In The Interest of A.B., a Minor: Linda Brisco and Joseph Brisco v. Latoya Brisco

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF MISSISSIPPI

NO. 2024-CA-00476-COA

IN THE INTEREST OF A.B., A MINOR: LINDA APPELLANTS
BRISCO AND JOSEPH BRISCO

v.

LATOYA BRISCO APPELLEE

DATE OF JUDGMENT: 03/13/2024
TRIAL JUDGE: HON. MARCIE TANNER SOUTHERLAND
COURT FROM WHICH APPEALED: WARREN COUNTY YOUTH COURT
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANTS: MICHAEL EARL KEYTON
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLEE: LATOYA BRISCO (PRO SE)
NATURE OF THE CASE: CIVIL - CUSTODY
DISPOSITION: AFFIRMED - 09/02/2025
MOTION FOR REHEARING FILED:

BEFORE CARLTON, P.J., McDONALD AND LASSITTER ST. PÉ, JJ.

LASSITTER ST. PÉ, J., FOR THE COURT:

¶1. Latoya Brisco was sentenced to serve time in the custody of the Mississippi

Department of Corrections (MDOC) in 2017. When she began her incarceration, her parents,

Joseph and Linda Brisco, were given temporary custody of Latoya’s son, A.B., by the Warren

County Youth Court. In 2021, Brisco was released from prison and moved in with her

parents and A.B. in Vicksburg. But in May 2023, the relationship between Latoya and her

parents deteriorated beyond repair, and Latoya moved out. She filed a motion in youth court

to regain custody of A.B. After several hearings, the youth court found that there had been

a substantial change in circumstances since the Briscos were given custody of A.B. and that

it would be in A.B.’s best interest to return to his mother’s custody.
¶2. The Briscos appealed the youth court’s decision, arguing that Latoya had not proved

a material change in circumstances, that the youth court should have required CPS to

continue to monitor Latoya, and that the youth court should have granted a continuance so

they could subpoena a witness. We find no error and affirm.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

¶3. In 2017, Latoya was found guilty of manslaughter in Warren County Circuit Court and

was sentenced to serve time in MDOC custody.1 In June 2017, a youth court judge granted

the Briscos temporary custody of A.B. after finding that it was in his best interest to be

“placed in the care, custody, and control” of his maternal grandparents. The Briscos took

A.B. to visit Latoya each month, and the mother and son were able to continue their

relationship this way.

¶4. Latoya was released from incarceration in 2021 and moved in with her parents and

A.B. For roughly a year, she was on parole and wore an ankle-monitoring device. After she

was discharged from parole, she was placed on supervised probation and had to report to a

probation officer.2 By July 2023, Latoya was completely free from MDOC’s custody and

oversight, and she petitioned the youth court to have custody returned to her.

¶5. The youth court judge appointed a guardian ad litem (GAL) to investigate A.B.’s well-

1
Brisco v. State, 295 So. 3d 498 (Miss. Ct. App. 2019).
2
We recognize that “supervised probation and post-release supervision are totally
different statutory creatures” and that “supervised probation” may not be the correct name
for the supervision Latoya experienced following her release. See Miller v. State, 875 So.
2d 194, 199 (¶10) (Miss. 2004); see also Miss. Code Ann. §§ 47-7-33, 47-7-34 (Rev. 2023).
However, we have used the terminology used by the parties at the hearing.

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being and make a recommendation to the court on the custody determination. The youth court

held several hearings over the next few months. Following the first hearing, the court ordered

that A.B. be granted unsupervised alternating weekend visitation with A.B. and Saturday

visitation on the other weekends. The court later increased Latoya’s visitation to every

weekend, and the court ultimately found that Latoya should regain full custody of A.B.

¶6. A summary of the testimony from the hearings follows.

Shirlene Hill, CPS Social Worker

¶7. Hill testified that she saw no reason why Latoya and A.B. should not be reunited. She

visited Latoya’s home and found it to be safe and secure. She confirmed that Latoya was

working and receiving disability payments and that her income would allow her to provide

adequately for A.B. The Briscos questioned Hill extensively about Latoya’s medical history

and any possible red flags. Hill testified, however, that she found nothing in Latoya’s medical

history to make her change her opinion that Latoya should regain custody of A.B. She

testified that she had reviewed all of Latoya’s medical history, and despite Latoya’s issues

with depression and bipolar disorder, among other things, Latoya appeared to be “meeting

her mental health needs.”

