State v. Hernandez

State of NebraSka , appellaNt, v.
oScar H erNaNdez , appellee .
809 N.W.2d 279
Filed March 2, 2012. 	No. S-11-414.
1. Judgments: Statutes: Appeal and Error. Statutory interpretation presents a
question of law upon which an appellate court reaches a conclusion independent
of the trial court.
2. Statutes: Legislature: Intent: Appeal and Error. In construing a statute, an
appellate court’s objective is to determine and give effect to the legislative intent
of the enactment.
3. Statutes: Appeal and Error. When construing a statute, an appellate court looks
to the statute’s purpose and gives to the statute a reasonable construction that best
achieves that purpose, rather than a construction that would defeat it.
4. ____: ____. Absent a statutory indication to the contrary, an appellate court gives
words in a statute their ordinary meaning.
5. Statutes. To the extent there is a conflict between two statutes, the specific stat-
ute controls over the general statute.
6. Statutes: Legislature: Intent. Components of a series or collection of statutes
pertaining to a certain subject matter are in pari materia and should be conjunc-
tively considered and construed to determine the intent of the Legislature, so that
different provisions are consistent, harmonious, and sensible.
Appeal from the District Court for Lancaster County: robert
r. otte, Judge. Exception overruled.
Joe Kelly, Lancaster County Attorney, and Daniel Packard
for appellant.
Heidi M. Hayes, of Morrow, Poppe, Watermeier & Lonowski,
P.C., L.L.O., for appellee.
H eavicaN, c.J., coNNolly, G errard, StepHaN, MccorMack,
and M iller-lerMaN, JJ.
coNNolly, J.
The district court for Lancaster County acquitted Oscar
Hernandez of driving during revocation under Neb. Rev. Stat.
§ 60-6,197.06 (Reissue 2010), concluding that the statute did
not apply to Hernandez’ conduct. The State concedes that
double jeopardy would bar a subsequent trial. Nevertheless,
the State appeals under Neb. Rev. Stat. § 29-2315.01 (Reissue
2008) and asks this court to provide an exposition of the law
for future cases. Because we agree with the district court and
STATE v. HERNANDEz 	423
Cite as 283 Neb. 423
Nebraska Supreme Court Online Library
www.nebraska.gov/apps-courts-epub/
11/01/2026 04:43 AM CST

conclude that § 60-6,197.06 does not apply to the facts of this
case, we overrule the State’s exception.
BACKGROUND
Because of Hernandez’ third conviction for driving under
the influence, the Nebraska Department of Motor Vehicles
revoked his license. The revocation began on December 16,
2009, and was to last for 2 years. Hernandez, however, received
an ignition interlock permit from the Nebraska Department of
Motor Vehicles. An ignition interlock permit allows a person to
operate a motor vehicle that is equipped with an ignition inter-
lock device in limited circumstances.1 To receive the permit,
Hernandez had to show that an ignition interlock device had
been installed in his vehicle. Hernandez showed proof that the
device had been installed in a 2002 Dodge Ram.
On May 5, 2010, Hernandez was involved in a car accident.
He was driving a 1992 Dodge Ram Wagon van that did not
have an ignition interlock device. Hernandez admitted to the
responding officer that he could drive only vehicles with inter-
lock devices.
The State charged Hernandez with driving during revoca-
tion under § 60-6,197.06. The court found Hernandez not
guilty. The court concluded that another statute, Neb. Rev. Stat.
§ 60-6,211.05(5) (Supp. 2009), applied and that § 60-6,197.06
did not. We set out these statutes and the district court’s reason-
ing in detail below.
ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR
The State takes exception under § 29-2315.01 and argues
that the district court erred in concluding that § 60-6,197.06
did not apply to Hernandez’ conduct.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
[1] Statutory interpretation presents a question of law upon
which an appellate court reaches a conclusion independent of
the trial court.2
1 See Neb. Rev. Stat. §§ 60-480(12) (Reissue 2010) and 60-4,118.06 (Supp.
2009) and § 60-6,211.05.
2 See State v. Mena-Rivera, 280 Neb. 948, 791 N.W.2d 613 (2010).
424 	283 NEBRASKA REPORTS

