Sarah Anderson (Grabmiller) v. Joshua Grabmiller

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF MISSISSIPPI

NO. 2023-CA-00593-COA

SARAH ANDERSON (GRABMILLER) APPELLANT

v.

JOSHUA GRABMILLER APPELLEE

DATE OF JUDGMENT: 03/22/2023
TRIAL JUDGE: HON. CHARLES E. SMITH
COURT FROM WHICH APPEALED: LAUDERDALE COUNTY CHANCERY
COURT
ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLANT: MARTY CRAIG ROBERTSON
SARAH HUNTER DIDLAKE
JOHN S. GRANT IV
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLEE: WILLIAM B. JACOB
NATURE OF THE CASE: CIVIL - DOMESTIC RELATIONS
DISPOSITION: AFFIRMED - 09/17/2024
MOTION FOR REHEARING FILED:

BEFORE CARLTON, P.J., SMITH AND EMFINGER, JJ.

CARLTON, P.J., FOR THE COURT:

¶1. Sarah Anderson and Josh Grabmiller both filed for divorce in February 2021 in the

Chancery Court of Lauderdale County. They subsequently agreed to a divorce on the ground

of irreconcilable differences. They agreed on certain issues, and they submitted other issues

to the chancellor for resolution. Relevant to this appeal, Anderson and Grabmiller submitted

the following issue: “The amount, duration, and form of alimony, if any, to be paid by one

party to the other.” On March 22, 2023, the chancery court issued its final judgment of

divorce ordering Sarah to “pay monthly periodic alimony to Josh in the amount of $1,000.00,

beginning April 1, 2023.” The chancery court denied Sarah’s post-trial motion to alter or
amend the judgment with respect to the alimony issue.

¶2. Sarah appeals only with respect to the alimony issue, asserting that (1) the chancellor

erred by failing to analyze or consider rehabilitative alimony as an alternative to periodic

alimony; and (2) the chancellor erred by failing to apply the Armstrong factors1 to decide the

proper type of alimony (rehabilitative or periodic) and by failing to consider whether any of

the factors supported rehabilitative alimony.

¶3. For the reasons addressed below, we affirm the judgment of the chancery court.

PROCEDURAL HISTORY AND STATEMENT OF FACTS

¶4. Sarah and Josh were married on December 28, 2008, and have two minor daughters,

E.R. and S.L.2 Sarah and Josh each filed separate complaints for divorce in February 2021.

The two matters were consolidated. On March 25, 2021, the chancery court issued an “Order

Granting Temporary Relief” in which the court awarded Sarah temporary physical and legal

custody of the children and delineated a visitation schedule. The chancery court also ordered,

as follows:

Sarah shall pay temporary monthly spousal support of $2,000.00.00 [sic] to
Joshua beginning on April 1, 2021. Joshua shall pay temporary monthly child
support to Sarah in the amount of $400.00 per month, beginning on April 1,
2021. With the requirement of both to pay support to each other, the above
amounts shall be off set, with Sarah being required to pay to Joshua the
amount of $1,600.00 each month.

¶5. Sarah and Josh eventually agreed to a divorce on the ground of irreconcilable

differences. They also filed a “Consent to Adjudicate” in which they “request[ed] the Court

1
Armstrong v. Armstrong, 618 So. 2d 1278, 1280 (Miss. 1993).
2
Initials are used to protect the children’s privacy.

2
to decide the matters upon which they cannot agree.” Concerning this appeal, the consent

to adjudicate specifically requested that the chancery court determine “[t]he amount,

duration, and form of alimony, if any, to be paid by one party to the other.”

I. The March 2023 Trial

¶6. A three-day trial was held on March 6-8, 2023, to address the issues listed in the

consent to adjudicate. Josh testified and called his mother as a witness. Sarah testified and

called her mother as a witness. Fifty-eight exhibits were admitted into evidence.

¶7. At the time of trial, Josh was forty-one years old, and Sarah was thirty-nine. E.R. was

nine, and S.L. was five. Sarah testified that after completing her undergraduate degree, she

moved from Mississippi to Georgia to attend the Philadelphia College of Osteopathic

Medicine (“DO school”) in Suwanee, a suburb of Atlanta, Georgia. Sarah met Josh while

she was attending DO school. Sarah and Josh married on December 28, 2008, near the end

of Sarah’s second year.

¶8. Josh has a high school diploma and has taken some college courses. When Sarah and

Josh married, Josh was working at TGC, a family business formed to install video equipment

in smart houses. Later, the business began selling DVDs on eBay and Amazon. About six

months before Sarah completed DO school, Josh was laid off from his job.

¶9. Sarah graduated from DO school in 2011. After DO school, Sarah and Josh moved

to Tupelo for Sarah to complete her residency in family medicine at North Mississippi

Medical Center. Sarah and Josh lived in Tupelo for about three years. When they moved to

Tupelo, they purchased a house that needed updating, so Josh painted and did other repair

3
work to the home for the first three to six months that they lived there. Then Josh got a sales

job at Terminix. Josh testified Terminix paid him $45,000 a year.

¶10. In August 2013, Sarah and Josh had their first child, E.R., during Sarah’s third year

of residency. After Sarah finished maternity leave, Josh resigned from Terminix to stay

home with E.R.

¶11. After Sarah’s residency, in July 2014, Sarah and Josh moved to Meridian for Sarah

to work at Rush Medical Group (Rush). Sarah and Josh purchased a home from Sarah’s

grandfather that required extensive renovation. Josh testified that they agreed he would “be

the stay-at-home parent while [Sarah] worked, and then [he] was going to continue to work

on the house as well during [his] free time.” Josh testified about the scope of the renovation,

explaining that “[w]e’re talking about a 3,500 square foot house that needed to be completely

gutted and renovated, and toilets removed on slab foundations because Sarah wanted me to.

So this wasn’t . . . a cookie-cutter remodel.” Sarah testified that “[she] wanted to buy [her

grandfather’s] house . . . [and that] she wanted updates done. And so, the plan was . . . that

[Josh] would work on those updates and then he would transition into employment.” The

parties’ second daughter, S.L., was born in August 2017.

