State v. Strong

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Nebraska Supreme Court Advance Sheets
318 Nebraska Reports
STATE v. STRONG
Cite as 318 Neb. 525
State of Nebraska, appellee, v.
Charmayne R. Strong, appellant.
___ N.W.3d ___
Filed February 28, 2025. 	No. S-24-296.
1. Statutes: Appeal and Error. Statutory interpretation presents a question
of law that an appellate court resolves independently of the trial court.
2. Statutes. It is not within the province of the courts to read meaning
into a statute that is not there or to read anything direct and plain out of
a statute.
3. Blood, Breath, and Urine Tests: Search Warrants. Neb. Rev. Stat.
§ 60-6,197(3) (Reissue 2021) criminalizes the refusal to submit to a
chemical blood test when the blood test is sought pursuant to a search
warrant.
Appeal from the District Court for Sheridan County, Travis
P. O’Gorman, Judge, on appeal thereto from the County
Court for Sheridan County, Paul G. Wess, Judge. Judgment of
District Court affirmed.
Bell Island, of Island Law Office, P.C., L.L.O., for appellant.
Michael T. Hilgers, Attorney General, and Nathan A. Liss
for appellee.
Funke, C.J., Miller-Lerman, Cassel, Stacy, Papik, and
Freudenberg, JJ.
Papik, J.
At issue in this case is a single legal question: Can a per-
son be convicted of refusal to submit to a chemical blood test
Nebraska Supreme Court Online Library
www.nebraska.gov/apps-courts-epub/
10/14/2026 08:08 AM CDT

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Nebraska Supreme Court Advance Sheets
318 Nebraska Reports
STATE v. STRONG
Cite as 318 Neb. 525
for alcohol under Neb. Rev. Stat. § 60-6,197 (Reissue 2021)
when law enforcement seeks the blood test pursuant to a
search warrant? The answer to that question is yes. Because
that resolves the appellant’s assignments of error, we affirm
her conviction.
BACKGROUND
Relatively few background facts are necessary to frame the
legal dispute at issue. Law enforcement officers responding to
a minor two-vehicle accident suspected that the occupant of
one of the vehicles, Charmayne R. Strong, was intoxicated.
After Strong refused to take a preliminary breath test, officers
arrested her and transported her to law enforcement headquar-
ters. Officers then obtained a search warrant for a chemical
test of her blood. They also advised her that refusal to submit
to the blood test was a separate crime for which she could be
charged. Strong initially said she would consent to the blood
test, but after she was transported to a hospital, she raised
objections and insisted on speaking to various individuals
before she would agree to the blood test. After some time,
the officers determined that Strong had refused to submit to
the blood test and transported her back to law enforcement
headquarters.
The State later charged Strong in county court with refusal
to submit to a chemical test, in violation of § 60-6,197. Strong
filed a motion to suppress evidence related to her arrest. At a
hearing on the motion to suppress, the county court received
evidence establishing the facts set forth above. The county
court overruled the motion to suppress. Following a stipulated
bench trial at which it was agreed that the county court would
consider the evidence adduced at the hearing on the motion
to suppress, along with some other exhibits, the county court
found Strong guilty of refusal to submit to a chemical test.
The county court imposed a sentence of 6 months’ probation
with various conditions, including a 60-day license revocation
and a $500 fine.

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Nebraska Supreme Court Advance Sheets
318 Nebraska Reports
STATE v. STRONG
Cite as 318 Neb. 525
Strong appealed to the district court. Her primary argument
in the district court was that one cannot be found guilty of
refusal to submit to a chemical test for blood under § 60-6,197
if the blood draw is sought pursuant to a search warrant. The
district court rejected Strong’s arguments and affirmed her
conviction.
Strong then filed this appeal along with a petition to bypass
the Nebraska Court of Appeals. We granted the petition to
bypass.
ASSIGNMENTS OF ERROR
Strong assigns that the district court erred by affirming the
county court’s denial of her motion to suppress and by finding
there was sufficient evidence to convict her.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
[1] Statutory interpretation presents a question of law that
an appellate court resolves independently of the trial court.
State v. Clausen, ante p. 375, 15 N.W.3d 858 (2025).
ANALYSIS
Framing the Question at Issue.
The issue Strong presents in this case is narrow. Strong does
not contest the county court’s findings that officers sought a
chemical test of her blood, that she was advised that a failure
to submit to the chemical test was a separate offense for which
she could be charged, or that she refused to submit to the
chemical test. See State v. Rothenberger, 294 Neb. 810, 885
N.W.2d 23 (2016) (setting forth elements of offense of refusal
to submit to chemical test under § 60-6,197). Neither does
Strong contend that the search warrant was improperly issued.
Instead, she argues only that one cannot be found guilty of
refusal to submit to a chemical test for blood under § 60-6,197
if the blood draw is sought pursuant to a search warrant.
Strong has clothed her sole legal contention in the garb
of assignments of error that assert her motion to suppress
should have been granted and the evidence was insufficient to

