Dunham v. Dunham

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Nebraska Court of Appeals Advance Sheets
34 Nebraska Appellate Reports
DUNHAM v. DUNHAM
Cite as 34 Neb. App. 235
Alicia G. Dunham, now known as Alicia G.
Murphy, appellant, v. Daniel R.
Dunham, appellee.
___ N.W.3d ___
Filed April 21, 2026. 	Nos. A-25-176, A-25-177, A-25-337, A-25-338.
1. Parental Rights: Judgments: Appeal and Error. Termination of paren-
tal rights cases raised under Neb. Rev. Stat. § 42-364(5) (Cum. Supp.
2024) are reviewed de novo on the record, and an appellate court is
required to reach a conclusion independent of the lower court’s findings.
2. Evidence: Appeal and Error. When the evidence is in conflict, the
appellate court will consider and give weight to the fact that the lower
court observed the witnesses and accepted one version of the facts over
the other.
3. Jurisdiction: Appeal and Error. Before reaching the legal issues
presented for review, it is the duty of an appellate court to determine
whether it has jurisdiction over the matter before it.
4. ____: ____. When an appellate court is without jurisdiction to act, the
appeal must be dismissed.
5. Jurisdiction: Final Orders: Appeal and Error. Read together, Neb.
Rev. Stat. § 25-1911 (Reissue 2016) and Neb. Rev. Stat. § 25-1912
(Cum. Supp. 2024) generally prescribe that for an appellate court to
acquire jurisdiction of an appeal, the party must be appealing from
either a judgment or decree rendered or from a final order.
6. Final Orders: Appeal and Error. Under Neb. Rev. Stat. § 25-1902
(Cum. Supp. 2024), the four types of final orders which may be
reviewed on appeal are (1) an order which affects a substantial right
in an action and which in effect determines the action and prevents
a judgment, (2) an order affecting a substantial right made during a
special proceeding, (3) an order affecting a substantial right made on
summary application in an action after a judgment is rendered, and (4)
an order denying a motion for summary judgment when such motion
Nebraska Supreme Court Online Library
www.nebraska.gov/apps-courts-epub/
10/18/2026 12:39 AM CDT

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DUNHAM v. DUNHAM
Cite as 34 Neb. App. 235
is based on the assertion of sovereign immunity or the immunity of a
government official.
7. Juvenile Courts: Appeal and Error. A proceeding before a juvenile
court is a special proceeding for appellate purposes.
8. Final Orders: Words and Phrases. A substantial right is an essential
legal right, not a mere technical right.
9. Final Orders. It is not enough that the right itself be substantial; the
effect of the order on that right must also be substantial.
10. Final Orders: Appeal and Error. Whether the effect of an order is
substantial depends on whether it affects with finality the rights of the
parties in the subject matter.
11. Parental Rights: Proof. Terminating parental rights requires both clear
and convincing evidence that one of the statutory grounds enumerated in
Neb. Rev. Stat. § 43-292 (Reissue 2016) exists and clear and convincing
evidence that termination is in the best interests of the children.
12. Parental Rights. Whereas statutory grounds are based on a parent’s past
conduct, the best interests inquiry focuses on the future well-being of
the child.
13. Parental Rights: Words and Phrases. Termination of parental rights is
a final and complete severance of the child from the parent and removes
the entire bundle of parental rights. With such severe and final conse-
quences, parental rights should be terminated only in the absence of any
reasonable alternative and as the last resort.
Appeals in Nos. A-25-176 and A-25-337 from the District
Court for Sarpy County: George A. Thompson, Judge, and
Nos. A-25-177 and A-25-338 from the Separate Juvenile Court
of Sarpy County: Jonathon D. Crosby, Judge. Appeals in Nos.
A-25-176, A-25-177, and A-25-337 dismissed. Judgment in
No. A-25-338 affirmed.
Wendy A. Wussow, Angela F. Schmit, and Michael W.
Milone, of Koukol Johnson Schmit & Milone, L.L.C., for
appellant.
John Andrew McWilliams and Kristina B. Murphree, of
Gross Welch Marks Clare, P.C., L.L.O., for appellee.
Moore, Bishop, and Welch, Judges.

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Nebraska Court of Appeals Advance Sheets
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DUNHAM v. DUNHAM
Cite as 34 Neb. App. 235
Bishop, Judge.
I. INTRODUCTION
Alicia G. Dunham, now known as Alicia G. Murphy, filed
a petition to terminate the parental rights of her ex-husband,
Daniel R. Dunham, to their two children. Although filed in the
Sarpy County District Court, the court granted Alicia’s request
that her petition be transferred to the separate juvenile court of
Sarpy County pursuant to Neb. Rev. Stat. § 42-364(5) (Cum.
Supp. 2024). After a trial, the juvenile court found that Alicia
failed to meet her burden to show that termination of Daniel’s
parental rights was in the children’s best interests. It dismissed
her petition and “transferred” the case back to the district court.
Alicia appeals the juvenile court’s order. After concluding we
have jurisdiction over that final order, we affirm.
II. BACKGROUND
Alicia and Daniel were married in Iowa in 2013 and are the
parents of twins (a son and a daughter) born in 2015. Alicia
filed a petition for dissolution of marriage in November 2019.
1. Iowa Divorce
On January 4, 2022, an Iowa district court entered a
“Default Decree for Dissolution of Marriage.” The decree
acknowledged that Alicia was living in Nebraska, “having
recently relocated” from Iowa. Pursuant to the decree, Alicia
was awarded sole legal custody and primary physical cus-
tody of the parties’ children. The Iowa court noted a history
of domestic abuse and acknowledged that the parties had
been abiding by a “criminal no-contact order” that prohibited
Daniel from having contact with Alicia or their children. (As
part of Daniel’s separate criminal case for stalking and child
endangerment, a no-contact order was entered on January 25,
2021; on November 5, it was continued for a period of 5 years
and was set to expire on November 5, 2026.) The divorce
decree awarded Daniel “visitation” pursuant to a phased-in
“parenting schedule” (beginning with video or telephone calls
and progressing to in-person supervised visits); the parties