¶12. Updates to the home were still incomplete when Josh and Sarah both separately filed

for divorce in February 2021. Josh said that the remodeling was not completed because “[i]t

was a lot to do.” He testified that “[i]t’s hard to remodel when you’re having to take care of

the family, too; pick up the kids from school, drop them up; pick them up from dance, drop

them off; cook, clean and go b[u]y the groceries. I was in charge of the finances as well.”

4
¶13. When Sarah first started working at Rush, she had a traditional family medicine

practice where she was required to be on call. Sarah testified she enjoyed this type of work,

but it “took [her] away from [her] kids and made [her] miss things that [she] didn’t want to

miss.” After about six months, Sarah switched jobs and began working with the family

medicine residency program in Meridian. Sarah said that by the time S.L. was born in

August 2017, she was the associate program director.

¶14. Sarah testified that she had approximately $300,000 in student loan debt. According

to Sarah, “the plan was always that I was going to work, and as soon as my student loans

were paid off, that my workload would be cut back so that I could focus on being a mother.”

She said at that point, “Josh was going to get a job and a job [where] [h]e had benefits so that

he could provide for insurance and that I could cut back to part time, in order to be with the

girls more.” Sarah testified it took her five years to pay off her student loan debt; she was

able to do this by picking up moonlighting shifts in the emergency room at Stennis Hospital.

¶15. In 2019, Sarah paid off her student loans. She said that once the student loans were

paid off, she and Josh discussed that they needed to “get [their] finances in line,” so they met

with a financial planner to discuss their retirement. Based on information provided by Sarah

and Josh at the meeting, the financial planner prepared a “Wealthcare Guide Financial Plan”

dated September 2020. The Wealthcare financial plan indicated that one of their goals was

“to allow Sarah to reduce her workload and/or change jobs in about five years.” During

cross-examination, Josh acknowledged that he and Sarah told the financial planner that they

planned that he “was going to go back to work and pursue a career.” The Wealthcare

5
financial plan shows that an “[a]ssumption” with respect to the parties’ income was that Josh

would have “[r]ealtor [e]arnings” of approximately $50,000 per year from “2022-retirement.”

Following the meeting with the financial planner, Sarah and Josh both opened IRAs. Sarah

funded both accounts. Sarah and Josh also purchased life insurance policies.

¶16. Regarding childcare, when Sarah and Josh moved to Meridian in July 2014, E.R.

began attending daycare. Josh testified that S.L., who was born in August 2017, was placed

in daycare “for a short while” before the COVID-19 pandemic shut down schools in early

2020. He said that “we wanted [S.L.] to go to daycare. It was time for her to go to daycare

. . . . My job was to renovate the house at that time.” Once E.R., their older daughter, began

school, she went to daycare for at least one summer break.

¶17. Josh testified that in his free time he made do-it-yourself (DIY) videos and posted

them on YouTube “as a hobby.” He said he created his YouTube channel about two years

before his separation from Sarah and acknowledged that he did not make any kind of

substantial income from the YouTube videos.

¶18. The chancery court found that Josh and Sarah “separated as husband and wife” in

August 2019, although Josh testified he and Sarah were still living in the same house when

they filed their divorce actions in February 2021. At the beginning of the COVID-19

pandemic, the two girls stayed home with Josh. E.R. attended virtual school during this time.

Sarah testified that she often came home and found the virtual schoolwork had not been

completed. Around January 2021, Sarah made arrangements with her mother for E.R. to go

to her house after school or if there was a virtual school day. Sarah’s mother would then help

6
E.R. with her schoolwork. S.L. attended daycare during this same time. Sarah would pick

up S.L. every day on her way home from work.

¶19. During cross-examination, Josh acknowledged that he withdrew $30,000 from the

family checking account at the time of the separation. He testified he considered it family

funds because although Sarah earned the money, “I allowed her to earn it by doing what I

was doing at home by taking care of everything on the back end while she worked. It was

equal employment.”

¶20. As noted, Josh and Sarah both separately filed for divorce in February 2021, and the

cases were later consolidated. The chancery court found that as of February 11, 2021, when

each party filed for divorce, the home remodeling and addition work had not been completed.

¶21. After filing their complaints for divorce, both Josh and Sarah filed motions for

temporary relief. The chancery court issued an “Order Granting Temporary Relief” on

March 25, 2021, granting Sarah temporary physical and legal custody of both children. Josh

was granted visitation on the second, fourth, and fifth weekends of each month, as well as

summer and holiday periods. Sarah was granted temporary use of the marital home; Josh was

granted temporary use of the cabin. As noted, Sarah was also ordered to pay temporary

monthly spousal support of $2,000 to Josh beginning on April 1, 2021, and Josh was ordered

to pay temporary monthly child support to Sarah in the amount of $400 per month, beginning

on the same date. Sarah testified at trial that as of the time of trial, she had paid Josh $2,000

for the last twenty-four months ($48,000) in temporary alimony since the temporary hearing.

During that same time period, Sarah received $400 per month ($9,600) in child support from

7
Josh.

¶22. After the temporary order was entered, Josh obtained employment with Clearspan

Components (Clearspan) in Meridian doing industrial maintenance. He was still working at

Clearspan at the time of trial in March 2023. The chancery court found he has monthly

disposable income of $2,995 per month, as shown by his Rule 8.05 financial disclosures. See

UCCR 8.05. Josh testified that his work schedule is 6:00 a.m. to 4:00 p.m. Monday-

Thursday and 6:00 a.m. to 2:30 p.m. on Friday. He also may work the Saturdays when he

does not have the children.

¶23. The chancellor found that Sarah works as a family physician in a clinic and has

monthly disposable income as shown on her Rule 8.05 financial disclosures of $12,969.

Sarah testified that her work schedule is 8:00 a.m. to 4:00 p.m. Monday through Thursday

and 8:00 a.m. to 12:00 p.m. on Friday.

¶24. At the end of the three-day trial, after both parties rested, the chancellor specifically

asked the parties’ counsel whether either one of them “want[ed] to take time for any

argument.” Both lawyers said they did not. The chancellor then said he would go through

the evidence presented and render a written opinion soon.

