Quardero Gipson a/k/a Quardero M. Gipson v. State of Mississippi

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF MISSISSIPPI

NO. 2022-KA-01305-COA

QUARDERO GIPSON A/K/A QUARDERO M. APPELLANT
GIPSON

v.

STATE OF MISSISSIPPI APPELLEE

DATE OF JUDGMENT: 11/21/2022
TRIAL JUDGE: HON. SMITH MURPHEY
COURT FROM WHICH APPEALED: TALLAHATCHIE COUNTY CIRCUIT
COURT, SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT: OFFICE OF STATE PUBLIC DEFENDER
BY: W. DANIEL HINCHCLIFF
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLEE: OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL
BY: CASEY BONNER FARMER
DISTRICT ATTORNEY: JAMES STEPHEN HALE JR.
NATURE OF THE CASE: CRIMINAL - FELONY
DISPOSITION: AFFIRMED - 07/30/2024
MOTION FOR REHEARING FILED:

BEFORE BARNES, C.J., McDONALD AND SMITH, JJ.

SMITH, J., FOR THE COURT:

¶1. A Tallahatchie County Circuit Court jury convicted Quardero Gipson of one count of

conspiracy to commit armed robbery and one count of first-degree murder. The Tallahatchie

County Circuit Court sentenced Gipson to serve five years for conspiracy and life

imprisonment for first-degree murder, with both sentences to be served consecutively in the

custody of the Mississippi Department of Corrections (MDOC). In his sole argument on

appeal, Gipson contends that the circuit court erred by failing to grant a new trial due to

potential juror bias and an improper external influence on the jury. Finding no reversible
error, we affirm.

FACTS

¶2. A Tallahatchie County grand jury indicted Gipson and Quincy Scott for one count of

conspiracy to commit armed robbery and one count of capital murder. As part of a plea deal,

Scott agreed to testify against Gipson at Gipson’s trial. Following the testimony and

evidence, a jury convicted Gipson of one count of conspiracy and one count of first-degree

murder. The circuit court ordered Gipson to serve a five-year sentence for conspiracy and

life imprisonment for first-degree murder.

¶3. Gipson filed separate post-trial motions for a judgment notwithstanding the verdict

and a new trial, respectively. Following a hearing, the circuit court entered an order denying

both post-trial motions. Aggrieved, Gipson appeals.

DISCUSSION

¶4. On appeal, Gipson does not challenge the evidence supporting his convictions but,

instead, argues only that the circuit court erred by failing to grant him a new trial after the

defense asserted “that the jury had been subject to multiple improper and outside influences

. . . .” Specifically, Gipson contends that (1) potential bias arose due to connections that

Jurors 149 and 92 had to people associated with the trial, and (2) in responding to a jury

question, the bailiff improperly influenced the jury’s deliberations. We “review the grant or

denial of a motion for a new trial under an abuse-of-discretion standard.” Forrest v. State,

376 So. 3d 404, 408 (¶9) (Miss. Ct. App. 2023) (quoting Winner v. CSX Transp. Inc., 100 So.

3d 478, 486 (¶29) (Miss. Ct. App. 2012)).

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I. Juror Bias

¶5. At two different points during Gipson’s trial, the State brought the potential for juror

bias to the circuit court’s attention. Gipson asserts on appeal that the circuit court failed to

sufficiently question the two empaneled jurors involved and to adequately investigate their

potential for bias before allowing them to remain on the jury.

¶6. The first instance arose after a lunch recess when the State informed the circuit judge

of a potential bias issue involving Juror 149. The prosecutor stated that he had received

information that Juror 149 might share a child with Scott’s uncle. As previously explained,

Scott was Gipson’s co-indictee but had agreed to testify against Gipson as part of a plea deal.

¶7. Upon the request of Gipson’s attorney, the circuit judge questioned Juror 149 to

ascertain the exact nature of her relationship, if any, with Scott’s uncle. In response to the

circuit judge’s questioning, Juror 149 answered that she was not married to Scott’s uncle but

did “talk to him.” In addition, Juror 149 stated that she did not know Scott.

