State v. Wilson

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Nebraska Supreme Court Advance Sheets
320 Nebraska Reports
STATE v. WILSON
Cite as 320 Neb. 728
State of Nebraska, appellee, v.
James A. Wilson, appellant.
___ N.W.3d ___
Filed January 23, 2026. 	No. S-24-530.
1. Effectiveness of Counsel: Appeal and Error. Whether a claim of inef-
fective assistance of trial counsel may be determined on direct appeal is
a question of law.
2. ____: ____. In reviewing claims of ineffective assistance of counsel on
direct appeal, an appellate court decides only whether the undisputed
facts contained within the record are sufficient to conclusively deter-
mine whether counsel did or did not provide effective assistance and
whether the defendant was or was not prejudiced by counsel’s alleged
deficient performance.
3. Effectiveness of Counsel: Proof. To prevail on a claim of ineffective
assistance of counsel under Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 104
S. Ct. 2052, 80 L. Ed. 2d 674 (1984), the defendant must show that his
or her counsel’s performance was deficient and that this deficient perfor-
mance actually prejudiced the defendant’s defense.
4. ____: ____. To show that counsel’s performance was deficient, a
defendant must show that counsel’s performance did not equal that of
a lawyer with ordinary training and skill in criminal law.
5. ____: ____. To show prejudice in a claim of ineffective assistance of
counsel, the defendant must demonstrate a reasonable probability that
but for counsel’s deficient performance, the result of the proceeding
would have been different.
6. Proof: Words and Phrases. A reasonable probability is a probability
sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome.
7. Effectiveness of Counsel: Appeal and Error. In determining whether
there is a reasonable probability that any deficient performance of trial
counsel would have resulted in a different outcome in the proceeding,
an appellate court may properly consider the strength of the admissible
evidence relating to the controverted issues in the case.
Nebraska Supreme Court Online Library
www.nebraska.gov/apps-courts-epub/
10/18/2026 12:54 AM CDT

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Nebraska Supreme Court Advance Sheets
320 Nebraska Reports
STATE v. WILSON
Cite as 320 Neb. 728
8. Effectiveness of Counsel: Postconviction: Records: Appeal and
Error. To raise an ineffective assistance of counsel claim on direct
appeal, the defendant must allege deficient performance with enough
particularity for (1) an appellate court to make a determination of
whether the claim can be decided upon the trial record and (2) a district
court later reviewing a petition for postconviction relief to recognize
whether the claim was brought before the appellate court.
9. Effectiveness of Counsel: Proof: Appeal and Error. When a claim of
ineffective assistance of counsel is raised in a direct appeal, the appel-
lant is not required to allege prejudice; however, an appellant must make
specific allegations of the conduct that he or she claims constitutes defi-
cient performance by trial counsel.
10. Effectiveness of Counsel: Records: Appeal and Error. Once raised, an
appellate court will determine whether the record on appeal is sufficient
to review the merits of the ineffective performance claims. The record
is sufficient if it establishes either that trial counsel’s performance was
not deficient, that the appellant will not be able to establish prejudice as
a matter of law, or that trial counsel’s actions could not be justified as a
part of any plausible trial strategy.
11. Rules of Evidence: Words and Phrases. Under Neb. Evid. R. 401,
Neb. Rev. Stat. § 27-401 (Reissue 2016), relevant evidence means evi-
dence having any tendency to make the existence of any fact that is of
consequence to the determination of the action more probable or less
probable than it would be without the evidence.
12. Criminal Law: Rules of Evidence: Other Acts. In a criminal case,
Neb. Evid. R. 404(1), Neb. Rev. Stat. § 27-404(1) (Cum. Supp. 2024),
operates as a broad exclusionary rule of relevant evidence that speaks
to a criminal defendant’s propensity to have committed the crime or
crimes charged.
13. Rules of Evidence. Neb. Evid. R. 403, Neb. Rev. Stat. § 27-403
(Reissue 2016), allows the exclusion of evidence if its probative value is
substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of
the issues, or misleading the jury, or by considerations of undue delay,
waste of time, or needless presentation of cumulative evidence.
14. Evidence: Words and Phrases. Unfair prejudice means an undue
tendency to suggest a decision based on an improper basis.
15. Effectiveness of Counsel: Trial. Trial counsel’s decisions that amount
to reasonable trial strategy do not constitute deficient performance.
16. Trial: Attorneys at Law. Trial counsel is afforded due deference to
formulate trial strategy and tactics.
17. Effectiveness of Counsel: Trial: Appeal and Error. Appellate courts
do not use perfect hindsight to criticize unsuccessful trial strategies.

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Nebraska Supreme Court Advance Sheets
320 Nebraska Reports
STATE v. WILSON
Cite as 320 Neb. 728
Rather, they must assess trial counsel’s performance from counsel’s per-
spective when counsel provided the assistance.
18. Effectiveness of Counsel: Presumptions: Appeal and Error. There
is a strong presumption that counsel acted reasonably, and an appellate
court will not second-guess counsel’s reasonable strategic decisions.
19. Effectiveness of Counsel: Trial: Appeal and Error. It is more the
exception than the rule that defense counsel’s strategy can be reasonably
inferred from the trial record on direct appeal.
20. Witnesses. It is generally improper for a witness to testify as to the
credibility of another witness.
21. Prosecuting Attorneys: Witnesses. It is improper for a prosecutor to
inquire of a witness whether another person may or may not be telling
the truth.
22. Criminal Law: Trial: Prosecuting Attorneys. Prosecutors have a duty
to conduct criminal trials in a manner that provides the accused with
a fair and impartial trial and may not inflame the jurors’ prejudices or
excite their passions against the accused. This rule includes intentionally
eliciting testimony from witnesses for prejudicial effect.
Appeal from the District Court for Douglas County: Horacio
J. Wheelock, Judge. Affirmed.
Robert W. Kortus, of Nebraska Commission on Public
Advocacy, for appellant.
Michael 	T. 	Hilgers, 	Attorney 	General, 	and 	Jacob 	M.
Waggoner for appellee.
Funke, C.J., Cassel, Stacy, Papik, Freudenberg, and
Bergevin, JJ.
Papik, J.
The State prosecuted James A. Wilson based on events that
began with a confrontation over a food delivery and ended
when he fired a gun at a police officer. Wilson was ultimately
convicted of attempted second degree murder, two counts of
use of a firearm to commit a felony, discharging a firearm
at an occupied motor vehicle, and two counts of terroristic
threats. Now on appeal, Wilson claims his trial counsel was
ineffective in failing to adequately challenge testimony about