ANALYSIS
The statute under which the State charged Hernandez,
§ 60-6,197.06, provides in part:
(1) Unless otherwise provided by law pursuant to an
ignition interlock permit, any person operating a motor
vehicle on the highways or streets of this state while his
or her operator’s license has been revoked pursuant to
section 28-306, section 60-698, subdivision (4), (5), (6),
(7), (8), (9), or (10) of section 60-6,197.03, or section
60-6,198, or pursuant to subdivision (2)(c) or (2)(d) of
section 60-6,196 or subdivision (4)(c) or (4)(d) of section
60-6,197 as such subdivisions existed prior to July 16,
2004, shall be guilty of a Class IV felony, and the court
shall, as part of the judgment of conviction, revoke the
operator’s license of such person for a period of fifteen
years from the date ordered by the court and shall issue
an order pursuant to section 60-6,197.01.
The 	court 	concluded 	that 	instead 	of 	§ 	60-6,197.06,
§ 	60-6,211.05(5) 	applied 	to 	Hernandez’ conduct. 	Section
60-6,211.05(5) provides:
A person who tampers with or circumvents an ignition
interlock device installed under a court order while the
order is in effect, who operates a motor vehicle which is
not equipped with an ignition interlock device in violation
of a court order made pursuant to this section, or who
otherwise operates a motor vehicle equipped with an igni-
tion interlock device in violation of the requirements of
the court order under which the device was installed shall
be guilty of a Class II misdemeanor.
(Emphasis supplied.)
The court reasoned that the first clause of § 60-6,197.06(1)—
“Unless otherwise provided by law pursuant to an ignition
interlock permit”—removed from the statute’s coverage those
persons who had valid ignition interlock permits. The court
concluded that § 60-6,211.05(5) applied to persons who had
violated the terms of an ignition interlock permit. Because
Hernandez had an ignition interlock permit but had violated its
terms by operating a vehicle not equipped with such a device,
STATE v. HERNANDEz 	425
Cite as 283 Neb. 423

the court ruled that § 60-6,211.05 was the only statute under
which the State could charge him.
This appeal presents an issue of statutory interpretation. The
question is whether a person who is required to have an igni-
tion interlock device but drives a vehicle without one may be
charged under § 60-6,197.06.
The State rests its argument on the introductory clause of
§ 60-6,197.06(1). The State contends that this clause, which
reads “Unless otherwise provided by law pursuant to an igni-
tion interlock permit,” means that if a person complies with
the terms of the ignition interlock permit, a person cannot be
charged with driving during revocation under § 60-6,197.06.
But if he or she violates the permit’s terms—for instance, by
driving a vehicle that is not equipped with an ignition interlock
device—the permitholder is driving during a period of revoca-
tion and can be charged under § 60-6,197.06(1) for committing
a Class IV felony.
Hernandez sees it differently. He argues that the court
correctly 	determined 	that 	the 	introductory 	clause 	of
§ 60-6,197.06(1) precludes permitholders, even those who
violate the terms of the permit, from being prosecuted under
this statute for driving during revocation. Hernandez contends
that other statutes provide the appropriate crime and punish-
ment for those who violate the terms of their ignition interlock
permits. We agree.
[2-4] In construing a statute, our objective is to determine
and give effect to the legislative intent of the enactment.3 We
look to the statute’s purpose and give to the statute a reason-
able construction that best achieves that purpose, rather than
a construction that would defeat it.4 Absent a statutory indi-
cation to the contrary, we give words in a statute their ordi-
nary meaning.5
3 Mena-Rivera, supra note 2.
4 Id.
5 Id.
426 	283 NEBRASKA REPORTS

[5,6] Further, to the extent there is a conflict between two
statutes, the specific statute controls over the general statute.6
Finally, components of a series or collection of statutes pertain-
ing to a certain subject matter are in pari materia and should be
conjunctively considered and construed to determine the intent
of the Legislature, so that different provisions are consistent,
harmonious, and sensible.7
Section 60-6,211.05(5), which deals specifically with igni-
tion interlock permits, clearly and unambiguously states that
one “who operates a motor vehicle [that] is not equipped with
an ignition interlock device in violation of a court order” is
guilty of a Class II misdemeanor. The Legislature was clear
in expressing its intent that an ignition interlock permitholder
who operates a vehicle without an ignition interlock device be
punished only as a misdemeanant. The State asks us to read an
ambiguous clause to authorize a more severe punishment for
the same act. We reject the State’s request because doing so
would be inconsistent with the Legislature’s clear and unam-
biguous intent in § 60-6,211.05(5). Such a reading would ren-
der the statutory scheme inconsistent and disharmonious.
As mentioned, the State bases its argument on the introduc-
tory clause of § 60-6,197.06(1). As the State reads it, the clause
means that permitholders who comply with the terms of their
permits are not driving during revocation. But once they do
violate the terms, they are not acting “pursuant to an ignition
interlock permit”8 and are in effect driving during revocation.
We read the introductory clause differently. We read it to say
that other statutes provide the appropriate crimes with which to
charge a person who violates the terms of his or her ignition
interlock permit. In other words, we read “Unless otherwise
provided by law pursuant to an ignition interlock permit”9 to
mean simply “unless a person has an interlock permit.” This
6 See Davio v. Nebraska Dept. of Health & Human Servs., 280 Neb. 263,
786 N.W.2d 655 (2010).
7 Id.
8 § 60-6,197.06(1).
9 Id.
STATE v. HERNANDEz 	427
Cite as 283 Neb. 423

clause excludes ignition interlock permitholders from the cov-
erage of § 60-6,197.06.
CONCLUSION
We agree with the district court’s interpretation of the stat-
ute. Section 60-6,197.06 does not provide the penalty for a
driver who has a valid ignition interlock permit but operates
a vehicle not equipped with such a device. That conduct is a
Class II misdemeanor under § 60-6,211.05(5). We overrule the
State’s exception.
exceptioN overruled.
G errard, J., not participating in the decision.
WriGHt, J., not participating.
428 	283 NEBRASKA REPORTS