Louis Edward Chandler v. State of Mississippi

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF MISSISSIPPI

NO. 2020-CP-01060-COA

LOUIS EDWARD CHANDLER APPELLANT

v.

STATE OF MISSISSIPPI APPELLEE

DATE OF JUDGMENT: 08/06/2020
TRIAL JUDGE: HON. JAMES T. KITCHENS JR.
COURT FROM WHICH APPEALED: CLAY COUNTY CIRCUIT COURT
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT: LOUIS EDWARD CHANDLER (PRO SE)
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLEE: OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL
BY: LAUREN GABRIELLE CANTRELL
NATURE OF THE CASE: CIVIL - POST-CONVICTION RELIEF
DISPOSITION: AFFIRMED - 08/23/2022
MOTION FOR REHEARING FILED:
MANDATE ISSUED:

BEFORE CARLTON, P.J., McDONALD AND EMFINGER, JJ.

EMFINGER, J., FOR THE COURT:

¶1. On January 10, 2017, Louis Edward Chandler pled guilty in the Clay County Circuit

Court to two counts of aggravated DUI. On January 17, 2017, he was sentenced to a term of

seven years in the custody of the Mississippi Department of Corrections (MDOC), with five

years suspended and two years to serve, for count one’s conviction and fifteen years, with

five years suspended and ten years to serve, for count two’s conviction. The sentences were

ordered to run consecutively. He was also ordered to serve a term of five years of post-

release supervision for each conviction. He was ordered to pay court costs in both counts and,

in count two, he was ordered to pay a fine in the amount of $500 and restitution in the

amount of $360,000. On January 21, 2020, Chandler filed a pro se motion for post-conviction
relief (PCR), which the circuit court dismissed without a hearing by an order entered on

August 6, 2020.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

¶2. As a result of his guilty pleas, Chandler was convicted of two counts of aggravated

DUI that arose from a head-on vehicle collision. The factual basis offered by the State during

the plea proceedings showed that on the night of April 25, 2014, Chandler negligently drove

his vehicle northbound in a southbound lane of travel. He collided with the vehicle driven

by Joanna K. Hardwick.1 Maurice Hall was a passenger in the Hardwick vehicle. Hardwick

and Hall suffered “severe injuries to their legs and other organs” as a result of the accident.

The State said its proof would show that Hardwick and Hall suffered injuries “that’s

necessary in the statute.” Chandler was found to have been driving with a blood-alcohol

concentration (BAC) of 0.19%, which the State contends showed that he was “under the

influence” at the time of the collision. The trial court asked Chandler, “Is that what happened,

Mr. Chandler?” Chandler responded, “Those facts are true.” As a result of his guilty pleas,

Chandler was found guilty and sentenced as stated above.

¶3. In his PCR motion, Chandler sought to have all charges against him “dropped” and

asked that he be released from incarceration immediately. In the alternative, Chandler asked

for a new trial in a new venue or “review for a more appropriately judicial sentence” or that

“the restitution judgment against him be vacated.” The trial court found these claims were

without merit and dismissed the motion without a hearing. Chandler appeals from this order.

1
Hardwick’s name apparently became Joanna Malone, but we will identify her as
Hardwick to be consistent with the name in the indictment.

2
STANDARD OF REVIEW

¶4. In Davis v. State, 335 So. 3d 1108, 1110 (¶7) (Miss. Ct. App. 2022), this Court stated:

When reviewing a circuit court’s denial or dismissal of a PCR motion, we will
reverse the judgment of the circuit court only if its factual findings are clearly
erroneous; however, we review the circuit court’s legal conclusions under a de
novo standard of review.

(Quoting Hays v. State, 282 So. 3d 714, 716-17 (¶5) (Miss. Ct. App. 2019)).

ANALYSIS

¶5. In his PCR motion, Chandler lists five grounds upon which he contends relief should

be granted.2 We will address these five grounds separately below. However, before setting

out his grounds for relief, in the “Introduction” section of his PCR motion, Chandler seems

to challenge the factual basis for his guilty pleas. In this section, he raises the following

issues:

1. He did not think his operation of his vehicle was impaired by his
consumption of alcohol.

2. He implies that the cause of the collision was a “poorly designed,
poorly illuminated and dangerous” intersection of Highway 82 and
Highway 45 Alt., which was under construction.