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DUNHAM v. DUNHAM
Cite as 34 Neb. App. 235
were to work together to request a modification of the criminal
no-contact order. Daniel was ordered to complete a substance
abuse evaluation and follow its recommendations, and he was
to successfully complete a parenting course and a domestic
abuse program. Additionally, he was ordered to pay $2,061.68
per month for child support. In July 2023, Daniel’s child sup-
port obligation was modified to $75 per month.
As will be discussed later in this opinion, Daniel has been
incarcerated in Iowa since January 26, 2022.
2. Nebraska District Court Proceedings
Alicia and the children moved to Nebraska on January 1,
2022, 3 days before the entry of the default divorce decree. She
subsequently remarried in 2023.
On February 2, 2024, Alicia filed an “Amended Complaint
to Register and Enforce Foreign Child Custody Determination
and Foreign Child Support Order” with the Sarpy County
District Court in Nebraska. She requested that the district
court (1) register Iowa’s January 2022 default decree and the
July 2023 modification of child support, (2) enforce and mod-
ify the child custody determination, and (3) enforce the child
support order and collect the child support arrearages. Alicia
alleged that the parties were currently involved in a separate
action in the county court for Sarpy County for the stepparent
adoption of the parties’ children. On March 11, 2024, she
filed a motion to assume jurisdiction under the Uniform Child
Custody Jurisdiction and Enforcement Act, asking the district
court to assume jurisdiction from the Iowa court and noting
that a motion to relinquish jurisdiction had been filed in the
Iowa court. On April 10, the district court entered an order
confirming registration of the foreign child custody determi-
nation and child support order but overruling the motion to
assume jurisdiction “at this juncture.”
On April 11, 2024, Alicia filed a petition in the district
court for the termination of Daniel’s parental rights to the
parties’ children. She claimed that Daniel’s parental rights

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DUNHAM v. DUNHAM
Cite as 34 Neb. App. 235
should be terminated pursuant to various subsections of Neb.
Rev. Stat. § 43-292 (Reissue 2016), specifically subsections
(1) (abandonment), (2) (substantial and continuous or repeated
neglect), (3) (neglect to pay for juvenile’s subsistence, educa-
tion, or other care that was court ordered), (4) (unfitness by
reason of habitual use of intoxicating liquor or narcotic drugs),
(5) (inability to discharge parental responsibilities because of
mental illness or mental deficiency), and (9) (aggravated
circumstances). She alleged that Daniel, who was currently
incarcerated on a 20-year sentence in Iowa, was unfit to parent
and that it was in the children’s best interests to terminate his
parental rights. Alicia requested that, pursuant to § 42-364(5),
the district court transfer jurisdiction over the petition of ter-
mination of parental rights to the juvenile court, unless the
district court found that the county court was a more appropri-
ate forum given the pending adoption matter.
On May 21, 2024, the Iowa court entered an order wherein
it “decline[d] to exercise its continuing jurisdiction to make
child-custody determinations” after it found that “Iowa is an
inconvenient forum and that it is appropriate for the court in
Nebraska to exercise jurisdiction.”
On May 23, 2024, Daniel filed his answer and “Counter
Complaint” in the Sarpy County District Court wherein he
sought joint legal and physical custody of the parties’ children,
as well as a modification of the parenting plan. That same day,
Daniel also filed a motion for temporary orders and motion to
compel parenting time.
On June 3, 2024, Alicia filed a motion to stay all child
custody proceedings “pending resolution from the separate
Juvenile Court . . . on the Petition for Termination of Parental
Rights.” That same day, Alicia also filed a motion to transfer
to juvenile court pursuant to § 42-364(5), noting her motion to
stay further child custody proceedings pending the disposition
of the termination of parental rights proceedings; however,
“[i]n the alternative to staying further child custody proceed-
ings,” she “move[d] for an order transferring all child custody

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DUNHAM v. DUNHAM
Cite as 34 Neb. App. 235
proceedings to the separate Juvenile Court . . . , including the
Answer and Counter Complaint” filed by Daniel. On July 11,
the district court granted the transfer and ordered the clerk of
the district court to “transfer this case” to the juvenile court
pursuant to § 42-364(5).
3. Juvenile Court Proceedings
On July 22, 2024, Alicia filed a “Motion to Stay Custody
Modification Action Pending Termination of Parental Rights
Action.” On August 5, Daniel filed a motion for temporary
orders and motion to compel parenting time.
On August 22, 2024, the juvenile court reappointed Daniel’s
attorney as court-appointed counsel. It also granted Alicia
leave to amend the petition to terminate parental rights to
strike § 43-292(5) (inability to discharge parental responsibili-
ties because of mental illness or mental deficiency).
A hearing on the petition to terminate Daniel’s parental
rights was held in the juvenile court over the course of 4 days
in October 2024. Daniel appeared at the hearing telephonically
because he was incarcerated. Alicia and Daniel both testified
at the hearing and called witnesses to testify on their behalf,
and numerous exhibits were received into evidence. The testi-
mony and evidence will be discussed later in our analysis.
On December 6, 2024, Daniel’s attorney filed a motion
for attorney fees for court-appointed services rendered and
expenses incurred.
In its order entered on February 11, 2025, the juvenile court
found that Alicia failed to meet her burden to show that ter-
mination of Daniel’s parental rights was in the children’s best
interests. The court also found that “[w]hether [Daniel] will
be fit to parent or even have contact with the children when he
is released from custody remains to be seen” and that “[t]he
District Court can tailor a safety plan and issue orders limit-
ing or excluding contact with [Daniel] should he be released.”
The juvenile court’s order stated:

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DUNHAM v. DUNHAM
Cite as 34 Neb. App. 235
IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that the Petition for
Termination of Parental Rights filed on April 11, 2024, is
hereby dismissed.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that in all other respects,
unless specifically modified by this Order, the prior orders
of the District Court shall remain in full force and effect.
Any other claims for relief not specifically granted by this
Order are overruled and dismissed without prejudice.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that this case is transferred
back to the District Court of Sarpy County, Nebraska,
upon entry of this order on today’s date.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that all costs associated
with the termination of parental rights adjudication shall
be paid by the District Court.
On February 20, 2025, Daniel filed an amended motion to
alter or amend judgment and request for hearing. He requested
that the juvenile court amend the February 11 order to read,
in pertinent part: “‘IT IS FUTHER ORDERED that all costs
associated with the termination of parental rights adjudication
other than Father’s court appointed attorney fees shall be paid
by the District Court. The Sarpy County Separate Juvenile
Court shall be responsible for Father’s court appointed attor-
ney fees.’”
On March 7, 2025, Alicia filed her notices of appeal in case
Nos. A-25-176 (captioned in district court) and A-25-177 (cap-
tioned in juvenile court).
On April 10, 2025, Daniel filed a withdrawal of his amended
motion to alter or amend judgment. On April 22, the juve-
nile court entered an order of withdrawal, finding: “IT IS
THEREFORE ORDERED that the Amended Motion to Alter
or Amend Judgement is hereby withdrawn and no further hear-
ing will be held on this matter.”
On May 2, 2025, Alicia filed her notices of appeal in case
Nos. A-25-337 (captioned in district court) and A-25-338 (cap-
tioned in juvenile court).