II. The Chancery Court’s Memorandum Opinion and Final Judgment
of Divorce

¶25. The chancellor entered his memorandum opinion and the final judgment of divorce

on March 22, 2023. Regarding custody, the chancellor found that “the best interest of the

children [would] be served by granting Sarah physical custody and the parties being granted

joint legal custody.” The order detailed a visitation schedule, and Josh was ordered to pay

8
$600 per month in child support.

¶26. The chancellor then addressed the equitable division of property. He noted that the

parties agreed to the division of their real property through their stipulations in the consent

to adjudicate. Sarah would get the exclusive title, use, and possession of the marital home,

and Josh would get the exclusive title, use, and possession of the cabin. The parties also

agreed that each party would retain the use of their own vehicle, with both vehicles being

valued at about $7,000. The chancery court found that the accounts Josh held at the time of

separation were worth approximately $24,000 in total and that Sarah had her own IRA,

checking, and savings accounts totaling about $78,974. The chancellor found that “[w]ith

the parties’ agreement and the [c]ourt’s decision on the contested items, Josh has marital

assets totaling $104,306.00, and Sarah has marital assets totaling $172,982.00.” As an offset

to accomplish a fifty/fifty division, the chancellor ordered Sarah to pay Josh $34,172.50 “to

equalize the equitable distribution” of marital property.

¶27. Next, the chancellor addressed alimony. After addressing the Armstrong factors, the

chancellor ordered Sarah to “pay monthly periodic alimony to Josh in the amount of

$1,000.00, beginning April 1, 2023.” Josh was ordered to pay Sarah $600 per month in child

support, and the chancellor noted that these amounts “may be off set for as long as the parties

agree.” To avoid repetition, we detail the chancellor’s findings, analysis, and ruling only on

the alimony issue below because it is the subject of this appeal.

III. Post-Trial Proceedings

¶28. After entry of the final judgment of divorce that incorporated the chancellor’s

9
memorandum opinion, Sarah filed a motion to alter or amend the judgment. Relevant to this

appeal, Sarah requested that the chancery court “alter or amend the type of alimony ordered

and instead award Josh rehabilitative alimony for a period of time deemed equitable under

the totality of [the] circumstances.” The chancellor heard Sarah’s motion on May 15, 2023.

The chancellor denied her motion with respect to the alimony issue in a bench ruling and in

his order entered on May 16, 2023, after which Sarah appealed. The details of the hearing

and the chancellor’s bench ruling are discussed below.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

¶29. “Under the standard of review utilized to review a chancery court’s findings of fact,

particularly in the areas of divorce, alimony[,] and child support, this Court will not overturn

the court on appeal unless its findings were manifestly wrong.” In re Dissolution of

Marriage of Wood, 35 So. 3d 507, 512 (¶8) (Miss. 2010). “For questions of law, our

standard of review is de novo.” Id. “[W]hen reviewing decisions on alimony, we do not

apply or reweigh the Armstrong factors de novo but instead recognize that alimony awards

are within the discretion of the chancellor, and will not be reversed on appeal unless the

chancellor abused his discretion.” Layton v. Layton, 181 So. 3d 275, 279-80 (¶10) (Miss. Ct.

App. 2015) (internal quotation marks omitted). Additionally, “[t]his Court reviews a trial

court’s denial of a Rule 59 motion under an abuse of discretion standard.” Brooks v. Roberts,

882 So. 2d 229, 233 (¶15) (Miss. 2004) (referencing M.R.C.P. 59).

DISCUSSION

I. Consideration of Rehabilitative Alimony as an Alternative to
Periodic Alimony

10
¶30. Sarah asserts that the chancellor erred by failing to analyze or consider rehabilitative

alimony as an alternative to periodic alimony when he ordered her to pay Josh $1,000 per

month in periodic alimony. We disagree. Rather, based upon our review of the record and

the transcript of the entire proceedings, we find that the chancellor did, in fact, analyze and

consider rehabilitative alimony in ultimately denying Sarah’s request that the judgment be

amended to allow for rehabilitative alimony, rather than periodic alimony. Accordingly, we

are not persuaded by Sarah’s first assignment of error.

¶31. As an initial matter, we recognize that alimony “should not be considered unless the

property division results in a ‘deficit’ to one spouse.” Layton, 181 So. 3d at 282 (¶17) (citing

Seymour v. Seymour, 960 So. 2d 513, 519 (¶16) (Miss. Ct. App. 2006)). The term “deficit”

used by the courts in this context does not mean that “one spouse[] [has received] assets with

a lesser net value than those allocated to the other spouse.” Id. “Rather, the question is

whether the spouse seeking alimony is left ‘with a deficit with respect to having sufficient

resources and assets to meet his or her needs and living expenses.’” Id. (quoting Jackson

v. Jackson, 114 So. 3d 768, 777 (¶22) (Miss. Ct. App. 2013)) (emphasis added by the Layton

Court).

¶32. Mississippi has four types of alimony: periodic,3 lump sum, rehabilitative, and

reimbursement. Rogillio v. Rogillio, 57 So. 3d 1246, 1250 (¶11) (Miss. 2011). The periodic

and rehabilitative types of alimony are relevant here.

3
The terms “permanent alimony” and “periodic alimony” are used interchangeably
to refer to the same type of alimony. See, e.g., Armstrong, 618 So. 2d at 1281. We use the
term “periodic alimony” in this opinion except where the term “permanent” is used in quoted
material.

11
¶33. “Periodic alimony is awarded on the basis of need, generally in monthly installments.”

Gussio v. Gussio, 371 So. 3d 734, 748 (¶35) (Miss. Ct. App. 2023). “It has no fixed

termination date, but it automatically terminates upon the remarriage of the recipient or death

of the payor.” Id. “It can be modified or terminated in the event of a material change of

circumstances for either party.” Id.

¶34. “[R]ehabilitative alimony is similar to periodic alimony, but it includes a ‘time

limitation’ so that it is payable only for a ‘fixed period.’” Id. at 749 (¶37). Rehabilitative

alimony is also “modifiable and vests only as it accrues.” Id. The purpose of rehabilitative

alimony is to “allow[] the party to get back into the working world in order to become

self-sufficient.” Id. (quoting Lauro v. Lauro, 847 So. 2d 843, 849 (¶15) (Miss. 2003)).

