IN RE SE. EYE CTR. (PENDING MATTERS); IN RE SE. EYE CTR. (JUDGMENTS), 2024 NCBC 84

STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA
WAKE COUNTY
IN THE GENERAL COURT OF JUSTICE
SUPERIOR COURT DIVISION
IN RE SOUTHEASTERN EYE
CENTER-PENDING MATTERS 15CVS001648-910
GUILFORD COUNTY
IN RE SOUTHEASTERN EYE
CENTER-JUDGMENTS 12CVS011322-400
ORDER AND OPINION ON DEFENDANT
DOUGLAS S. HARRIS’S MOTION TO RECONSIDER
1. 	THIS MATTER is before the Court on Defendant Douglas S. Harris’s
(“Harris”) Motion to Reconsider (the “Motion”)1 pursuant to Rule 54(b) of the North
Carolina Rules of Civil Procedure (the “Rule(s)”) filed on 2 August 2024 in the above-
captioned matters. 	The Motion seeks the Court’s reconsideration and revision or
rescission of the following rulings as constituting clear error:2
1 (Def. Harris’s Mot. Reconsider Ct.’s Am. Order & Op. Mots. Summ. J.; Order Setting Claim
& Matters for Trial by Jury; Am. Order & Op.; Order Approving Nivison Settlement &
Related 	Transactions; 	Order 	Approving 	Pl’s. 	Mot. 	Apptmt. 	Receiver 	for 	JDPW 	Tr.
[hereinafter, “Harris Mot. Reconsider”], ECF No. 1608.) 	For ease of reference, all ECF
citations in this Order and Opinion are to the Court’s electronic docket in Wake County 15
CVS 1648 unless otherwise specified.
2 Unless otherwise defined, the capitalized terms in this Order and Opinion refer to those
terms as used in the Court’s Amended Order and Opinion on Motions for Summary Judgment
or Partial Summary Judgment (Old Battleground v. CCSEA) entered on 6 January 2022. See
In re Se. Eye Ctr.—Pending Matters, 2021 NCBC LEXIS 43, at *3–18 (N.C. Super. Ct. Jan. 6,
2022) (hereinafter, the “Jan. 2022 Am. Order”).
In re Se. Eye Ctr. (Pending Matters); In re Se. Eye Ctr. (Judgments), 2024 NCBC
84.

a. 	Paragraphs 27, 140, and 142 of the Court’s 6 January 2022 Amended
Order and Opinion on Motions for Summary Judgment or Partial Summary
Judgment 	(Old 	Battleground 	Properties, 	Inc. 	(“Old 	Battleground”) 	v.
Central Carolina Surgical Eye Associates, P.A. (“CCSEA”) (the “January
2022 Amended Order”)3;
b. 	Paragraph 5 of the Court’s 6 January 2022 Order Setting Claims and
Matters for Trial by Jury (Old Battleground v. CCSEA) (the “Jury Trial
Order”)4;
c. 	Paragraph 19 of the Court’s 28 April 2016 Order Approving Nivison
Settlement 	and Related Transactions 	Including 	Release 	of 	CEA 	Sale
Proceeds (All Matters) (the “Settlement Approval Order”)5; and
d. 	Paragraph 12 of the Court’s 28 April 2016 Order Approving Plaintiffs’
Motion 	for Appointment 	of 	Receiver for JDPW 	Trust 	(“JDPW”) 	(Old
Battleground 	v. 	CCSEA 	– 	Consolidated) 	(All 	Matters) 	(the 	“JDPW
Receivership Order”).6
3 (Jan. 2022 Am. Order; see Harris Mot. Reconsider ¶¶ 1, 3 (misciting the Jan. 2022 Am.
Order as ECF No. 1648).)
4 (ECF No. 1444 [hereinafter, the “Jury Trial Order”]; see Harris Mot. Reconsider ¶ 2.)
5 (In re Se. Eye Ctr. —Pending Matters, 2016 N.C. Super. LEXIS 34 (N.C. Super. Ct. Apr. 28,
2016) [hereinafter, the “Settlement Approval Order”]; see Harris Mot. Reconsider ¶ 4.)
6 (In re Se. Eye Ctr. —Pending Matters, 2016 N.C. Super. LEXIS 43 (N.C. Super. Ct. Apr. 28,
2016) [hereinafter, the “JDPW Receivership Order”]; see Harris Mot. Reconsider ¶ 5.)