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Nebraska Supreme Court Advance Sheets
320 Nebraska Reports
STATE v. WILSON
Cite as 320 Neb. 728
his character and testimony involving the veracity of other
witnesses, as well as evidence he claims was unduly emotional
and inflammatory. We affirm.
I. BACKGROUND
While working as a food delivery driver, Wilson had a
dispute with a pair of customers and later that same day,
exchanged gunshots with a police officer. Wilson was tried
before a jury on charges of one count of attempted sec-
ond degree murder, see Neb. Rev. Stat. §§ 28-304 (Reissue
2016) and 28-201(4)(a) (Cum. Supp. 2024); two counts of
use of a firearm to commit a felony, see Neb. Rev. Stat.
§ 28-1205(1)(a) and (c) (Reissue 2016); one count of discharg-
ing a firearm at an inhabited house, an occupied building, or
an occupied motor vehicle, see Neb. Rev. Stat. § 28-1212.02
(Reissue 2016); and two counts of terroristic threats, see Neb.
Rev. Stat. § 28-311.01 (Reissue 2016). The two counts of ter-
roristic threats and one count of use of a firearm to commit a
felony arose out of Wilson’s interactions with the customers.
Wilson’s encounter with the police officer was the basis for
the charges of attempted second degree murder; the second
count of use of a firearm to commit a felony; and discharging
a firearm at an inhabited house, occupied building, or occu-
pied motor vehicle.
The jury heard evidence that one evening, Wilson left his
house to make a food delivery in Omaha, Nebraska. Wilson’s
wife at the time testified that Wilson had come home angry
and that before leaving their house, Wilson said that he would
“either wind up in jail or dead.”
According to evidence at trial, that same evening, Wilson
brought a food delivery to Daniel and Sandra Bartlett. After
placing the Bartletts’ food on the front step of their house,
Wilson loudly knocked on the front door three or four times.
Daniel testified that he was surprised at how loudly Wilson
had “bang[ed]” on the door for a food delivery and thought
Wilson might break the screen on the door. When Daniel

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Nebraska Supreme Court Advance Sheets
320 Nebraska Reports
STATE v. WILSON
Cite as 320 Neb. 728
opened the door to retrieve the food, Wilson said that the tip
was “shit.” Daniel testified that Wilson sounded angry. Wilson
and Daniel exchanged some words, and Daniel recalled that
Wilson challenged him to a fight.
Daniel recounted that he then stepped outside to prevent
Wilson from coming inside. Daniel testified that at that point,
Wilson pulled a handgun from his waistband “very fast”
and, holding it in his right hand, pointed it at Daniel’s face.
According to the Bartletts’ account, Daniel reentered the house
and told Sandra that Wilson had pulled a gun on him. They
both testified that Sandra went to the doorway and exchanged
some more words with Wilson. Sandra testified that during
this time, Wilson was waving his arms around while holding
his gun in his left hand. Both Daniel and Sandra identified the
gun as a two-toned handgun. Daniel further testified that it
was a 9-mm handgun. It is undisputed that Wilson was carry-
ing a two-toned 9-mm handgun in a holster that day. Footage
from a video doorbell camera viewed by the jury showed por-
tions of the confrontation not including the moments when,
according to Daniel, Wilson drew his gun and pointed it at
Daniel. In the footage, which was otherwise generally consis-
tent with the Bartletts’ account, Wilson held a black object in
his hand, but it was not plainly evident in the footage that it
was a gun. Soon afterward, Wilson left in his vehicle.
There was evidence that a short distance from the Bartletts’
house, Wilson stopped his vehicle very close to a car that
was parked on the wrong side of the road, nearly touching
the car’s bumper, and honked his vehicle’s horn. According
to testimony and video footage in evidence, Daniel yelled to
warn the occupants of the parked car that Wilson was armed.
The jury heard evidence that Wilson exited his vehicle, yelled
at the occupants of the parked car, and punched the parked
car’s back passenger window twice, shattering the window.
No charges were filed relating to the incident involving the
parked car.

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Nebraska Supreme Court Advance Sheets
320 Nebraska Reports
STATE v. WILSON
Cite as 320 Neb. 728
Meanwhile, the Bartletts reported to police that Wilson
had pulled a gun on them. Based on the Bartletts’ report,
Omaha police officer Tamara Phillips used Wilson’s license
plate number to obtain his address. Officer Phillips testified
that she drove to the address and waited nearby for backup to
arrive. Officer Phillips recounted that while she waited, she
saw Wilson’s vehicle pull into his driveway. For the safety of
anyone inside the house, Officer Phillips decided to approach
Wilson on her own to make a felony stop.
Officer Phillips testified that she pulled into Wilson’s drive-
way and tried to activate the siren and lights on her police
cruiser but did not succeed. Officer Phillips testified that as
she pulled into the driveway, she saw “the barrel of [Wilson’s]
gun pointed towards [her].” Officer Phillips fired at Wilson
through her windshield and ran for cover. Officer Phillips testi-
fied that regardless of whether Wilson fired first, her reaction
would have been the same because she was trained to shoot
when confronted with a firearm.
Wilson and Officer Phillips exchanged gunfire as Officer
Phillips ran into the street. The State presented evidence that
after Wilson had emptied his gun’s magazine, he threw the gun
at the back of Officer Phillips’ police cruiser. Wilson’s gunfire
left holes in the police cruiser. Officer Phillips sustained a
graze wound to the back of her arm; Wilson was shot twice
in the leg.
After Wilson threw his gun, Officer Phillips approached him
and ordered him to the ground. Additional officers arrived at
the scene, and Wilson was taken into custody.
Wilson testified in his own defense and offered a differ-
ent account. Wilson acknowledged that he was angry and
frustrated on the evening of the events at issue. Although he
admitted to carrying a gun in a holster that evening, he denied
pulling the gun on the Bartletts, claiming instead that he was
holding his cell phone. Wilson explained that he was probably
checking his cell phone for his next delivery or using his cell
phone’s camera to document the delivery, as was his routine

