Wiley Zachary Carroll a/k/a Wiley Z. Carroll v. State of Mississippi

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF MISSISSIPPI

NO. 2023-CP-00688-COA

WILEY ZACHARY CARROLL A/K/A WILEY Z. APPELLANT
CARROLL

v.

STATE OF MISSISSIPPI APPELLEE

DATE OF JUDGMENT: 05/26/2023
TRIAL JUDGE: HON. GRADY FRANKLIN TOLLISON III
COURT FROM WHICH APPEALED: TIPPAH COUNTY CIRCUIT COURT
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT: WILEY ZACHARY CARROLL (PRO SE)
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLEE: OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL
BY: ASHLEY LAUREN SULSER
NATURE OF THE CASE: CIVIL - POST-CONVICTION RELIEF
DISPOSITION: AFFIRMED - 08/06/2024
MOTION FOR REHEARING FILED:

BEFORE BARNES, C.J., McDONALD AND LAWRENCE, JJ.

BARNES, C.J., FOR THE COURT:

¶1. Wiley Carroll, appearing pro se, appeals the Tippah County Circuit Court’s denial of

his self-styled “Motion to Vacate/Set Aside an Illegal Sentence,” which was considered a

motion for post-conviction relief (PCR). Carroll claims his plea and sentence for the crime

of burglary of a dwelling should be set aside because the State did not prove ownership of

the dwelling. We find no error and affirm the trial court’s denial of his motion.

FACTS

¶2. In April 2021, Carroll, along with another individual, was indicted in Tippah County

for burglary of a dwelling. Carroll is not a newcomer to PCR procedure or this Court. Over

the years, Carroll has had numerous other charges, felony convictions, and two appeals to
this Court. At the time of his February 2023 plea hearing in this case, Carroll had two other

charges pending on the Tippah County Circuit Court docket: possession of

methamphetamine related to an arrest in 2019; and aggravated assault stemming from an

incident in 2020. With his drug-possession case set for trial the following day, Carroll was

placed on notice by the State that he was eligible for an enhanced punishment of life

imprisonment under Mississippi Code Annotated section 99-19-83 (Rev. 2020) if convicted

again of a felony due to his prior convictions.1

¶3. During Carroll’s plea hearing on the charge of burglary of a dwelling, the State

explained that Carroll had been offered a sentence of twenty years, with fourteen years

suspended and six years to serve in the custody of the Mississippi Department of Corrections

(MDOC) with the enhancement reduced to the status of a non-violent habitual offender

under section 99-19-81 (Rev. 2020), and five years of post-release supervision. This

sentence would run concurrently with the sentence he was serving for felony DUI. Carroll

initially agreed to plead guilty but told the judge that he did not commit the crime. In

response, the trial court refused to accept his guilty plea. Carroll then tried to bargain for

an Alford2 plea, but the State denied his request. The next day, however, before trial was to

1
In 1988, Carroll was convicted of strong-arm robbery and sentenced to eight years
in the custody of the Mississippi Department of Corrections (MDOC). In 2004, Carroll
pleaded guilty to attempted armed robbery and was sentenced to twenty years in the custody
of the MDOC. Carroll v. State, 120 So. 3d 471, 473 (¶4) (Miss. Ct. App. 2013). More
recently, in May 2021, one month after the charge in this case, Carroll pleaded guilty to
felony DUI and was sentenced to five years in the custody of the MDOC. Carroll v. State,
371 So. 3d 196, 197 (¶2) (Miss. Ct. App. 2023).
2
North Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25 (1970).

2
begin on his charge of possession of methamphetamine, Carroll changed his plea to guilty

on the burglary charge, admitting he committed the crime. Carroll was sentenced according

to the State’s original offer stated above, and his two other pending charges were retired to

the files.

¶4. On March 17, 2023, Carroll timely filed the instant PCR motion, arguing his

conviction and sentence should be vacated and set aside because they were “illegal.” He

claimed his indictment was fatally defective, his guilty plea was involuntary, his non-violent

habitual-offender status was improper, and the trial court lacked jurisdiction. Carroll argued

his indictment was defective for failing to “charge all of the essential elements of the

offense” because the homeowners listed on the indictment were incorrect. The indictment

read that on March 14, 2021, Carroll and his co-defendant burglarized “the dwelling of

Curtiss Lamar Christian and Sarah Jackson, located at 126 Moore’s Mill Road, Ripley, in

Tippah County, Mississippi.” Carroll claimed that these two individuals were illegally

occupying the home, or “squatters,” and were not the homeowners. Further, he argued his

plea was involuntary. Carroll again denied guilt, explaining that he was “compelled by

circumstance” to plead guilty because if he did not accept the State’s offer, he perceived a

“railroad ride was forthcoming” during his upcoming trial for possession of

methamphetamine. He properly surmised that if convicted at that trial, the only sentencing

option was life imprisonment due to his qualification for enhanced punishment under section

99-19-83. He described this situation as “court room manipulation.” Carroll also claimed

that in his plea agreement, the State “illegally tacked on” the enhanced penalty under section