¶8. Hill conducted background checks on all of Latoya’s roommates and saw no causes

for concern. Hill spoke with A.B., and he had not expressed any issue or concern with her.

Hill concluded that all his basic needs were met when he was with his mother.

¶9. Hill also noted that after the court ordered the family to participate in family

counseling, Joseph called her and told her that he and Linda would not participate. Hill

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described the Briscos as fairly uncooperative during her entire investigation.

Latoya Brisco, A.B.’s mother

¶10. Latoya testified that it was “horrible” living with her mother again and that her father

had a problem with her because she was a lesbian. But the problems between Latoya and her

parents extended beyond her sexuality. Latoya described arguments over helping A.B. with

homework, the volume of the television, vacations, and even the way Latoya dressed. All of

these things came to a head in 2023, when Latoya moved out and tried to take A.B. She

testified that Linda called the police to stop her from taking A.B., so Latoya filed a motion

in youth court to transfer custody back to her.

¶11. Latoya testified that before that final fight, she had been able to come and go freely

with A.B. Despite the tense relationship between Latoya and her parents, she testified that

she had been able to care for A.B. like a mother while they were both living at the Briscos’

home. It was not until she moved out and tried to take A.B. that her parents used the custody

order against her.

¶12. After leaving her parents’ home, Latoya lived in a four-bedroom home with a high

school friend of hers, and A.B. had his own room at the house. Latoya testified that she was

working two different security jobs and receiving disability payments for her anxiety and

depression issues. Her primary working hours were overnight from 10:45 p.m. to 6:45 a.m.,

and she sometimes worked on Sundays and Wednesdays at a local church. Latoya testified

that one of her roommates and one of her cousins had both agreed to watch A.B. while she

worked overnight and to help Latoya with getting him to school if required.

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¶13. Sometimes Latoya’s girlfriend, Felicia, would help her care for A.B. Felicia and

Latoya had been dating for over a year, and Felicia had two children whom A.B. enjoyed

spending time with. Latoya testified that her parents—primarily her father—did not approve

of her relationship with Felicia. Despite this, the Briscos allowed her to take A.B. on

overnight, out-of-state vacations with Felicia. She testified that whenever she left the state,

she had permission to do so from her parole officer.

¶14. Latoya admitted that she occasionally got angry with A.B. and had fussed at him for

bad grades. She testified that her mom, Linda, had done a “great” job with A.B. while she

had been in prison. She knew that A.B. loved her parents and that he was “distraught” over

the custody battle. She said if she was given custody again, she would still allow them to be

in his life.

Joseph Brisco Jr., Latoya’s Brother

¶15. Joseph Jr. testified that he and Latoya had frequent communication since she had been

released from prison, and he did not believe she had been rehabilitated. Much of Joseph Jr.’s

testimony was based on hearsay because he was not present for many of the alleged events.

He testified that the name she used on Facebook was a reference to drugs. He claimed that

A.B. had told someone he did not want to stay in his room at night, but it was unclear

whether this referred to being with Latoya or not. He claimed that Latoya had “cursed [A.B.]

out” but later clarified that she had told A.B. “to get out in front of the damn TV.” The crux

of Joseph Jr.’s testimony was that Latoya’s mental health was unstable. He described her as

having a Jekyll-and-Hyde personality and that he never knew which Latoya he would

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encounter.

Crystal Clements, Latoya’s Sister

¶16. Crystal testified that she and Latoya talked weekly and that she had seen Latoya’s

anger issues increase since she got out of prison. Like Joseph Jr., she claimed that Latoya’s

moods were unpredictable. She testified that Latoya was not patient with A.B., particularly

about homework, and she claimed that Latoya had called A.B. stupid. She felt that A.B.

should stay with the Briscos because they had him on a better routine than Latoya. Crystal

claimed that A.B. seemed out of sorts when he came back from visitation with Latoya, and

she suspected that a lack of routine was to blame.