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Nebraska Supreme Court Advance Sheets
320 Nebraska Reports
STATE v. WILSON
Cite as 320 Neb. 728
practice. Wilson admitted to the following: engaging in a ver-
bal altercation with the Bartletts, punching out the window of
the parked car after leaving the Bartletts’ house, assuming that
the police would be on the way to his house after the incidents
involving the Bartletts and the parked car, seeing a police offi-
cer parked near his house, and seeing the police cruiser pull
into his driveway without its lights or siren engaged.
Wilson’s account suggested that he shot at Officer Phillips in
self-defense. Wilson testified that he shot at Officer Phillips
on “reaction and self-preservation.” According to Wilson,
who is left-handed, when Officer Phillips pulled into the
driveway, he was holding his keys and his cell phone in his
right hand. He believed that he was putting them in his pocket
when he heard Officer Phillips fire at him. Wilson denied
showing his gun or removing it from its holster on his left hip
until after he heard gunshots and saw a gun pointed at him.
He maintained that this was the first time he unholstered his
gun that evening.
After closing arguments and deliberations, the jury found
Wilson guilty of each of the six charged counts. The district
court accepted the jury’s verdicts and sentenced Wilson to an
aggregate term of 47 to 81 years’ imprisonment.
Represented by new counsel, Wilson appeals and raises sev-
eral claims of ineffective assistance of trial counsel. We sum-
marize additional facts relevant to those claims in the analysis
section below.
II. ASSIGNMENTS OF ERROR
Wilson alleges, restated, consolidated, and reordered, that
his trial counsel was ineffective in (1) failing to properly
respond to impermissible character evidence presented in (a)
the testimony of Wilson’s former wife and (b) the audio of a
call from the 911 emergency dispatch service; (2) failing to
object when the prosecutor asked Wilson and a police officer
about the veracity of other witnesses; and (3) failing to prop-
erly object to unduly emotional and inflammatory testimony

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Nebraska Supreme Court Advance Sheets
320 Nebraska Reports
STATE v. WILSON
Cite as 320 Neb. 728
(a) that an Omaha police officer was previously killed in the
line of duty and (b) that Wilson described the individuals in
the parked car as “‘a couple of [B]lack kids.’”
III. STANDARD OF REVIEW
[1,2] Whether a claim of ineffective assistance of trial
counsel may be determined on direct appeal is a question of
law. State v. Hagens, ante p. 65, 26 N.W.3d 174 (2025). In
reviewing claims of ineffective assistance of counsel on direct
appeal, an appellate court decides only whether the undisputed
facts contained within the record are sufficient to conclusively
determine whether counsel did or did not provide effective
assistance and whether the defendant was or was not preju-
diced by counsel’s alleged deficient performance. Id.
IV. ANALYSIS
On direct appeal, Wilson assigns three categories of inef-
fective assistance of trial counsel: failure to properly respond
to impermissible character evidence, failure to object to the
State’s questions about the veracity of other witnesses, and
failure to properly object to unduly emotional and inflamma-
tory evidence. Within each category, Wilson claims multiple
instances of ineffective assistance.
But before addressing Wilson’s individual ineffective assis-
tance of counsel claims, we review the general principles that
govern them.
[3-7] To prevail on a claim of ineffective assistance of
counsel under Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 104 S.
Ct. 2052, 80 L. Ed. 2d 674 (1984), the defendant must show
that his or her counsel’s performance was deficient and that
this deficient performance actually prejudiced the defendant’s
defense. State v. Vazquez, 319 Neb. 192, 21 N.W.3d 615
(2025). To show that counsel’s performance was deficient, a
defendant must show that counsel’s performance did not equal
that of a lawyer with ordinary training and skill in criminal
law. Id. To show prejudice in a claim of ineffective assis-
tance of counsel, the defendant must demonstrate a reasonable

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Nebraska Supreme Court Advance Sheets
320 Nebraska Reports
STATE v. WILSON
Cite as 320 Neb. 728
probability that but for counsel’s deficient performance, the
result of the proceeding would have been different. Id. A rea-
sonable probability is a probability sufficient to undermine
confidence in the outcome. Id. In determining whether there is
a reasonable probability that any deficient performance of trial
counsel would have resulted in a different outcome in the pro-
ceeding, an appellate court may properly consider the strength
of the admissible evidence relating to the controverted issues
in the case. Id.
[8,9] To raise an ineffective assistance of counsel claim on
direct appeal, the defendant must allege deficient performance
with enough particularity for (1) an appellate court to make
a determination of whether the claim can be decided upon
the trial record and (2) a district court later reviewing a peti-
tion for postconviction relief to recognize whether the claim
was brought before the appellate court. Id. When a claim of
ineffective assistance of counsel is raised in a direct appeal,
the appellant is not required to allege prejudice; however, an
appellant must make specific allegations of the conduct that
he or she claims constitutes deficient performance by trial
counsel. Id.
[10] Once raised, an appellate court will determine whether
the record on appeal is sufficient to review the merits of the
ineffective performance claims. State v. Miranda, 313 Neb.
358, 984 N.W.2d 261 (2023). The record is sufficient if it
establishes either that trial counsel’s performance was not defi-
cient, that the appellant will not be able to establish prejudice
as a matter of law, or that trial counsel’s actions could not be
justified as a part of any plausible trial strategy. Id. However,
we will not address an ineffective assistance of counsel claim
on direct appeal if it requires examination of facts not con-
tained in the record. See State v. Vazquez, supra.
As we explain in the subsections that follow, we conclude
that Wilson’s ineffective assistance of counsel claims are with-
out merit, inadequately assigned, or not fit for resolution on
direct appeal.

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Nebraska Supreme Court Advance Sheets
320 Nebraska Reports
STATE v. WILSON
Cite as 320 Neb. 728
1. Character Evidence
Wilson avers that his trial counsel was ineffective in failing
to adequately respond to numerous instances of impermissible
character evidence presented during his former wife’s testi-
mony, during an audio recording of a 911 call, and during clos-
ing arguments. Before we resolve these claims, we first recite
pertinent evidence rules.
[11] To be admissible, evidence must be relevant. See Neb.
Evid. R. 402, Neb. Rev. Stat. § 27-402 (Reissue 2016). Under
Neb. Evid. R. 401, Neb. Rev. Stat. § 27-401 (Reissue 2016),
relevant evidence means evidence having any tendency to
make the existence of any fact that is of consequence to the
determination of the action more probable or less probable
than it would be without the evidence. State v. Vazquez, 319
Neb. 192, 21 N.W.3d 615 (2025). But not all relevant evidence
is admissible.
[12] In a criminal case, Neb. Evid. R. 404(1), Neb. Rev.
Stat. § 27-404(1) (Cum. Supp. 2024), operates as a broad
exclusionary rule of relevant evidence that speaks to a criminal
defendant’s propensity to have committed the crime or crimes
charged. State v. Vazquez, supra. Rule 404(1) renders propen-
sity evidence—as to the accused—inadmissible unless it is first
offered by an accused, and even then, only when it evidences
a pertinent character trait. See State v. Wheeler, 314 Neb. 282,
989 N.W.2d 728 (2023). See, also, Neb. Evid. R. 405, Neb.
Rev. Stat. § 27-405 (Reissue 2016) (method of proving char-
acter); Neb. Evid. R. 608, Neb. Rev. Stat. § 27-608 (Reissue
2016) (regarding attacking witness’ credibility with evidence of
character for untruthfulness).
[13,14] Neb. Evid. R. 403, Neb. Rev. Stat. § 27-403 (Reissue
2016), allows the exclusion of evidence if its probative value
is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice,
confusion of the issues, or misleading the jury, or by consid-
erations of undue delay, waste of time, or needless presenta-
tion of cumulative evidence. State v. Oldson, 293 Neb. 718,
884 N.W.2d 10 (2016). Most, if not all, evidence offered by a