3
99-19-81. Relatedly, he argued that the trial court was “without jurisdiction” to utilize his

prior felony conviction in 2004 for attempted armed robbery because on appeal “this case

. . . was rendered null and void.” See Carroll, 120 So. 3d at 476 (¶15) (upholding

conviction but reversing and remanding on banishment issue).3

¶5. On May 23, 2023, the trial court denied Carroll’s PCR motion, ruling he was

incorrect that ownership is an element of burglary of a dwelling, citing Mississippi Code

Annotated section 97-17-23 (Rev. 2020); thus, he was “not entitled to any relief.” Carroll

appealed.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

¶6. In reviewing the trial court’s denial or dismissal of a PCR motion, this Court will

reverse the judgment only if the trial court’s factual findings are clearly erroneous. The trial

court’s legal conclusions are reviewed de novo. Hays v. State, 282 So. 3d 714, 716-17 (¶5)

(Miss. Ct. App. 2019).

ANALYSIS

¶7. Before this Court, Carroll continues to argue that his indictment is fatally defective

because the incorrect owners were listed on his indictment for burglary of a dwelling.4

3
Carroll is incorrect in suggesting his conviction for attempted armed robbery was
reversed. In this case, part of Carroll’s post-release supervision condition was banishment
from the Third Circuit Court District, from which he sought post-conviction relief. Carroll,
120 So. 3d at 472 (¶1). On appeal, this Court reversed and remanded for the trial court to
determine from a more complete record than provided on appeal regarding whether the
requisite banishment considerations were met. Id.
4
Carroll also incorporates into his appellate brief other arguments about the
sufficiency of the record and his insistence that the trial judge who presided over his guilty
plea hearing should have recused. These arguments were not a part of his PCR motion and,

4
¶8. Entering a guilty plea waives “all technical and non-jurisdictional defects contained

in the indictment.” Clark v. State, 54 So. 3d 304, 308 (¶9) (Miss. Ct. App. 2011) (citing

Reeder v. State, 783 So. 2d 711, 720 (¶36) (Miss. 2001)). Carroll attempts to evade the

waiver by arguing that the trial court lacked jurisdiction5 and that the indictment failed to

include an essential element of the crime, as these are the only two matters he presents that

are not waived on appeal. Beene, 910 So. 2d at 1154 (¶7) (citing Jefferson v. State, 556 So.

2d 1016, 1019 (Miss. 1989)) (After entry of a guilty plea, the only two matters not waived

on appeal are failure to charge a necessary element of the crime and lack of subject matter

jurisdiction.). His argument fails, though, because the State had to prove only possession

of, or residence in, the dwelling at the time of the burglary, not ownership.

¶9. Mississippi Code Annotated section 97-17-23(1) defines burglary of a dwelling as

breaking and entering the dwelling house or inner door of such dwelling
house of another, whether armed with a deadly weapon or not, and whether
there shall be at the time some human being in such dwelling house or not,
with intent to commit some crime therein[.]

thus, were not ruled upon by the trial court. “Issues not raised in a motion for post-
conviction relief are procedurally barred on appeal.” Rutledge v. State, 359 So. 3d 668, 669
(¶4) (Miss. Ct. App. 2023) (quoting Smith v. State, 973 So. 2d 1003, 1006 (¶6) (Miss. Ct.
App. 2007)). Procedural bar notwithstanding, we find no merit to his arguments.
Carroll also expressed concern and confusion before the trial court, and now to this
Court, about changes to his cause number from TK2021-017 to CV-2023-049. The record
shows the former cause number is related to filings in his criminal charge of burglary of a
dwelling, and the latter cause number is the civil action number for pleadings related to his
post-conviction-relief collateral challenge, which is an original civil action, not a criminal
action. See Miss. Code Ann. § 99-39-7 (Rev. 2020).
5
Carroll fails to explain how the trial court lacked jurisdiction. The Court will not
review issues raised without relevant authority cited. Beene v. State, 910 So. 2d 1152, 1154
(¶7) (Miss. Ct. App. 2005) (citing Williams v. State, 708 So. 2d 1358, 1360-61 (¶12) (Miss.
1998)).

5
Miss. Code Ann. § 97-17-23(1) (emphasis added). Burglary of a dwelling has two required

elements: “(1) breaking and entering the dwelling house or inner door of such dwelling

house of another, and (2) with the intent to commit some crime therein.” Holder v. State,

348 So. 3d 370, 374 (¶9) (Miss. Ct. App. 2022) (emphasis added) (quoting Bowman v. State,

283 So. 3d 154, 162 (¶25) (Miss. 2019)). Carroll contends that the State must prove

ownership of the premises since ownership in someone other than the defendant is an

essential element of the crime. See infra note 8.