2. 	Gerald A. Jeutter, Jr. (the “Receiver”) and the Nivison Parties7 contend in
opposition that none of the Court’s rulings reflects clear error or manifest injustice
and thus that reconsideration is not warranted.8
3. 	Having considered the Motion, the parties’ briefs in support of and in
opposition to the Motion, the appropriate matters of record, and the arguments of
counsel at the hearing on the Motion, the Court, in the exercise of its discretion,
hereby DENIES Harris’s Motion for the reasons set forth below.
Smith Debnam Narron Drake Saintsing & Myers, L.L.P., by Byron L.
Saintsing, 	for Plaintiff 	Old 	Battleground 	Properties, 	Inc., 	Plaintiff
Nivison Family Investments, LLC, and Arthur Nivison.
Oak City Law LLP, by Robert E. Fields III and Samuel Pinero II, for
Gerald A. Jeutter, Jr., as Receiver for JDPW Trust U/T/A Dated June
8, 2007, Central Carolina Surgical Eye Associates, P.A., HUTA Leasing
LLC, Southeastern Eye Management, Inc., Southeastern Cataract Laser
Center, PLLC, EMS Partners, LLC, KEPES Newco, LLC, and DRE
Newco, LLC.
Douglas S. Harris, Pro se.
Bledsoe, Chief Judge.
I.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
4. 	This dispute arises within a large group of cases before this Court that have
been consolidated into two files: In re Se. Eye Ctr.-Pending Matters (Wake County 15
7 The Nivison Parties are, collectively, Plaintiff Nivison Family Investments, LLC (“NFI”),
Plaintiff Old Battleground Properties, Inc. (“Old Battleground”), and Arthur Nivison.
8 (See Receiver’s Resp. Br. Opp’n Doug Harris Mot. Pursuant Rule 54 (Old Battleground v.
CCSEA/Nivison v. Harris), ECF No. 1627; Nivison Parties’ Resp. Opp’n Douglas S. Harris’s
Mot. Reconsider, ECF No. 1624.)

CVS 1648) and In re Se. Eye Ctr.—Judgments (Guilford County 12 CVS 11322). The
extensive background of these cases is set forth in previous orders and opinions of
this Court.9
5. 	To provide context for the Court’s analysis and resolution of the Motion, the
Court finds it necessary to reproduce certain findings and conclusions from prior
orders and opinions in these actions which are now at issue.
6. 	As relevant here, on 28 April 2016, and upon Plaintiffs’ and the Receiver’s
various motions, the Court entered the Settlement Approval Order and the JDPW
Receivership Order. 	The Settlement Approval Order provided, in relevant part, as
follows:
19. The Receiver has negotiated a settlement of the claim by the Nivison
Parties. 	The terms of the Settlement provide for an allowed claim
against CCSEA, DRE and KEPES10 of $4 million (the “Allowed Claim”)
and an allowed claim against the JDPW Trust of $2.1 million, plus
accrued interest and attorney’s fees, if the JDPW Trust is placed into
Receivership with Gerald A. Jeutter, Jr. appointed as the Receiver. Both
of these allowed claims are less than half of the total amount sought by
the Nivison Parties against the Receivership Entities, Dr. Epes, Ms.
Epes, and the JDPW Trust.11
9 See In re Se. Eye Ctr.—Pending Matters, 2019 NCBC LEXIS 29, at *3–23 (N.C. Super. Ct.
May 7, 2019); Jan. 2022 Am. Order, at *3–18; Order & Op. Def. Douglas S. Harris’s Mot.
Dismiss Pursuant to N.C. R. Civ. P. Rules 12(b)(1) & 12(h)(3) ¶¶ 3–10, ECF No. 1683 (each
reciting procedural background and citing prior orders).
10 DRE and KEPES “were established to receive and hold substantially all of the assets of Dr.
Richard Epes and his wife by Order of this Court.” (Settlement Approval Order ¶ 2; see Order
Joint. Mot. Approve Settlement Agreement & Release (All Matters), ECF No. 117.)
11 (Settlement Approval Order ¶ 19.)

Harris argues that the Court’s approval of the Settlement permitting a $2.1 million
claim against JDPW was clearly erroneous and should be revised or rescinded
because a “settlement between two parties basing their settlement upon the use of a
third party’s legal rights and property is not permitted by law.”12
7. 	The Settlement Approval Order further provided, in relevant part, as
follows:
38. Doug Harris objects that the joint prosecution aspects of this
Settlement result in a conflict of interest for the Receiver, if the Receiver
is appointed as the Receiver of the JDPW Trust, and that the claims may
be circular due to indemnity claims by those from whom relief is sought
in the joint prosecution. 	In the event of such an appointment, the
Settlement provides for allowance of a claim against the JDPW Trust in
the amount of $2.1 million, plus accrued interest and attorney’s fees.
This amount is a substantial reduction in the amount sought from the
JDPW Trust by the Nivison Parties. 	The Settlement further provides
that the allowed claim will be assigned to KEPES. 	As a result, upon
entry of this Order approving the Settlement, the Receiver will not be in
a position to assert claims against the JDPW Trust while acting as
Receiver for the JDPW Trust. 	To the extent that Doug Harris or the
Castle McCulloch Parties assert claims against Receivership Entities
based upon claims asserted by the JDPW Trust, any issues presented by
those claims can be addressed at that time in the context of actual,
instead of hypothetical, disputes. These objections are OVERRULED in
the exercise of the Court’s discretion.
****
40. The Receiver is free to settle these disputed claims in the manner
that is most favorable to the Receivership Entities and those with valid
legal interests in the Receivership Entities and in the Receivership
Entities’ assets. 	The Receiver is not required to settle in the manner
that is most beneficial to other persons and entities who may be liable
in whole or in part for the loan to the JDPW Trust or for damage that
occurred in connection with that transaction. 	To the contrary, the
approach taken here seeks to maximize the recovery available to the
creditors of the Receivership Entities and represents sound business
12 (Harris Mot. Reconsider ¶ 4.)