¶8. After the circuit judge finished questioning Juror 149, Gipson’s attorney made no

objection to Juror 149 remaining on the jury. In fact, Gipson’s attorney stated the following:

[W]hile it seems . . . that [the connection] could pose a problem, I think at this
degree of distance, her not being in a formalized relationship [with Scott’s
uncle, a]nd, obviously, she’s already answered that she could be an impartial
juror. I don’t think that this is one . . . that we need to request she be removed
from the defense.

Thus, without any objection, the circuit judge ruled that Juror 149 would remain on the jury,

and Gipson’s trial resumed.

¶9. At a later point in the trial, the State again informed the circuit judge of a potential

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issue of juror bias. Outside the jury’s presence, the attorneys and the circuit judge questioned

Deputy Benjamin McKinney with the Tallahatchie County Sheriff’s Department. Deputy

McKinney stated that he worked as a narcotics investigator and had just received an

unsolicited text message from a confidential informant about one of the jurors. According

to the informant, Gipson had previously been in a relationship with a female juror. Deputy

McKinney testified that the informant had proved to be reliable in the past but had given no

“basis of reliability” for the information provided in the text message.

¶10. The parties agreed to have the circuit judge question Juror 92 about her potential

connection to Gipson. In response to the circuit judge’s examination, Juror 92 stated that

prior to the trial, she had known of Gipson “[f]rom around the area” but had not personally

known him. Juror 92 further stated that her daughter had gone to school with Gipson, and

Juror 92 denied ever having been in a relationship with Gipson. Based on Juror 92’s

responses, Gipson’s attorney stated that the defense had no concerns about her and asked that

she remain on the jury. Without any further objection or discussion, the circuit judge granted

the request.

¶11. In previously discussing a defendant’s claim of juror impartiality, this Court stated:

A defendant bears the burden of showing he was prejudiced by the jury
selected or that the jury was biased or less than impartial. We have stated that
the trial court has complete discretion to remove any juror that the trial court
is convinced is not able to try the case without any bias or prejudice toward the
State or the defendant. Since there is no firm rule guiding the courts in every
given situation of voir dire examination, these matters must be determined on
a case by case basis. An appellate court may not reverse a decision by a trial
court regarding jury selection unless there is an abuse of discretion.

Chisholm v. State, 298 So. 3d 1046, 1050 (¶10) (Miss. Ct. App. 2020) (citations and internal

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quotation marks omitted).

¶12. Our caselaw also recognizes that a defendant may fail to preserve an issue for appeal

if he makes no contemporaneous objection at trial. Giles v. State, 282 So. 3d 519, 525 (¶¶14-

15) (Miss. Ct. App. 2019). Here, the record reflects that the defense failed to object to the

sufficiency of the circuit judge’s voir dire of either Juror 149 or Juror 92. Moreover, the

defense raised no objection to the circuit judge’s decision to allow both jurors to remain on

the jury. In fact, Gipson’s attorney specifically declined to request that Juror 149 be removed

and then actually requested that Juror 92 be allowed to remain on the jury.

¶13. In addition to noting Gipson’s lack of objection at trial, we find no abuse of discretion

in the circuit judge’s ruling regarding Jurors 149 and 92. As the defendant, Gipson bears the

burden to prove the jurors’ bias. Chisholm, 298 So. 3d at 1050 (¶10). Upon careful review,

we conclude that he failed to satisfy his evidentiary burden.

II. External Influence

¶14. As previously discussed, Gipson also contends on appeal that the bailiff improperly

influenced the jury. “We review the trial court’s decisions concerning jury influence for an

abuse of discretion.” Grimes v. State, 361 So. 3d 179, 189 (¶24) (Miss. Ct. App. 2023).