¶10. We disagree. In Bowman, the Mississippi Supreme Court held that for the crime of

burglary of a dwelling, the State did not have to prove the resident owned the dwelling, only

that she occupied it. Bowman, 283 So. 3d at 161 (¶20). There, the defendant challenged the

sufficiency of the evidence on his burglary conviction, in part arguing that the State failed

to prove the dwelling (a hunting camp) belonged to the occupant/victim (the defendant’s

estranged wife) because she neither owned it nor intended to reside there permanently. Id.

at 161-62 (¶¶17, 19). The Bowman court disagreed, as the court had long ago established

that “[p]ossession is enough as against burglars.” Id. at 161 (¶20) (quoting Lewis v. State,

85 Miss. 35, 40, 37 So. 497, 497 (1904) (citing Wharton, Cr. Law, § 804 (10th ed.))).6 The

Lewis court found that “this is true even if the possession be a wrongful possession.” Lewis,

85 Miss. at 40, 37 So. at 497 (citing 1 McClain, Cr. Law, § 508). Possession is sufficient,

the Bowman court explained, because at common law, burglary was considered an offense

6
In Lewis, the supreme court held that the indictment’s charge and the State’s proof
of ownership of the building was sufficient because the person charged with ownership
“used and occupied” the building at the time of the burglary. Lewis, 85 Miss. at 40, 37 So.
at 497.

6
against habitation rather than property, and the law sought to protect the security of the

residents, not the property. Id. (quoting Robinson v. State, 364 So. 2d 1131, 1133 (Miss.

1978)). Moreover, the supreme court “has held in several cases that in an indictment for

burglary the allegations as to the ownership of the title to the building constitute

surplusage. . . .” Id. (citing Taylor v. State, 214 Miss. 263, 266, 58 So. 2d 664, 665 (1952)).

The Bowman court concluded that the law only required that the State prove the victim was

residing at the hunting camp when the defendant broke in. Id.

¶11. Similarly, in Sullivan v. Cook, 218 So. 2d 879 (Miss. 1969), a habeas corpus

proceeding, the appellant contended that his indictment, judgment, and sentence were void

because there was no allegation in the indictment of who owned the burglarized building.

Id. at 880. However, the indictment did identify the individual who occupied the building

and his proprietorship of a drug store. Id. Citing Taylor, the supreme court found,

beginning with Lewis, that “insofar as the burglary is concerned, the occupant of the

building at the time of the burglary is the owner.” Id. at 880-81 (quoting Taylor, 214 Miss.

at 266, 58 So. 2d at 665). The supreme court thus found the appellant’s indictment was not

defective. Id. at 881.

¶12. Here, the same holds true. Even if we were to accept Carroll’s contention that the

two individuals named in the indictment were illegally squatting at the burglarized residence

and not the homeowners, his indictment remains valid. Carroll does not argue that the

“squatters” were not occupying the residence; he just maintains they are not the true owners.7

7
Carroll offered no proof of his contention to the trial court or this Court but,
instead, directs us to call the Tippah County Tax Assessor’s office to confirm whom he

7
The statute only specifies the burglarized dwelling must be “of another,” i.e., not the

defendant’s dwelling. Further, under Mississippi precedent, possession of the dwelling is

sufficient, even if wrongful. Therefore, the indictment was not defective, and the State did

not have to prove these two individuals owned the dwelling.8 “The purpose of the

indictment is to provide the accused reasonable notice of the charges against him so that he

may prepare an adequate defense.” Walker v. State, 271 So. 3d 789, 792 (¶7) (Miss. Ct.

App. 2019) (quoting Brawner v. State, 947 So. 2d 254, 265 (¶31) (Miss. 2006)). The

indictment gave Carroll sufficient notice to prepare his defense.

¶13. For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the trial court’s denial of Carroll’s PCR motion.

¶14. AFFIRMED.

identifies as the property’s owner.
8
Carroll cites Harveston v. State, 798 So. 2d 638 (Miss. Ct. App. 2001), an
automobile burglary case, for the proposition that the State must provide “evidence of the
ownership of the premises broken into, since ownership in someone other than the defendant
is an essential element of a burglary charge.” Id. at 640 (¶4) (citing Cooksey v. State, 175
Miss. 82, 82, 166 So. 388, 390 (1936)). However, Harveston is distinguishable because it
involved the burglary of automobiles, not a dwelling, prosecuted under a different statute
(Miss. Code Ann. § 97-17-33 (burglary of other buildings)). Id. at 639 (¶1). This Court
found insufficient evidence of the vehicles’ ownership in two of three counts. Id. at 642
(¶13). To the extent that Cooksey appears to support Carroll’s argument, we also find it
factually distinguishable since it involves a store, not a dwelling house, which was a
different crime under the burglary statutes then, as now. See Woods v. State, 186 Miss. 463,
463, 191 So. 283, 284 (1939). Nowadays, burglary of a dwelling house is a distinct statutory
crime from burglary of a non-dwelling house. Bowman, 283 So. 3d at 161 (¶18). In
Cooksey, the store owner named in the indictment had died about a week before the crime.
Cooksey, 175 Miss. at 82, 166 So. at 389. Because a dead person cannot be an owner of
property, the indictment lacked any ownership element, and the conviction was reversed and
remanded for a new trial. Id., 166 So. at 390. The Cooksey court acknowledged that
“possession may support proof of ownership,” but it must be alleged and proved at the time
of the burglary. Id.

8
CARLTON AND WILSON, P.JJ., WESTBROOKS, McDONALD,
LAWRENCE, McCARTY, SMITH AND EMFINGER, JJ., CONCUR.

9