judgment. This objection is OVERRULED in the exercise of the Court’s
discretion.
41. 	Doug 	Harris 	and 	Mr. 	McDaniel 	further 	object 	to 	the 	entire
Settlement on the grounds of “bad math” and a litany of other reasons
why an allowed claim of $4 million dollars is not justified on the facts as
they see them. 	These objections reflect one side of the many disputed
factual contentions surrounding the transactions with the Nivison
Parties 	since 	2012. 	Disputes 	exist 	as to 	which 	version 	of 	the 3
September 21, 2012 contract, if any, is a binding contract, whether a
contract was ever formed, whether consideration was provided for
modifications, whether material facts were misrepresented, whether
disclosures were full and adequate, whether property was owned by Dr.
Epes or Ms. Epes, whether documents were signed by the person whose
signature purports to be on the documents, and many other similar
issues. 	These are the types of heavily contested disputes, filled with
uncertainties and complexities, from which settlements are born. As a
result, these objections are OVERRULED in the exercise of the Court’s
discretion.
42. 	The 	Nivison 	Parties 	are 	pursuing 	their 	claims 	against 	the
Receivership Entities with vigor and determination. 	The proposed
Settlement appears to the Court to be a better alternative than the
continued 	expenditure 	of 	Receivership 	resources 	in 	an 	effort 	to
determine each and every one of these disputed factual and legal claims.
The resolution reached is a reasonable middle ground among the
multiple 	potential 	outcomes. 	Given 	that 	the 	Nivison 	Parties
undisputedly 	provided 	several 	million 	dollars 	of 	value 	to 	the
Receivership Entities and the JDPW Trust, for which they have not been
repaid, the result does not appear inequitable to the Court. Accordingly,
this 	Objection 	is 	OVERRULED 	in 	the 	exercise 	of 	the 	Court’s
discretion.13
8. 	The JDPW Receivership Order provided, in relevant part, as follows:
4. The Motion seeks appointment of a receiver to administer the assets
that JDPW Trust had in the past or which it currently has, citing the
fact that JDPW Trust does not appear to be operating for the benefit of
its beneficiary or its creditors. 	As recited in the Motion, on September
21, 2012, NFI loaned the sum of $2.1 million to JDPW Trust and these
funds were used to acquire, at a discount, loans and various instruments
from NewBridge Bank. These loans were made by NewBridge Bank or
13 (Settlement Approval Order ¶¶ 38, 40–42.)

its predecessor in interest to both the CCSEA Entities and HCM and
CM. Defendant Richard Harris is the brother of Defendant Doug Harris.
Defendant Richard Harris is the primary owner of HCM and CM. Doug
Harris 	negotiated 	with 	NewBridge 	Bank 	on 	behalf 	of 	the 	Castle
McCulloch Defendants, in particular his brother, Richard Harris, for
sale of the loan documents to a third party purchaser, later identified as
Arthur 	Nivison, 	the 	principal 	of 	NFI, 	for 	settlement 	of 	the 	total
outstanding balance owed for a loan extended to HCM and CM (the
“Castle McCulloch Loan”) and three loans extended to the CCSEA
Entities by NewBridge Bank (the “CCSEA Loans”). 	It appears to the
Court that, upon receipt of $2.1 million, NewBridge Bank transferred
its interest in all four loans to JDPW Trust, but JDPW Trust did not
assign any of the loan documents from any of the four loans to NFI as
NFI contends JDPW Trust promised to do. 	It is undisputed that as of
September 	21, 	2012, 	the 	date 	the 	four 	loans 	were 	assigned 	by
NewBridge Bank to JDPW Trust, the total amount owed to NewBridge
Bank on all four loans was approximately $3.4 million. 	It is further
undisputed 	that 	of 	the 	$3.4 	million 	owed 	to 	NewBridge 	Bank,
approximately $1.6 million was the outstanding balance on the Castle
McCulloch Loan.
****
7. It appears to the Court that the Castle McCulloch Defendants
benefited from the acquisition by JDPW Trust of the NewBridge Bank
notes because the notes were in default and Doug Harris, the Trustee of
JDPW Trust, agreed to, and in fact did, forbear from collection of the
notes. In sworn testimony, Doug Harris and JDPW Trust acknowledged
the indebtedness which it owes to NFI. 	(Transcript – September 14,
2014 hearing before the Honorable Paul C. Ridgeway.) 	JDPW Trust
claims it has no assets to pay this debt, and appears to have been
insolvent at all relevant times. 	Yet, Doug Harris has testified under
oath that JDPW Trust assigned the Castle McCulloch Loan documents
to Defendant Richard Harris shortly after the September 21, 2012
closing. In addition, a release deed dated March 15, 2013, prepared by
Doug Harris and recorded in the Guilford County Registry on April 14,
2015, purports to release all of the Castle McCulloch real property from
the Castle McCulloch Deed of Trust and Assignment of Rents and
Profits 	granted 	to 	NewBridge 	Bank. 	(Exhibit 	YY 	– 	Amended
Consolidated Complaint.) 	It appears to the Court that these actions
demonstrate that Doug Harris, as Trustee of JDPW Trust, has taken
affirmative steps to rid JDPW Trust of substantial assets which would
otherwise have been available to pay the debt of JDPW Trust to NFI. It
further appears that such transactions benefitted Doug Harris, the

