears in the appellate record.
Because the record in these consolidated appeals does not
reflect that the juvenile court had any statutory authority
to modify the dispositions, all such modifications must be
vacated for plain error 77 and the matters remanded to the juve-
nile court.
75 Supplemental brief for appellee at 10.
76 State v. Perry, 318 Neb. 613, 17 N.W.3d 504 (2025).
77 See, In re Interest of Josue G., supra note 62; In re Interest of Nowa K.,
supra note 65; In re Interest of Iyana P., supra note 65.

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IN RE INTEREST OF JOHNNY H.
Cite as 320 Neb. 675
V. CONCLUSION
Upon our de novo review of the record, we find no abuse
of 	discretion 	in 	the 	juvenile 	court’s 	determination 	under
§ 43-2,106.03 that Johnny is not amenable to the rehabilita-
tive services that can be provided under the juvenile code. But
we find the juvenile court plainly erred in terminating proba-
tion and jurisdiction based on that determination, because the
Legislature has not given juvenile courts authority to modify
dispositional orders based solely on a finding of nonamenabil-
ity under § 43-2,106.03. We therefore affirm that portion of the
juvenile court’s orders finding nonamenability, and we vacate
the remainder of the orders and remand the causes to the juve-
nile court for further proceedings.
Affirmed in part, and in part vacated and
remanded for further proceedings.