¶35. The chancellor “must consider the [Armstrong] factors in determining whether

alimony should be awarded.” Pierce v. Pierce, 132 So. 3d 553, 565 (¶30) (Miss. 2014); see

Gussio, 371 So. 3d at 749 (¶37) (An award of periodic or rehabilitative alimony is based

upon the same factors, “i.e., the Armstrong factors.”). The twelve Armstrong factors are:

1. The income and expenses of the parties;

2. The health and earning capacities of the parties;

3. The needs of each party;

4. The obligations and assets of each party;

5. The length of the marriage;

6. The presence or absence of minor children in the home, which may
require that one or both of the parties either pay, or personally provide,
child care;

12
7. The age of the parties;

8. The standard of living of the parties, both during the marriage and at
the time of the support determination;

9. The tax consequences of the spousal support order;

10. Fault or misconduct;

11. Wasteful dissipation of assets by either party; or

12. Any other factor deemed by the court to be “just and equitable” in
connection with the setting of spousal support.

Armstrong, 618 So. 2d at 1280.

¶36. In considering the Armstrong factors, the appellate courts generally recognize that

“[t]he chancellor must make findings of fact regarding [each one].” Gussio, 371 So. 3d at

749 (¶39). Further, “[i]t is hornbook law that whether to award alimony and the amount to

be awarded are largely within the discretion of the chancellor.” Id. (quoting Gutierrez v.

Gutierrez, 233 So. 3d 797, 811 (¶33) (Miss. 2017)). “As a result, the chancellor is given

wide latitude in determining an alimony award.” Id. “We will not disturb the chancellor’s

decision on alimony on appeal unless it is found to be against the overwhelming weight of

the evidence or manifestly in error.” Id. (quoting Creekmore v. Creekmore, 651 So. 2d 513,

517 (Miss. 1995)).

¶37. In this case, the chancellor recognized the parties had agreed that certain issues would

be decided by the court. The chancellor had the parties’ signed consent “attached and made

a part” of his memorandum opinion. One of the issues the parties requested the chancellor

to decide was “[t]he amount, duration, and form of alimony, if any, to be paid by one party

13
to the other.”

¶38. As such, when the chancellor began discussing the alimony issue, he specifically

recognized the four types of alimony in Mississippi, namely “permanent, lump sum,

rehabilitative[,] and reimbursement.” Having already completed the analysis concerning the

equitable distribution of the marital property, the chancellor recognized he “must now

determine if alimony should be awarded” by utilizing the twelve factors set forth by the

Mississippi Supreme Court in Armstrong. The chancellor then made specific findings of fact

on each of the Armstrong factors.

¶39. With respect to Sarah’s and Josh’s incomes and expenses, the needs of each party,

their earning capacities, and the obligations and assets of each party, the chancellor

incorporated his prior discussion of these factors in addressing the equitable distribution

issue. In that context, the chancellor closely examined the appraisals for the home and three

acres and the cabin property, the value of the parties’ respective vehicles, the monies each

party had at the time of separation, Sarah’s medical training, and the fact that Josh “took the

role of a stay home Dad, which he performed for a period of seven to eight years.” The

chancellor also detailed and assessed the information in the parties’ Rule 8.05 financial

disclosures and the lengthy asset list showing the items that belong to each party by

agreement. In the alimony context, the chancellor reiterated that he had “addressed issues

concerning the expenses listed by both parties” and then found that “Josh does not appear to

have as much room to reduce his expenses as Sarah, but they both can reduce expenses in the

Court’s opinion.”

14
¶40. Additionally, the chancellor specifically assessed the parties’ monthly net disposable

income and reasonable expenses based upon their Rule 8.05 financial disclosures, as follows:

Josh’s 8.05 shows monthly net disposable income of $2,996.00 (not including
alimony income). Josh will be ordered to pay child support of $600.00 per
month, reducing his disposable income to $2,396.00. The Court has closely
reviewed his 8.05 expenses for he and the children, and believes certain
expenses are inflated or have no credibility. The Court finds that Josh’s
reasonable expenses should be in the range of $3,400.00 per month . . . .
Sarah’s 8.05 shows monthly net disposable income of $12,970.00, and with the
Court awarding her child support of $600.00, she will have disposable income
of $13,570.00 to pay her and the children’s expenses. The Court likewise
believes certain expenses on her 8.05 for [her] and the children are inflated or
do not exist. Except for mortgage and vehicle notes, neither party submitted
documentary evidence to substantiate their monthly fluctuating expenses. The
Court finds that Sarah’s reasonable expenses should be in the range of
$11,500.

¶41. Following this analysis, the chancellor determined that Josh was left with a monthly

deficit of $1,004, while Sarah was left with a monthly surplus of $2,050. As such, the

chancellor found that “[t]he evidence reflects a financial disparity in the part[ies’] ability to

meet their reasonable expenses.”

¶42. Regarding the parties’ health, the chancellor incorporated his discussion of this factor

as addressed in the context of child-custody under Albright.4 The chancellor found that

“[b]oth parties are in general good physical health.” Regarding the parties’ mental health,

the chancellor summarized the testimonies from Sarah and her mother regarding Sarah’s

level “10” stress level from “working many hours and coming home to perform the duties

of a mother” before reducing her hours, as well as her comparatively calm emotional stress

level after the separation. Regarding Josh, the chancellor noted that “[w]hen asked about his

4
Albright v. Albright, 437 So. 2d 1003, 1005 (Miss. 1983).

15
mental health, Josh answered by saying it was ‘perfect.’ This description gives the [c]ourt

some concern.”