Trustee of JDPW Trust, as well as his brother, Richard Harris, and his
related companies. It appears to the Court that, at the same time that
Doug Harris was representing his brother, Richard Harris and JDPW
Trust in these transactions with NewBridge Bank and Nivison and
adverse to Dr. Epes, Mark McDaniel and CCSEA, Doug Harris also was
simultaneously representing Dr. Epes and CCSEA in litigation with Dr.
Harriott.
****
12. 	The Court perceives no conflict of interest in the Receiver of the
CCSEA Entities serving as receiver for the JDPW Trust, provided that
NFI is allowed a $2.1 million claim, plus interest and attorney’s fees,
against the receivership estate of JDPW Trust. 	Further, the Receiver
already 	has 	substantial 	knowledge 	regarding 	the 	facts 	and
circumstances regarding the transactions at issue, and therefore judicial
economy would be served by having him appointed as the receiver for
JDPW Trust.14
Harris argues that the first sentence of paragraph 12 above is clear error and must
be revised or rescinded.15
9. 	The JDPW Receivership Order further provided that “[t]he Receiver of
JDPW Trust is authorized to allow the claim of NFI against the receivership estate
of JDPW Trust in the amount of $2.1 million, together with accrued interest,
attorney’s fees and costs.”16
10. 	In its Amended Order and Opinion of 6 January 2022, the Court described
the comprehensive settlement between the Receiver and the Nivison Parties and the
allowance of the claim against JDPW as follows:
14 (JDPW Receivership Order, Findings Fact ¶¶ 4, 7, 12.)
15 (Harris Mot. Reconsider ¶ 5.)
16 (JDPW Receivership Order, Order for Relief ¶ 5.)

27. Along with placing JDPW into receivership, the Court also approved
a settlement agreement between Plaintiffs, the Receivership Entities,
and JDPW. Among other things, the settlement allowed Plaintiffs a $2.1
million claim against JDPW, arising out of the Nivison Loan for the
same amount. (See Ord. Approving Nivison Settlement & Related
Transactions [“Ord. Approving Nivison Agrmt.”] at 8, ECF No. 471.)
This represented a substantial reduction from the amount originally
sought by Plaintiffs against JDPW. (See Ord. Approving Nivison Agrmt.
8.).17
Harris argues that the inclusion of JDPW at the end of the first sentence of this
paragraph is clear error and should be revised or rescinded.18
11. 	In its Jury Trial Order also issued on 6 January 2022, the Court determined
that “JDPW’s liability to Nivison has been established at $2.1 million plus accrued
interest, attorney’s fees, and costs and, as a result, no issue concerning the amount
of JDPW’s liability to Nivison remains for determination by a jury.”19 Harris argues
that this determination constituted clear error and should be revised or rescinded
because it conflicts with the Court’s footnote 1 in its Order Amending Summary
Judgment Order,20 which was also entered on 6 January 2022 and reads as follows:
“The Court notes that both the Receiver, (see ECF No. 1386 at 1–2), and the Court
assumed for purposes of the Receiver’s motion for partial summary judgment that
17 (Jan. 2022 Am. Order ¶ 27.)
18 (Harris Mot. Reconsider ¶ 1.)
19 (Jury Trial Order ¶ 5.)
20 (Harris Mot. Reconsider ¶ 2.)