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DUNHAM v. DUNHAM
Cite as 34 Neb. App. 235
In response to various motions and objections, this court
ordered 	the 	four 	appeals 	consolidated 	for 	briefing 	and
disposition.
III. ASSIGNMENTS OF ERROR
Alicia assigns, consolidated and restated, that the juvenile
court erred by (1) failing to consider and find a statutory
basis for terminating Daniel’s parental rights, specifically,
abandonment for 6 months or more, failing to provide neces-
sary parental care and protection, failing to provide financial
support, habitual use of intoxicating liquor or narcotic drugs,
and subjecting the children to aggravated circumstances; (2)
failing to find that termination of Daniel’s parental rights was
in the best interests of the children and dismissing Alicia’s
petition on that basis; and (3) immediately transferring the
case back to the district court without any notice, hearing, or
input from the parties following an order concluding a discrete
phase of a special proceeding.
IV. STANDARD OF REVIEW
[1,2] Termination of parental rights cases raised under
§ 42-364(5) are reviewed de novo on the record, and an appel-
late court is required to reach a conclusion independent of the
lower court’s findings. Benjamin S. v. Crystal S., 313 Neb.
799, 986 N.W.2d 492 (2023). However, when the evidence is
in conflict, the appellate court will consider and give weight
to the fact that the lower court observed the witnesses and
accepted one version of the facts over the other. Id.
V. ANALYSIS
1. Jurisdiction
[3,4] Before reaching the legal issues presented for review,
it is the duty of an appellate court to determine whether it has
jurisdiction over the matter before it. Kellogg v. Mathiesen,
320 Neb. 223, 26 N.W.3d 651 (2025). See, also, In re Interest
of Johnny H., 320 Neb. 675, 29 N.W.3d 808 (2026). When an

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DUNHAM v. DUNHAM
Cite as 34 Neb. App. 235
appellate court is without jurisdiction to act, the appeal must
be dismissed. In re Interest of Ricardo T. et al., 315 Neb. 718,
999 N.W.2d 562 (2024).
Most proceedings seeking termination of parental rights fall
within the jurisdiction of the juvenile courts. See Neb. Rev.
Stat. § 43-247(6) (Cum. Supp. 2024). Such jurisdiction is con-
current with the county court or district court. Christine W. v.
Trevor W., 303 Neb. 245, 928 N.W.2d 398 (2019).
[5] Neb. Rev. Stat. § 25-1911 (Reissue 2016) states that “[a]
judgment rendered or final order made by the district court
may be reversed, vacated, or modified for errors appearing
on the record.” Neb. Rev. Stat. § 25-1912 (Cum. Supp. 2024)
describes the procedure for obtaining a “reversal, vacation,
or modification of judgments and decrees rendered or final
orders made by the district court.” Together, these statutes
generally prescribe that for an appellate court to acquire juris-
diction of an appeal, the party must be appealing from either
a judgment or decree rendered or from a final order. Khaitov
v. Greater Omaha Packing Co., 319 Neb. 932, 25 N.W.3d 739
(2025). See, also, Neb. Rev. Stat. § 43-2,106.01(1) (Reissue
2016) (any final order or judgment entered by juvenile court
may be appealed to Court of Appeals in same manner as
appeal from district court to Court of Appeals).
[6] Pursuant to Neb. Rev. Stat. § 25-1902(1) (Cum. Supp.
2024):
The following are final orders which may be vacated,
modified, or reversed:
(a) An order affecting a substantial right in an action,
when such order in effect determines the action and
prevents a judgment;
(b) An order affecting a substantial right made during a
special proceeding;
(c) An order affecting a substantial right made on
summary application in an action after a judgment is
entered; and

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DUNHAM v. DUNHAM
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(d) An order denying a motion for summary judgment
when such motion is based on the assertion of sovereign
immunity or the immunity of a government official.
We directed the parties to address specific questions in the
jurisdiction section of their briefs. We will set forth the rele-
vant questions as appropriate below.
(a) Appeals From Juvenile Court Order
(i) File Stamps on Notices of Appeal
In our direction to the parties, we noted that Alicia’s
notices of appeal filed in case Nos. A-25-177 and A-25-338
identified the juvenile court in the caption, but “were file-
stamped in the district court.” We asked the parties if the
filing of the notice of appeal in the district court, rather than
in the juvenile court, impacted this court’s jurisdiction over
those appeals. The parties contend that these two notices of
appeal were properly filed in the juvenile court.
On 	the 	notices 	of 	appeal 	in 	case 	Nos. A-25-177 	and
A-25-338, the file stamp reads:
Filed in Sarpy District Court
*** EFILED ***
Case Number: [juvenile case number]
Transaction ID: [number]
Filing Date: [date and time]
Thus, on the surface, it appears that these notices of appeal
were filed in the wrong court.
However, a closer look at the transcripts reveals that every
electronic file stamp appearing on the juvenile court filings
reads as noted above; however, the manual file stamp on doc-
uments reads:
FILED
SARPY COUNTY SEPARATE JUVENILE COURT
[date and time]
[signature]
CLERK DISTRICT COURT

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DUNHAM v. DUNHAM
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The manual file stamp clearly shows that the filings in the
juvenile court were done by the clerk of the district court.
Therefore, while the electronic file stamps on the notices
of appeal are misleading, any discrepancy can be explained
by a comparison of the electronic and manual file stamps in
the transcripts. Accordingly, we agree with the parties that
the notices of appeal in case Nos. A-25-177 and A-25-338 were
filed in the juvenile court.
(ii) Final, Appealable Order?
We also asked the parties to address whether the juve-
nile court’s February 11, 2025, order was a final, appeal-
able order, even though custody and parenting time issues
remained pending.
Alicia claims that the juvenile court’s February 11, 2025,
order was a final, appealable order, because it affected a
substantial 	right 	made 	during 	a 	special 	proceeding. 	See
§ 25-1902(1)(b).
[7] Nebraska case law establishes that a proceeding before
a juvenile court is a special proceeding for appellate purposes.
See, In re Interest of Manuel C. & Mateo S., 314 Neb. 91,
988 N.W.2d 520 (2023), modified on denial of rehearing 314
Neb. 580, 991 N.W.2d 305; In re Interest of Isabel P. et al.,
293 Neb. 62, 875 N.W.2d 848 (2016). Therefore, the threshold
jurisdiction question is whether the juvenile court’s February
11, 2025, order declining to terminate Daniel’s parental rights
was an order “affecting a substantial right made during a spe-
cial proceeding” within the meaning of § 25-1902(1)(b).
[8-10] A substantial right is an essential legal right, not a
mere technical right. In re Interest of Johnny H., 320 Neb.
675, 29 N.W.3d 808 (2026). And the Nebraska Supreme
Court has said it is not enough that the right itself be sub-
stantial; the effect of the order on that right must also be
substantial. Id. Whether the effect of an order is substantial
depends on whether it affects with finality the rights of the
parties in the subject matter. Id. See, also, In re Interest of

