Willie Qualls, Jr. a/k/a Willie Jene Qualls, Jr. a/k/a Peter Willie Qualls, Jr. a/k/a Willie Gene Qualls, Jr. v. State of Mississippi

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF MISSISSIPPI

NO. 2023-KA-01112-COA

WILLIE QUALLS, JR. A/K/A WILLIE JENE APPELLANT
QUALLS, JR. A/K/A PETER WILLIE QUALLS,
JR. A/K/A WILLIE GENE QUALLS, JR.

v.

STATE OF MISSISSIPPI APPELLEE

DATE OF JUDGMENT: 09/11/2023
TRIAL JUDGE: HON. TOMIKA HARRIS IRVING
COURT FROM WHICH APPEALED: CLAIBORNE COUNTY CIRCUIT COURT
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT: OFFICE OF STATE PUBLIC DEFENDER
BY: STACY FERRARO
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLEE: OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL
BY: DANIELLE LOVE BURKS
DISTRICT ATTORNEY: DANIELLA MARIE SHORTER
NATURE OF THE CASE: CRIMINAL - FELONY
DISPOSITION: AFFIRMED IN PART; VACATED AND
REMANDED IN PART - 05/26/2026
MOTION FOR REHEARING FILED:

BEFORE CARLTON, P.J., WESTBROOKS AND WEDDLE, JJ.

WESTBROOKS, J., FOR THE COURT:

¶1. Willie Qualls Jr. was convicted of being a felon in possession of a weapon following

a shooting at a bar that resulted in the death of Arthur Newell. The trial court sentenced

Qualls to life imprisonment as a violent habitual offender under Mississippi Code Annotated

section 99-19-83 (Rev. 2015). Qualls appeals, arguing that the State failed to prove his

habitual-offender status under section 99-19-83. The State concedes that the evidence

presented at trial was insufficient to establish Qualls’ habitual-offender status under section
99-19-83, and the State agrees that the case should be remanded for resentencing under

Mississippi Code Annotated section 99-19-81 (Rev. 2015).

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

¶2. On the night of March 25, 2018, police were called to respond to shots fired at Simps

Bar and Grill on Tillman Road. According to eyewitnesses, an altercation occurred on the

porch outside the front door of the bar. Witnesses stated that Qualls began arguing with a

man named Craig and was subsequently asked by a security guard to leave. Qualls responded

by saying he had a gun. Afterward, Qualls went outside on the porch and started arguing with

Quitta Smith, who pushed him at some point during the argument. Qualls was asked once

again to leave by Arthur “Rooster” Newell. In response, Qualls then pointed his gun at Smith

and continued to argue with several men on the porch, stating that he “was going to kill

[her]” and “do five years and get out of jail.” The men replied that if Qualls let them off the

porch, they were going to “show him.” Qualls then said he was going to go to his car and

show them something. While pacing and making threats to “shoot this m*****f***** up,”

Qualls walked toward his car. As he approached, he encountered Montrell Johnson and

pointed his gun at him before getting into the car. A few minutes later, Qualls exited his car

and continued arguing with Johnson.

¶3. Witnesses stated that Johnson was trying to diffuse the situation and calm Qualls

down. While arguing with Johnson, Qualls pointed his gun in the air and fired several times

before lowering the pistol and aiming it at Johnson. In response, Johnson ran around the car

to the driver’s side, and then he leaned across the top of the car, shooting his gun at Qualls.

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As Johnson shot his gun, a man later identified as Billy Burnell came out of the bar with a

pool stick and knocked Qualls to the ground. Qualls fell, and his gun slid under his car. Other

people began to join in and hit Qualls, while Newell intervened, trying to get them to stop.

Several witnesses reported hearing multiple gunshots originating from various locations, shot

from different firearms. At some point during the commotion, Newell was shot in the face

and killed. No witness reported seeing Qualls shoot Newell.

¶4. Qualls was prosecuted for second-degree murder and possession of a deadly weapon

while being a felon. Qualls stipulated that he had a previous felony conviction. The jury was

unable to reach a unanimous decision on the second-degree murder charge but found Qualls

guilty of being a felon in possession of a weapon. At Qualls’ sentencing hearing, the State

sought to have Qualls sentenced as a violent habitual offender under section 99-19-83, which

provides that a defendant will be sentenced to life imprisonment without eligibility for parole

if he has served separate sentences of one year or more for unrelated violent felony

convictions.

¶5. The State’s Exhibit S22 at the hearing included certified documents demonstrating

that Qualls was convicted of auto burglary and included time sheets and discharge papers

demonstrating that he served seven years. The State’s Exhibit S21 included certified

documents demonstrating that in a separate incident in a different county, Qualls had been

convicted of aggravated assault and felon in possession of a concealed weapon, and he was

sentenced to fifteen years in custody with ten years to serve and five years on probation.

However, Exhibit S21 did not include a discharge certificate or other documentation

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demonstrating the actual time that Qualls served in prison. No other evidence of Qualls’ time

served was presented. Qualls did not object to the evidence presented at sentencing, and the

court found that the State met its burden to prove violent habitual offender status. Qualls now

appeals.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

¶6. When a defendant fails to object at trial, an appellate court can still review for plain

error when “a defendant’s substantive or fundamental rights are affected.” Green v. State,

183 So. 3d 28, 31 (¶6) (Miss. 2016). “Plain-error review is properly utilized for correcting

obvious instances of injustice or misapplied law.” Id. (Emphasis and internal quotation marks

omitted). “For the plain-error doctrine to apply, there must have been an error that resulted

in a manifest miscarriage of justice or seriously affects the fairness, integrity or public

reputation of judicial proceedings.” Hall v. State, 201 So. 3d 424, 428 (¶12) (Miss. 2016).