the Assignment Agreement document favored by Doug Harris was the operative
Assignment Agreement.”21
12. 	Also relevant to Harris’s Motion are the following provisions of the Court’s
January 2022 Amended Order:
140. 	Monetary Judgment Against Doug Harris. 	Second, the Court
grants JDPW’s request to enter a money judgment in JDPW’s favor
against Doug Harris for: (i) the full amount JDPW owes to Plaintiffs on
the Nivison Loan and (ii) the $1.3 million due and payable on the CM
Note over and above the $2.1 million JDPW borrowed under the Nivison
Loan. 	As already observed, the Court may “[c]ompel the trustee to
redress a breach of trust by paying money, restoring property, or other
means[.]” 	N.C.G.S. § 36C-10-1001(b)(3); see also id. § 36C-10-1002(a)
(“A trustee who commits a breach of trust is liable for the greater of: (1)
[t]he amount required to restore the value of the trust property and trust
distributions to what they would have been had the breach not occurred;
or (2) [t]he profit the trustee made by reason of the breach.”); id. § 36C-
10-1010(b) (“A trustee is personally liable for torts committed in the
course 	of 	administering 	a 	trust, 	or 	for 	obligations 	arising 	from
ownership or control of trust property . . . if the trustee is personally at
fault.”).
****
142. 	In addition, JDPW is entitled to a monetary judgment against
Doug Harris for the $1.3 million due and payable on the CM Note over
and above the amount JDPW borrowed from Plaintiffs via the Nivison
Loan. 	Had Doug Harris not committed a breach by transferring away
the CM Note and Release Deed and failing to enforce JDPW’s rights to
the CM Loan, JDPW would not only have been able to repay the Nivison
Loan, but it would have also profited from the CM Loan by receiving the
difference ($1.3 million) between what JDPW could have collected on the
CM Loan and what it owed on the Nivison Loan. 	But instead, Doug
Harris arranged to receive that amount for himself personally through
other channels, pursuant to the Epes and McDaniel Agreements. Thus,
even absent a breach of trust, Doug Harris may be held personally liable
for 	that 	amount. 	See 	N.C.G.S. 	§ 36C-10-1003(a) 	(“A 	trustee 	is
21 (Order Am. Summ. J. Order (Old Battleground v. CCSEA) ¶ 7 n.1, ECF No. 1442.)

accountable 	for 	any 	profit 	made 	by 	the 	trustee 	arising 	from 	the
administration of the trust, even absent a breach of trust.”).22
Harris argues that the Court’s conclusions in these two paragraphs that $1.3 million
was due and payable on the Castle McCulloch Note (“CM Note”) was clear error and
should be revised or rescinded.23
13. 	Finally, also relevant to Harris’s Motion is the claim he submitted to the
Receiver seeking $1.3 million for himself based upon his agreements with Dr. Epes
and Mark McDaniel.24 The claim stated, in relevant part, as follows:
WHEREAS, 	NewBridge 	Bank 	has 	made 	four 	loans, 	numbers
06846670101, 06846679001, 06846679002 to CCSEA and 04753419001
to Historic Castle McCulloch, LLC, Castle McCulloch, Inc., and NSITE
(all 	Newbridge 	Bank 	documents 	incorporated 	by 	reference), 	and
Newbridge has offered to discount equity in these loans of $3,350,139.30
to $2,026,834.35 which offer these parties wish to effectuate.
****
McDaniel and the corporations in consideration of said waiver agree
that the money owed on NewBridge loan number 04753419001, $1.3
million, will be paid to Harris with eight percent annual interest in a
lump sum, two years from the date of this agreement.25
22 (Jan. 2022 Am. Order ¶¶ 140, 142.)
23 (Harris Mot. Reconsider ¶ 3.)
24 (See 2d Index Exs. Supp. Mot. Partial Summ. J. by Receiver for JDPW Tr. (Old
Battleground v. CCSEA), Ex. 1385.8, Claim of Douglas S. Harris against the entities within
the receivership, joint & severally (Old Battleground v. CCSEA – Consol.), ECF No. 1385.8;
Index Exs. Supp. Mot. Partial Summ. J. by Receiver for JDPW Tr. (Old Battleground v.
CCSEA), Ex. 1384.4, Agreement re $1.3MM by Dr. Epes; Ex. 1384.5, Agreement re $1.3MM
by Companies, ECF Nos. 1384.4, 1384.5.)
25 (See Index Exs. Supp. Mot. Partial Summ. J. by Receiver for JDPW Tr. (Old Battleground
v. CCSEA), Ex. 1384.5, Agreement re $1.3MM by Companies 1–2.)