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Manuel C. & Mateo S., supra (substantial right is affected if
order affects subject matter of litigation, such as diminishing
claim or defense that was available to appellant prior to order
from which appeal is taken).
Here, in its February 11, 2025, order, the juvenile court
declined to terminate Daniel’s parental rights after finding
that Alicia failed to meet her burden to show that termination
was in the children’s best interests. The appellate courts have
previously addressed the merits of an appeal of a juvenile
court’s order declining to terminate parental rights. See, In re
Interest of Isabel P. et al., supra (finding appellate court had
jurisdiction over State’s appeal of order declining to terminate
father’s parental rights); In re Interest of Joseph S. et al., 21
Neb. App. 706, 842 N.W.2d 209 (2014) (addressing merits of
State’s appeal of order denying petition to terminate parental
rights), reversed on other grounds 288 Neb. 463, 849 N.W.2d
468. Accordingly, we agree with Alicia that the February 11
order declining to terminate Daniel’s parental rights affected
a substantial right with the type of finality required to create a
final, appealable order under § 25-1902(1)(b).
That said, Daniel timely filed an amended motion to alter
or amend the judgment. After Daniel filed his motion, but still
within 30 days of the juvenile court’s February order, Alicia
filed a notice of appeal in case No. A-25-177.
Because Daniel filed his amended motion to alter or amend
judgment in the juvenile court after the juvenile court’s order
indicated it was transferring jurisdiction back to the district
court, we asked the parties to address two questions. First,
what impact, if any, did the amended motion to alter or amend
have on the finality of the February 11, 2025, order? Second,
to the extent the motion tolled the time to appeal, did the
juvenile court’s April 22, 2025, order withdrawing the motion
sufficiently dispose of the motion? Both parties concluded
that regardless of the transfer back to the district court or
Daniel’s amended motion to alter or amend, which was later
withdrawn, this court has jurisdiction over one of the appeals

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from the juvenile court, either case No. A-25-177 (filed within
30 days of the February 11 order) or case No. A-25-388 (filed
within 30 days of the April 22 order), both of which appeal
the merits of the juvenile court’s February 11 order declining
to terminate Daniel’s parental rights. For the reasons stated
below, we agree that this court has jurisdiction.
Daniel filed an amended motion to alter or amend judgment
within 10 days of the juvenile court’s February 11, 2025, order.
See Neb. Rev. Stat. § 25-1329 (Reissue 2016) (motion to alter
or amend shall be filed no later than 10 days after entry of
judgment). Therefore, regardless of the juvenile court’s order
indicating the transfer back to the district court, the timely
filed motion to alter or amend remained under the jurisdiction
of the juvenile court. At that point, we consider § 25-1912,
which states, in relevant part:
(1) The proceedings to obtain a reversal, vacation, or
modification of judgments and decrees rendered or final
orders made by the district court . . . shall be by filing in
the office of the clerk of the district court in which such
judgment, decree, or final order was rendered, within
thirty days after the entry of such judgment, decree,
or final order, a notice of intention to prosecute such
appeal . . . .
. . . .
(3) The running of the time for filing a notice of
appeal shall be terminated as to all parties . . . (b) by
a timely motion to alter or amend a judgment under
section 25-1329 . . . and the full time for appeal fixed in
subsection (1) of this section commences to run from the
entry of the order ruling upon the motion . . . . When any
motion terminating the time for filing a notice of appeal
is timely filed by any party, a notice of appeal filed before
the court announces its decision upon the terminating
motion shall have no effect, whether filed before or after
the timely filing of the terminating motion. A new notice

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of appeal shall be filed within the prescribed time after
the entry of the order ruling on the motion.
(Emphasis supplied.) See, also, § 43-2,106.01(1) (any final
order or judgment entered by juvenile court may be appealed to
Court of Appeals in same manner as appeal from district court
to Court of Appeals).
Because Daniel filed a timely motion to alter or amend, the
running of the time for filing a notice of appeal terminated,
and a notice of appeal was required to be filed after the entry
of the order ruling on the motion. See § 25-1912(b). However,
Daniel withdrew his motion to alter or amend, and on April
22, 2025, the court entered an order of withdrawal, ordering
that “the Amended Motion to Alter or Amend Judgment is
hereby withdrawn and no further hearing will be held on this
matter.” Thus, the juvenile court’s order acknowledged the
withdrawal and disposed of the motion. Alicia then filed a
notice of appeal in case No. A-25-388 within 30 days of the
April 22 order.
We agree with the parties that (1) the notice of appeal filed
in case No. A-25-177 was timely filed following the entry
of the initial February 11, 2025, juvenile court order, which
declined to terminate Daniel’s parental rights, and (2) that the
notice of appeal filed in case No. A-25-338 was timely filed
following the entry of the April 22 juvenile court order that
disposed of the tolling motion. However, until a timely filed
tolling motion is disposed of by the entry of a court order, the
appeal clock is not triggered. See § 25-1912(3). Therefore,
the appeal filed in case No. A-25-177 is of “no effect,” id.,
and is dismissed, while the appeal filed in case No. A-25-338
properly triggers the jurisdiction of this court.
(b) Appeals From District Court
In case Nos. A-25-176 and A-25-337, Alicia’s notices of
appeal identified the district court in the caption and were file
stamped in that court. We asked the parties to address whether
Daniel’s pending counterclaim in the district court rendered any

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appeal from the district court premature. Alicia claims that the
pendency of Daniel’s custody claims did not render these two
appeals premature because “the proceeding before the juvenile
court was special and its order affected the parties[’] substan-
tial, parental right.” Brief for appellant at 14. “Moreover, in the
context of multifaceted special proceedings . . . an order that
ends a discreet phase of the proceedings affects a substantial
right because it finally resolves the issues raised in that phase.”
Id. Daniel also points out that “Alicia is not appealing an order
of the district court, and Daniel’s pending counterclaim in the
district court therefore has no effect on Alicia’s appeal from
the juvenile court.” Brief for appellee at 11.
Alicia is challenging only the juvenile court’s February 11,
2025, order. We acknowledge the likelihood that these two
additional appeals were filed in the district court because, as
will be discussed later, the juvenile court’s order “transferred
back” the case to the district court “upon entry of this order
on today’s date.” This language may explain why Alicia took
the cautionary step of filing notices of appeal in both the dis-
trict court and the juvenile court.
However, any attempt to appeal from the district court at
this time would not be properly before us because not all
issues before that court have been resolved, including Daniel’s
counterclaim. See Neb. Rev. Stat. § 25-1315 (Cum. Supp.
2024) (any order that adjudicates fewer than all claims and
rights and liabilities of all parties shall not terminate action as
to any claims or parties; order remains subject to revision at
any time before entry of judgment adjudicating all claims and
rights and liabilities of all parties, and is therefore not final,
appealable order). Thus, the two appeals from the district court
are premature and are dismissed for lack of jurisdiction.
2. Termination of Parental Rights
We now address the merits of Alicia’s appeal from the juve-
nile court’s February 11, 2025, order. She contends that the
juvenile court erred by dismissing her petition to terminate