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Nebraska Supreme Court Advance Sheets
320 Nebraska Reports
STATE v. WILSON
Cite as 320 Neb. 728
party is calculated to be prejudicial to the opposing party. Id.
Unfair prejudice means an undue tendency to suggest a deci-
sion based on an improper basis. Id. Unfair prejudice speaks
to the capacity of some concededly relevant evidence to lure
the fact finder into declaring guilt on a ground different from
proof specific to the offense charged, commonly on an emo-
tional basis. Id. When considering whether evidence of other
acts is unfairly prejudicial, we consider whether the evidence
tends to make conviction of the defendant more probable for
an incorrect reason. Id.
We apply these concepts to Wilson’s claims of ineffective
assistance of counsel regarding character evidence, and we
ultimately conclude that his arguments were inadequately
assigned, lack merit, or cannot be resolved on direct appeal.
(a) Testimony by Former Wife
At the time of the events at issue in this case, Wilson
was married to Amber Wilson. Prior to trial, they divorced.
The State called Amber as a witness for its case in chief.
On appeal, Wilson argues that his trial counsel was ineffec-
tive in failing to adequately object or otherwise intervene at
several points during Amber’s testimony because she testi-
fied to improper propensity or character evidence and made
statements that were unduly prejudicial or misleading and
confusing to the jury. The disputed excerpts fall into distinct
groups: Wilson’s relationships, Wilson’s employment history,
Wilson’s statements, Wilson’s demeanor, and Wilson’s charac-
ter for untruthfulness.
Wilson’s core contention is that the various instances of
deficient performance by his counsel during Amber’s testi-
mony allowed for the admission of testimony that prejudiced
him by diminishing his credibility in the eyes of the jury. And
he posits that this affected the outcome of his trial because
in his version of events, his gun was in its holster during the
confrontation with the Bartletts and remained there until after
Officer Phillips fired her weapon. Wilson essentially claims

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Nebraska Supreme Court Advance Sheets
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STATE v. WILSON
Cite as 320 Neb. 728
that if the jury had believed his account of the evening, it
would not have returned the guilty verdicts that it did.
As we will explain, most of Wilson’s claims related to
Amber’s testimony lack merit because Wilson cannot show
deficient performance or prejudice. Regarding testimony about
Wilson’s character for untruthfulness, however, we conclude
that the record on direct appeal is insufficient to address
Wilson’s claims.
(i) Relationships
Among other things, the State asked Amber about Wilson’s
relationships with his child and stepchildren:
Q Okay. Do you know where [Wilson’s 12- or 13-year-
old son] lives?
A He lives [here] in Omaha.
Q Okay. And does your ex-husband, . . . Wilson, have
a relationship with that son?
A No.
. . . .
Q Does he have — well, describe his relationship with
your children.
A The older two was pretty non-existent, but he had
a relationship with my youngest son. My youngest son’s
father was not in the picture[.]
Q Okay. And — but not a relationship or was it a
relationship at all with your older two?
A There was a relationship, but I wouldn’t call it a
good or a steady one.
Wilson’s counsel did not object to this testimony.
The State also asked about Amber’s relationship with Wilson
prior to his arrest. She testified that there were good days but
that “there was a lot of anger, a lot of distrust [by Wilson
toward her] and anguish. . . . A lot of fighting.” Wilson’s coun-
sel did not object.
Wilson contends that his trial counsel was ineffective in not
objecting to the foregoing testimony about his relationships,

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STATE v. WILSON
Cite as 320 Neb. 728
asserting that evidence that he was a “poor father” and a “poor
husband” was “either not relevant evidence or it was propen-
sity evidence attacking [his] character.” Brief for appellant at
26. He further argues that the evidence was “unduly prejudi-
cial, misleading and confusing to the jury.” Id. at 28.
Even if Wilson’s trial counsel was deficient in not objecting
to and seeking to strike the testimony about his relationships,
we do not perceive that it prejudiced him. To show prejudice,
Wilson would have to demonstrate a reasonable probability
that but for this testimony, the outcome of his trial would
have been different. See State v. Vazquez, 319 Neb. 192, 21
N.W.3d 615 (2025). We do not see a reasonable probability
that without this testimony about Wilson’s relationships, the
jury would have reached different conclusions on the dis-
puted issues at trial—whether Wilson displayed a gun to the
Bartletts and whether he drew his gun before Officer Phillips
shot at him. Therefore, this claim of ineffective assistance of
counsel fails.
(ii) Employment History
The State asked Amber about Wilson’s employment history:
Q When you say [he had] multiple [jobs during the 7
years you were married], about how many?
A Probably close to 15, 20.
. . . .
Q So did he — was he unable to hold a job?
A Yes.
Q And did that cause any tension or stress in your
marriage?
A Yes.
Amber also testified that before Wilson’s arrest, “[n]o job was
satisfying him, and nobody did what he wanted them to do and
pay him what he thought he deserved to be paid.” Wilson’s
counsel did not object to any of this testimony.
Over a relevancy objection, Amber also testified that Wilson
had expressed frustration with the food delivery job because