¶15. In Grimes, this Court reiterated the established procedure a trial court should employ

when faced with a party’s claims of improper outside influence on a jury. Id. at 189-90

(¶¶25-26). As we stated in Grimes,

In Gladney v. Clarksdale Beverage Co., 625 So. 2d 407, 418-19 (Miss. 1993),
the Mississippi Supreme Court explained . . . that when an allegation of juror
misconduct arises, the circuit court must first determine whether there is good
cause to warrant further investigation by the court. Id. at 418. “In order for

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the duty to investigate to arise, the party contending there is misconduct must
make an adequate showing to overcome the presumption of jury impartiality.”
Id. “At the very minimum, it must be shown that there is sufficient evidence
to conclude that good cause exists to believe that there was in fact an improper
outside influence or extraneous prejudicial information.” Id. at 419.
“Although a minimal standard of a good cause showing of specific instances
of misconduct is acceptable, the preferable showing should clearly substantiate
that a specific, non-speculative impropriety has occurred.” Id.

After a party presents a threshold showing of good cause that a jury may have
been exposed to improper outside information, Gladney indicates that the trial
court should conduct a post-trial investigative hearing. Id. At such a hearing,
which could include questioning jurors about the extraneous information, “the
proper procedure is for the judge to limit the questions asked the jurors to
determine whether [the] communication was made and what it contained.” Id.
When the trial court determines that the communication was made and what
the contents were, “the court is then to decide whether it is reasonably possible
that this communication altered the verdict.” Id.

Grimes, 361 So. 3d at 189-90 (¶¶25-26).

¶16. The record in the present case reflects that the bailiff heard a juror knock on the door

during the jury’s deliberations. The bailiff opened the door, and when the jurors asked him

a question, he responded. Following the exchange, the bailiff informed the circuit judge of

his interaction with the jury.

¶17. On the record and in the presence of both parties, the circuit judge questioned the

bailiff. The bailiff explained that the jury had asked him what would happen if it was unable

to reach a decision. The bailiff stated that he had responded, “Normally[,] it would be a hung

jury.” According to the bailiff, the jury then informed him that they had reached a verdict

as to Count I but not as to Count II. The bailiff stated that he had told the jury that it “ha[d]

to come to some type of decision[,]” but he denied that he had answered any legal questions

for the jury.

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¶18. The defense raised concerns over the bailiff’s interactions with the jury. Specifically,

Gipson’s attorney asserted that any statement by the bailiff that the jury had to reach a

decision could have swayed the jury in its deliberations. In light of the defense’s concerns,

the circuit judge further examined the bailiff to ascertain exactly what he said to the jury.

The bailiff stated that the jury’s exact question to him had been, “What would happen if we

[do not] come up with a decision in Count 2?” The bailiff further stated that he told the jury,

“Normally, it’s a mistrial.” The bailiff then asked the jury if it wished to deliberate longer.

When the jurors indicated that “they might have been two people away from a . . . unanimous

decision[,]” the bailiff responded, “Well, maybe more deliberation might be required.”

Although the bailiff previously testified that he had told the jurors they “ha[d] to come to

some type of decision[,]” he now clarified that he “did not tell them you all have got to come

up with a verdict. I did not say those words.”

¶19. The circuit judge allowed Gipson’s attorney to also question the bailiff. Gipson’s

attorney asked whether the bailiff had explicitly instructed the jury that it “need[ed] to come

up with a decision[.]” The bailiff responded that as far as he could recall, he had simply

asked the jurors if they thought they might “need to do a little more collaboration on it[.]”

When the circuit judge asked if there was anything further from the defense, Gipson’s

attorney stated, “[W]e’ll have the opportunity to . . . poll the jury, if necessary. And then if

there is something needed, we can move forward at that time with anything, if that’s a

sufficient response.” Without further discussion, the circuit judge announced that the jury

had reached a decision on the verdicts and ordered the bailiff to escort the jury back into the

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courtroom. After the jury returned guilty verdicts for both conspiracy and first-degree

murder, the defense requested that the circuit judge poll the jury. The poll revealed that the

jurors had been unanimous in their verdicts.

