In Re: Kimberly Monique Ross

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF MISSISSIPPI

NO. 2024-CP-01233-COA

IN RE: KIMBERLY MONIQUE ROSS APPELLANT

DATE OF JUDGMENT: 10/21/2024
TRIAL JUDGE: HON. TAMETRICE HODGES
COURT FROM WHICH APPEALED: HINDS COUNTY CHANCERY COURT,
FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT: KIMBERLY MONIQUE ROSS (PRO SE)
NATURE OF THE CASE: CIVIL - OTHER
DISPOSITION: AFFIRMED - 04/28/2026
MOTION FOR REHEARING FILED:

BEFORE BARNES, C.J., McDONALD AND WEDDLE, JJ.

WEDDLE, J., FOR THE COURT:

¶1. Kimberly Ross, appearing pro se, appeals the Hinds County Chancery Court’s order

finding her in contempt of court and denying her motion for the chancellor’s recusal. She

argues that (1) the chancellor violated her due process rights and (2) exhibited judicial bias

and improperly denied her motion for recusal.1 Finding no error, we affirm.

FACTS

¶2. In February 2024, the chancery court denied Kimberly’s emergency petition to modify

custody. Aggrieved by the chancellor’s decision, Kimberly filed a motion on February 9,

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Kimberly makes other claims on appeal regarding the custody dispute; however, her
issues are not properly before this Court because she did not timely appeal the custody
decision. The chancellor made a custody determination on February 8, 2024, and no appeal
was taken from that decision. Kimberly’s failure to timely appeal the custody matter bars our
consideration of those issues. Black v. Black, 403 So. 3d 131, 134 (¶10) (Miss. Ct. App.
2025) (finding “if the notice of appeal is not timely filed, the appellate court simply does not
have jurisdiction”).
2024, seeking a change of venue, recusal of “the presiding court,” and reconsideration.2 The

chancellor denied the motion. Kimberly subsequently filed several additional motions, which

she never noticed for a hearing.

¶3. On September 9, 2024, Kimberly filed an emergency motion for recusal, alleging that

the chancellor had “rendered judgments based on hearsay, bias, prejudice, influence, and

retaliation.” Opposing counsel, Terrance High, asked for the court to deny her motion and

requested that she pay his attorney’s fees and costs associated with the filing.

¶4. A hearing was held on October 21, 2024, on Kimberly’s emergency motion for

recusal. During the hearing, Kimberly stated that “everything that was said during the

February hearing showed bias, prejudice, influenced, you know it was . . . it was not fair at

all.”3 In support of her argument, Kimberly attempted to produce the transcript from the

February 2024 custody hearing, but she was unable to locate a copy to present to the court.

¶5. The chancellor also heard arguments from opposing counsel. On rebuttal, Kimberly

remained unable to produce any documents to support her allegations. Accordingly, the

chancellor moved forward with her ruling. While making a ruling on Kimberly’s motion, the

following exchange took place.

The Court: In regards to attorney fees, I am going to grant those because not

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In this motion, Kimberly requested recusal on the ground that the court lacked
jurisdiction.
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During the hearing, opposing counsel and the chancellor pointed out that Kimberly
had a history of making frivolous claims. The chancellor also noted, and Kimberly
acknowledged, that after the custody ruling was made in February 2024, Kimberly
threatened to sue the chancellor, opposing counsel, and anyone else “for so many million
dollars.”

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only was this motion untimely, but it was frivolous.

Kimberly: It was not.

The Court: Ms. Ross, you don’t talk, not during the Court’s rulings. Don’t
talk. I’m going to grant the attorney fees. How much are you
asking for Attorney High?

Mr. High: Your Honor, if the Court would allow me to supplement that to
the Court.

The Court: Okay.

Mr. High: We’ll have it to you this week.

The Court: All right. Once I get that back, Ms. Ross, you’ll have 30 days to
pay those fees. If those fees aren’t paid, this Court will
incarcerate you until those fees are paid.

Kimberly: I don’t have the means to do that. If he’s asking for a substantial
amount and you’re giving me 30 days to do that, there is no way
possible to do that unless I’m given a payment plan or
something of that nature. This is what I mean by the biasness.