3. Both victims had illegal narcotics in their blood test reports.

4. The victims’ injuries did not qualify as “maiming” under the statute.

5. MHP officers gave false testimony.

2
On appeal, Chandler has raised several new arguments in support of his claims for
relief that were not set out in his PCR motion before the circuit court. He has also attached
to his appellate brief documents that were not a part of the record before the circuit court.
We will not consider arguments or documents raised for the first time on appeal. Jones v.
State, 334 So. 3d 196, 197 (¶6) (Miss. Ct. App. 2022).

3
¶6. During the guilty plea proceeding, the State made a proffer of what its evidence would

show if this matter had proceeded to trial. As stated above, the State advised the court that

its proof would show, that at the time of the collision, Chandler was operating his vehicle

negligently by driving his vehicle northbound in a southbound lane of travel. Chandler’s

BAC was 0.19% at the time of the collision. The State would have shown at trial that

Chandler’s operation of his vehicle caused the head-on collision with the vehicle driven by

Hardwick. The collision caused significant injuries to Hardwick and her passenger Hall. The

State advised the court that its proof would show that the victims’ injuries were sufficient to

meet the elements of the statute.

¶7. Had this matter gone to trial, a jury would have been called upon to determine whether

the State had proved beyond a reasonable doubt each of the elements of aggravated DUI.3

All the questions and issues raised by Chandler could have been presented to a jury for

determination. However, Chandler chose to enter pleas of guilty. By admitting that the facts

proffered by the State were true, Chandler waived his right to challenge the sufficiency of

the State’s proof or to have these issues decided by a jury. In Wright v. State, 271 So. 3d 560,

563 (¶10) (Miss. Ct. App. 2018), this Court explained:

[T]his Court has held that “a valid guilty plea waives the right to challenge the
sufficiency of the State’s evidence.” Grissom v. State, 66 So. 3d 1280, 1282
(¶6) (Miss. Ct. App. 2011).

After a review of the record, including the petition to enter a guilty plea and the transcript

from the guilty-plea hearing, we find that Chandler’s guilty pleas were freely, voluntarily,

3
After being instructed by the court, a jury would have determined whether the
injuries suffered by Hardwick and Hall were sufficient under the statute.

4
knowingly, and intelligently made and entered and that each had a factual basis. Accordingly,

Chandler’s valid guilty pleas waived his right to challenge his convictions as to these

unnumbered allegations or claims for relief. In any event, these claims are without merit.

¶8. We now move to the numbered grounds for relief Chandler presented to the circuit

court in his PCR motion:

I. “Denial of due process in violation of the Fifth, Sixth, Seventh and
Section 1 of the Fourteenth Amendments to the U. S. Constitution
by improper commingling of criminal and civil proceedings.”4

¶9. In his PCR motion, Chandler alleged that there was a “conspiracy” to falsely implicate

“The Pony”5 in order to “maximize the potential financial awards resulting from this

accident.” As evidence of his theory, Chandler contends that two Mississippi Highway Patrol

officers, who worked the scene of the accident, testified falsely during the hearing on his

motion to suppress the BAC results. According to Chandler,6 the officers testified during that

hearing that Chandler “confessed” to being at The Pony and that they remember Chandler

wearing a “pink bracelet or wristband.” Chandler also challenges the officers’ testimony that

he was given three different field sobriety tests. While Chandler brought up this issue

concerning the officers’ testimony on the morning of trial, there was no mention of The Pony

4
Hardwick, one of the victims, sued Chandler and others in the Clay County Circuit
Court for damages resulting from the accident in the case styled “Joanna Hardwick Malone
v. Louis E. Chandler, Charles G. Westlund, Jr., MEC Inc. d/b/a The Pony, and John Doe(s)
A, B and C,” bearing civil action number 15-CV-00044. This suit was pending before the
same circuit judge as the underlying criminal charges.
5
“The Pony” is a nightclub located in the general vicinity of the site of the collision.
6
The transcript of the hearing of the motion to suppress is not a part of the appellate
record.

5
during the guilty plea hearing that afternoon. The factual basis tendered by the State included

proof that Chandler had a BAC of 0.19% at the time of the collision, but there was no

mention of where he may have consumed the alcohol. There was also no mention of the

pending civil lawsuit during Chandler’s guilty plea hearing. While Chandler contends that

the officers testified falsely, as noted above, that would have been for a jury’s determination

had this matter proceeded to trial.