14. 	After full briefing, the Court held a hearing on the Motion on 11 September
2024, at which the Receiver and the Nivison Parties were represented by counsel and
Douglas S. Harris appeared pro se.26 The Motion is now ripe for resolution.
II.
LEGAL STANDARD
15. 	Under Rule 54(b), interlocutory orders are “subject to revision at any time
before the entry of judgment adjudicating all the claims and the rights and liabilities
of all the parties.” N.C. R. Civ. P. 54(b). That said, “[a] motion for reconsideration is
not a vehicle to identify facts or legal arguments that could have been, but were not,
raised at the time the relevant motion was pending.” Reynolds v. Burks, 906 S.E.2d
508, at *12 (N.C. Ct. App. Sept. 3, 2024) (quoting Julianello v. K-V Pharm. Co., 791
F.3d 915, 923 (8th Cir. 2015)). 	“The limited use of a motion to reconsider serves to
ensure that parties are thorough and accurate in their original pleadings and
arguments presented to the Court.” 	Id. (quoting Wiseman v. First Citizens Bank &
Tr. Co., 215 F.R.D. 507, 509 (W.D.N.C. 2003)). But “[t]o allow motions to reconsider
offhandedly or routinely would result in an unending motions practice.” Id.
16. 	As a result, “[m]otions to reconsider rarely succeed because the grounds that
merit reconsideration rarely exist.” Gvest Real Est., LLC v. JS Real Est. Invs., LLC,
2024 NCBC LEXIS 42, *3–4 (N.C. Super. Ct. Mar. 7, 2024). As Judge Conrad of this
Court has explained, “[i]t isn’t enough to polish up old arguments and try them again
or to spin out new arguments that could’ve been raised but weren’t. 	A party must
26 (See Am. Not. Hr’g, ECF No. 1632.)

point to a true game changer: ‘new evidence,’ a ‘change in the controlling law,’ or ‘the
need to correct a clear error or prevent manifest injustice.’” 	Id. (quoting Pender v.
Bank of Am. Corp., 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1838, at *7 (W.D.N.C. Jan. 7, 2011)).27
Since “[s]uch problems rarely arise,” a “motion to reconsider should be equally rare.”
W4 Farms, Inc. v. Tyson Farms, Inc., 2017 NCBC LEXIS 99, at *5 (N.C. Super. Ct.
Oct. 19, 2017) (quoting Harson Corp. v. Zlotnicki, 779 F.2d 906, 909 (3d Cir. 1985)).
III.
ANALYSIS
17. 	In his attempt to meet the high bar for reconsideration, Harris cites no new
evidence or change in relevant law and instead relies entirely on purported instances
of “clear error” in the Court’s challenged orders. 	As will be shown below, however,
rather than show “clear error” or “manifest injustice,” Harris merely repackages a
series of previously rejected arguments into a new Motion under Rule 54 that fails to
provide a basis for reconsideration. 	The Court will address each of Harris’s
contentions in turn.
A. The Court’s finding that the Settlement Agreement between the Nivison
Parties and the Receiver bound JDPW—Paragraph 27 of the January 2022
Amended Order.
18. 	Harris argues that since he was the Receiver of JDPW at the time of the
settlement negotiations between the Receiver and the Nivison Parties and did not
27 See, e.g., United Therapeutics Corp. v. Liquidia Techs., 2023 NCBC LEXIS 107, at *3–4
(N.C. Super. Ct. Aug. 31, 2023) (“Absent guidance from North Carolina’s appellate courts on
the standard to apply when considering a motion to reconsider an interlocutory ruling under
Rule 54(b), the Court turns to federal case law addressing similarly worded portions of the
Federal Rule 54(b).”).

participate in those discussions, the Court could not have approved a settlement
binding JDPW. 	Harris therefore contends that the Court’s recitation that the
Settlement Approval Order is binding on JDPW constitutes clear error.28 	This is
precisely the same argument Harris raises in his Motion to Dismiss under Rules
12(b)(1) and 12(h)(3),29 however, which the Court has rejected by its Order on that
motion which is filed contemporaneously herewith (the “12(b)(1) Order”). The Court
incorporates by reference its analysis in the 12(b)(1) Order here and therefore denies
Harris’s Motion as to paragraph 27 of the January 2022 Amended Order.30
B. The Court’s finding that JDPW’s liability to the Nivison Parties is $2.1
million—Paragraph 5 of the Jury Trial Order.
19. 	Next, Harris seeks reconsideration of the Court’s recognition in the Jury
Trial Order that “JDPW’s liability to Nivison has been established at $2.1 million
plus accrued interest, attorney’s fees, and costs, and, as a result, no issue concerning
the amount of JDPW’s liability to Nivison remains for determination by a jury.”31
28 (Harris Mem. L. Supp. Mot. Reconsider Ct.’s Am. Order & Op. Mots. Summ. J.; Order
Setting Claim & Matters for Trial by Jury; Am. Order & Op.; Order Approving Nivison
Settlement & Related Transactions; Order Approving Pl’s. Mot. Apptmt. Receiver for JDPW
Tr. 3–5 [hereinafter, “Harris Mem. L. Supp. Mot. Reconsider”], ECF No. 1609.)
29 (Def. Douglas S. Harris’s Br. Supp. of Def.’s Mot. Dismiss Pursuant to N.C. R. Civ. P. Rules
12(b)(1) & 12(h)(3) 12–16, ECF No. 1576.)
30 (See Order & Op. Def. Douglas S. Harris’s Mot. Dismiss Pursuant to N.C. R. Civ. P. Rules
12(b)(1) & 12(h)(3) ¶¶ 23, 25, ECF No. 1683 (noting that “With Count Four still pending
against JDPW, and after a full hearing on both motions, including Harris’s opposition to each,
the Court entered its order appointing the Receiver as the receiver for JDPW—immediately
vesting title to all of JDPW’s assets in the Receiver—and at the same time entered its order
authorizing the Receiver to allow NFI’s reduced claim in the amount of $2.1 million, which
the Receiver later reported to the Court and all parties that he had allowed.”).)
31 (Jury Trial Order ¶ 5.)

