In re Interest of Jerel S.

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Nebraska Supreme Court Advance Sheets
320 Nebraska Reports
IN RE INTEREST OF JEREL S.
Cite as 320 Neb. 526
In re Interest of Jerel S., a child
under 18 years of age.
State of Nebraska, appellee, v.
Jerel S., appellant.
___ N.W.3d ___
Filed December 12, 2025. 	No. S-25-149.
1. Juvenile Courts: Appeal and Error. An appellate court reviews juve-
nile delinquency cases de novo on the record and reaches its conclusions
independently of the juvenile court’s findings.
2. Evidence: Appeal and Error. When the evidence is in conflict, an
appellate court may give weight to the fact that the lower court observed
the witnesses and accepted one version of the facts over the other.
3. Criminal Law: Intent: Words and Phrases. For purposes of the crime
of terroristic threats, the intent to terrorize another is an intent to pro-
duce intense fear or anxiety in another.
4. Criminal Law: Evidence: Intent. The intent with which an act is com-
mitted is a mental process and may be inferred from the words and acts
of the defendant and from the circumstances surrounding the incident.
5. Effectiveness of Counsel: Proof. Generally, to prevail on a claim of
ineffective assistance of counsel under Strickland v. Washington, 466
U.S. 668, 104 S. Ct. 2052, 80 L. Ed. 2d 674 (1984), the defendant must
show that his or her counsel’s performance was deficient and that this
deficient performance actually prejudiced the defendant’s defense.
6. Effectiveness of Counsel. Counsel is not deficient for failing to file a
meritless motion.
7. Effectiveness of Counsel: Proof. To show prejudice, the defendant must
demonstrate a reasonable probability that but for counsel’s deficient per-
formance, the result of the proceeding would have been different.
8. Motions for Continuance: Appeal and Error. A court does not abuse
its discretion in denying a continuance unless it clearly appears that the
party seeking the continuance suffered prejudice because of that denial.
Nebraska Supreme Court Online Library
www.nebraska.gov/apps-courts-epub/
10/18/2026 12:57 AM CDT

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Nebraska Supreme Court Advance Sheets
320 Nebraska Reports
IN RE INTEREST OF JEREL S.
Cite as 320 Neb. 526
Appeal from the Separate Juvenile Court of Lancaster
County: Reggie L. Ryder, Judge. Affirmed.
Megan E. McDowell, of Morrow, Poppe, Watermeier &
Lonowski, P.C., L.L.O., for appellant.
Patrick F. Condon, Lancaster County Attorney, Aynsley
Davis, and Kyle Jedlicka, Senior Certified Law Student, for
appellee.
Funke, 	C.J., 	Cassel, 	Stacy, 	Papik, 	Freudenberg, 	and
Bergevin, JJ.
Papik, J.
After a trial, the juvenile court adjudicated Jerel S. as a
juvenile who committed an act which would constitute the
crime of terroristic threats. Jerel appeals the adjudication,
alleging that the juvenile court erred in finding that he com-
mitted an act which would constitute the crime of terroristic
threats and in overruling a motion to continue. He also asserts
that his counsel was ineffective. Finding no merit to these
assignments, we affirm.
I. BACKGROUND
1. Petition Filed
The State commenced these proceedings by filing a peti-
tion in the juvenile court. The petition asked the juvenile
court to adjudicate Jerel as a juvenile who committed an act
which would constitute a felony, pursuant to Neb. Rev. Stat.
§ 43-247(2) (Cum. Supp. 2024). The felony alleged was ter-
roristic threats as described in Neb. Rev. Stat. § 28-311.01
(Reissue 2016).
The juvenile court appointed the public defender’s office to
represent Jerel. At the request of Jerel’s counsel, the juvenile
court ordered a competency evaluation. After receiving a com-
petency evaluation completed by a psychologist, the juvenile