“To determine if plain error has occurred, this Court must determine if the trial court has

deviated from a legal rule, whether that error is plain, clear, or obvious, and whether that

error has prejudiced the outcome of the trial.” Conner v. State, 138 So. 3d 143, 151 (¶19)

(Miss. 2014).

DISCUSSION

¶7. Qualls contends that the State failed to prove that he served one year or more for both

prior violent felonies used to prove his habitual offender status under section 99-19-83,

which states:

Every person convicted in this state of a felony who shall have been convicted
twice previously of any felony or federal crime upon charges separately

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brought and arising out of separate incidents at different times and who shall
have been sentenced to and served separate terms of one (1) year or more,
whether served concurrently or not, in any state and/or federal penal
institution, whether in this state or elsewhere, and where any one (1) of such
felonies shall have been a crime of violence, as defined by Section 97-3-2,
shall be sentenced to life imprisonment, and such sentence shall not be reduced
or suspended nor shall such person be eligible for parole, probation or any
other form of early release from actual physical custody within the Department
of Corrections.

Miss. Code Ann. § 99-19-83.

¶8. The State bears the burden to prove habitual status beyond a reasonable doubt at

sentencing. Young v. State, 368 So. 3d 299, 304 (¶10) (Miss. 2023). To establish habitual

status, the defendant must be indicted as an habitual offender, the prosecution must “prove

the prior offenses by competent evidence,” and “the defendant must be given a reasonable

opportunity to challenge the prosecutor’s proof.” Id. Further, “if the State fails to prove an

accused habitual offender’s prior convictions by competent evidence, the State does not get

‘a second chance to prove . . . habitual-offender status on remand, because that would violate

the prohibition against double jeopardy under the Mississippi Constitution.’” Ward v. State,

346 So. 3d 868, 874 (¶17) (Miss. 2022) (quoting Grayer v. State, 120 So. 3d 964, 969-70

(¶20) (Miss. 2013)). Additionally, “[a]n illegal sentence is an obvious error subject to

plain-error review.” Swinney v. State, 241 So. 3d 599, 606 (¶17) (Miss. 2018) (quoting

Martin v. State, 214 So. 3d 217, 220 (¶6) (Miss. 2017)).

¶9. Our appellate courts have consistently remanded for resentencing when the record on

appeal demonstrates that the State failed to present competent evidence of a defendant’s

habitual status at trial. Young, 368 So. 3d at 301 (¶1); Grayer, 120 So. 3d at 969 (¶20);

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Swinney, 241 So. 3d at 614 (¶68); Ward, 346 So. 3d at 874 (¶17); Course v. State, 396 So.

3d 1181, 1193 (¶43) (Miss. Ct. App. 2024). In Young, for example, the Mississippi Supreme

Court held that the defendant’s presentence report did not contain sufficiently reliable

information to establish his habitual status. “The report did not contain any information

regarding the length of Young’s prior sentences for [the] felony convictions or the dates on

which the incidents took place.” Young, 368 So. 3d at 302 (¶4). This line of cases

consistently observes the principle that a defendant has a fundamental right to be free from

an illegal sentence that does not conform to the applicable penalty statute. Perry v. State, 233

So. 3d 750, 760 (¶25) (Miss. 2017). Again, “the State does not get ‘a second chance to prove

. . . habitual-offender status, because that would violate the prohibition against double

jeopardy under the Mississippi Constitution.’” Ward, 346 So. 3d at 874 (¶17) (quoting

Grayer, 120 So. 3d at 969-70 (¶20)).

¶10. Here, Qualls contends that the trial court erred in sentencing him as a violent habitual

offender under section 99-19-83 because the State failed to prove that he served separate

terms of at least one year on each of his prior convictions. While the State presented evidence

that he was convicted of the aggravated assault and felon-in-possession charges, the State did

not present any evidence demonstrating the amount of time Qualls actually served for those

convictions. In the absence of competent evidence that Qualls actually served a year or more,

the proof is insufficient to establish him as a violent habitual offender.

¶11. On appeal, the State concedes the issue and agrees that the proper disposition is to

remand for resentencing as a non-violent habitual offender. Therefore, on plain-error review,

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and as the State concedes, the proper remedy in this case is to vacate the sentencing order and

remand for resentencing under section 99-19-81.

CONCLUSION

¶12. The prosecution failed to put on competent evidence that Qualls served one year or

more for the prior violent felonies supporting his habitual-offender status under section 99-

19-83. We affirm his conviction of possession of a weapon as a felon; however, because the

prohibition against double jeopardy precludes a second opportunity for the State to prove

Qualls’ habitual-offender status, we vacate the sentencing order and remand for resentencing

under the non-violent habitual statute, section 99-19-81.

¶13. AFFIRMED IN PART; VACATED AND REMANDED IN PART.

BARNES, C.J., CARLTON AND WILSON, P.JJ., McDONALD, LAWRENCE,
McCARTY, WEDDLE AND LASSITTER ST. PÉ, JJ., CONCUR. EMFINGER, J.,
CONCURS IN PART AND IN THE RESULT WITHOUT SEPARATE WRITTEN
OPINION.

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