¶43. With respect to the remaining seven factors, the chancellor found that “[t]he parties

have been married for [fourteen] years. This is considered to have been a relatively long

marriage.” Regarding the need for childcare, the chancellor found that “[t]he children are

school age and ride the bus home in the afternoons. Sarah’s mother takes care of them until

Sarah gets home without charge.” As to the parties’ ages—Josh (41) and Sarah (39)—the

chancellor found that age “is not a factor currently.” In comparing the parties’ standard of

living during the marriage and at the time support is determined, the chancellor found that

“[t]he . . . standard of living for both has changed in that they both have comfortable, livable

homes which was not the case prior to the separation. Their standard previously was not

great but not bad. Sarah now has the benefit of having paid off her student loans.”

Regarding tax consequences of the spousal support order, the chancellor found that “Sarah

will have to pay taxes on any money paid to Josh designated as alimony.” The chancellor

found that “neither party [had] more fault or misconduct than the other,” and “[n]either party

is found to have wrongfully dissipated any assets.”

¶44. Regarding any other factor deemed to be “just and equitable,” the chancellor found:

“At the present time Josh has not stated any plans for advancement in education that might

lead to a higher yearly income. Sarah has placed herself in a position to earn a very good

salary. Josh has helped in this regard by being a stay-at-home Dad for seven-eight years.”

¶45. In determining the “amount, duration, and form of alimony, if any” to be allowed, the

16
chancellor found that “Josh testified that he needed and wanted the [c]ourt to award him

permanent monthly alimony in the amount of $1,000.00. No other form of alimony was

requested. The [c]ourt finds this reasonable under the totality of the circumstances.” The

chancellor ordered Sarah to “pay monthly periodic alimony to Josh in the amount of

$1,000.00, beginning April 1, 2023,” and ordered Josh to pay Sarah $600 per month in child

support. The chancellor further ordered, though, that “the above amounts may be off set for

as long as the parties agree.” Thus, by ordering Sarah to pay $1,000 per month in periodic

alimony to Josh, the chancellor addressed the “amount” and “form” of alimony as requested

in the parties’ consent to adjudicate. Further, because periodic alimony, by definition, “has

no fixed termination date,” Gussio, 371 So. 3d at 748 (¶35), the chancellor likewise

essentially addressed the alimony’s “duration.”

¶46. Sarah asserts that the chancellor committed “reversible error” by “limiting his

[alimony] inquiry” to periodic alimony when the parties’ consent to adjudicate generally

requested that the chancery court determine “[t]he amount, duration, and form of alimony,

if any, to be paid by one party to the other.” We are unpersuaded by this argument because

Sarah wholly ignores the rest of the proceedings in this case. The chancellor did consider

rehabilitative alimony when Sarah raised the issue in her motion to alter or amend the

judgment.5

5
We also point out that even in the consent to adjudicate, the parties requested the
chancery court to decide “the form, if any” (emphasis added) of alimony to be awarded.
Sarah consistently testified throughout trial that Josh should not receive any alimony at all.
In particular, Sarah testified that she only wanted the chancellor to give her “credit” for
paying temporary alimony and to deny Josh’s claim for alimony in the future. Additionally,
although the chancellor specifically offered counsel the opportunity to present an argument

17
¶47. After the chancellor’s memorandum opinion and final judgment were entered, Sarah

filed a motion that included her request that the chancery court “alter or amend the type of

alimony ordered and instead award Josh rehabilitative alimony for a period of time deemed

equitable under the totality of [the] circumstances.” In her motion, Sarah asserted that “she

and Josh were only married for approximately fourteen (14) years, two of which they spent

separated”; at the time of trial she had paid Josh “$2,000.00 per month in alimony totaling

approximately $48,000.00” pursuant to the temporary order; and that to require her to pay

“permanent alimony with no set duration could potentially have her paying alimony for more

times than the parties were married.”

¶48. At the May 15, 2023 hearing on her motion, Sarah asserted two primary arguments

concerning the chancellor’s award of periodic alimony to Josh. First, Sarah addressed the

chancellor’s finding that the parties’ fourteen-year marriage “is considered to have been a

relatively long marriage.” Sarah asserted that it was “a clear error for the Court to have

classified [their] marriage as a relatively long marriage.” She argued that rehabilitative

alimony was more appropriate in this case, citing Branch v. Branch, 174 So. 3d 932 (Miss.

Ct. App. 2015), a case in which the parties separated after twelve years of marriage and

at the end of trial (that would include, for example, an argument regarding the appropriate
form of alimony, if any), Sarah’s counsel declined to do so.
As for Josh, we observe that although he did not specifically request “periodic” or
“permanent” alimony, he did testify that he did not have sufficient income to meet his
expenses without Sarah’s assistance and that he therefore was asking for “alimony” in the
amount of “$1,000 a month.” Josh explained that he wanted “alimony to help with the
children and to help me with providing a good house.” Josh placed no time limit on his
request for alimony, thus squarely meeting the definition of “permanent” or “periodic”
alimony. See, e.g., Gussio, 371 So. 3d at 748 (¶35).

18
divorced after fourteen years. Id. at 937 (¶¶2-7). The wife was a stay-at-home mother for

most of the marriage. Id. at (¶3). The chancellor awarded the wife rehabilitative alimony

in the amount of $1,000 for seventy-two months, id. at (¶8), and this Court affirmed that

award. Id. at 945 (¶54).6

¶49. Sarah also argued that it was “clear error” for the chancellor to fail to consider Josh’s

relatively young age (forty-one at the time of divorce) in his Armstrong analysis. According

to Sarah, age was another “big critical factor” under Armstrong. She asserted that

“Mississippi case law shows patterns of denying permanent alimony [to] parties who are

young and able to still work.” On this point, Sarah’s counsel provided examples, as follows:

Examples include cases such as: Craft v. Craft, [825 So. 2d 605, 610-11
(¶¶21-22) (Miss. 2002)], from the Mississippi Court of Appeals [sic] in which
the wife was [thirty-nine] and in good health and was awarded rehabilitative
alimony as a result. And, similarly, in H[u]lts v. H[u]lts, [11 So. 3d 1273,
1280-81 (¶¶28-34) (Miss. Ct. App. 2009)], a [forty]-year-old wife that was in
good health was awarded five years of rehabilitative alimony.

¶50. In response to Sarah’s assertions regarding alimony, Josh pointed out that Sarah failed

to address “the difference in disparity of income.” Josh asserted that this was a “very critical

. . . Armstrong factor” that the chancellor properly took into account in properly awarding

periodic alimony to Josh.