¶10. Chandler then points to certain comments the circuit judge made during the criminal

proceedings concerning the civil lawsuit and to the fact that the circuit judge signed the Final

Judgment of Dismissal with Prejudice.7 Those comments were made by the circuit judge

during the sentencing hearing as he considered restitution and how restitution was to be paid

in light of the amount of damages and the pending civil lawsuit. The judge’s comments at

that time show that he was aware of the civil lawsuit, because he noted that one of the civil

lawsuit attorneys was present at sentencing. There is no evidence that any contested issue in

the civil lawsuit had been brought before the circuit judge for his decision, prior to

Chandler’s guilty pleas and sentencing. Chandler failed to show that the pending civil lawsuit

was “improperly commingled” with his criminal case or that it had any impact upon the

voluntariness of his guilty pleas to the charges in the underlying criminal case.

¶11. Chandler further alleges that his attorney in the civil lawsuit advised him, prior to his

guilty pleas, that the plaintiffs would dismiss him from the lawsuit if Chandler would admit

7
Chandler attached a copy of this order to his PCR motion. That order was signed
on March 28, 2018, over a year after Chandler’s guilty pleas and sentence. That order noted
that the cause of action against The Pony was still pending, again, over a year after the
conclusion of the criminal proceeding.

6
that he had been at The Pony. Chandler refused, but he states that he was later advised, after

his incarceration, that The Pony had settled the case for $300,000. He maintains that The

Pony had “no liability in regards to my accident.” Chandler attached to his PCR motion a

copy of an “Absolute Release With Covenants,”8 which shows that his insurance company

settled the civil lawsuit against him for a payment of $100,000. In his PCR motion, Chandler

fails to show how settlement negotiations by his attorney for the civil lawsuit had any impact

upon the voluntariness of his guilty pleas.

¶12. Many of Chandler’s arguments are without support in the appellate record. He draws

inferences from facts that are not supported by the record. He speculates as to the cause and

effect of statements that were made at different points in the proceedings. Much of his

argument is admittedly based upon his own “opinion” concerning these matters. In Home

Solutions of Mississippi LLC v. Ridge, 301 So. 3d 670, 676 (¶23) (Miss. Ct. App. 2020), we

held:

In the absence of meaningful argument or citation of authority, the appellate
court will not consider an assignment of error. Patton v. State, 109 So. 3d 66,
75 (¶22) (Miss. 2012); see also Russell Real Prop. Servs. LLC v. State, 200 So.
3d 426, 430 (¶10) (Miss. 2016) (finding assertions of error not supported by
citation or authority to be abandoned); Flowers v. Boolos (In re Estate of
Smith), 204 So. 3d 291, 313 (¶49) (Miss. 2016) (“It is the duty of an appellant
to provide authority in support of an assignment of error, and the failure to do
so is considered abandonment of the issue; thereby making the issue
procedurally barred for appellate review.”).

Chandler has not supported this argument with any citation of authority. He does not explain

how any of the issues he alleges, even if true, rise to the level of a constitutional violation in

8
This document was attached to Chandler’s PCR motion, but was executed over a
year after his convictions.

7
the underlying criminal case. Most of his complaints seem to be directed toward his opinion

that The Pony had no liability in the civil lawsuit. In any event, it appears that Chandler was

represented by separate, retained counsel in the criminal and civil cases. He has cited no

authority to support his contention that it was improper for the circuit judge to preside over

both cases. Had Chandler believed there to be a conflict, then his attorney, in either case,

could have moved for recusal.9

¶13. Allegations of judicial misconduct were also made in Robinson v. Burton, 49 So. 3d

660, 667 (¶¶27-28) (Miss. Ct. App. 2010), and this Court explained:

Our supreme court has held that failure to move to recuse or to
contemporaneously object to alleged impropriety procedurally bars this issue
from our review. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Frierson, 818 So. 2d 1135, 1141
(¶10) (Miss. 2002). In Frierson, the supreme court reviewed a litigant’s later
claims of judicial impropriety for plain error. Id. at (¶¶10-12). The supreme
court relied on the well-established rule that “if no contemporaneous objection
is made, the error, if any, is waived.” Id. (quoting Smith v. State, 797 So. 2d
854, 856 (¶7) (Miss. 2001)). Other jurisdictions have applied this same
rationale and held that claims of judicial impropriety or racial bias not properly
raised in the trial court are procedurally barred. See Harbin v. Roberts, 305 Ga.
App. 107, 699 S.E. 2d 36, 38-39 (2010); In re Key, 182 N.C. App. 714, 643
S.E.2d 452, 456 (2007); State v. Alfatlawi, 153 P.3d 804, 820 (Utah Ct. App.
2006) (racial bias); People v. Moniz, 2003 WL 21508430, unpublished opinion
per curiam of the Mich. Court of Appeals, issued July 1, 2003 (Docket No.
234431) (racial bias).

While procedural bars may apply, we proceed to determine whether the record
shows error affecting Robinson’s substantial rights. Because of the nature and
seriousness of Robinson’s allegations and to ensure there has been no
miscarriage of justice, we review for plain error. See Frierson, 818 So. 2d at
1141 (¶¶10-12). In conducting our review, we are mindful that the supreme
court has clearly explained there is a presumption that the “trial judge is
qualified and unbiased, and this presumption may only be overcome by

9
See Mississippi Rule of Civil Procedure 16A and, in effect at the time before July
1, 2017, Uniform Rule of Circuit and County Court Practice 1.15.

8
evidence which produces a reasonable doubt about the validity of the
presumption.” Payton v. State, 897 So. 2d 921, 943 (¶72) (Miss. 2003). The
scope of this inquiry focuses on whether a “reasonable person, knowing all the
facts and circumstances, would harbor doubts about [the trial judge’s]
impartiality.” Frierson, 818 So. 2d at 1142 (¶¶12, 15) (quoting Summers ex rel.
Dawson v. St. Andrew’s Episcopal Sch., Inc., 759 So. 2d 1203, 1209 (¶21)
(Miss. 2000)).

In the present case, there was no motion for recusal and no contemporaneous objection to any

action by the circuit judge in the underlying criminal cause. We find this issue to be

procedurally barred. In any event, we have reviewed the transcript of the guilty plea and

sentencing hearings for plain error. We find no error by the circuit judge that adversely

affected Chandler’s substantial rights or that would cause a reasonable person to question the

circuit judge’s impartiality.

II. “Denial of due process in violation of the Sixth Amendment to the
U.S. Constitution by denial of effective assistance of counsel.”

¶14. In his less-than-one-page argument in support of this allegation of ineffective

assistance of counsel, Chandler states that his attorney

had a conflict of interest and betrayed his duty of undivided loyalty and
confidentiality and failed to exert his best efforts to wholeheartedly advance
[Chandler’s] legitimate interest with fidelity and diligence[,] forsook his duty
to provide [Chandler] with credible and vigorous defense of the charges
against him and forsook his sworn duty to protect the law and to protect his
client’s interest.

Chandler does not explain in his PCR motion any specifics as to what wrongful acts his

attorney committed or what actions he failed to take in Chandler’s defense. Chandler does

not attach a separate affidavit to support his allegation in this regard. All that the circuit court

had before it were the allegations contained in the PCR motion.

9
¶15. In Galloway v. State, 298 So. 3d 966, 974-75 (¶¶43-44) (Miss. 2020), the supreme

court explained:

Conflict-of-interest claims involving attorneys in criminal cases are a species
of ineffective assistance of counsel under the Sixth Amendment. Strickland [v.
Washington], 466 U.S. [668], 688, 104 S. Ct. 2052 [(1984)] (“Counsel’s
function is to assist the defendant, and hence counsel owes the client a duty of
loyalty, a duty to avoid conflicts of interest.”). Such claims are evaluated under
one of two separate standards: the Strickland standard or the standard from
Cuyler v. Sullivan, 446 U.S. 335, 100 S. Ct. 1708 [(1980)]. Crawford v. State,
192 So. 3d 905, 917-18 (Miss. 2015) (citing Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687-92,
104 S.Ct. 2052).