The Court: Ms. Ross. Ms. Ross.

The Bailiff: Stop talking.

The Court: Ms. Ross.

The Bailiff: Stop talking.

The Court: Let me go ahead and hold you in contempt because you just
won’t. You won’t. You won’t quit.

Kimberly continued to interrupt the chancellor until the bailiff escorted her from the

courtroom. Following the hearing, the chancellor entered an order finding that Kimberly was

in willful contempt for violating Uniform Chancery Court Rule 4.03. Kimberly was assessed

a $200 fine and ordered to serve seven days in the custody of the Hinds County Sheriff’s

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Department.

¶6. The chancellor also entered an order denying Kimberly’s motion for recusal. She

found that the motion was untimely because she (the chancellor) had been presiding over the

case since January 1, 2023, and that Kimberly failed to meet her burden of proof that the

chancellor was biased and partial beyond a reasonable doubt. On November 5, 2024,

Kimberly filed a notice of appeal regarding the order of contempt and order denying the

motion for recusal.

DISCUSSION

I. Contempt of Court

¶7. “Whether the contempt is civil or criminal hinges on the purpose of the contempt

finding. If the primary purpose of the contempt order is to enforce the rights of private party

litigants or enforce compliance with a court order, then the contempt is civil. But if the

purpose is to punish the contemnor for disobedience of a court order, then the contempt is

criminal.” Harris v. State, 224 So. 3d 76, 80 (¶17) (Miss. 2017) (citing Mingo v. State, 944

So. 2d 18, 32 (¶50) (Miss. 2006)). In the case before us, the record reflects that the chancellor

found Kimberly in contempt for disobeying the court’s order to not interrupt the chancellor

while rendering an opinion. Because the contempt is criminal in nature, the scope of review

is ab initio. In re Conservatorship of Bennett, 418 So. 3d 1256, 1272 (¶39) (Miss. Ct. App.

2025) (citing Seals v. Stanton, 350 So. 3d 1051, 1058 (¶19) (Miss. 2022)). More specifically,

the court determines from the beginning “whether the record proves a party guilty of

contempt beyond a reasonable doubt.” Id. (citing In re Smith, 926 So. 2d 878, 886 (¶9) (Miss.

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2006)).

¶8. There are two forms of criminal contempt: direct and constructive. “Direct criminal

contempt involves words spoken or actions committed in the presence of the court that are

calculated to embarrass or prevent the orderly administration of justice.” Graves v. State, 66

So. 3d 158, 160 (¶4) (Miss. Ct. App. 2010). “Punishment for direct contempt may be meted

out instantly by the judge in whose presence the offensive conduct was committed.” Id.

(quotation mark omitted). “Unlike direct contempt, constructive contempt involves actions

which are committed outside the presence of the court.”4 In re Williamson, 838 So. 2d 226,

237 (¶31) (Miss. 2002). The contempt occurred in the chancellor’s presence; therefore,

Kimberly’s acts constituted direct criminal contempt.

¶9. The chancellor found Kimberly to be in willful contempt for violating Uniform

Chancery Court Rule 4.03. Rule 4.03 prohibits interruptions: “No interruptions shall be

allowed during the time that the chancellor is rendering an oral opinion, judgment, order, or

ruling.” UCCR 4.03. Although the chancellor warned Kimberly that she could not interrupt

the chancellor while making a ruling, Kimberly continued to disobey the chancellor’s order.

Upon review of the record, we agree that Kimberly is guilty beyond a reasonable doubt of

direct criminal contempt.

II. Motion to Recuse

¶10. “This Court reviews the denial of a motion to recuse under an abuse-of-discretion

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In the case of constructive criminal contempt, we have held that defendants must
be provided with procedural due process safeguards, including a specification of charges,
notice, and a hearing. In re Williamson, 838 So. 2d 226, 237 (¶31) (Miss. 2002).

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standard.” Good v. Sanders, 418 So. 3d 1241, 1247 (¶22) (Miss. Ct. App. 2025) (quoting

Queen v. State, 325 So. 3d 656, 665 (¶37) (Miss. 2021)). The chancellor denied Kimberly’s

motion for recusal, finding it both untimely and lacking diligence. On appeal, Kimberly

argues that the chancellor “denied recusal despite clear bias, engaged in ex parte

communications, and refused to consider compelling evidence of abuse and fraud.”