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Daniel’s parental rights after finding that termination was not
in the children’s best interests. She also claims that the court
failed to consider and find a statutory basis for terminating
Daniel’s parental rights.
(a) Evidence From Hearing
The parties were married in 2013, had their children in 2015,
and separated in January 2020. The parties were divorced on
January 4, 2022, and Daniel has been incarcerated in Iowa
since January 26 of that same year.
Alicia testified that there were “[a]t least ten” incidents of
domestic violence during her marriage to Daniel. In 2015, she
obtained a protection order against him while she was preg-
nant with their children because he “head-butted [her] right
in the face” when “[h]e was drunk”; she later dismissed her
protection order because they “were seeking . . . reconcilia-
tion.” Regarding the 2015 incident, Daniel testified, “To this
day, . . . I don’t recall doing it,” but he acknowledged that it
was possible he did it while intoxicated. Alicia said she also
obtained a protection order against Daniel in October 2019
after an incident when “[Daniel] was drunk, he was following
me around the house and scaring me,” so “I locked myself
in the bathroom and called the police.” The police detained
Daniel while Alicia and the children left the home. Alicia later
dismissed that protection order as well, because “[w]e agreed
that we were working on reconciliation and that he would
attend AA meetings.” When asked if Daniel ever physically
harmed the children, Alicia replied, “Not except for spanking
too hard”; she also recalled an incident when Daniel “picked
[their son] up in anger, was going to remove him from the
table . . . the motion of picking him up really abruptly, he hit
his head on the house” (she did not specify dates). (Alicia’s
adult daughter from a previous marriage testified that prior to
January 2020, she saw Daniel discipline the parties’ children:
“often it would start with a — pretty aggressive speech and
turn into spanking very quickly.”)

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Alicia stated that the parties separated in January 2020
after an incident when Daniel “was drunk, picked a fight,”
took her phone and credit card, and then “grabbed [her] and
tried to forcibly remove [her] wedding ring from [her] hand”
while the children were present. She said their son “actually
hit [Daniel] trying to make him stop,” and “I fought back”
and “scratched” Daniel. She then took off her ring and “tossed
it into the next room.” Alicia called the police, but she was
arrested because Daniel “lied and said that I had attacked
him, and he had more markings on his body.” During his tes-
timony about the January incident, Daniel said that “[w]e had
an argument[,] and she attacked me,” and that “she called the
cops and went to jail.” Alicia testified that she was charged
with domestic abuse, but the charges were subsequently dis-
missed. Daniel denied being charged with a criminal action
related to this incident.
Both parties testified that after they separated in January
2020, Daniel had parenting time Wednesdays and every other
weekend. Starting in August or September, his parenting time
was required to be supervised. (Alicia said she had requested
Daniel’s parenting time be supervised because he had health
issues at the time, and she had heard that he was using
cocaine.) According to Alicia, Daniel exercised his supervised
parenting time “[l]ess than five[]” times. The parties agreed
that his last in-person parenting time with the children was
in January 2021. A criminal no-contact order was entered on
January 25, preventing Daniel from having any contact with
Alicia or the children. He had no further contact with his
children, in person or otherwise, prior to the January 4, 2022,
divorce decree, which set forth a plan for phased-in parenting
time. Daniel’s only other contact with the children was one
“FaceTime” call in January 2022, shortly after the divorce
decree was entered. Daniel testified, “[T]he next day I got a
call from my probation officer telling me not to contact them
anymore” because it violated the criminal no-contact order.
Daniel had no further contact of any kind with the children.

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Daniel testified that, prior to 2020, he used alcohol, but
not cocaine. However, after the entry of the January 2020
temporary order in the divorce proceeding, he began using
cocaine “every other weekend the weeks I wouldn’t have
[the children].”
Justine Teut, formerly known as Justine Peebles (Justine),
testified that she and Daniel had a “very short-lived” rela-
tionship that was “romantic in nature,” beginning the last
couple days in August or the first couple days of September
2020. She saw cocaine and guns in Daniel’s home, and he
had cocaine in the home on days he had parenting time with
his children. Justine stated that in September, Daniel told her
that “he wanted to get full custody of his kids and that he had
orchestrated different things to try to harm [Alicia] to make
these things come to fruition.” Daniel “asked me to call the
police and tell them . . . to, like, pull [Alicia] over on-site at
the kids’ school, telling them she had guns and drugs in the
car, because he wanted to get her specifically pulled over on
school grounds, for, like, child endangerment.” Daniel “talked
to me about it . . . on several occasions.” Additionally, Daniel
told her that “he had hired a hitman to kill Alicia, and he said
. . . he would be on camera somewhere and so he had an alibi.”
Justine said she called Alicia to make sure that she was safe
and to let her know what Daniel had been saying. Justine also
called the police. (She made “iPhone” recordings of conversa-
tions with Daniel in September and October and sent the vid-
eos to law enforcement; the videos were received in evidence
at the termination hearing.) Justine last saw Daniel in January
or February 2021, when she encountered him while she was
out with friends. She said that Daniel assaulted her because
“he already knew that I had gone to the police about Alicia,
and he was trying to . . . get me to change my story.”
Daniel stated that in January 2021, he was charged with
“[d]rugs, guns, stalking, and two counts of child endanger-
ment.” His drug charge “was a felony because of the quan-
tity” of cocaine, “5.64 grams.” He had “hired someone” to

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plant cocaine in Alicia’s car, with the intent that she would be
arrested. When asked why he hired someone to plant cocaine
in Alicia’s vehicle, Daniel responded, “Because I thought it
would gain me an upper hand in our custody battle.” The per-
son he hired to plant the drugs also “planted a gun” in Alicia’s
car; Daniel denied paying them to plant the gun but confirmed
that he was responsible for the fact that it happened. (Alicia
testified that she found the gun and drugs in her vehicle in a
seat pouch “right in front of where [their son] always sat.”)
Daniel said that the stalking conviction was because he had
“put a tracker” on Alicia’s car, “not to know where she is, but
to know where [the children] were.” As part of the criminal
case for stalking and child endangerment, a no-contact order
was entered against Daniel on January 25, 2021.
According to an order entered by an Iowa district court
on November 5, 2021, Daniel pled guilty to “Delivery of
Cocaine, Aiding and Abetting”; the “pronouncement of sen-
tence [was] deferred” and Daniel was placed on 5 years’ pro-
bation. According to a separate order entered on November 5,
Daniel pled guilty to “Stalking, an Aggravated Misdemeanor,”
and two counts of child endangerment. He was “committed to
the custody of the Director of the Department of Corrections
for a period of not more than 2 years” on each count; the
sentences were to run consecutively “for a total term of incar-
ceration of six (6) years.” The order states that his sentences
were “suspended” and that Daniel was “placed on probation”
for 2 years. Additionally, his no-contact order was “contin-
ued for a period of five (5) years, until November 5, 2026.”
Daniel’s deferred judgment and probation were ultimately
revoked on May 11, 2022.
Daniel pled guilty to trespass causing bodily injury, assault
causing bodily injury, and tampering with a witness (the vic-
tim was Justine); he said, “It was part of a plea agreement
because I was drunk and high and didn’t recall what I was
doing.” According to an order entered by an Iowa district court
on November 23, 2021, Daniel was sentenced to consecutive