¶51. After hearing the parties’ arguments, the chancery court denied Sarah’s motion to alter

or amend on the alimony issue. In his bench ruling, the chancellor specifically noted that he

was familiar with the Branch case discussed by Sarah’s counsel in arguing that rehabilitative,

6
We note that the only alimony issue on appeal in Branch was whether the chancellor
erred in awarding the wife rehabilitative alimony at all; periodic alimony was not awarded
and was not an issue. Branch, 174 So. 3d at 944 (¶49).

19
not periodic, alimony was proper in this case. The chancellor explained that he “considered

the fact and does place a significant role on the disparity of income. That [fourteen]-year

marriage, in my opinion, . . . it may be in the middle ground somewhere, but looking at the

disparity of income, the [c]ourt is not going to make any changes on [the alimony issue].”

In his written order denying Sarah’s motion on the alimony issue, the chancellor specifically

stated that his bench ruling was made “after hearing argument of counsel and reviewing

documentary evidence” and the bench ruling was incorporated by reference into the

chancellor’s order.

¶52. Despite the chancellor’s consideration of her thorough arguments in favor of

rehabilitative alimony in her motion and at the May 15 hearing, Sarah asserts that the

chancellor erred by excluding any consideration of the rehabilitative alimony issue in this

case. She cites Stroh v. Stroh, 221 So. 3d 399, 412-14 (¶¶43-51) (Miss. Ct. App. 2017), in

support of her assertion. We find that Sarah’s contention is unavailing.

¶53. In Stroh, this Court reversed a “ruling that the law would not permit an award of

lump-sum alimony (rather than periodic alimony) on the facts . . . .” Id. at 414 (¶51). In

particular, the Court found that the chancellor erred by failing to consider lump-sum alimony

based upon his mistaken determination that the Cheatham7 decision “precluded an award of

lump-sum alimony, in lieu of periodic alimony” in that case. Id. at 413-14 (¶49). According

to Sarah, Stroh applies here because “the chancellor’s outright denial of rehabilitative

alimony was ‘premised on a clear error or an erroneous legal standard’ because the denial

7
Cheatham v. Cheatham, 537 So. 2d 435 (Miss. 1988), overruled on other grounds
by Cassell v. Cassell, 389 So. 3d 305, 315-16 (¶28) (Miss. 2024).

20
was apparently based on an incorrect finding that the issue was not before the court.”

¶54. We find no merit in this argument because we find no indication that the chancellor

believed, in any way, that the issue of rehabilitative alimony was not before him after Sarah

raised the issue in her motion to alter or amend. On the contrary, our review of the record

(and the May 15 hearing transcript in particular) clearly shows that the rehabilitative-alimony

issue was before the chancellor and that he considered it. Indeed, as set forth in the

chancellor’s written order, he explicitly considered the argument of counsel and reviewed the

evidence before issuing his bench ruling denying Sarah’s motion to alter or amend the

judgment on the alimony issue.

¶55. We find Hine v. Anchor Lake Prop. Owners Ass’n Inc., 911 So. 2d 1001 (Miss. Ct.

App. 2005), helpful in our analysis. In that case, this Court rejected the appellants’ argument

that the chancellor “clearly erred” because he did not consider a particular issue. Id. at 1005

(¶16). The Court found it was “clear that the [appellants] . . . raised the relevant law” and

the chancellor “specifically noted [in his order] that he had considered ‘the evidence and the

arguments submitted.’” Id.; see also, e.g., Roley v. Roley, 329 So. 3d 473, 499 (¶74) (Miss.

Ct. App. 2021) (rejecting appellant’s assignment of error that the chancellor failed to

consider his Rule 59 arguments where the chancellor’s order contained “the explicit

statement . . . that it was made ‘[a]fter considering the Court file and hearing oral arguments

on the matter’”). Because the chancellor in this case did consider rehabilitative alimony,

Stroh does not apply. Accordingly, we find that Sarah’s assertions on this point are not

persuasive, and we reject Sarah’s first assignment of error.

21
II. Application of the Armstrong Factors

¶56. Sarah’s second issue on appeal relates to her first. According to Sarah, the chancellor

“limited his inquiry [regarding alimony] to one type—permanent” and, thus, “erred by failing

to apply the Armstrong factors to decide the proper type of alimony (rehabilitative or

periodic) and by failing to consider whether any of the factors supported rehabilitative

alimony.” We find that the first premise underlying Sarah’s second assignment of error is

incorrect. We have already found above that the chancellor did consider rehabilitative

alimony. We also reject her assertions regarding the Armstrong factors. As we discuss

below, we find that the chancellor sufficiently analyzed the Armstrong factors in the

rehabilitative-alimony context when he denied Sarah’s post-trial motion seeking to change

the periodic alimony to rehabilitative alimony.

¶57. In this case, the chancellor made detailed findings of fact on each of the Armstrong

factors in his memorandum opinion that was entered several weeks after the conclusion of

the three-day trial. At that point, the chancellor found that Josh’s request for periodic

alimony in the amount of $1,000 per month was “reasonable under the totality of the

circumstances.” As we have already noted, the chancellor did not consider any other form

of alimony, observing that no other form of alimony was sought at trial.

¶58. After entry of the final judgment of divorce, Sarah filed a motion to alter or amend

the judgment, seeking, in relevant part, to reform the alimony award into rehabilitative

alimony. As we found above, the chancellor considered rehabilitative alimony at that point

but ultimately denied Sarah’s motion on the alimony issue. In her second assignment of

22
error, Sarah asserts that reversal is warranted because the chancellor failed to apply the

Armstrong factors in the rehabilitative-alimony context.

¶59. We recognize that the chancellor did not reiterate a complete on-the-record

consideration of the Armstrong factors in the rehabilitative alimony context when he issued

his bench ruling or order denying Sarah’s motion. In Lowrey, the Mississippi Supreme Court

observed that “[f]actor tests, such as provided in . . . Armstrong for alimony, must be

considered on the record in every case.” Lowrey v. Lowrey, 25 So. 3d 274, 280 (¶7) (Miss.