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IN RE INTEREST OF JEREL S.
Cite as 320 Neb. 526
court found that Jerel was competent to stand trial. Shortly
thereafter, Jerel entered a denial to the allegations of the peti-
tion and the juvenile court scheduled the petition for an adju-
dication hearing.
2. Motions to Disqualify, Continue
On the morning the adjudication hearing was to begin,
Jerel’s counsel filed a motion to disqualify the juvenile court
judge assigned to the case. Jerel claimed disqualification
was warranted because the juvenile court judge had previ-
ously decided a motion for approval of an emergency place-
ment involving Jerel in another case, brought pursuant to
§ 43-247(3)(a). Jerel’s counsel argued that because the motion
for approval of emergency placement contained information
about the same incident upon which the allegations in the
State’s petition were based, the juvenile court judge could not
be fair and impartial.
The juvenile court judge overruled the motion to dis-
qualify. The juvenile court judge explained that he would not
consider information he had been exposed to in other pro-
ceedings involving Jerel in deciding the adjudication petition
and that the fact that he had been exposed to such information
did not call into question his ability to be fair and impartial.
The juvenile court judge also commented on the fact that,
although Jerel’s counsel had been appointed months earlier,
the motion to disqualify was not filed until just prior to the
adjudication hearing.
Immediately after the motion to disqualify was overruled,
Jerel’s counsel moved for a continuance. In support, Jerel’s
counsel stated, “This is the first time I’ve met with Jerel in
person and he’s not had an opportunity to fully go over all the
discovery in this case . . . .” Counsel also asked that “certain
documentation . . . about the alleged incident be provided
to [her] office in order for [her] to review” and appeared to
assert that Jerel was entitled to such information under Brady
v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 83 S. Ct. 1194, 10 L. Ed. 2d 215

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IN RE INTEREST OF JEREL S.
Cite as 320 Neb. 526
(1963). After the juvenile court asked Jerel’s counsel why
the documents had not been sought earlier, counsel responded
that she had only recently discovered the existence of the case
involving Jerel brought pursuant to § 43-247(3)(a).
The juvenile court found that good cause for a continuance
was lacking and denied the motion. Then the adjudication
hearing began.
3. Adjudication Hearing
The State’s primary witness at the adjudication hearing was
Lanslot Pyne, a foster parent, with whom Jerel had once been
temporarily placed. Pyne testified that just after 2 o’clock one
morning while Jerel was placed with him, Jerel entered the
living room of Pyne’s apartment, where Pyne was watching a
movie. According to Pyne, Jerel then said that he was “gonna
make [the weekend] exciting” for Pyne. Jerel walked to the
room where he was staying and initially returned with a lighter.
Jerel ignited the lighter and placed it near a tree in Pyne’s liv-
ing room. When Pyne did not react, Jerel returned to his room
and retrieved medication, a flashlight, and a knife.
Pyne testified that the agency that placed Jerel in his care
had directed that he secure medications and sharp objects and
keep them away from Jerel. Following that direction, Pyne had
secured knives, medication, and other objects in a safe in his
bedroom. When Jerel appeared with the medication, flashlight,
and knife, Pyne walked to his room, where he found the safe
broken open and several objects, including knives and the
medication, missing.
Pyne testified that he then asked Jerel why he took the
items, and he recounted Jerel’s response:
He said he was about to make my night exciting. He been
thinking about way to get rid of me but he wanted to do
something really quick because I’m a big person so he
don’t wanna do something and then I get to attack him
and overpower him, so he rather take me out and do it
very quick.