This, he contends, is inconsistent with footnote 1 in the Court’s Order Amending
Summary Judgment Order (Old Battleground v. CCSEA), which, as noted above,
reads, “[t]he Court notes that both the Receiver, (see ECF No. 1386 at 1–2), and the
Court assumed for purposes of the Receiver’s motion for partial summary judgment
that the Assignment Agreement document favored by Doug Harris was the operative
Assignment Agreement.”32 	Because Harris’s preferred version of the Assignment
Agreement contains a clause limiting JDPW’s liability to the Nivison Parties,33
Harris argues that the Court’s finding that JDPW owes the Nivison Parties $2.1
million is clearly erroneous.34
20. 	Harris ignores, however, that: (i) the Court conditioned its April 2016
approval of JDPW’s Settlement Agreement with the Nivison Parties on the Receiver’s
appointment as the trustee of JDPW Trust; (ii) that the settlement involved an
assessment of the strengths and weaknesses of the Receiver’s and the Nivison
Parties’ competing positions and ultimately resulted in a substantial reduction from
32 (Order Am. Summ. J. Order (Old Battleground v. CCSEA) ¶ 7 n.1.)
33 This provision states:
5. It is understood by the Parties that James Mark McDaniel, Jr. and Dr. C.
Richard 	Epes 	are 	pledging 	additional 	security 	together 	with 	personal
guarantees in separate documents, but in the event of default, JDPW Trust’s
liability is limited to the forfeiture of the aforementioned equipment and all of
its future right title, and interest in said equipment.
(Index Exs. Mot. Summ. J., Ex. 1382.2, Sept. 21, 2012 Agreement between Arthur Nivison &
JDPW ¶ 5, ECF No. 1382.2.)
34 (Harris Mem. L. Supp. Mot. Reconsider 6–9.)

the 	Nivison 	Parties’ 	viable 	damages 	claim; 	and 	(iii) 	that 	assessing 	uncertain
outcomes, 	and compromising 	claims 	and 	defenses, 	in 	litigation 	is 	inherent 	in
evaluating and reaching any settlement.35 	Harris provides no new evidence or law
to suggest that the Court’s approval of the $2.1 million settlement in April 2016
should be reconsidered, and the Court finds no clear error or manifest injustice to
justify the reconsideration of its ruling in Paragraph 5 of the Jury Trial Order.36
C. The Court’s conclusion that $1.3 million was due and owing on the CM
Note—Paragraphs 140 and 142 of the January 2022 Amended Order.
21. 	Harris next argues that paragraphs 140 and 142 of the January 2022
Amended Order granting “JDPW’s request to enter a money judgment in JDPW’s
favor against Doug Harris for . . . (ii) the $1.3 million due and payable on the CM
Note over and above the $2.1 million JDPW borrowed under the Nivison Loan” should
be revised and rescinded for clear error. 	In support of his argument, Harris claims
that when NewBridge Bank received the payment of $2.1 million in exchange for the
Notes, it allocated a portion of that payment to pay off the remaining balance on the
CM Note.37 Harris thus contends that because there was no money owed on the CM
Note, he cannot face liability for failing to collect on that Note. Harris’s argument is
again without merit.
35 (Settlement Approval Order ¶ 41.)
36 In light of the Court’s conclusion, it need not consider the Receiver’s argument that Harris’s
preferred Assignment Agreement did not constitute a valid and binding contract. 	(See
Receiver’s Resp. Br. Opp’n Doug Harris Mot. Pursuant Rule 54 (Old Battleground v.
CCSEA/Nivison v. Harris) 11–14.)
37 (Harris Mem. L. Supp. Mot. Reconsider 11.)