Linda Brisco, Latoya’s Mother

¶17. Linda testified that she wanted A.B. to be in a safe and stable environment and

doubted that Latoya could provide that. She testified that Latoya had no patience with A.B.

while he did his homework. She claimed that A.B. was afraid of his mother and her temper

and that Latoya had threatened to “pop” A.B. Linda claimed that she had put a lock on her

bedroom door so she and A.B. could hide from Latoya.

¶18. Linda described an argument when Latoya came to the school where Linda worked

to confront Linda about a tax deduction involving A.B. Linda said that after the argument,

Latoya wanted to pick up A.B. from school and that she could not because of the custody

order. The argument became so heated between the two women that campus police

intervened.

Joseph Brisco Sr., Latoya’s Father

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¶19. Joseph testified that Latoya “had an attitude” before, during, and after her

incarceration. He described her as a bully who wanted to “bully people around.” He said that

the day they picked her up from prison, they got into an argument because he did not feel that

she was being “humble” enough and that he was “not going to let her rule [him] when she

[was] under [his] leadership.”

¶20. Joseph testified that he did not really speak to Latoya anymore because “of what is

going on with CPS and her.” He claimed that Latoya had insinuated that she would kill him,

like when she committed manslaughter. Joseph also claimed that Latoya did not have

permission to leave the state when she took A.B. on trips, but he admitted that he had not

tried to stop her or report her.

Eric Proctor, Latoya’s Probation Officer

¶21. Proctor testified that he had never had a problem with Latoya while she was on

supervised probation. He considered her to be rehabilitated under MDOC standards. Latoya

reported to him every time she was supposed to and never failed a drug test.

¶22. Proctor explained that before she had been on supervised probation under his

supervision, she was on parole and wearing an ankle monitor with GPS. If she had left the

state while wearing the monitor, it would have been a violation of her probation. And if she

had violated her probation terms, he did not think she would have been allowed to move to

supervised probation.

¶23. Proctor testified that he had never given her permission to leave the state and had no

knowledge that she had done so. If she had left without permission, she would have been in

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violation of her probation.

A.B., Latoya’s Son

¶24. A.B. told the court in chambers, while in the presence of counsel, that he wanted to

live with his mother. The youth court remarked several times how A.B. was a very bright and

sweet young man who loved his mother and his grandparents very much. When A.B. testified

after being called by the Briscos, he testified that he did not like staying with his mother in

Clinton “too much.” He said he would rather be in Vicksburg, where his grandparents lived,

and visit his mother “at least on the weekends.” He denied being afraid of Latoya.

¶25. During A.B.’s testimony, Joseph Sr. excused himself from the room. The youth court

judge remarked on this and apparently found it to be “very telling” that he would “put a ten-

year-old child on the witness stand” and not “even sit and listen to it.”

¶26. Latoya testified after A.B.’s testimony that she believed her parents had “coached”

A.B. into testifying that he did not want to live with her.

Guardian ad Litem

¶27. The GAL testified that it was in A.B.’s best interest to be with Latoya. She had seen

nothing that was a danger or threat to his well-being and noted that there had been no

negative report about Latoya to CPS. Even after hearing all of the testimony, her opinion was

the same. She disagreed with Latoya’s family’s concern over Latoya’s mental health. She

believed that Latoya had “very good” insight into her mental health and was taking it

seriously.

¶28. The GAL testified that A.B. seemed to be stuck in the middle of his mother and

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grandparents; he loved everyone and just wanted them to get along. She said that A.B. had

sometimes told her he wanted to be with his mother, and other times he said he wanted to be

with his grandmother. However, keeping the fact that Latoya was A.B.’s natural mother in

mind, she saw no reason that Latoya should not have custody of her son.

*****

¶29. The youth court returned custody of A.B. to Latoya. The court’s order noted that the

Briscos were “filled with animosity toward [ Latoya] and would do whatever they could to

keep [her] from regaining custody of [A.B.].” The court found a “complete breakdown” of

the family relationship and that it was detrimental to A.B.’s well-being. The court questioned

Joseph Jr.’s credibility, as he did not live in Warren County and did not see Latoya often. The

court also noted that Joseph Jr. had “much antipathy” for Latoya. Ultimately, the court

concluded that his testimony was not credible.