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Nebraska Supreme Court Advance Sheets
320 Nebraska Reports
IN RE INTEREST OF JEREL S.
Cite as 320 Neb. 526
Pyne also testified that Jerel told him he had been research-
ing ways to kill Pyne slowly. When asked if Jerel had specifi-
cally said that “he was going to kill [Pyne],” or that “he was
going to harm [Pyne],” Pyne answered in the affirmative.
Based on Jerel’s statements, Pyne believed that Jerel was
about to attack him. Pyne testified that he moved behind a
counter and that at that time, Jerel stood on top of the counter
and jumped off before “coming at [him] with the knife also.”
Pyne testified that at some point after Jerel had come down
from the counter, Pyne was able to get both of Jerel’s hands
behind him and put him “down on the ground in a hold.”
Pyne then called law enforcement. When Pyne was asked on
cross-examination if Jerel suffered any injuries on the night of
the incident, he responded, “Not to my knowledge.”
The 	State 	also 	called 	a 	law 	enforcement 	officer 	who
responded to the scene to testify. The officer testified that when
he arrived, Jerel told him that he had obtained medication, a
knife, and a hammer and that Pyne had assaulted him because
he did so.
On cross-examination, Jerel’s counsel elicited testimony
from the officer that during his interactions with Jerel, Jerel
appeared to be in pain, had a scratch on his forearm, and had
bleeding cuts on his face. Jerel’s counsel also elicited testi-
mony that the officer called an ambulance, which transported
Jerel to a hospital, and that when the officer arrived at Pyne’s
apartment, there was another man in the apartment. During
Pyne’s testimony, he had denied that there was another person
in the apartment.
Jerel testified on his own behalf. He testified that he did not
enjoy living with Pyne. He claimed that Pyne threatened him
and joked with him by putting his hands around Jerel’s throat.
According to Jerel, he had requested a different placement
from his caseworker prior to the confrontation at issue.
In his testimony, Jerel offered an account of the confron-
tation that differed from Pyne’s. He testified that he found
his medication in an unlocked suitcase, along with hammers,

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Nebraska Supreme Court Advance Sheets
320 Nebraska Reports
IN RE INTEREST OF JEREL S.
Cite as 320 Neb. 526
flashlights, lighters, and other “stuff like that.” He grabbed a
medication pack, the knife, and a flashlight, and he showed
them to Pyne. He testified that he did so because he “was hop-
ing that through that [Pyne] would not want to keep [Jerel] in
his home any longer and remove [him] sooner.”
Jerel testified that he did not go after Pyne, but that Pyne
began chasing him. Jerel testified that he jumped onto the
counter to avoid Pyne and that he felt threatened while on
the counter. Jerel testified that after he jumped off the coun-
ter, Pyne’s friend, who Jerel said was in the apartment dur-
ing the entire altercation, grabbed him and then Pyne pinned
him to the ground. According to Jerel, he received scratch
marks and bruises from Pyne’s contact with him. Jerel denied
making any verbal threats to Pyne and denied intending to
harm Pyne.
4. Adjudication
The juvenile court adjudicated Jerel as a juvenile described
in § 43-247(2), finding beyond a reasonable doubt that Jerel
committed an act which would constitute making terroris-
tic threats. In explaining its ruling, the juvenile court stated
that it found Pyne “highly credible.” In contrast, the juve-
nile court stated that it found Jerel’s account of the incident
“not believable.”
Jerel filed a timely appeal of the adjudication.
II. ASSIGNMENTS OF ERROR
Represented by different counsel on appeal, Jerel assigns
three errors. Two assignments pertain to the juvenile court. He
asserts that the juvenile court erred by finding that the State
proved its allegations beyond a reasonable doubt and by over-
ruling his motion to continue.
Jerel also claims that he received ineffective assistance
from his trial counsel. Here, he assigns that “trial counsel
provided ineffective assistance of counsel throughout the pro-
ceedings, including at trial, . . . which violated his due process

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IN RE INTEREST OF JEREL S.
Cite as 320 Neb. 526
rights and which precluded him from fundamental fairness in
the process to which he was entitled.”
III. STANDARD OF REVIEW
[1,2] An appellate court reviews juvenile delinquency cases
de novo on the record and reaches its conclusions indepen-
dently of the juvenile court’s findings. See In re Interest of
Gunner B., 312 Neb. 697, 980 N.W.2d 863 (2022). When the
evidence is in conflict, however, an appellate court may give
weight to the fact that the lower court observed the witnesses
and accepted one version of the facts over the other. Id.
This court has not directly addressed what standard of
review applies to the denial of a continuance in a juvenile
delinquency case. In criminal and civil cases, however, the
decision of whether to grant a continuance is reviewed for
abuse of discretion. See State v. Ramos, 319 Neb. 511, 23
N.W.3d 640 (2025) (criminal), and Noel v. Pathology Med.
Servs., ante p. 92, 26 N.W.3d 196 (2025) (civil). We apply that
same standard here.
IV. ANALYSIS
1. State’s Burden of Proof
We begin our analysis with Jerel’s argument that the juvenile
court erred by finding that the State carried its burden of proof.
In this case, for Jerel to be adjudicated under § 43-247(2), the
State was obligated to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that
he committed an act which would constitute a felony under the
laws of this state. See In re Interest of Zoie H., 304 Neb. 868,
937 N.W.2d 801 (2020).
[3] As we have noted above, the State alleged that Jerel
committed an act which would constitute the Class IIIA felony
of terroristic threats described in § 28-311.01. Relevant here,
§ 28-311.01(1) provides that a person commits terroristic
threats if he or she “threatens to commit any crime of violence
. . . [w]ith the intent to terrorize another.” For purposes of the
crime of terroristic threats, the intent to terrorize another is an