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prison sentences of 1 year each for the trespass and assault
convictions, and 2 years for tampering with a witness. The
sentences in this case were also to run consecutively to the sep-
arate criminal case (i.e., delivery of cocaine, stalking, and child
endangerment). The sentences were suspended, and Daniel was
placed on probation for 2 years. Daniel’s probation was ulti-
mately revoked on May 11, 2022.
When Daniel’s deferred judgment and probation terms were
revoked on May 11, 2022, he was sentenced to 10 years’ impris-
onment for the “Delivery of Cocaine, Aiding and Abetting”
conviction and to 2 years’ imprisonment each for the stalking
conviction and for the two child endangerment convictions; all
counts were to run consecutively to each other, for a total of 16
years’ imprisonment. He was also sentenced to 1 year’s impris-
onment for each trespass and assault conviction and 2 years’
imprisonment for the tampering with a witness conviction; all
counts were to run consecutively to each other, for a total of
4 years’ imprisonment. Additionally, the sentences in the two
cases were to run consecutively to each other, “for a total term
of incarceration not to exceed twenty (20) years [in] prison.”
Additionally, according to exhibits received into evidence,
on January 26, 2022, Daniel was operating a vehicle while
under the influence of an alcoholic beverage or other drug.
Daniel testified that he was convicted of “OWI” (cocaine and
“meth”) and that “they gave me 126 days in jail, time served.”
Prior to the “OWI,” he used meth “three, four times.” The
June 2022 sentencing order received into evidence shows that
Daniel pled guilty to “OWI” and was sentenced to 126 days’
incarceration, with the time already served.
Daniel testified that he has been sober since he was incarcer-
ated on January 26, 2022, and that “I’m a completely different
person sober.” “[T]here’s some drugs at every prison, but . . . I
just don’t even have a desire,” “I had [a] bad year and a half,
and now that I’m clear-headed and everything like that, I look
at it — everything way different.”

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According to an “EFR Residential Substance Use Assessment
Summary Report,” Daniel was “assessed for substance abuse
services” on April 22, 2022. Daniel was diagnosed with
“Cocaine Type Use Disorder, Mild,” and “[d]ue to [Daniel’s]
self-reported cocaine use, it is recommended that he participate
in Level 1.0 Extended Outpatient treatment.” Daniel testified
that he did not get the opportunity to attend the recommended
outpatient treatment because he “went to prison” and that treat-
ment was not available to him at his correctional facilities. “The
only thing they had at the . . . Jail was . . . every Monday they
would have guys from [Alcoholics Anonymous] come in and
talk to us,” “[s]o I participated in that.” When Daniel was later
in a different correctional facility, he “attend[ed] [Narcotics
Anonymous] every Friday,” and he completed a 24-session
treatment program called “Achieving Change Through Value-
Based Behavior” (ACTV) for domestic violence offenders. He
was on a waiting list to participate in a parenting class at his
current correctional facility.
According to Daniel, he was denied parole two times. Daniel
did not expect to be released the first time, because “I had not
completed treatment[,] and I hadn’t been in prison long enough
. . . for parole to grant it to me.” He did believe that he would
be paroled the second time, because “I had [ACTV] treatment
completed[,] and my counselor recommended my parole”;
“they would not tell me why I didn’t receive parole.” Daniel
said that he would be eligible for parole again in May 2025.
He confirmed that eligibility for parole did not mean that he
would be paroled.
Alicia testified that she never told the children that Daniel
was incarcerated. When asked what she told the children about
why they have no contact with Daniel, Alicia responded, “The
day that he was arrested [in January 2021] and the protective
order was put in place, I — I said to them, he’s not going to
be calling you anymore,” “he’s made some bad choices and
he’s getting some help, but we probably won’t — he won’t be

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calling for a while.” The children “were happy with that and
never asked a single question since.”
Alicia believes that termination of Daniel’s parental rights is
in the children’s best interests. At the time of trial, the children
were 9½ years old, and Alicia testified that they do not have
a relationship with Daniel. Their daughter has “never asked”
about Daniel since he was arrested in 2021, and their son
“probably every two to three months” will make a reference to
Daniel, “usually involving golf.” (The children’s nanny since
2021 testified that she has never heard the children refer to
Daniel. And Alicia’s current husband testified that the children
have lived with him since “around the new year of” 2022
and have never asked about Daniel; the daughter has never
referred to Daniel, and the son “very occasionally, will bring
up [sic] usually if golf is involved.”) When asked if she ever
mentioned Daniel to the children since January 2022, Alicia
replied, “I have not brought him up, no,” but “[i]f they brought
him up . . . I always reply in a positive manner.” When asked
if she has concerns for her safety or the safety of the children
if Daniel is released on parole, Alicia replied, “Yes.” She said,
“He’s made many threats . . . that he would like to kill me,”
and “I would put nothing past him as far as the children, if he
felt rejected by them, I would put nothing past him.”
According to Daniel’s testimony, he did not currently have
a relationship with his children and he was not currently pro-
viding financial support for them. He had previously paid off
his child support obligations after selling the marital home in
2023 (the remainder of the sale money was used to pay back
money to his parents that he had previously borrowed to pay
off the mortgage and “get it out of [Alicia’s] name” as part
of the divorce). (Alicia testified that Daniel satisfied other
court-ordered obligations to her from that house sale, includ-
ing outstanding childcare expenses and attorney fees.) By the
time of the termination hearing in October 2024, Daniel was
“like 13,000” in arrearages in child support and his current
court-ordered child support obligation was $75 per month.