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STATE v. WILSON
Cite as 320 Neb. 728
customers did not tip appropriately. The State continued with
more questions about the food delivery job:
Q And did he ever discuss with you or let you know
his feelings about having to deliver food to other people?
A Yes.
Q What would that be?
A That people were basically lazy and didn’t know how
to tip people correctly for the work that they were doing.
Wilson’s counsel did not object.
On direct appeal, Wilson asserts that when his counsel did
not object, he received ineffective assistance because evidence
that he was a “poor employee” or was “unreliable” was “either
not relevant evidence or it was propensity evidence attacking
[his] character.” Brief for appellant at 26. Wilson also claims
that the evidence was “unduly prejudicial, misleading and con-
fusing to the jury.” Id. at 28.
We note that Wilson’s counsel did object to Amber’s testi-
mony that Wilson had said customers did not tip appropriately.
But we need not decide whether Wilson’s counsel otherwise
performed deficiently regarding evidence of his employment
because, even if there was deficient performance, Wilson
cannot show that it prejudiced him. Amber’s testimony was
partially cumulative of Wilson’s; Wilson himself testified that
he had held 15 to 20 jobs throughout his marriage to Amber
and that it was a source of tension in their relationship. See
State v. Sawyer, 319 Neb. 435, 22 N.W.3d 650 (2025) (even if
trial counsel performed deficiently in not objecting to witness’
testimony, defendant was not prejudiced because witness’ tes-
timony was cumulative of other evidence). To the extent that
the evidence was not cumulative, there is not a reasonable
probability that without Amber’s testimony about Wilson’s
employment, the jury would have reached different conclu-
sions as to whether Wilson pulled a gun on the Bartletts and
whether he pointed his gun at Officer Phillips before she shot
at him. Accordingly, this claim of ineffective assistance of
counsel does not warrant reversal.

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STATE v. WILSON
Cite as 320 Neb. 728
(iii) Statements About Death and Jail
Amber testified that before leaving for the food delivery,
Wilson said he was going to “wind up in jail or dead.” The
State inquired whether Wilson had stated, on other occasions,
that he wanted to go to jail. Amber testified that he had, and
that he said he would be less of a burden if he went to jail.
Wilson’s counsel did not object.
Now on direct appeal, Wilson argues that he received inef-
fective assistance when his trial counsel did not challenge this
testimony, because evidence that he was “despondent” was not
relevant or was improper propensity evidence attacking his
character. Brief for appellant at 26. Again, Wilson also asserts
that the evidence was “unduly prejudicial, misleading and
confusing to the jury.” Id. at 28. We disagree. We do not view
this testimony as irrelevant or as improper character evidence,
nor do we perceive that the probative value was substantially
outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice.
We do not understand the testimony to be character evidence.
“Though difficult to define, character has been described as
the generalized disposition or tendency to act in a particular
way in all the varying situations of life, caused by some-
thing internal to the actor that arises from that person’s moral
being.” State v. Oldson, 293 Neb. 718, 745, 884 N.W.2d 10, 38
(2016). See, also, State v. Thomas, 303 Neb. 964, 932 N.W.2d
713 (2019) (distinguishing character’s connotation of enduring
general propensity from situationally specific emotion). Amber
did not comment on Wilson’s character, as we have explained
the concept; she merely repeated what he had said on a previ-
ous occasion.
And the testimony was relevant. Intent was an element
of all the crimes charged. See, §§ 28-304; 28-201(4)(a);
28-1205(1)(a) and (c); 28-1212.02; and 28-311.01. Intent is
the state of mind operative at the time of an action. State v.
Craig, 219 Neb. 70, 361 N.W.2d 206 (1985). See, also, State
v. Barnes, 317 Neb. 517, 10 N.W.3d 716 (2024) (intent is
generally defined as state of mind accompanying an act). We

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have defined motive as “that which leads or tempts the mind
to indulge in a criminal act.” See State v. Thomas, 303 Neb.
at 973, 932 N.W.2d at 722. Testimony regarding Wilson’s
statements about death or jail informed the fact finder about
Wilson’s state of mind leading up to his arrest and suggested
that he had a motive—ending up dead or in jail—and, thus,
intent to commit the crimes charged. See id. (motive, even
when not element of charged crime, is relevant to State’s proof
of intent element of crime).
Moreover, given that the disputed testimony goes rather
squarely to motive and intent, we reject the notion that its
probative value was substantially outweighed by the danger of
unfair prejudice; we do not see how it would lure the jury into
convicting Wilson on a ground different from proof specific
to the charged offenses. See State v. Oldson, supra. We con-
clude that Wilson’s trial counsel did not perform deficiently in
not challenging the testimony above.
(iv) Demeanor
Amber testified about Wilson’s demeanor leading up to his
arrest:
Q Okay. How would you describe [Wilson’s] demeanor
on the days leading up to the [evening of his arrest]?
A Angry.
Q Okay. How about — was it just the days leading
up or the weeks or the months? Describe for us how his
demeanor had been for the last couple of years.
A It was progressive — I would say months — where
things got very bad. . . .
Q Okay. And did you ever express any concerns to
your parents about his demeanor?
A Yes, I did. I referred to [Wilson] as a ticking time
bomb.
Q Why?
A He was an unpredictable force. You never knew what
[Wilson] you were getting from day-to-day.

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Q Okay. Were you afraid of him?
A Yes.
Wilson’s counsel did not object, and the State referred to this
testimony in its closing argument.
Now, Wilson asserts that his counsel’s failure to object was
ineffective assistance. That is because he claims testimony that
he had a “poor demeanor” or that he was “angry, scary, . . . or
dangerous” was not relevant or was improper propensity evi-
dence attacking his character. Brief for appellant at 26. And
Wilson asserts again that the evidence was “unduly prejudicial,
misleading and confusing to the jury.” Id. at 28.
We need not decide whether this was deficient performance.
Even assuming without deciding that it was, Wilson cannot
show prejudice. Amber’s testimony that he was angry, unpre-
dictable, and potentially explosive during the period leading
up to his arrest was cumulative of other evidence that Wilson
was angry, unpredictable, and potentially explosive during
the series of events that began with the food delivery and
ended in a shootout with Officer Phillips. See State v. Sawyer,
319 Neb. 435, 22 N.W.3d 650 (2025) (even if trial counsel
performed deficiently in not objecting to witness’ testimony,
defendant was not prejudiced because witness’ testimony
was cumulative of other evidence). Video footage viewed
by the jury showed Wilson loudly banging on the Bartletts’
door. Daniel testified that Wilson sounded angry when they
spoke to each other, and additional video footage captured an
exchange of insults between Wilson and Sandra in what could
be perceived as an angry tone of voice. When Wilson encoun-
tered a car parked on the wrong side of the street, he engaged
in another verbal confrontation and shattered the car’s win-
dow. Finally, in light of this evidence, we do not agree that
the disputed testimony was unduly prejudicial or misleading
or confusing for the jury. Because the jury heard the testi-
mony about Wilson’s behavior and viewed the related video
footage, it is not probable that the jury based its decision on