2009)). However, as one respected scholar has noted, the appellate courts, more

“[r]ecently[,] . . . have declined to reverse some alimony decisions for failure to make

Armstrong findings.” Deborah H. Bell, Bell on Mississippi Family Law § 9.04[2], at 277 (3d

ed. 2020).

¶60. Indeed, this Court has recognized in numerous cases that “[w]hile an on-the-record

analysis of the factors set out in Armstrong is helpful for appellate review, the lack of that

analysis in the record does not always warrant reversal, which will be required only in the

case of manifest error.” Lewis v. Lewis, 360 So. 3d 298, 304 (¶18) (Miss. Ct. App. 2023)

(quoting Thompson v. Thompson, 816 So. 2d 417, 420 (¶9) (Miss. Ct. App. 2002)). “When

the chancellor fails to address all factors on-the-record, we are not required to remand the

case, and should not, so long as all facts are available to us so as to allow an equitable

determination to be made.” Id. (quoting Roberson v. Roberson, 949 So. 2d 866, 869 (¶6)

(Miss. Ct. App. 2007)); see also, e.g., Voda v. Voda, 731 So. 2d 1152, 1155 (¶11) (Miss.

1999) (“Even if the chancellor has failed to delineate all the factors on the record, where all

23
the facts are available to us, we are not required to remand the case to the trial court.”); Neely

v. Neely, 305 So. 3d 164, 173-74 (¶37) (Miss. Ct. App. 2020); Goellner v. Goellner, 11 So.

3d 1251, 1258 (¶24) (Miss. Ct. App. 2009); Dorsey v. Dorsey, 972 So. 2d 48, 54 (¶17) (Miss.

Ct. App. 2008).

¶61. Here, the chancellor had already made findings of fact on each of the Armstrong

factors in his memorandum opinion. In his bench ruling denying Sarah’s post-trial motion,

the chancellor reassessed his original finding that the couple’s fourteen-year marriage “is

considered to have been a relatively long marriage.” He then acknowledged that the

fourteen-year marriage “may be in the middle ground somewhere.” Nevertheless, the

chancellor again noted the “disparity of income” between the parties and stated that “the

Court is not going to make any changes on [the alimony issue].”

¶62. As such, the chancellor expressly reconsidered the “length of the marriage” factor, as

well as implicitly reassessed his findings of fact on the Armstrong factors that “assist the

courts in identifying a disparity of the parties’ resources after equitable distribution,”

including “the parties’ incomes, reasonable expenses, . . . custodial arrangements, assets, and

earning capacities.” Bell, supra, § 9.04[3], at 279.

¶63. As noted, the chancellor emphasized the financial/earning capacity between the parties

in denying Sarah’s motion to reform the alimony award, and he had addressed the Armstrong

factors relevant to their financial disparity in detail in his memorandum opinion. After a

close review of the parties’ Rule 8.05 financial disclosures, the chancellor found that Josh

was left with a monthly income deficit of $1,004, while Sarah was left with a monthly

24
surplus of $2,050. The chancellor further found that “[a]t the present time Josh has not stated

any plans for advancement in education that might lead to a higher yearly income. Sarah has

placed herself in a position to earn a very good salary. Josh has helped in this regard by

being a stay-at-home Dad for seven-eight years.”

¶64. With respect to these findings, we find particularly relevant the supreme court’s

observation that “[a] significant disparity in earning capacity is a major factor in the

determination of a periodic alimony award.” Davis v. Davis, 832 So. 2d 492, 499 (¶23)

(Miss. 2002); see Hammond v. Hammond, 327 So. 3d 173, 180 (¶21) (Miss. Ct. App. 2021)

(When a significant factor in awarding alimony included disparity in earning capacity, this

Court found that although the spouse who was awarded alimony “might be able to earn

somewhat more, she lacks a college degree, and there is no evidence that she could earn

substantially more than she was earning at the time of trial.”); Layton, 181 So. 3d at 278-79

(¶5) (determining that the chancellor did not abuse his discretion by awarding wife alimony

in divorce case where husband’s net income was ten times wife’s gross income; wife’s

income was insufficient to meet her expenses; and although the wife “attended junior college

and . . . college on two different occasions,” she never graduated, and the chancellor

“concluded that she was unlikely to complete any college degree at this point”); Watts v.

Watts, 99 So. 3d 751, 762 (¶33) (Miss. Ct. App. 2012) (finding no abuse of discretion in

award of permanent alimony to wife where “[t]he record shows that the chancellor noted [the

husband’s] earning capacity of $150,000 per year based on his master’s degree in nurse

anesthesia, while estimating [the wife’s] earning capacity to be at best $43,000 per year”).

25
¶65. Regarding the couple’s fourteen-year marriage, the chancellor recategorized this as

perhaps “middle ground somewhere.” But even with this “reclassification,” we find no error

in the chancellor declining to grant Sarah’s motion to reform the alimony awarded from

periodic to rehabilitative alimony. This Court has affirmed awards of periodic alimony

where the marriages were of comparable lengths. See Layton, 181 So. 3d at 287 (¶38)

(recognizing that “the chancellor was well within his discretion in finding that the length of

the marriage [(ten years)] favored periodic alimony”); Mamiaro v. Mamiaro, 179 So. 3d 51,

55 (¶¶17-19) (Miss. Ct. App. 2015) (affirming periodic alimony where the chancellor found

the couple’s “almost” eleven-year marriage favored periodic alimony); Watts, 99 So. 3d at

755, 762 (¶¶4-5, 33) (finding no abuse of discretion in the chancellor’s award of permanent

alimony where the parties separated after twelve years and agreed to a divorce after thirteen

years); see also Rogillio v. Rogillio, 101 So. 3d 150, 151, 155 (¶¶5, 21) (Miss. 2012)

(recognizing that “the chancellor did not abuse her discretion in finding that the length of the

marriage [(less than ten years)] favored [periodic] alimony”).