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Nebraska Supreme Court Advance Sheets
320 Nebraska Reports
IN RE INTEREST OF JEREL S.
Cite as 320 Neb. 526
intent to produce intense fear or anxiety in another. State v.
Clark, 315 Neb. 736, 1 N.W.3d 487 (2024).
An analysis of whether the State carried its burden to show
that Jerel committed an act which would constitute terroris-
tic threats must begin with the fact that the State introduced
evidence, through Pyne’s testimony, that Jerel, while holding
a knife, said that he had been thinking about ways to get rid
of Pyne and researching ways to kill him. Pyne also testified
that Jerel told him he was going to kill him and harm him.
Jerel does not contest that such statements would constitute
“threats . . . to commit [a] crime of violence” for purposes of
§ 28-311.01(1). Instead, Jerel primarily argues that his con-
flicting account of the confrontation supplies reasonable doubt
that he, in fact, made such statements. To this, Jerel adds that
the juvenile court should have believed his testimony rather
than Pyne’s because he was more credible. In support, he
points out that the law enforcement officer corroborated his
testimony that there was another man present in the apartment
during the incident and that Jerel suffered injuries. Meanwhile,
Pyne denied the presence of another man and disclaimed any
knowledge of Jerel’s injuries.
Jerel essentially asks us to reweigh his account of the
incident alongside Pyne’s. But although our review in this
case is de novo, there is a caveat. When confronted with
conflicting testimony in juvenile delinquency cases, we may,
notwithstanding our de novo standard of review, give weight
to the fact that the lower court observed the witnesses and
accepted one version of the facts over the other. See In re
Interest of Gunner B., 312 Neb. 697, 980 N.W.2d 863 (2022).
We find it appropriate to do so here. The juvenile court had
the opportunity to observe the testimony of Pyne and Jerel
firsthand; we, on the other hand, can only review a cold appel-
late record. And while Jerel points to some issues on which
his testimony was arguably corroborated and Pyne’s was not,
those issues are collateral to the primary question before the
juvenile court—whether Jerel made the alleged threats or not.

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Nebraska Supreme Court Advance Sheets
320 Nebraska Reports
IN RE INTEREST OF JEREL S.
Cite as 320 Neb. 526
The juvenile court considered the conflicting testimony and
found beyond a reasonable doubt that he had. We are not in a
position to say that was erroneous.
[4] In addition to asking us to credit his testimony rather
than Pyne’s, Jerel submits there was inadequate proof that
he intended to terrorize Pyne. Although there was perhaps
no direct evidence of Jerel’s intent, we have recognized that
the intent with which an act is committed is a mental process
and may be inferred from the words and acts of the defendant
and from the circumstances surrounding the incident. State
v. Clark, supra. Here, Pyne’s testimony that Jerel discussed
killing him while holding a knife would certainly allow one
to infer that Jerel intended to terrorize Pyne. That testimony,
found credible by the juvenile court, leaves us unable to con-
clude that the State failed to prove Jerel acted with the requi-
site intent.
Jerel’s arguments that the State failed to carry its burden of
proof are meritless.
2. Ineffective Assistance
of Counsel
We next address Jerel’s assignment of error claiming that
he received ineffective assistance of counsel. This court does
not appear to have previously held that a juvenile has a right
to effective assistance of counsel in a juvenile delinquency
proceeding. However, in In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 87 S. Ct.
1428, 18 L. Ed. 2d 527 (1967), the U.S. Supreme Court held
that the 14th Amendment right to due process guarantees a
juvenile offender a right to counsel in a delinquency adjudica-
tion in which the juvenile’s freedom could be curtailed. See,
also, In re Interest of Jordan B., 300 Neb. 355, 913 N.W.2d
477 (2018). Many other courts have concluded that the right
to counsel in juvenile delinquency proceedings described in
In re Gault includes the right to effective counsel. See, e.g.,
In re Johnathan T., 2022 IL 127222, 193 N.E.3d 1240, 456
Ill. Dec. 832 (2022); JP v. State, 514 P.3d 785 (Wyo. 2022);