¶30. The court further concluded that Latoya’s right as A.B.’s natural parent trumped that

of the Briscos. She specifically found a “substantial change” in circumstances: Latoya was

no longer incarcerated, was employed and had stable housing, and there was no evidence of

harm to A.B. while Latoya had visitation with him. Given this, the court found it was in

A.B.’s best interest to return custody to Latoya.

ANALYSIS

¶31. On appeal, the Briscos argue that the youth court erred by finding a material change

in circumstances and finding that it was in A.B.’s best interest to be returned to Latoya’s

custody; that the court erred “by closing the file and relieving CPS from any obligation to

9
monitor the relationship between” A.B. and Latoya; and that the court erred by not granting

their motion to continue in order to subpoena a witness for purposes of impeachment.

¶32. Our review of youth court cases is limited. Kevin v. Miss. Dep’t of Child Prot. Servs.,

341 So. 3d 1014, 1018 (¶9) (Miss. Ct. App. 2022). The youth court judge, sitting without a

jury, is the trier of fact. Id. Findings of fact by a youth court judge “will not be overturned

where they are supported by substantial evidence in the record, unless manifestly wrong.” In

re S.A.M., 826 So. 2d 1266, 1274 (¶17) (Miss. 2002). Decisions regarding witness credibility

are left to the youth court judge as the fact finder. See In re D.O., 798 So. 2d 417, 422 (¶17)

(Miss. 2001) (“The trier of fact chose to believe Dr. Townsend over Dr. Islam, and [the child]

over the parents. Such is the charge of the fact finder.”).

I. Material Change in Circumstances

¶33. The Briscos argue that the youth court erred by finding that Latoya had proved a

material change in circumstances to allow modification of custody. To address this

contention, it is necessary to examine the statutory framework leading up to the youth court’s

decision.

¶34. Youth courts have the “exclusive original jurisdiction in all proceedings concerning

a delinquent child, a child in need of supervision, a neglected child, an abused child or a

dependent child.” Miss. Code Ann. § 43-21-151(1) (Supp. 2024). A neglected child is one

“[w]ho is otherwise without proper care, custody, supervision or support.” Miss. Code Ann.

43-21-105(l)(ii) (Supp. 2025). In a case of neglect, the youth court may “place the child in

the custody of . . . a relative” and may grant the relative “durable legal custody” of the child.

10
See Miss. Code Ann. § 43-21-609(b) (Rev. 2023); Miss. Code Ann. § 43-21-105(y).

¶35. Durable legal custody “means the legal status created by a court order which gives the

durable legal custodian the responsibilities of physical possession of the child and the duty

to provide him with care, nurture, welfare, food, shelter, education and reasonable medical

care. All these duties as enumerated are subject to the residual rights and responsibilities of

the natural parent(s) or guardian(s) of the child or children.” Miss. Code Ann. § 43-21-

105(y). “Under durable legal custody, unlike termination of parental rights or adoption, the

natural parents retain residual rights and responsibilities as to the child.” In re S.A.M. 826 So.

2d at 1276 (¶26). Durable legal custody “is not permanent and is, therefore, subject to further

review and modification by the courts.” Id. at 1279 (¶39).

¶36. Mississippi Code Annotated section 43-21-613(2) (Rev. 2015 & Supp. 2025) grants

the youth court discretion to “conduct an informal hearing to review [a] disposition order”

if a child’s parent or guardian moves for a review. If, after review, “the youth court finds a

material change of circumstances relating to the disposition of the child, the youth court may

modify the disposition order to any appropriate disposition of equal or greater precedence

which the youth court could have originally ordered.” Id.

¶37. The 2017 order granting custody to the Briscos makes no finding that A.B. is a

neglected child, but looking at applicable statutes, it appears that the Briscos were granted

durable legal custody of A.B. upon the youth court’s order. Once Latoya filed to have

custody returned to her, the youth court’s orders all identify A.B. as a neglected child under

section 43-21-105(l)(ii). During the hearings, the youth court repeatedly stated that A.B.’s

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status as a neglected child was a settled matter. Since A.B. was a neglected child under the

statute, the youth court order in 2017 granted the Briscos durable legal custody of A.B., and

that custody arrangement remained subject to further review and modification. Latoya moved

the court for an “informal hearing” to determine whether a material change of circumstances

had occurred to allow her to regain custody.