22. 	As noted above, the Court concluded in paragraph 142 of the January 2022
Amended Order as follows:
Had Doug Harris not committed a breach by transferring away the CM
Note and Release Deed and failing to enforce JDPW’s rights to the CM
Loan, JDPW would not only have been able to repay the Nivison Loan,
but it would have also profited from the CM Loan by receiving the
difference ($1.3 million) between what JDPW could have collected on the
CM Loan and what it owed on the Nivison Loan. 	But instead, Doug
Harris arranged to receive that amount for himself personally through
other channels, pursuant to the Epes and McDaniel Agreements. Thus,
even absent a breach of trust, Doug Harris may be held personally liable
for that amount. (citations omitted).38
23. 	Harris does not argue anywhere in his briefing that the breach of fiduciary
duty found by the Court in its January 2022 Amended Order was erroneous.
Moreover, even if JDPW satisfied, rather than purchased, the CM Note, as Harris
contends, the undisputed fact remains that he failed to use JDPW’s ownership of the
Notes to its benefit. To the contrary, as he described in the claim he submitted to the
Receiver, he sought to obtain the benefit of the $1.3 million reduction in the CM Note
for himself—not, as his duty as JDPW’s trustee required, for the benefit of JDPW.
The Court therefore finds no clear error or manifest injustice in its conclusions in
paragraphs 140 and 142 of its January 2022 Amended Order.
D. The Court’s approval of the Settlement Agreement was not a conflict-of-
interest transaction—Paragraph 12 of the JDPW Receivership Order.
24. 	The Court stated in paragraph 12 of the JDPW Receivership Order that it
“perceive[d] no conflict of interest in the Receiver of the CCSEA Entities serving as
receiver for JDPW Trust, provided that NFI is allowed a $2.1 million claim, plus
38 (Jan. 2022 Am. Order ¶ 142.)

interest and attorney’s fees, against the receivership estate of JDPW Trust.” Harris
argues that the Court’s conclusion is clear error because JDPW did not benefit from
the settlement and that the settlement was made solely for the gain of the Nivison
Parties.39
25. 	Harris raised this same argument in his objection to the appointment of the
Receiver in his 2016 Objection to the Settlement and again in his objections to the
approval of the Joint Prosecution Agreement that same month.40 Having previously
considered the Receiver’s potential conflict of interest, the Court squarely addressed
this issue after full briefing by the parties in the Settlement Approval Order:
Doug Harris objects that the joint prosecution aspects of this Settlement
result in a conflict of interest for the Receiver, if the Receiver is
appointed as the Receiver of the JDPW Trust, and that the claims may
be circular due to indemnity claims by those from whom relief is sought
in the joint prosecution. 	In the event of such an appointment, the
Settlement provides for allowance of a claim against the JDPW Trust in
the amount of $2.1 million, plus accrued interest and attorney’s fees.
This amount is a substantial reduction in the amount sought from the
JDPW Trust by the Nivison Parties. 	The Settlement further provides
that the allowed claim will be assigned to KEPES. 	As a result, upon
entry of this Order approving the Settlement, the Receiver will not be in
a position to assert claims against the JDPW Trust while acting as
Receiver for the JDPW Trust. 	To the extent that Doug Harris or the
Castle McCulloch Parties assert claims against Receivership Entities
based upon claims asserted by the JDPW Trust, any issues presented by
those claims can be addressed at that time in the context of actual,
39 (Harris Mem. L. Supp. Mot. Reconsider 14.)
40 (Obj. Douglas S. Harris, Individually & as Tr. of JDPW Tr., to Receiver’s Mot. Confirm
Partial Settlement of Debt & Claims & all Related Transactions Including Request Release
CCSEA Sale Proceeds 3–5, ECF No. 333 (citing to the same case Harris uses to make his
argument in the instant case, Lowder v. Allstar Mills, Inc., 309 N.C. 695 (1983)); Obj. Douglas
S. Harris Individually & as Tr. of JDPW Tr. Resp. Nivison Entities’ Mot. Place JDPW Tr.
Into Receivership 15, ECF No. 345.)

instead of hypothetical, disputes. These objections are OVERRULED in
the exercise of the Court’s discretion.41
26. 	The Court finds no clear error or manifest injustice in its prior ruling at
paragraph 12 of the JDPW Receivership Order and that Harris’s recycled arguments
to the contrary continue to be without merit.
IV.
CONCLUSION
27. 	WHEREFORE, based on the above, the Court, in the exercise of its
discretion, hereby ORDERS as follows:
a. 	Harris’s Motion to Reconsider paragraphs 27, 140, and 142 of the
January 2022 Amended Order is hereby DENIED;
b. 	Harris’s Motion to Reconsider paragraph 12 of the JDPW Receivership
Order is hereby DENIED;
c. 	Harris’s Motion to Reconsider paragraph 19 of the Settlement Approval
Order is hereby DENIED;
d. 	Harris’s Motion to Reconsider paragraph 5 of the Jury Trial Order is
hereby DENIED; and
e. 	Harris’s Motion to Reconsider is otherwise DENIED.
28. 	Pursuant to Rule 54(b), the Court enters this Order as a final judgment
because there is no just reason for delay in entering the judgment as a final judgment
41 (Settlement Approval Order ¶ 38.)

and permitting appellate review of this Order and the other orders that the Court is
entering contemporaneously herewith.
SO ORDERED, this the 19th day of December, 2024.
/s/ Louis A. Bledsoe, III
Louis A. Bledsoe, III
Chief Business Court Judge