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IN RE INTEREST OF JEREL S.
Cite as 320 Neb. 526
D.C.M. v. Pemiscot County Juvenile Office, 578 S.W.3d 776
(Mo. 2019); In re Parris W., 363 Md. 717, 770 A.2d 202
(2001); In re K.J.O., 27 S.W.3d 340 (Tex. App. 2000). For
purposes of this opinion, we assume that Jerel had such a
right to effective counsel in this adjudication proceeding.
But our assumption that Jerel had a right to effective assis-
tance of counsel in this adjudication proceeding raises sev-
eral questions about how claims of ineffective assistance in
juvenile delinquency proceedings should be resolved. These
questions arise because while there are well-established rules
and procedures governing claims of ineffective assistance in
criminal cases, some of those rules and procedures do not map
neatly onto juvenile delinquency cases. We discuss each of
these questions in the sections below before ultimately analyz-
ing Jerel’s ineffective assistance of counsel claim.
(a) Adequate Assignment of Error?
The first question raised by Jerel’s ineffective assistance
assignment of error is whether it assigns the allegedly deficient
conduct of counsel with adequate specificity. When a criminal
defendant asserts ineffective assistance of counsel on direct
appeal, the assignment of error, standing alone, must specifi-
cally allege what conduct constituted deficient performance.
See State v. Rupp, ante p. 502, ___ N.W.3d ___ (2025).
If this were a criminal case, Jerel’s assignment of error
would clearly fail to adequately assign deficient performance.
Jerel’s assignment of error, quoted above, generally asserts
that counsel was ineffective throughout the proceedings. Any
detail about how his counsel was ineffective is set forth in the
argument section of the brief rather than in the assignment of
error itself. In an opinion released today, we explain that in
a criminal case, a party cannot comply with the specificity
requirement by making a general assignment of ineffective
assistance and setting forth the specifics of the allegedly
deficient performance in the argument section of the brief.
See id.

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IN RE INTEREST OF JEREL S.
Cite as 320 Neb. 526
This, however, is not a criminal proceeding. In addition,
the State made no argument in this case that the specificity
requirement for assigning ineffective assistance of counsel
should extend to this juvenile delinquency proceeding. For pur-
poses of this case, we therefore assume without deciding that
the specificity requirement does not apply and will consider
Jerel’s assignment of ineffective assistance of counsel notwith-
standing its general nature.
(b) Resolution Based on
Existing Record?
Another question posed by the assertion of ineffective
assistance of counsel in a juvenile case is whether such a
claim should be resolved based solely on the existing record.
In criminal direct appeals, we routinely decline to rule on
claims of ineffective assistance because the record is insuf-
ficient to assess them. See State v. Filholm, 287 Neb. 763,
768-69, 848 N.W.2d 571, 577 (2014) (“[w]e have held in
countless cases that the record on direct appeal was insuffi-
cient for assessing ineffective assistance of counsel claims”).
When the record on direct appeal is found to be insufficient
to resolve a claim of ineffective assistance in a criminal case,
the defendant can raise that ineffective assistance claim in a
subsequent motion for postconviction relief. See, e.g., State
v. Nolan, 292 Neb. 118, 870 N.W.2d 806 (2015) (finding
defendant was entitled to evidentiary hearing in postconvic-
tion proceeding on claims asserted in direct appeal but on
which record was insufficient to resolve). But see State v.
Stelly, 304 Neb. 33, 64, 932 N.W.2d 857, 879-80 (2019) (“just
because an appellate court finds the record on direct appeal
is insufficient to resolve a claim of ineffective assistance, it
does not mean that a postconviction court will necessarily be
precluded from later finding the existing record affirmatively
refutes the same claim”).
We, however, are aware of no procedure similar to a motion
for postconviction relief through which a juvenile could raise