¶11. The Uniform Chancery Court Rules state that motions for recusal must “be served on

the chancellor who is the subject of the motion within 30 days following notification to the

parties of the name of the chancellor assigned to the case; or, if it is based upon facts which

could not reasonably have been known to the filing party within such time, it shall be served

within 30 days after the filing party could reasonably discover the facts underlying the

grounds asserted.” UCCR 1.11(C). In her order denying the motion for recusal, the

chancellor stated that she had been presiding over the matter since January 1, 2023. Our

Supreme Court has held that the “failure to seek recusal generally is considered implied

consent to have the judge go forward in presiding over the case.” Rice v. State, 134 So. 3d

292, 299 (¶17) (Miss. 2014). Kimberly never filed a motion for recusal until after the

chancellor denied her motion to modify custody in February 2024.5 She filed her emergency

motion for recusal on September 9, 2024, because she believed the chancellor was biased.

Kimberly argued that her bias became apparent during the February 2024 hearing, which was

seven months before she filed her emergency motion for recusal. Thus, we find that

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Her first motion for recusal, which the chancellor ultimately denied, was on the
ground of lack of jurisdiction. Kimberly subsequently filed several motions, but she never
set the motions for a hearing.

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Kimberly’s argument is procedurally barred.

CONCLUSION

¶12. For these reasons, we affirm the contempt order of the Chancery Court of Hinds

County.

¶13. AFFIRMED.

BARNES, C.J., CARLTON AND WILSON, P.JJ., McDONALD, LAWRENCE,
EMFINGER AND LASSITTER ST. PÉ, JJ., CONCUR. McCARTY, J., SPECIALLY
CONCURS WITH SEPARATE WRITTEN OPINION. WESTBROOKS, J., NOT
PARTICIPATING.

McCARTY, J., SPECIALLY CONCURRING:

¶14. One of the many roles tasked to our trial judges is to maintain civility in the

courtroom, for “[a] judge shall require order and decorum in proceedings before the judge.”

Miss. Code Jud. Conduct Canon 3(B)(3). So judges may require courteousness from those

who come before them, even though there may be lapses.

¶15. In contrast, judges are required to exercise courteousness to those who come before

the Bench. The Canons of Judicial Conduct command that “Judges shall be patient,

dignified, and courteous to litigants, jurors, witnesses, lawyers and others with whom they

deal in their official capacities[.]” Canon 3(B)(4) (emphasis added). The Comment to that

Canon tells us that “Courts can be efficient and businesslike while being patient and

deliberate.”

¶16. The Supreme Court has explained the risks when judges fail to honor their part of the

deal. “When a judge fails to hold himself to the required standard of demeanor, he places

himself in a poor position to expect exemplary deportment from ‘others subject to direction

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and control.’” Miss. Comm’n on Jud. Performance v. Moore, 356 So. 3d 122, 128 (¶14)

(Miss. 2023) (quoting Canon 3(B)(4)).

¶17. This situation is certainly applicable to family law cases, where tensions and emotions

may run high due to the extremely high stakes for the litigants, who may literally be facing

the loss of their child to the court system.

¶18. This may be further amplified when one or more parties are pro se. We all know that

pro se litigants are held to more or less the same standard as attorneys—but our Supreme

Court has also acknowledged that “pro se litigants are afforded some leniency” at the same

time. Sumrell v. State, 972 So. 2d 572, 574 (¶6) (Miss. 2008). This simply recognizes the

reality that our world of rules, precedent, and decorum can be overwhelming to navigate.

¶19. It is clear here that the litigant was interrupting the trial court and this triggered the

imposition of contempt. Our standard of review defers to such a finding given the proof in

this case. However, it should be the rare case where that power is needed to control the

courtroom, not the everyday one. Even when the litigants or lawyers before us experience

slips in their patience or decorum, judges do not have to respond with a similar lack of

patience. In the end, we must honor our commitment to the Canons—which mandate “that

Judges shall be patient, dignified, and courteous[.]” Canon 3(B)(4).

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