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Nebraska Supreme Court Advance Sheets
318 Nebraska Reports
STATE v. STRONG
Cite as 318 Neb. 525
support her conviction. At oral argument, she acknowledged
that the success of both assignments of error depends upon
her contention that one cannot be found guilty of refusal to
submit to a chemical test for blood under § 60-6,197 if the
blood draw is sought pursuant to a search warrant. We need
not decide today whether either of Strong’s assignments of
error was an appropriate vehicle to raise her legal argument,
because even assuming one was, we find that the argument
lacks merit.
Although it is not clear that Strong relies directly on the
U.S. Supreme Court’s opinion in Birchfield v. North Dakota,
579 U.S. 438, 136 S. Ct. 2160, 195 L. Ed. 2d 560 (2016),
some background regarding that case is helpful to understand-
ing her argument. In Birchfield, the U.S. Supreme Court held
that a breath test may be administered as a search incident
to a lawful arrest for drunk driving but that the search inci-
dent to arrest doctrine did not justify the warrantless taking
of a blood sample. The U.S. Supreme Court also addressed
whether a warrantless blood test could be justified by implied
consent laws. On that question, the Court held that “motor-
ists cannot be deemed to have consented to submit to a blood
test on pain of committing a criminal offense.” Id., 579 U.S.
at 477.
The parties appear to agree that after Birchfield, in the
absence of exigent circumstances, a person cannot be crimi-
nally convicted of refusing to submit to a warrantless chemi-
cal blood test. The parties disagree, however, about whether
one can be convicted of refusal to submit to a chemical blood
test if the test is sought after law enforcement has obtained
a search warrant. As we have noted, Strong argues that one
cannot be convicted in those circumstances. In support of this
position, she argues that § 60-6,197 is an implied consent
statute that does not apply to a situation in which a search
warrant has been obtained. The State contends that the statute
is not so limited. We turn to that question now.

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Nebraska Supreme Court Advance Sheets
318 Nebraska Reports
STATE v. STRONG
Cite as 318 Neb. 525
Scope of § 60-6,197.
Strong characterizes § 60-6,197 as solely an “implied con-
sent statute.” Brief for appellant at 14. As she understands it,
§ 60-6,197 criminalizes the refusal to submit to a chemical
blood test only when the test is sought on the basis of implied
consent. Because the blood test at issue here was sought pursu-
ant to a search warrant rather than implied consent, she argues,
§ 60-6,197 does not apply.
Resolution of this argument obviously requires that we
consider and interpret the text of § 60-6,197. And Strong is
certainly correct that § 60-6,197 includes an implied consent
provision. Under § 60-6,197(1), any person operating or in
control of a motor vehicle in Nebraska is deemed to have
given his or her consent to submit to a chemical blood test for
alcohol or drugs.
But § 60-6,197 contains other provisions aside from sub-
section (1)’s “implied consent” provision. Subsection (3) of
§ 60-6,197 contains the language that criminalizes the refusal
to submit to a chemical test. It provides that “[a]ny person
arrested as described in subsection (2)” may “be required to
submit to” a chemical blood test for alcohol and drugs and
that “[a]ny person who refuses to submit to such test or tests
required pursuant to this section . . . shall be guilty of a crime
. . . .” § 60-6,197(3). Nothing in subsection (3) limits its appli-
cation to chemical tests sought pursuant to implied consent.
To the contrary, its language makes it a crime for “[a]ny per-
son arrested as described in subsection (2)” to refuse to submit
to “tests required pursuant to this section.” § 60-6,197.
Subsection (2) likewise is not limited to tests sought pursu-
ant to implied consent. Rather, it provides that law enforce-
ment may require “any person arrested for any offense arising
out of acts alleged to have been committed while the person
was driving or was in actual physical control of a motor vehi-
cle while under the influence of alcoholic liquor or drugs” to
submit to a chemical blood test if the officer “has reasonable
grounds to believe that such person was driving or was in the