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IN RE INTEREST OF JEREL S.
Cite as 320 Neb. 526
a claim that counsel in a delinquency adjudication was inef-
fective. One might then wonder whether we must attempt to
resolve Jerel’s claims of ineffective assistance based solely
on the trial record or whether we can defer ruling on those
claims as we might in a criminal case.
We acknowledge that in some states, when an appellate
court determines that the record in a direct appeal is insuffi-
cient to resolve a claim of ineffective assistance in a juvenile
delinquency proceeding, the court will remand the matter to the
court in which the adjudication hearing took place for an evi-
dentiary hearing. See, e.g., D.C.M. v. Pemiscot County Juvenile
Office, 578 S.W.3d 776 (Mo. 2019). We are not aware of any
Nebraska statute, however, that would authorize us to order or
the juvenile court to conduct such a hearing. Statutory authori-
zation for such a hearing is particularly salient in this context
given our recognition that a juvenile court, as a statutorily cre-
ated court of limited jurisdiction, has only the authority which
the statutes confer upon it. See, e.g., In re Interest of Jordon B.,
312 Neb. 827, 981 N.W.2d 242 (2022).
In any event, Jerel has not requested that his claims of
ineffective assistance be resolved on anything other than the
existing record. Accordingly, we will resolve Jerel’s claims
of ineffective assistance based on the record before us. If that
record does not establish ineffective assistance, Jerel will not
be entitled to relief.
(c) What Standard to Apply?
Before we can analyze Jerel’s ineffective assistance of
counsel claims, one more preliminary, but important, ques-
tion lingers: What standard ought to be applied to analyze
the claims? On this question, the parties each offer a dif-
ferent proposal.
The State argues that we should apply the same two-prong
inquiry first set forth in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S.
668, 104 S. Ct. 2052, 80 L. Ed. 2d 674 (1984), that is applied
when assessing ineffective assistance of counsel claims in

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IN RE INTEREST OF JEREL S.
Cite as 320 Neb. 526
criminal proceedings. Jerel, on the other hand, urges us to
apply a standard applied by the Indiana Supreme Court in A.M.
v. State, 134 N.E.3d 361 (Ind. 2019), a case in which a juve-
nile alleged that his counsel was ineffective in a disposition
modification proceeding. In that context, the Indiana Supreme
Court declined to evaluate the claim of ineffective assistance
under Strickland and instead evaluated the claim by asking
“whether the lawyer’s overall performance was so defective
that the . . . court cannot say with confidence that the juvenile
court imposed a disposition modification consistent with the
best interests of the child.” A.M. v. State, 134 N.E.3d at 368
(internal quotation marks omitted).
We have doubts that the standard applied by the Indiana
Supreme Court in A.M. is the appropriate standard to apply
when it is asserted that counsel provided ineffective assis-
tance in a juvenile delinquency adjudication proceeding. The
Indiana Supreme Court applied that standard when it was
alleged that counsel was ineffective in a disposition modifica-
tion proceeding, and that court recently declined an oppor-
tunity to extend the same standard to ineffective assistance
claims arising out of the adjudicative phase of juvenile delin-
quency proceedings. See J.M. v. State, 264 N.E.3d 1197
(Ind. 2025).
That said, we believe there are also reasons to ques-
tion whether Strickland is the appropriate test for analyzing
claims that counsel was ineffective in a juvenile delinquency
adjudication proceeding. Although it appears most courts
apply Strickland to such claims, see Barbara Fedders, Losing
Hold of the Guiding Hand: Ineffective Assistance of Counsel
in Juvenile Delinquency Representation, 14 Lewis & Clark
L. Rev. 771 (2010), Strickland held that its two-prong test
should be applied to determine whether a criminal defendant’s
Sixth Amendment right to counsel was violated. But the
Sixth Amendment applies to criminal prosecutions. See U.S.
Const. amend. VI (“[i]n all criminal prosecutions, the accused
shall . . . have the Assistance of Counsel for his defence”).