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Amber’s testimony, if the testimony was indeed inadmissible.
See State v. Oldson, supra.
(v) Untruthfulness
The State asked Amber whether Wilson was a truthful per-
son, and she replied that he was not. Wilson’s counsel did not
object to this testimony.
The State elicited additional testimony that Wilson had told
Amber “stories” about his employment:
Q All right. And during the day — I want to back up
before this incident occurred. During that day, though,
was [Wilson] working?
A No.
Q Okay. Do you remember? Was he supposed to start a
new job either that day or the day before?
A Yes.
Q Okay. Tell me about that.
A I believe it was at [a trucking company] and he was
supposed to be a driver of some sort. And the story that
I was told was that he showed up late and the truck or
the people or whatever the situation was took off without
him. So he was angry and came home.
Q Okay. When you say the story you were told, did
you suspect — did you have reason — strike that.
Did you question the veracity of that?
A Yes.
Q Why?
A I had been told a lot of stories about employment in
the past.
Wilson’s trial counsel made no objection.
On direct appeal, Wilson contends that this testimony
was inadmissible and that his counsel was ineffective in not
objecting to it. He argues that the testimony that he was “dis-
honest” was “either not relevant evidence or it was propensity
evidence attacking [Wilson’s] character.” Brief for appellant
at 26. And he claims that he did not “open[] the door” to

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this testimony for it to be admissible because Wilson had not
presented evidence of his character for truthfulness before
Amber testified. Id. Wilson further claims the testimony was
“unduly prejudicial, misleading and confusing to the jury.”
Id. at 28. The State does not challenge Wilson’s position that
the testimony was inadmissible; it argues only that even if it
was deficient performance not to object to it, Wilson cannot
show prejudice.
It does appear that Wilson’s trial counsel could have made
a successful objection to this testimony on the grounds that
it was improper character evidence. As we have said, under
Rule 404(1)(a), evidence of an accused’s character is not
admissible to show that he or she acted in conformity with
that character unless it is evidence of a pertinent character
trait and the accused offered it first. See, also, Rule 405. For
starters, Wilson’s character for truthfulness does not appear to
be pertinent to the crimes charged—attempted second degree
murder, use of a firearm to commit a felony, discharging a
firearm at an occupied motor vehicle, and terroristic threats.
See State v. Vogel, 247 Neb. 209, 526 N.W.2d 80 (1995) (in
criminal action, pertinent character traits are those involved
in crime on trial, e.g., honesty in theft cases or peacefulness
in murder cases). Moreover, it is undisputed that Amber’s
testimony on direct examination by the State was the first
mention of Wilson’s character for truthfulness. Wilson him-
self had not had the opportunity to offer character evidence
because he had not yet presented his case or testified. See
Rules 404(1)(c) and 608.
[15] But just because an objection may have led to the
exclusion of the testimony, that does not mean we can resolve
Wilson’s ineffective assistance of counsel claim on direct
appeal. To show deficient performance under Strickland v.
Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 104 S. Ct. 2052, 80 L. Ed. 2d 674
(1984), the defendant must show that counsel’s performance
did not equal that of a lawyer with ordinary training and skill
in criminal law. See State v. Corral, 318 Neb. 940, 20 N.W.3d

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372 (2025). Trial counsel’s decisions that amount to reasonable
trial strategy do not constitute deficient performance. Id.
[16-19] Trial counsel is afforded due deference to formulate
trial strategy and tactics. Id. We do not use perfect hindsight
to criticize unsuccessful trial strategies. Id. Rather, we must
assess trial counsel’s performance from counsel’s perspective
when counsel provided the assistance. Id. There is a strong pre-
sumption that counsel acted reasonably, and an appellate court
will not second-guess counsel’s reasonable strategic decisions.
Id. It is more the exception than the rule that defense counsel’s
strategy can be reasonably inferred from the trial record on
direct appeal. Id.
We have generally reached ineffective assistance of counsel
claims on direct appeal only in those instances where it was
clear from the record that such claims were without merit or
in the “rare case where trial counsel’s error was so egregious
and resulted in such a high level of prejudice that no tactic or
strategy could overcome the effect of the error, which effect
was a fundamentally unfair trial.” State v. Casares, 291 Neb.
150, 155, 864 N.W.2d 667, 672 (2015). “Even when we have
expressed skepticism that any reasonable trial strategy could
be revealed through an evidentiary hearing, we have held that
the record on direct appeal was insufficient to address the
ineffective assistance claim.” State v. Corral, 318 Neb. at 961,
20 N.W.3d at 395, citing State v. Sidzyik, 281 Neb. 305, 795
N.W.2d 281 (2011); State v. Gonzalez-Faguaga, 266 Neb. 72,
662 N.W.2d 581 (2003).
This is not one of the rare cases where the record demon-
strates that trial counsel’s failure to object was so egregious
an error that it resulted in a fundamentally unfair trial. It is
simply not clear from the record whether Wilson’s counsel
withheld objections based on trial strategy. Although Amber’s
testimony about Wilson’s character for untruthfulness may
have been inadmissible, the record is insufficient for us to
decide whether his counsel rendered ineffective assistance in
not objecting to it.

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Similarly, we are unpersuaded by the State’s argument that
even if the testimony about Wilson’s untruthfulness was inad-
missible, the record on direct appeal is sufficient to conclu-
sively determine that the testimony did not prejudice Wilson.
The State asserts that Amber’s testimony about Wilson’s
untruthfulness could not have affected the outcome of trial
because the Bartletts’ accurate descriptions of Wilson’s gun
demonstrated that their version of events was necessarily
the correct one and because the evidence overall supported
Wilson’s convictions. Certainly, it is proper to consider the
strength of admissible evidence in deciding whether there is
a reasonable probability that any deficient performance would
have resulted in a different outcome. See State v. Vazquez,
319 Neb. 192, 21 N.W.3d 615 (2025). But here, the heart of
Wilson’s trial defense was his position that events did not
unfold the way the Bartletts and Officer Phillips maintained
they did.
According to Wilson’s account, the elements of the charged
offenses could not be satisfied because he did not threaten the
Bartletts with his gun and because he removed it from its hol-
ster in self-defense only after Officer Phillips fired at him. The
State essentially contends that faced with conflicting stories,
the jury could not have found Wilson credible; but this was a
determination that was the province of the jury. See State v.
Anderson, 317 Neb. 435, 10 N.W.3d 334 (2024), cert. denied
___ U.S. ___, 145 S. Ct. 1331, 221 L. Ed. 2d 418 (2025) (it is
in fact finder’s province to resolve conflicts in evidence, pass
on credibility of witnesses, evaluate explanations, or reweigh
evidence presented). The outcome of the trial depended on
whether the jury found Wilson more credible than other wit-
nesses, and Amber’s testimony about Wilson’s untruthfulness
spoke directly to Wilson’s credibility.
Because 	we 	cannot 	conclusively 	determine 	whether
Wilson’s counsel was deficient in failing to object to evidence
that Wilson was not a truthful person or whether Wilson
was prejudiced by his counsel’s failure to do so, we find the