The Strickland standard requires a showing of deficient performance that
prejudiced the defense. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687, 104 S. Ct. 2052. The
Cuyler standard relieves the burden of showing prejudice when a claimant can
show that “an actual conflict of interest adversely affected his lawyer’s
performance.” Id. at 692, 104 S. Ct. 2052 (internal quotation marks omitted)
(quoting Cuyler, 446 U.S. at 350, 100 S. Ct. 1708). “Prejudice is presumed
only if the defendant demonstrates that counsel ‘actively represented
conflicting interests’ and that ‘an actual conflict of interest adversely affected
his lawyer’s performance.’” Id. (quoting Cuyler, 446 U.S. at 350, 100 S. Ct.
1708).

Chandler provides nothing to show that “an actual conflict of interest adversely affected his

lawyer’s performance” in the underlying criminal case. Accordingly, Chandler has not met

the Cuyler standard.

¶16. To the extent Chandler’s claim can be understood to allege that his counsel was guilty

of “deficient performance [that] prejudiced his defense,” this Court held in Willis v. State,

321 So. 3d 584, 591 (¶22) (Miss. Ct. App. 2021), that

[t]o prove ineffective assistance of counsel, Willis must show that (1) “his
defense counsel’s performance was deficient,” and (2) “the deficient
performance prejudiced his defense.” Hutto v. State, 286 So. 3d 653, 666 (¶55)
(Miss. 2019) (citing Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984)). “In
the context of guilty pleas, this means the defendant must show that, were it

10
not for counsel’s errors, he would not have pleaded guilty and would have
insisted on going to trial.” Hill v. State, 60 So. 3d 824, 827 (¶5) (Miss. Ct.
App. 2011) (quoting Burrough v. State, 9 So. 3d 368, 375 (¶22) (Miss. 2009)).
Willis bears the burden of proof. Webster v. State, 152 So. 3d 1200, 1203 (¶7)
(Miss. Ct. App. 2014). He was required to plead claims of ineffective
assistance with specificity, and the claims must be supported by affidavits
other than his own. Id. at (¶8).

Because Chandler did not plead this claim with “specificity” and provided no affidavits in

support of his claim, this issue is without merit.

III. “Denial of due process in violation of [the] Fifth, Sixth, and Section
1 of the Fourteenth Amendments to the U. S. Constitution by
improper judicial instructions to the Petitioner/Defendant.”

¶17. In support of this claim, Chandler points to comments by the circuit judge that do not

appear in the record on appeal. Chandler contends that he fired his retained attorney and told

the circuit judge that it was his “desire to go to trial and represent himself.” Chandler

contends that the circuit judge advised him against representing himself at trial. It is unclear

when Chandler alleges this occurred.

¶18. Based upon facts contained in the transcript, a motion to suppress was heard on

January 9, 2017, the day before the trial was scheduled to begin. There is, however, no

transcript from that hearing in the appellate record. There are two transcripts from the day

Chandler’s case was scheduled to go to trial. In the first transcript, the court notes that

Chandler’s attorney had advised the court that there was something Chandler wished to bring

to the attention of the court. Chandler’s statement to the court at that time was that he

disagreed with the testimony of the law enforcement officers during the hearing on the

motion to suppress and that he had never been to The Pony. While Chandler was addressing

11
the court he said, among other things, “[A]nd, I mean, I’m willing to represent myself.” The

circuit judge advised him that he had that right. Chandler further stated, “But I feel like the

jury, you, and everybody needs to see the whole facts of the case. And for whatever reason,

some of the testimony yesterday was false.” The judge told Chandler that he had the right to

go to trial and that his trial would begin that afternoon. The circuit judge made the comment,

“[Y]ou have an excellent lawyer that you’ve hired.” Chandler responded that he had no

reason to dispute that. There was no indication during that proceeding that Chandler had fired

his attorney or did not wish to go to trial represented by that attorney. Further, under oath

during the guilty plea proceeding, Chandler acknowledged his satisfaction with his attorney.

¶19. In any event, had Chandler advised the court that he wished to fire his retained

attorney and proceed to trial representing himself, the circuit judge would have been required

to advise Chandler of certain matters set forth in Uniform Rule of Circuit and County Court

Practice 8.05. This would include, in part, that

3. The court will not relax or disregard the rules of evidence, procedure
or courtroom protocol for the defendant and that the defendant will be
bound by and have to conduct himself within the same rules as an
attorney, that these rules are not simple and that without legal advice
his ability to defend himself will be hampered.