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IN RE INTEREST OF JEREL S.
Cite as 320 Neb. 526
And juvenile delinquency proceedings are not criminal pros-
ecutions. In re Interest of Jordan B., 300 Neb. 355, 913
N.W.2d 477 (2018). Rights to counsel in a juvenile delin-
quency proceeding have a different constitutional source—the
14th Amendment right to due process. See In re Interest of
Jordan B., supra.
In a concurring opinion in A.M., one judge of the Indiana
Supreme Court contended that because the right to counsel
in a juvenile delinquency proceeding is a due process right,
claims of ineffective assistance in such proceedings should
be analyzed not under Strickland or the test set forth by the
majority in A.M., but under a “minimal procedural-due-process
standard” of “fundamental fairness.” A.M. v. State, 134 N.E.3d
at 369 (Slaughter, J., concurring). The author of the concur-
rence asserted that under this standard, the juvenile would be
entitled to relief only if the lawyer “abandoned the case and
prevented the client from being heard.” Id. (internal quotation
marks omitted).
In the end, we determine it is not necessary to resolve in
this case whether Jerel’s claims are appropriately resolved
under Strickland, under the alternative proposed by Jerel, or
under a minimal procedural due process standard focused
solely on fundamental fairness. As we will explain now, under
any of those standards, we find no ineffective assistance.
(d) Analysis of Ineffective
Assistance Claims
Jerel argues that his counsel was ineffective in several
ways. He first argues that his counsel was ineffective in not
moving to disqualify the juvenile court judge earlier in the
proceedings. He next claims his counsel was ineffective in
not requesting and obtaining additional information, more
specifically documentation from the case involving Jerel
brought pursuant to § 43-247(3)(a), as well as information
provided to the psychologist for Jerel’s competency evalua-
tion. Jerel also alleges his counsel was ineffective in failing to

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IN RE INTEREST OF JEREL S.
Cite as 320 Neb. 526
meet with him in person to review the evidence that would be
presented against him and in failing to present defenses to the
petition. He mentions lack of capacity as a defense that was
“potentially” available. Brief for appellant at 22.
[5] Under Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 104 S. Ct.
2052, 80 L. Ed. 2d 674 (1984), Jerel has not shown ineffective
assistance. Generally, to prevail on a claim of ineffective assis-
tance of counsel under Strickland, the defendant must show
that his or her counsel’s performance was deficient and that
this deficient performance actually prejudiced the defendant’s
defense. State v. Hagens, ante p. 65, 26 N.W.3d 174 (2025).
With respect to some actions of his counsel, Jerel cannot show
deficient performance, and with respect to others, he cannot
show prejudice.
[6] Jerel’s claim that his counsel should have moved to
disqualify the juvenile court judge earlier fails the deficient
performance prong. While Jerel’s brief devotes several para-
graphs to arguing why his trial counsel could have made the
motion to disqualify earlier, it offers no real argument as to
why such a motion would have been successful. A litigant
seeking to disqualify a judge on the basis of bias or preju-
dice bears the heavy burden of overcoming the presumption
of judicial impartiality. See Buttercase v. Davis, 313 Neb. 1,
982 N.W.2d 240 (2022), modified on denial of rehearing 313
Neb. 587, 985 N.W.2d 588 (2023). The fact that the juvenile
court judge had previously been exposed, in another case,
to information regarding the incident at issue in this case is
hardly sufficient to overcome that presumption. A motion to
disqualify on this basis alone would have failed, regardless
of when it was filed. And counsel is not deficient for failing
to file a meritless motion. State v. Haas, 317 Neb. 919, 12
N.W.3d 787 (2024).
[7] Jerel’s other allegations of ineffective assistance of
counsel fail the prejudice prong of Strickland. To show preju-
dice, the defendant must demonstrate a reasonable probability
that but for counsel’s deficient performance, the result of the