¶38. At the end of those hearings, the youth court found that there was a “substantial

change of circumstances” since A.B.’s original placement with the Briscos because his

mother, Latoya, was “no longer incarcerated, . . . gainfully employed, . . . ha[d] stable

housing,” and had “a bonded relationship with her son.” Thus, the original reasons for the

determination that A.B. was “neglected” and needed to be placed in his grandparents’

temporary custody no longer existed. The court also found that it was in A.B.’s best interest

to return to his mother’s care, custody, and control.

¶39. Latoya was fully released from MDOC’s custody and had nothing but good reports

from her former probation officer. She testified extensively about her housing and

employment and her availability for her son for school drop-offs and pick-ups. A.B. testified

that he loved his mother and was not afraid of her, as some witnesses testified. The youth

court judge heard the parties’ testimony and determined that some of the Briscos’ witnesses

were not credible and that the Briscos were “filled with animosity” toward Latoya. As the

trier of fact, the judge was in the best place to assess witness credibility and demeanor.

¶40. The Briscos argue that Latoya did not meet her burden of proof regarding her ability

to care for A.B., specifically pointing to Latoya’s documented mental illnesses and alleged

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threatening or volatile behavior.3 However, their argument is based on the credibility of

witnesses, and it was the youth court’s purview to determine which of the witnesses she

found more credible. The court found that no one other than her family testified that Latoya’s

mental health was not under control or that she was not taking it seriously. There is nothing

in the record from which we could conclude differently.

¶41. We cannot say the youth court judge erred by determining that there had been a

material change in circumstances since the original temporary custody order or that it was

in A.B.’s best interest to return to Latoya’s custody.

II. Releasing CPS

¶42. The Briscos argue that the court erred by removing CPS from monitoring Latoya after

A.B. was given back to her. They argue that Mississippi Code Annotated section 43-21-613

requires that “reasonable efforts have been made to address the conditions that led to the

child’s removal and that continued monitoring is no longer necessary to protect the child’s

welfare.” While this language is not found in the cited section, the Briscos’ reliance on it is

also misplaced.

¶43. Nothing in that statute required CPS to monitor Latoya and A.B. In fact, the statute

suggests that reviews and CPS supervision are not required in “those cases in which the court

has granted durable legal custody. In such cases, the Department of Child Protection Services

shall be released from any oversight or monitoring responsibilities, and relieved of physical

3
The Briscos allege facts that are not in the record pertaining to alleged behavior after
the youth court’s final ruling and while the case was pending on appeal. We cannot consider
facts outside the record and strike any exhibit included in support of those facts. See
Appellant’s Br. at 11.

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and legal custody and supervision of the child.” Miss. Code Ann. § 43-21-613(3)(d). As

discussed, the temporary custody order was essentially a grant of durable legal custody.

¶44. The cases that the Briscos rely on are also distinguishable. In Kevin, CPS was

involved in Kevin from the outset; it was CPS who initially removed the child from the

mother’s custody. Kevin, 341 So. 3d at 1016 (¶2). In In re N.M. v. Mississippi Department

of Human Services, Marion County, 215 So. 3d 1007 (Miss. Ct. App. 2017), the child at issue

was placed into state custody upon birth because seven of her siblings had been adjudicated

as “neglected” before she was even born. Id. at 1008 (¶1). Neither of these cases support the

Briscos’ argument that the youth court erred by not requiring CPS to monitor Latoya after

regaining custody of A.B. In the present case, CPS became involved only after Latoya’s

motion to regain custody at the request of the youth court judge “to complete background

checks on all participants involved and conduct a walkthrough” of Latoya’s new home.

¶45. Given that there is no statutory requirement that CPS monitor Latoya after regaining

custody, we cannot say the court erred by releasing CPS from further involvement with

Latoya and A.B.