4. The right to proceed pro se usually increases the likelihood of a trial
outcome unfavorable to the defendant.

¶20. In James v. State, 266 So. 3d 1029, 1032 (¶8) (Miss. Ct. App. 2018), this Court

described Chandler’s burden on appeal:

“[I]t is the responsibility of the appellant to designate the record pursuant to
Rule 10(b) of the Mississippi Rules of Appellate Procedure in a manner
sufficient to allow this Court to review the appellant’s issues.” Austin v. State,

12
971 So. 2d 1286, 1287 n.1 (Miss. Ct. App. 2008). “In the absence of anything
in the record to the contrary, we must presume that the trial court acted
properly.” Id.

It was Chandler’s responsibility to provide a record sufficient to review this issue. Based

upon the above, we presume that the judge acted properly in advising Chandler concerning

self-representation.

IV. “Abuse of judicial discretion in imposing excessively harsh
sentencing in violation of the Eighth Amendment to the U.S.
Constitution.”

¶21. In his PCR motion, Chandler also contends that his thirty-two-year sentence for a first

offense that did not result in death, maiming, or significant long-term injuries shocks the

conscious. He contends that the sentence imposed is evidence of judicial prejudice. Again,

Chandler presented no meaningful argument in support of this issue and cited no authority

in support of this claim before the circuit court.

¶22. In considering whether sentences violate the Eighth Amendment, this Court said in

Harris v. State, 311 So. 3d 638, 662 (¶67) (Miss. Ct. App. 2020):

However, as our supreme court recently addressed, “Solem[10] must now be
viewed in the light of Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957 (1991).” Nash v.
State, 293 So. 3d 265, 269 (¶13) (Miss. 2020) (other citation omitted). “The
controlling opinion in Harmelin concluded that the Eighth Amendment
contains a narrow proportionality principle that does not require strict
proportionality between a crime and sentence but rather forbids only extreme
sentences that are grossly disproportionate to the crime.” Id. (internal quotation
marks omitted) (quoting Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48, 59-60 (2010)).
Therefore, in determining whether “a particular sentence is grossly
disproportionate, a court must first compare the gravity of the offense to the
severity of the sentence.” Id. It is only the exceedingly “rare case” where “‘this
threshold comparison leads to an inference of gross disproportionality’ should

10
Solem v. Helm, 463 U.S. 277 (1983).

13
the court ‘then compare the defendant’s sentence with the sentences received
by other offenders in the same jurisdiction and with sentences imposed for the
same crime in other jurisdictions.’” Id. (quoting Graham, 560 U.S. at 60).

Chandler failed to establish any inference of gross disproportionality in this case. The

maximum sentence for aggravated DUI is twenty-five years in the custody of the MDOC.

Miss. Code Ann. § 63-11-30(5) (Rev. 2013). Chandler was sentenced to a term of seven

years in the custody of the MDOC, with five years suspended and two years to serve, for

count one’s conviction and fifteen years, with five years suspended and ten years to serve,

for count two’s conviction. Both sentences were well below the statutory maximum sentence.

Without more, these sentences do not raise an inference of gross disproportionality. This

issue is without merit.

V. “Excessive imposition of restitution in violation of the Eighth
Amendment to the U.S. Constitution and MCA 99-37-3.”

¶23. In Chandler’s two-paragraph explanation of the basis for this claim for relief, he states

that (1) “$360,000 restitution to Ms. [Hardwick] is excessive, not supported by the facts”;

(2) violates the “limits imposed by MCA 99-37-3”; (3) is “further evidence of the improper

commingling of the criminal and civil cases”; and (4) the transcript of Hardwick’s testimony

at sentencing “is suspiciously missing but referenced on page four of the court transcript.”

In any event, the supplemental record on appeal shows that prior to the dismissal of

Chandler’s PCR motion, the circuit court had entered an agreed order in the underlying

criminal case, which basically set aside the prior order to pay $360,000 in restitution.