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record insufficient to resolve this claim. See State v. Kruger,
ante p. 361, 27 N.W.3d 398 (2025).
(b) 911 Call
The jury heard the recording of a 911 call made by Wilson’s
neighbor to report that someone was firing gunshots at a police
officer. In the recording, the neighbor’s boyfriend told the
dispatcher that shots were coming from someone in Wilson’s
house and that “they have had problems over there before.”
No one on the call identified Wilson as the shooter. Wilson’s
trial counsel did not object.
On appeal, Wilson asserts that this statement was impermis-
sible character evidence. He claims that his trial counsel was
ineffective in failing to seek redaction of it.
Here, the record establishes that counsel’s performance
was not deficient in not seeking redaction of the statement
that “they have had problems over there before” because it
is not clear who or what the speaker meant. And even if trial
counsel’s performance was deficient, Wilson cannot show
prejudice. Given all the evidence, Wilson cannot show a rea-
sonable probability that if the statement about “problems over
there” had been redacted, the outcome of his trial would have
been different.
(c) Closing Arguments
In closing arguments, trial counsel told the jury that Wilson
was on trial for the crimes charged, not for acting like a “jerk,”
and trial counsel referred to Wilson as a “jerk” several more
times. Wilson argues that his trial counsel was ineffective in
calling him a “jerk” in closing remarks. However, this argu-
ment is not encompassed in Wilson’s assignments of error,
where he pinpoints “the State’s [e]vidence of [his] [c]haracter
[p]resented by [Amber]” and “[i]mproper [a]dmission of . . .
[e]vidence”—he does not reference closing arguments, which
are not evidence. See State v. McSwine, 292 Neb. 565, 873
N.W.2d 405 (2016). An alleged error must be both specifi-
cally assigned and specifically argued in the brief of the party

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asserting the error to be considered by an appellate court. State
v. Kruger, supra. Because Wilson’s assignments of error did
not specifically identify ineffective assistance related to clos-
ing arguments, we will not dwell on this argument further.
2. Questions About Veracity
of Witnesses
On appeal, Wilson claims that his trial counsel rendered
ineffective assistance in failing to object to questions about the
veracity of other witnesses posed to him and to a police officer.
We address each allegation in turn and reject Wilson’s claims
of ineffective assistance of counsel.
(a) Questions Posed to Wilson
Wilson testified at trial. On cross-examination, the State
asked him about the veracity of multiple witnesses concerning
various topics. On appeal, Wilson claims that his trial counsel
was ineffective in not objecting to any of those exchanges,
which he classifies as improper attempts to elicit Wilson’s tes-
timony about the credibility of other witnesses. Wilson argues
that questions about the veracity of other witnesses “invade
the province of the jury, lack probative value, distort the pros-
ecution’s burden of proof, create ‘no win’ situations and are
argumentative.” Brief for appellant at 34.
[20,21] We recently addressed whether it was ineffective
assistance of counsel not to object to questions posed to a
criminal defendant about another witness’ veracity. In State v.
Vazquez, 319 Neb. 192, 21 N.W.3d 615 (2025), we observed
that it is generally improper for a witness to testify as to the
credibility of another witness. See, also, State v. Archie, 273
Neb. 612, 733 N.W.2d 513 (2007). We also recognized that it
is improper for a prosecutor to inquire of a witness whether
another person may or may not have been telling the truth.
State v. Vazquez, supra. See State v. Archie, supra. In Vazquez,
however, we declined to decide whether to adopt a bright-
line rule prohibiting all questions asking a defendant to com-
ment on the veracity of another witness or whether to instead

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permit such questions depending on how they are phrased or
depending on the factual circumstances. We reasoned that even
assuming without deciding that defense counsel was deficient
in not objecting, the defendant could not show prejudice
“because in response to a successful objection, the prosecutor
could be expected to simply rephrase the question in a way
that elicited the same information . . . but without asking [for]
comment directly on the veracity of another witness.” State v.
Vazquez, 319 Neb. at 251, 21 N.W.3d at 666.
We conclude that Vazquez is controlling here. Like the
appellant in Vazquez, Wilson claims that his trial counsel was
ineffective in not objecting when the prosecutor asked him,
the criminal defendant, about the veracity of other witnesses.
Certainly, we caution that the credibility of a witness is the
province of the fact finder and that no witness, expert or
otherwise, should give an opinion that another mentally and
physically competent witness is or is not telling the truth. See
State v. Beermann, 231 Neb. 380, 436 N.W.2d 499 (1989). But
even if trial counsel performed deficiently in not objecting to
such testimony by Wilson, Wilson cannot demonstrate preju-
dice. Like the scenario in Vazquez, had Wilson’s trial counsel
objected, the prosecutor could have rephrased the questions to
obtain the same information from Wilson—that he disagreed
with the other witnesses’ versions of events—and the jury
could have made its credibility assessment. Consequently, we
conclude that this claim of ineffective assistance of counsel
is meritless.
(b) Questions Posed to Police Officer
Officer Derek Urban was involved in Wilson’s transport
and medical treatment after his arrest. While waiting for medi-
cal treatment, Officer Urban’s body camera captured unsolic-
ited statements made by Wilson, including a statement that
Wilson did not shoot at anyone. At trial, the State questioned
Officer Urban about statements he heard Wilson make, includ-
ing the following:

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Q Based on what you knew, the statement made by
. . . Wilson, “I didn’t shoot anybody,” was that a truthful
statement?
A You’re saying was his statement truthful?
Q Yes.
A I did not believe it to be truthful.
Wilson’s trial counsel did not object.
On direct appeal, Wilson assigns that his trial counsel was
ineffective in not objecting to Officer Urban’s testimony that
he did not believe Wilson’s statement to be truthful. Wilson’s
argument generally cites authority that it is improper for
one witness to testify as to the credibility of another wit-
ness and that there is “unfair prejudice involved with opin-
ion evidence from law enforcement officers because a jury
may be predisposed to give more weight to such testimony.”
Brief for appellant at 40. See, State v. Rocha, 295 Neb. 716,
890 N.W.2d 178 (2017); State v. Archie, 273 Neb. 612, 733
N.W.2d 513 (2007).
Although we do not endorse this form of questioning, we
conclude that it did not prejudice Wilson. It is not entirely
clear what Wilson meant by his unsolicited statement that he
did not shoot anyone. If he was referring to the Bartletts, the
evidence is undisputed that he did not shoot at them; if he was
referring to Officer Phillips, the evidence is undisputed that
he did shoot at her, causing a graze wound. Given the ambi-
guity of the statement and the undisputed evidence, we cannot
discern a reasonable probability that but for Officer Urban’s
testimony that he did not believe the statement, the outcome
of Wilson’s trial would have been different. Therefore, we
conclude that this allegation of ineffective assistance of coun-
sel fails.
3. Unduly Emotional and
Inflammatory Evidence
Wilson asserts that the prosecutor elicited unduly emo-
tional and inflammatory testimony regarding a previously slain

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officer and Wilson’s description of the occupants of the parked
car as “‘a couple of [B]lack kids.’” Wilson generally asserts
that this was prosecutorial misconduct and that his trial counsel
was ineffective in not objecting to the testimony.
[22] We have observed that “[g]enerally, prosecutors have
a duty to conduct criminal trials in a manner that provides
the accused with a fair and impartial trial. They may not
inflame the jurors’ prejudices or excite their passions against
the accused.” State v. Vazquez, 319 Neb. 192, 220, 21 N.W.3d
615, 648 (2025), citing State v. McSwine, 292 Neb. 565, 873
N.W.2d 405 (2016); State v. Iromuanya, 282 Neb. 798, 806
N.W.2d 404 (2011). See, also, Rule 403 (“[a]lthough relevant,
evidence may be excluded if its probative value is substantially
outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the
issues, or misleading the jury, or by considerations of undue
delay, waste of time, or needless presentation of cumulative
evidence”). Accordingly, a prosecutor may not intentionally
elicit testimony from a witness for prejudicial effect. See State
v. Vazquez, supra.
Under these rules, we perceive no ineffective assistance
of counsel.
(a) Police Officer Previously
Killed in Line of Duty
Upon examination by the prosecution, Officer Phillips testi-
fied that she removed her seatbelt as she approached Wilson’s
vehicle and put her police cruiser in park. She testified that at
the moment she was getting out of her police cruiser, Wilson
had his gun pointed at her. The prosecution continued:
Q And you said you already were taking off or had
your seat belt off?
A Yes.
Q Why did you do that?
A Because we’re taught that if you[‘re] going to
approach. An example that was given to us in the academy,
if you know you’re going to do that and you’re within a

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safe distance, take your seat belt off prior to your traffic
stop because Jimmy Wilson, Junior, essentially was not
able to get out of his vehicle during his traffic stop. He
was actually still buckled in his vehicle[.]
Q And when you say Jimmy Wilson, that’s another
officer that —
A It’s an officer that was shot and killed, yes.
Q During a traffic stop?
A In his vehicle. Uh-huh.
Q Is that something during your training that is used as
an example?
A Uh-huh. Yes.
Shortly after this line of questioning, the prosecutor asked
another question relating the slain officer to Officer Phillips’
training. Wilson’s trial counsel did not object to any of the ref-
erences to the slain officer.
Based on the record before us, we are not persuaded that
trial counsel’s performance was deficient or, even if it was
deficient, that it was prejudicial. See State v. Miranda, 313
Neb. 358, 984 N.W.2d 261 (2023) (record on direct appeal
is sufficient to conclusively determine claim of ineffective
assistance of counsel if it establishes that trial counsel’s per-
formance was not deficient or that appellant will not be able
to establish prejudice). We do not see how fleeting references
to the slain officer during an explanation of police procedure
during armed encounters could have inflamed the passions of
the jury against Wilson.
(b) Wilson’s Description of
Individuals in Parked Car
The jury viewed body camera footage of the statements
Wilson made to an officer while receiving treatment at a hos-
pital. In that footage, Wilson, who is white, identified the indi-
viduals in the parked car as “a bunch of Black kids.” Wilson’s
trial counsel did not object when this exhibit was published to
the jury.

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Later in the trial, when cross-examining Wilson, the pros-
ecutor asked about the individuals Wilson encountered in the
parked car:
Q You go down the street, and there is a car that’s in
your way, right?
A Correct.
Q Okay. And you — “a couple of [B]lack kids,” isn’t
that what you said?
A I said — I don’t remember exactly what I said.
Q “A couple of [B]lack kids,” isn’t that what you told
the police?
A Yes.
Q Okay. That were in that car that was in your way,
and that made you angry, didn’t it?
A The fact that they were in my way or they were
[B]lack.
Q The fact that they were in your way?
A Yes.
Q I don’t know why you would mention that they were
[B]lack?
A I don’t know. I was wondering why you did.
Q Because you did. I’m quoting you.
A Okay.
Q Did you not tell the police that it was just [a] couple
of [B]lack kids in the car?
A I may have, yeah.
Q Do you remember saying that?
A I do remember saying that on the video when I
watched it, yes.
Wilson’s counsel did not object.
Now on appeal, Wilson claims that his counsel was ineffec-
tive in failing to object to this line of questioning, “[w]hether
viewed as prosecutorial misconduct, improper evidence of a
person’s bad character, irrelevant, or unduly prejudicial.” Brief
for appellant at 48. Wilson suggests that the questioning was
calculated to inflame the jurors’ prejudices.

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We find the record sufficient to dispose of this claim on
direct appeal because, even if trial counsel’s performance was
deficient, Wilson cannot establish prejudice as a matter of law.
See State v. Miranda, 313 Neb. 358, 984 N.W.2d 261 (2023).
Wilson’s testimony about his description of the occupants of
the parked car was cumulative of his recorded statements that
were published to the jury before Wilson testified. Therefore,
the record shows that Wilson cannot demonstrate prejudice
based on his trial counsel’s failure to object to the testimony.
See State v. Sawyer, 319 Neb. 435, 22 N.W.3d 650 (2025)
(failure to object to statement was not ineffective assistance of
counsel because statement was cumulative of other evidence;
thus, defendant could not demonstrate prejudice).
V. CONCLUSION
For the reasons above, we conclude that Wilson’s claims
of ineffective assistance of counsel either lack merit, were
inadequately assigned, or cannot be resolved on this appel-
late record.
Affirmed.