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Daniel said, “I don’t have a job at this [correctional] facility”
and “[i]t’s a long wait list for a job”; “[l]ast I knew I was
number 19 on the list.” When asked if he had sent any cards
or gifts to his children in the past year, Daniel responded, “I’m
not allowed to send them anything,” “[b]ecause there was a
protection order in place.”
Daniel acknowledged that he did not make any attempts to
modify the criminal no-contact order prior to being notified
of the filing of the petition for stepparent adoption of the par-
ties’ children in October 2023. He said he did not realize he
could petition to modify the criminal no-contact order until
“about a year ago” when his current attorney “pointed it out”;
he then “instructed” his attorney “to get it modified.” Exhibits
received into evidence show that in February 2024, counsel
filed a motion in the Iowa district court in Daniel’s criminal
case to modify the no-contact order; that court subsequently
modified the no-contact order “to reflect that it is not an
NCO [violation] for [Daniel] to exercise whatever visitation
rights have been granted to [him] concerning [the children in]
any existing or pending family law case, whether in Iowa or
Nebraska.” Daniel then instructed his attorney to ask Alicia’s
attorney to allow phone calls with the children, but he was
not allowed any phone calls. He then filed a motion in the
Sarpy County District Court to allow phone calls (i.e., his
motion for temporary orders and motion to compel parenting
time); that motion was still pending at the time of the termi-
nation hearing.
When asked, if given the opportunity, how he planned to
address the long period of absence from his children’s lives,
Daniel responded, “I’ll just tell them the truth, that I’ve made
a lot of bad decisions and I didn’t mean to harm them. And
just, I’m sure it will take time . . . for them to forgive me.
I — I mean, I’m going to try to do whatever I can.” Daniel
believed it was in his children’s best interests to resume con-
tact with him because “I’m their biological dad.” (Having
children of his own was important to Daniel. He said, “[T]hat

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was the only reason why I got married.”) While incarcerated,
Daniel wrote in journals for each of the children; “that way,
eventually when I get out, I can give those to [them] so that
way they know I never forgot about them.” Daniel had been
able to get updates about his children from his mother and
sister. Alicia had allowed Daniel’s mother and sister to have
contact with the children for a time when Daniel was incar-
cerated. During her testimony, Alicia confirmed that she con-
tinued to facilitate the children’s relationship with Daniel’s
family after he was incarcerated in January 2022, but she
asked Daniel’s mother to stop contacting her in January 2024
because Daniel’s mother helped him hire an attorney.
The court-appointed guardian ad litem for the children in
the separate stepparent adoption case testified that she met
with the children in May 2024, when they were 9 years old. At
that time, while looking at photographs on the wall of Alicia’s
home, the children identified Alicia’s husband as “their dad”
and “referred to the adoption as making [him] officially their
father.” The children were aware that Daniel was their biolog-
ical father. When the guardian ad litem asked them what they
remembered about Daniel, “they said they hadn’t seen him
since they were four”; Daniel’s daughter “didn’t remember”
him, and his son “remember[ed] [Daniel] had a beard” and
took him golfing and hunting. The guardian ad litem said,
“[T]he children have not had any contact with [Daniel] since
. . . they were four.” She further said, “And they’re now nine
years old, and so my concern would be is what impact it would
have on their well-being and mental health to introduce a
parental figure that they don’t know as a parental figure.”
Regarding any future contact Daniel might have with the
children, Alicia’s current husband testified, “I’m concerned
that their mental health, they — they have not seen him in so
long, I think him being reintroduced back into their lives would
definitely affect [the daughter], and I think it would affect [the
son’s] well-being as well.”

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Christopher Pierce testified that he had known Daniel for
approximately 10 years. Sometime in 2020, Pierce stopped
having in-person contact with Daniel because Pierce felt that
Daniel “was in a bad place [and] was abusing some substance”;
Daniel “[j]ust seemed . . . somewhat erratic,” “[k]ind of a party
mentality.” After Daniel was incarcerated, Pierce went through
the process to be able to maintain email communication with
him because “I know [Daniel] to be a good person, and he
was a good friend, and . . . I felt like he needed that support
in prison.” Pierce testified that Daniel’s conversations are now
“logical.” He further explained, “[D]rugs isn’t [sic] a part of
that conversation anymore, . . . and he’s made some reference
that he was in a bad place and that is behind him now,” and
“he seems genuine about that.” During their conversations,
Daniel “regularly” mentioned his children, “and he wants noth-
ing more than to be a part of . . . his kids’ lives.”
(b) Applicable Law and Analysis
[11,12] Under the Nebraska Juvenile Code, terminating
parental rights requires both clear and convincing evidence
that one of the statutory grounds enumerated in § 43-292
exists and clear and convincing evidence that termination is
in the best interests of the children. Benjamin S. v. Crystal S.,
313 Neb. 799, 986 N.W.2d 492 (2023). See, also, § 43-292.
Whereas statutory grounds are based on a parent’s past con-
duct, the best interests inquiry focuses on the future well-being
of the child. Benjamin S. v. Crystal S., supra. Proving that
termination would be in the best interests of the child is a high
hurdle because a parent’s right to raise his or her children is
constitutionally protected. Id. Therefore, we apply a rebuttable
presumption that it is in the child’s best interests to maintain a
relationship with his or her parent. Id. The presumption can be
overcome by proof of parental unfitness. See id.
[13] Termination of parental rights is a final and complete
severance of the child from the parent and removes the entire
bundle of parental rights. Kitsmiller v. Kitsmiller, 31 Neb.

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App. 473, 983 N.W.2d 147 (2022). With such severe and
final consequences, parental rights should be terminated only
in the absence of any reasonable alternative and as the last
resort. Id.
Alicia argues that “[t]he juvenile court erred [in] failing to
consider and find a statutory basis for terminating [Daniel’s]
parental rights.” Brief for appellant at 34. Although the juve-
nile court did not conduct an explicit analysis of every alleged
statutory ground for termination, it was not necessary for it to
do so in light of its finding that termination was not in the chil-
dren’s best interests. See, Benjamin S. v. Crystal S., supra (ter-
mination of parental rights requires clear and convincing evi-
dence of statutory ground and that termination is in children’s
best interests); Kitsmiller v. Kitsmiller, supra (although juvenile
court did not conduct explicit analysis of statutory grounds for
termination, such was unnecessary in light of court’s finding
that termination was not in child’s best interests).
The juvenile court indicated that it would “address some
of the underlying allegations relating to the provisions of
[§] 43-292 while considering the best interests of the chil-
dren,” but that its focus was on the “best interests of the
children and the necessity to terminate the parental rights of
[Daniel] given the unique facts to this case and the alterna-
tive to termination.” It acknowledged Alicia’s argument that
consideration of the statutory factors leaned in favor of ter-
minating Daniel’s parental rights, and it stated, “This court
might agree. However, this court requires more than leaning in
favor of when taking the drastic and final step of termination.”
Thus, while the juvenile court did not analyze each alleged
statutory factor under § 43-292, it appeared to agree that a
statutory basis existed for terminating Daniel’s parental rights.
However, it went on to conclude that Alicia “failed to meet her
burden to show termination of [Daniel’s] parental rights [was]
in the best interests of the children.” Therefore, even accepting
that Alicia proved one or more statutory grounds for termina-
tion by clear and convincing evidence, we nevertheless agree