¶24. Chandler first argues that the order that he pay Hardwick $360,000 in restitution is not

supported by the record. However, in the transcript of the guilty plea and sentencing hearing,

14
the circuit judge mentions several times that the file in the criminal case contains a victim

impact statement, which could have contained evidence of her medical expenses. Further,

Hardwick testified at sentencing. The transcript of the sentencing hearing did not include her

testimony. Chandler had the responsibility to make sure that the appellate record contained

those matters necessary to decide the issues presented. James, 266 So. 3d at 1032 (¶8).

Because Chandler failed to provide the needed information and because the restitution order

has been set aside, we find this issue is without merit.

CONCLUSION

¶25. In his PCR motion, Chandler failed to support his claims for relief with sufficient

arguments, citations of authority, and proof to warrant a hearing on his motion. In Franks v.

State, 322 So. 3d 513, 518 (¶13) (Miss. Ct. App. 2021), this Court explained:

The circuit court also determined that Franks did not “include any affidavit
with his PCR motion, and he has failed to show any good cause why an
affidavit could not be obtained.” Mississippi Code Annotated section
99-39-9(1)(e) (Rev. 2015) states that a PCR motion shall contain the
following:

A specific statement of the facts which are not within the
petitioner’s personal knowledge. The motion shall state how or
by whom said facts will be proven. Affidavits of the witnesses
who will testify and copies of documents or records that will be
offered shall be attached to the motion. The affidavits of other
persons and the copies of documents and records may be
excused upon a showing, which shall be specifically detailed in
the motion, of good cause why they cannot be obtained. This
showing shall state what the petitioner has done to attempt to
obtain the affidavits, records and documents, the production of
which he requests the court to excuse.

Thus, “[t]he movant must prove, through affidavits or otherwise, the
potential existence of such facts that, if proven at the hearing, would

15
entitle him to relief.” Magee v. State, 270 So. 3d 225, 229 (¶14) (Miss. Ct.
App. 2018) (quoting Whatley v. State, 123 So. 3d 461, 471 (¶33) (Miss. Ct.
App. 2013)).

(Emphasis added). Chandler had the burden of proving by a preponderance of the evidence

that he was entitled to post-conviction relief. Kennedy v. State, 181 So. 3d 299, 303 (¶15)

(Miss. Ct. App. 2015). He had the obligation and opportunity to include with his PCR motion

all evidence that he deemed relevant to show that he was entitled to post-conviction relief.

See Watson v. State, 337 So. 3d 672, 676 (¶10) (Miss. Ct. App. 2021). In Phillips v. State,

332 So. 3d 408, 410 (¶4) (Miss. Ct. App. 2022), we set forth when a trial court may

summarily dismiss a PCR motion:

Mississippi Code Annotated section 99-39-11(2) (Rev. 2020) provides that the
trial court may summarily dismiss a PCR motion “[i]f it plainly appears from
the face of the motion, any annexed exhibits and the prior proceedings in the
case that the movant is not entitled to any relief.”

We find that it “plainly appears from the face of the motion, [the] annexed exhibits and the

prior proceedings in the case,” that Chandler was not entitled to any relief. Therefore, his

PCR motion was properly dismissed without a hearing. While the circuit court summarily

dismissed the PCR motion, finding the claims to be without merit, the circuit court’s

reasoning included that “there is no direct appeal from a plea of guilty.” To the extent that

the circuit court interpreted Chandler’s PCR motion as an attempt to directly appeal his

convictions and sentences, we disagree. The PCR motion was a proper vehicle for Chandler

to challenge his guilty pleas and sentences. See Miss. Code Ann.§ 99-39-5 (Rev. 2020). In

Boone v. State, 148 So. 3d 377, 379 (¶7) (Miss. Ct. App. 2014), this Court reasoned:

“An appellate court may affirm a trial court’s decision if the correct result is

16
reached, even if the trial court reached the result for the wrong reasons.”
Harper v. State, 102 So. 3d 1154, 1161 (¶21) (Miss. Ct. App. 2012) (quoting
Methodist Hosp. of Hattiesburg Inc. v. Richardson, 909 So. 2d 1066, 1070 (¶7)
(Miss. 2005)).

Thus we affirm the dismissal of Chandler’s PCR motion but for a different reason than the

circuit court.

¶26. AFFIRMED.

BARNES, C.J., CARLTON AND WILSON, P.JJ., GREENLEE,
WESTBROOKS, McDONALD, LAWRENCE, McCARTY AND SMITH, JJ.,
CONCUR.

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