III. Denying a Continuance

¶46. The Briscos argue that the youth court reversibly erred by denying their motion for a

continuance to subpoena Roscoe Gammill, who had been Latoya’s probation officer before

Eric Proctor. The grant or denial of a continuance is reviewed for an abuse of discretion, and

we will not reverse the trial court “unless the decision results in manifest injustice.” Johnson

v. Johnson, 281 So. 3d 70, 74 (¶14) (Miss. Ct. App. 2019). “There is no mechanical test for

14
determining whether a continuance should be granted, and the circumstances of each case

must be carefully examined, especially the reasons presented to the trial judge at the time the

request is denied.” Id.

¶47. There is no evidence that the youth court abused its discretion in denying the motion.

During the January 24 hearing, the parties disputed whether Latoya had left the state without

permission while on probation under another officer’s supervision. But at the end of the

hearing, the parties all rested, and the youth court announced that the matter was under

advisement. Later, on January 31, the Briscos sought a hearing to present evidence to

impeach Latoya’s testimony that she had never left the state without permission.

¶48. The Briscos’ attorney explained that he had contacted MDOC and found Latoya’s

probation officer Roscoe Gammill, but he was not present to testify. Instead, counsel had

Gammill on the phone. The youth court declined to speak to Gammill on the phone but

recessed to allow the Briscos to have Gammill testify via Zoom. But after the recess, the

Briscos’ counsel announced that Gammill did not want to testify. So the youth court judge

told him that he could subpoena Gammill for “another day because this has been a complete

waste of your time and the court’s time.” The court also noted that the case was already

finalized and under advisement, but she told counsel if he needed to get the witness there,

he could request another date and have the witness ready next time.

¶49. But on February 26, the day before the scheduled hearing for Gammill’s testimony,

the Briscos’ counsel filed a motion for a continuance. During a telephone conference with

all parties, the court asked why counsel had asked for a continuance for a court date he had

15
previously agreed to. Counsel claimed that he had a previously scheduled trial date in another

county and had misread his calendar. Counsel also admitted that he had not subpoenaed

Gammill yet.

¶50. The youth court judge denied the motion for a continuance and stated that she

believed counsel was attempting to delay the proceedings. She noted that the matter had been

going on for more than six months and that it was over a month since she had taken the case

under advisement. She told the parties to be present the next day for the hearing as scheduled.

¶51. Gammill did not appear at the hearing. The Briscos’ counsel did, and he made a

proffer of Gammill’s testimony. Counsel also provided documentation proving his case in

Jefferson County, which was why he asked for the continuance. But when the court examined

the documents, she determined that the hearing in Jefferson County was scheduled after the

parties had set the February 27 hearing, despite counsel knowing that the hearing for him to

present Gammill’s testimony was scheduled for February 27.

¶52. Given these facts, it was not an abuse of discretion for the youth court judge to deny

the Briscos’ motion for a continuance. Counsel was not prepared at the January 31 hearing

and was advised to subpoena his witness. He did not subpoena the witness and then tried to

get yet another continuance based on a court date scheduled after the youth court matter. Nor

is there any evidence that the denial caused a manifest injustice to the Briscos. The purported

testimony would have potentially tarnished Latoya’s credibility, but given the record and the

court’s remarks about the Briscos’ credibility, we cannot say that the testimony would have

changed the outcome.

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CONCLUSION

¶53. The Warren County Youth Court’s decision to return custody of A.B. to his mother,

Latoya, is supported by substantial evidence. There was a material change in circumstances

since A.B. had been placed in the Briscos’ temporary custody, and substantial evidence

supports the youth court’s finding that it was in A.B.’s best interest to return to his mother’s

custody. The youth court was not required to have CPS monitor Latoya’s custody of her son.

Finally, the youth court did not abuse its discretion in denying the Briscos’ motion for a

continuance following the resting of the parties.

¶54. AFFIRMED.

BARNES, C.J., CARLTON, P.J., WESTBROOKS, LAWRENCE, McCARTY,
EMFINGER AND WEDDLE, JJ., CONCUR. McDONALD, J., CONCURS IN
RESULT ONLY WITHOUT SEPARATE WRITTEN OPINION. WILSON, P.J.,
DISSENTS WITHOUT SEPARATE WRITTEN OPINION.

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