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with the juvenile court that terminating Daniel’s parental rights
is not necessary, nor in the children’s best interests at this time.
Alternative measures remain available in the district court, as
indicated by the juvenile court. See Kitsmiller v. Kitsmiller,
supra (parental rights should be terminated only in absence of
any reasonable alternative and as last resort).
The juvenile court stated that the district court could create
a “safety plan and issue orders limiting or excluding contact”
and that Daniel could “be required to demonstrate sobriety
prior to any contact.” It also referred to Daniel’s testimony
that “he wishes to have a relationship with his children,” and
it concluded that the evidence did not support that he had
abandoned the children. The court pointed out that there were
“numerous competing orders suggesting that [Daniel] could
not legally contact the children after he was incarcerated” and
that he “communicated with family members” to obtain infor-
mation about the children. The court pointed to Daniel’s testi-
mony that he hoped to be released “sometime in the summer
of 2025” and that “his case manager supports his release.”
The court also noted that Alicia had facilitated a relation-
ship with Daniel’s “side of the family until she learned they
assisted him in acquiring an attorney to fight the adoption
proceedings.” It acknowledged Daniel’s testimony that he was
not the “same person” and that he was “no longer addicted
to drugs and alcohol. It also acknowledged that “[w]hether
[Daniel] will be fit to parent or even have contact with the
children when he is released from custody remains to be
seen.” The court pointed out that this was not a case involving
physical or sexual assault of a child and that if the evidence
“included aggravated circumstances such as these, the court’s
analysis and conclusion might be different.” It also stated that
Alicia’s “purpose for termination,” being “in part to allow her
new husband to adopt the children,” was not factored in its
consideration, and the court added that her husband “seems
like a wonderful stepparent” and that the “children are lucky
to have him in their lives.”

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Our assessment of the evidence is consistent with that of
the juvenile court. Although Daniel’s own actions led to the
criminal no-contact order and his incarceration, Daniel testi-
fied that he has been sober since January 2022 and is now “a
completely different person.” As pointed out by Daniel, his
addiction and criminal behaviors occurred prior to the entry
of the Iowa divorce decree and were discussed therein, but
the court nevertheless provided him parenting time. Notably,
there is nothing in our record to suggest that Alicia appealed
or otherwise challenged the Iowa court’s order that provided
Daniel a phased-in parenting schedule, which included video
or telephone calls and was to progress to in-person supervised
visits. However, due to his incarceration and the no-contact
orders, he was unable to exercise the parenting time he was
granted. While incarcerated, Daniel wrote in journals for
each of the children to give to them when he was eventually
released, “so that way they know I never forgot about them.”
Also, Daniel made efforts to modify the no-contact order and
have contact with his children once he realized he could do so
after obtaining his current attorney.
Alicia’s current husband and the guardian ad litem appointed
in the separate stepparent adoption proceeding did express
some concern that reintroducing Daniel to the children could
affect the children’s mental health and well-being. But like the
juvenile court, we find that those concerns can be addressed
outside of a termination of Daniel’s parental rights. The cir-
cumstances present here can be distinguished from those cases
brought by the State seeking to terminate an individual’s
parental rights. Unlike those cases, the children involved in
this case are not being left in foster care to languish in a tem-
porary setting for an unknown amount of time; rather, they
have the security and stability of being cared for by their
mother and stepfather while further steps are taken to deter-
mine whether Daniel can appropriately and safely maintain a
parenting relationship with his children.

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Further, in cases initiated by the State, parents are usually
provided with services and a reasonable period of time to
attempt to overcome their personal deficiencies or incapacities
that led to the State’s involvement. In this case, at the time of
the Iowa divorce decree in January 2022, there was certainly
evidence to support the imposition of a phased-in supervised
parenting schedule, given Daniel’s drug and alcohol abuse
and reprehensible behaviors in the preceding years. However,
since that time, there was evidence that Daniel has been sober
since his incarceration in January 2022, that he has no desire
for drugs, and that “he wants nothing more” than to be a part
of his children’s lives. And while there is evidence to support
that Daniel may have overcome his past deficiencies or inca-
pacities, we agree with the juvenile court’s cautionary assess-
ment that “[w]hether [Daniel] will be fit to parent or even have
contact with the children when he is released from custody
remains to be seen” and that “[t]he district [c]ourt can tailor a
safety plan and issue orders limiting or excluding contact with
[Daniel] should he be released.”
Alicia argues that “the heart of [her] petition was to deter-
mine whether Daniel should be excluded from [the] children’s
lives before ever reaching that point” and that “[c]omplicating
the issue by avoidance and putting it off to a later date is not
in the best interests of the children.” Brief for appellant at 49.
However, based on our de novo review, we agree with the
juvenile court that Alicia failed to meet her burden to prove
that terminating Daniel’s parental rights was in the children’s
best interests. With such severe and final consequences,
parental rights should be terminated only in the absence of
any reasonable alternative and as the last resort. Kitsmiller v.
Kitsmiller, 31 Neb. App. 473, 983 N.W.2d 147 (2022).
In this case, there remains a reasonable alternative to main-
taining Daniel’s parental rights. Daniel’s contact with the chil-
dren can be addressed in the modification proceeding before
the district court. See Benjamin S. v. Crystal S., 313 Neb. 799,
816, 986 N.W.2d 492, 503 (2023) (Supreme Court concluded

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Nebraska Court of Appeals Advance Sheets
34 Nebraska Appellate Reports
DUNHAM v. DUNHAM
Cite as 34 Neb. App. 235
there was not clear and convincing evidence that terminating
mother’s parental rights was in children’s best interests and
reversed district court’s termination order; Supreme Court
“express[ed] no view regarding the parties’ respective requests
to modify the decree or how the district court might structure
a modified parenting plan within the context of modifica-
tion proceedings”). Accordingly, we affirm the order of the
juvenile court dismissing Alicia’s petition for termination of
Daniel’s parental rights.
3. Transfer Back to District Court
Alicia claims the juvenile court erred in transferring the case
back to the district court without any notice, hearing, or input
from the parties. She argues, “The parties should have been
notified of the [juvenile] court’s decision regarding termination
and have been allowed to appeal that decision in the juvenile
court, or move to alter or amend the same, as well as seek
temporary or other orders before jurisdiction was transferred.”
Brief for appellant at 51. However, as discussed previously,
the juvenile court’s order indicating it was transferring the case
back to the district court did not preclude it from maintaining
jurisdiction for a timely filed motion to alter or amend and the
subsequent filing of a notice of appeal. Further, there is noth-
ing to suggest that Alicia attempted to file any post-decision
motions in the juvenile court, and she was able to appeal the
juvenile court’s final order once the court disposed of the toll-
ing motion. Any further matters related to the best interests of
the children can be addressed in the district court.
VI. CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, in case No. A-25-338, we affirm
the juvenile court’s February 11, 2025, order dismissing Alicia’s
petition to terminate Daniel’s parental rights. The other three
appeals are dismissed.
Appeals in nos. A-25-176, A-25-177,
and A-25-337 dismissed.
Judgment in no. A-25-338 affirmed.