¶66. We recognize that the chancellor did not revisit his findings of fact on the remaining

Armstrong factors. However, both the supreme court and this Court have recognized that

“[i]n examining the Armstrong factors, the chancellor may consider them as an ‘overall

combination’ and need not individually list each one.” Rogillio, 101 So. 3d at 154 (¶16).8

8
Accord Blalack v. Blalack, 938 So. 2d 909, 912 (¶7) (Miss. Ct. App. 2006)
(recognizing that “the chancellor is not required to analyze each Armstrong factor
individually in his opinion, but is required to view the overall combination of the factors as
a whole, opting to address individual factors at his discretion” (internal quotation marks
omitted) (quoting Wells v. Wells, 800 So. 2d 1239, 1245 (¶12) (Miss. Ct. App. 2001))).

26
Further, as we have already noted, even if each Armstrong factor is not addressed, “we are

not required to remand the case, and should not, so long as all facts are available to us so

as to allow an equitable determination to be made.” Lewis, 360 So. 3d at 304 (¶18)

(emphasis added).

¶67. Here, the chancellor had already made findings of fact on each Armstrong factor.

Based upon our own review of the facts of this case, including the chancellor’s findings of

fact on the remaining factors in his memorandum opinion, we find no reason that a second

on-the-record review of the remaining factors was necessary and certainly find no manifest

error in the chancellor not doing so.

¶68. To briefly address the chancellor’s findings on the remaining factors, we begin by

noting that he found that the parties’ ages (Josh (41), Sarah (39)) “[was] not a factor

currently.” Sarah contends that this finding is “clearly erroneous” and that “the age factor

weighs against the award of permanent alimony and supports rehabilitative alimony.” We

do not find that the chancellor’s “neutral” rating of this factor was manifestly wrong,

particularly in light of the “overall combination” of factors considered by the chancellor.

Further, the Court has affirmed awards of periodic alimony in cases involving alimony

recipients of comparable ages. See, e.g., Layton, 181 So. 3d at 287 (¶35) (periodic alimony

recipient thirty-four years old); Mamiaro, 179 So. 3d at 58 (¶32) (Carlton, J., concurring in

part and dissenting in part) (affirming award of periodic alimony where chancellor found the

recipient’s age of thirty-seven years was a “neutral” factor).

¶69. Regarding the need for childcare, Sarah asserts that typically the spouse with custody

27
of the children (Sarah in this case) is also the alimony recipient. The chancellor in this case,

however, found that “[t]he children are school age and ride the bus home in the afternoons.

Sarah’s mother takes care of them until Sarah gets home without charge.” On these facts,

we find no abuse of discretion in the chancellor awarding periodic alimony to Josh simply

because the custodial parent might typically be the alimony recipient.

¶70. As for the remaining Armstrong factors, the chancellor found that “Sarah will have

to pay taxes on any money paid to Josh designated as alimony”; “neither party [had] more

fault or misconduct than the other”; and “[n]either party is found to have wrongfully

dissipated any assets.” We do not find that any of these determinations of fact warrant

reversal of the chancellor’s periodic alimony award.

¶71. In sum, after considering the chancellor’s bench ruling and order and the supporting

facts in the record we find that the chancellor did assess the Armstrong factors in the

rehabilitative alimony context, and he was neither manifestly wrong nor did he abuse his

discretion when he denied Sarah’s motion to reform the alimony award from periodic to

rehabilitative alimony.

¶72. Sarah also asserts that “[c]aselaw shows . . . there is not a single Armstrong factor that

would preclude a rehabilitative alimony award [in this case].” Thus, according to Sarah,

“[b]ecause rehabilitative alimony would be proper on [the] facts [of this case], and because

the chancellor failed to consider it in his Armstrong analysis, . . . this Court should reverse

and remand.”

¶73. Again, Sarah’s argument is based upon the incorrect premise that the chancellor did

28
not conduct an Armstrong analysis in the rehabilitative alimony context. As we have

discussed, we find that this premise is not supported by the record. We further observe that

in the cases Sarah cites to support her argument, the appellate courts found no abuse of

discretion in the chancellor awarding rehabilitative alimony and, accordingly, affirmed the

chancellor’s decision on that issue.”9 But that outcome does not necessarily support reversal

of the chancellor’s decision to award periodic alimony in this case. On the contrary, in this

case, we must apply a “limited abuse of discretion standard” in reviewing the chancellor’s

decision to award periodic alimony. We will not “disturb [his] opinion when supported by

substantial evidence unless the chancellor abused his discretion, was manifestly wrong,

clearly erroneous or an erroneous legal standard was applied.” Rankin v. Rankin, 323 So. 3d

1073, 1077 (¶8) (Miss. 2021). In this regard, we “will not reweigh the testimony and

evidence and substitute [our] judgment for that of the chancellor.” Id. at 1079 (¶17).

CONCLUSION

¶74. In sum, we find that the chancellor’s judgment awarding periodic alimony to Josh “is

supported by substantial evidence, the decision is neither manifestly wrong nor clearly

erroneous, and an erroneous legal standard was not applied.” Id. at 1080 (¶19). Sarah

appealed no other aspect of the chancery court’s March 22, 2023 final judgment of divorce.

9
See, e.g., Carnathan v. Carnathan, 722 So. 2d 1248, 1249 (¶3) (Miss. 1998)
(affirming chancellor’s rehabilitative alimony award); Prestwood v. Prestwood, 285 So. 3d
1213, 1219 (¶19) (Miss. Ct. App. 2019) (same); Branch, 174 So. 3d at 944-45 (¶¶49-54)
(same); Hults v. Hults, 11 So. 3d 1273, 1281 (¶34) (Miss. Ct. App. 2009) (finding “it was
within the chancellor’s discretion to award rehabilitative alimony” rather than periodic
alimony); McCarrell v. McCarrell, 19 So. 3d 168, 169 (¶1) (Miss. Ct. App. 2009) (affirming
chancellor’s rehabilitative alimony award).

29
Accordingly, the final judgment of divorce incorporating the March 22, 2023 memorandum

opinion is affirmed in all respects.

¶75. AFFIRMED.

BARNES, C.J., WILSON, P.J., WESTBROOKS, McDONALD, LAWRENCE,
McCARTY, SMITH AND EMFINGER, JJ., CONCUR.

30