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Nebraska Supreme Court Advance Sheets
318 Nebraska Reports
STATE v. STRONG
Cite as 318 Neb. 525
actual physical control of a motor vehicle in this state while
under the influence of alcoholic liquor or drugs in violation of
section 60-6,196.” § 60-6,197(2) (emphasis supplied).
[2] In sum, subsection (3) makes it a crime to refuse a test
“required pursuant to this section,” but “this section,” spe-
cifically subsection (2), broadly authorizes law enforcement
to seek tests whenever they arrest a person with reasonable
grounds to believe the person was driving under the influ-
ence. See § 60-6,197. Only by reading extratextual meaning
into the statute could one conclude that § 60-6,197 does not
criminalize refusals when a blood test is sought pursuant to a
search warrant. As we often say, however, it is not within the
province of the courts to read meaning into a statute that is not
there or to read anything direct and plain out of a statute. State
v. Clausen, ante p. 375, 15 N.W.3d 858 (2025).
[3] We therefore hold that § 60-6,197(3) criminalizes the
refusal to submit to a chemical blood test when the blood test
is sought pursuant to a search warrant.
No Constitutional Barrier
to Strong’s Conviction.
Although we read § 60-6,197 to broadly criminalize the
refusal to submit to chemical blood tests, we acknowledge
that under Birchfield, § 60-6,197 cannot be constitutionally
applied as broadly as it is written. If law enforcement seeks
a blood test and the only justification for the blood test is the
motorist’s implied consent, Birchfield holds that the motorist
cannot be criminally punished for refusing. Not only is this
made clear by Birchfield itself, we recognized as much in State
v. McCumber, 295 Neb. 941, 893 N.W.2d 411 (2017), a case
in which we, in reliance on Birchfield, vacated a defendant’s
conviction for refusing a blood test when the blood test was
sought without a warrant and without the presence of exigent
circumstances.
In this case, however, there is no constitutional barrier to
Strong’s conviction. Birchfield held that a person could not be

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Nebraska Supreme Court Advance Sheets
318 Nebraska Reports
STATE v. STRONG
Cite as 318 Neb. 525
criminally punished for refusing to submit to a warrantless,
unlawful blood test. See Birchfield v. North Dakota, 579 U.S.
438, 478, 136 S. Ct. 2160, 195 L. Ed. 2d 560 (2016) (“[u]nable
to see any other basis on which to justify a warrantless test of
[the defendant’s] blood, we conclude that [he] was threatened
with an unlawful search and that the judgment affirming his
conviction must be reversed”). But here, Strong was not asked
to submit to an unlawful blood test. Law enforcement officers
had obtained a search warrant, and Strong makes no argument
that the warrant was improperly issued or that law enforce-
ment officers lacked authority to require the test for some other
reason. Because the test was lawful, there is no constitutional
barrier to criminalizing Strong’s refusal to submit to it. This
too was recognized in our opinion in McCumber, supra. There,
we rejected a facial challenge to § 60-6,197, explaining that
there were circumstances when the statute could be validly
applied such as when the blood test is sought pursuant to a
valid warrant.
Prior to concluding, we address one additional argument
Strong makes in reliance on language from Birchfield. Strong
points to language in that opinion stating that a person “‘has
no right to resist [a] search’” backed by a warrant. Birchfield,
579 U.S. at 455 (quoting Bumper v. North Carolina, 391 U.S.
543, 88 S. Ct. 1788, 20 L. Ed. 2d 797 (1968)). She suggests
that this language recognizes that a person is not capable of
refusing a blood test supported by a warrant. We disagree. It
does not follow from the fact that one is not legally justified
in refusing a search that one is also incapable of refusing. We
can discern no constitutional barrier to Strong’s conviction for
refusal to submit to a chemical blood test.
CONCLUSION
Because Strong’s assignments of error are without merit, we
affirm her conviction.
Affirmed.