¶20. After the circuit judge dismissed the jury, Gipson’s attorney moved for a mistrial

based on the bailiff’s involvement with the jury. Deciding to “go ahead and actually address

this now” while the jurors were still in the courthouse, the circuit judge cleared the courtroom

of everyone but the parties and had the jury return. The circuit judge explained that he had

“one question pertaining to the verdicts and a[n] interaction that the jury had with [the bailiff]

during the deliberation process.” The circuit judge then asked, “Was there anything

pertaining to the interaction that you had when . . . your bailiff[] visited the jury room, was

there anything that he said or did . . . that changed your decision and that you would

otherwise not be voting guilty?” Each juror answered in the negative and affirmed that their

verdicts were unanimous. The circuit judge concluded that the verdicts were “not the result

of any interaction between the bailiff . . . and the jury.”

¶21. In his motion for a new trial, Gipson renewed his argument that the bailiff had

improperly influenced the jury. At the hearing on Gipson’s post-trial motions, the circuit

judge found that he had followed the steps in Gladney to ascertain if the jury had been

improperly influenced during its deliberations. The circuit judge therefore stated that as to

“the incident pertaining to the bailiff,” he would not allow further inquiry into the jury’s

internal deliberations but would “stand[] by the transcript” that had been made after Gipson’s

attorney first raised the issue.

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¶22. Upon review, we find that after good cause was shown, the circuit judge correctly held

an investigative hearing to determine if the bailiff had provided extraneous information to

the jury, the extent and specific content of any extraneous information given, and if it was

reasonably possible that extraneous information had altered the jury’s verdicts. See Grimes,

361 So. 3d at 189-90 (¶¶25-26). We further find, however, that the circuit judge erred by

concluding with the additional question about whether the bailiff’s statements to the jurors

influenced their decision to find Gipson guilty. Mississippi “Rule of Evidence 606 does not

permit ‘any inquiry into the internal deliberations of the jurors.’” Roach v. State, 116 So. 3d

126, 133 (¶23) (Miss. 2013) (quoting Gladney, 625 So. 2d at 419). As the supreme court

explained in Roach,

[a] juror may testify on the question of whether extraneous prejudicial
information was improperly brought to the jury’s attention or whether any
outside influence was improperly brought to bear upon any juror. But
questioning of a juror must be limited to whether the communication was made
and what it contained. It is inappropriate and a violation of Rule 606(b) for
any juror to be questioned with regard to whether or not the extraneous
information actually altered his verdict.

Id. (citations and internal quotation marks omitted).

¶23. Despite the circuit judge’s final erroneous question about the effect of the bailiff’s

statements on the jury’s verdict, we note that the remainder of the investigative hearing was

thorough and complied with the requirements of Gladney. “Each juror was given the

opportunity, when polled, to express any dissatisfaction with the verdict and the opportunity

to vote without any jury deliberation room pressure.” Hayes v. Entergy Miss. Inc., 871 So.

2d 743, 748 (¶14) (Miss. 2004). No juror expressed any such dissatisfaction with the verdicts

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or contrary vote to the verdicts. In addition, both the circuit judge and Gipson’s attorney

questioned the bailiff regarding the extent and specific content of his interaction with the

jury.

¶24. Based upon the investigation conducted, the circuit judge concluded the testimony and

evidence failed to show a reasonable possibility that the jurors’ verdicts had resulted from

their interaction with the bailiff. “Under the facts presented, and giving deference to the

[circuit] judge’s determination of the credibility of witnesses, we cannot say that the [circuit]

judge” abused his discretion. Roach, 116 So. 3d at 134 (¶24). We therefore find no

reversible error.

CONCLUSION

¶25. Because we find no abuse of discretion in the circuit court’s decision to deny a new

trial, we affirm Gipson’s convictions and sentences.

¶26. AFFIRMED.

BARNES, C.J., CARLTON AND WILSON, P.JJ., LAWRENCE, McCARTY
AND EMFINGER, JJ., CONCUR. McDONALD, J., CONCURS IN PART AND IN
THE RESULT WITHOUT SEPARATE WRITTEN OPINION. WESTBROOKS, J.,
CONCURS IN PART AND DISSENTS IN PART WITHOUT SEPARATE WRITTEN
OPINION.

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