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proceeding would have been different. State v. Thomas, 311
Neb. 989, 977 N.W.2d 258 (2022). A reasonable probability
is a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the out-
come. Id.
Even if Jerel could establish that his counsel was deficient
in any of the ways alleged, he cannot show any reason-
able probability that, but for those alleged deficiencies, the
adjudication hearing would have ended in a different result.
While Jerel complains that his counsel should have obtained
more documentation, he offers no suggestion as to what any
of this documentation would have shown. While he says
that his counsel should have met with him in person before
the day of the adjudication hearing, he does not tell us how
such a meeting would have affected the evidence presented
at trial. And while he says that his counsel should have put
on evidence of defenses including, “potentially,” a defense
based on capacity, he points to no information that would
have allowed that or any other defense to succeed. See brief
for appellant at 22.
Jerel’s ineffective assistance claims would also fail under
the standard he asks us to apply from the Indiana Supreme
Court’s opinion in A.M. v. State, 134 N.E.3d 361 (Ind. 2019).
While Jerel argues that his trial counsel should have done
various things differently, the Indiana Supreme Court stated
that under the standard it articulated, courts should focus not
“on what the child’s lawyer might or might not have done to
better represent the child” but on whether the hearing was
fundamentally fair and whether the outcome was appropriate
considering the child’s best interests. See A.M. v. State, 34
N.E.3d at 368.
On the record before us, we cannot conclude the hearing
was fundamentally unfair or resulted in an outcome incon-
sistent with Jerel’s best interests. Although Jerel claims there
were things his trial counsel could or should have done dif-
ferently, it is not as though his trial counsel did nothing at all
or abandoned the case. Counsel cross-examined the State’s

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witnesses and allowed Jerel to give his account of the incident
at issue through his direct testimony. Counsel was able to use
that testimony to develop an argument that the events at issue
did not occur as Pyne testified. And although the juvenile
court was ultimately not persuaded by this argument, we find
no basis to conclude the adjudication hearing was fundamen-
tally unfair or resulted in an outcome that was inconsistent
with Jerel’s best interests. And because Jerel’s counsel did not
abandon the case or prevent Jerel from being heard, his claims
would also fail under a minimal procedural due process stan-
dard focused solely on fundamental fairness.
3. Motion to Continue
Finally, we turn to Jerel’s contention that the juvenile court
erred by denying his motion to continue. Jerel’s arguments
that the juvenile court should have continued the case rely on
much of the same material that formed the basis of his inef-
fective assistance of counsel claims. Jerel argues that the juve-
nile court should have granted his request for a continuance
because his trial counsel informed the juvenile court that she
had not met with Jerel in person before the day of the adjudica-
tion hearing, had not gone over all the evidence with him, and
had not obtained evidence that she claimed might be relevant
to the case. These comments, Jerel argues, demonstrated that
counsel was not prepared to adequately represent him and were
grounds for a continuance.
[8] We find no reversible error. A court does not abuse its
discretion in denying a continuance unless it clearly appears
that the party seeking the continuance suffered prejudice
because of that denial. State v. Ramos, 319 Neb. 511, 23
N.W.3d 640 (2025). As previewed by our discussion of Jerel’s
ineffective assistance of counsel claims, there is no basis on
which we could conclude that the adjudication hearing would
have ended differently had a continuance been granted so
that Jerel’s counsel could meet with him personally or obtain
additional documentation. We do not know what would have

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transpired differently had Jerel’s counsel met with him in per-
son, and we do not know what documents might have been
obtained. Furthermore, Jerel had the benefit of a contested
adjudication hearing at which his counsel cross-examined the
State’s witnesses, adduced testimony from Jerel, and presented
an argument that he did not commit an act which would con-
stitute terroristic threats. Jerel cannot show that he suffered
prejudice from the denial of the continuance.
V. CONCLUSION
For the reasons above, we find no merit to Jerel’s assign-
ments of error and therefore affirm.
Affirmed.