Mancel L. Rencher a/k/a Mancel Logan Rencher v. State of Mississippi

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF MISSISSIPPI

NO. 2024-CP-00008-COA

MANCEL L. RENCHER A/K/A MANCEL APPELLANT
LOGAN RENCHER

v.

STATE OF MISSISSIPPI APPELLEE

DATE OF JUDGMENT: 12/04/2023
TRIAL JUDGE: HON. MICHAEL PAUL MILLS JR.
COURT FROM WHICH APPEALED: ALCORN COUNTY CIRCUIT COURT
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT: MANCEL L. RENCHER (PRO SE)
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLEE: OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL
BY: ASHLEY LAUREN SULSER
NATURE OF THE CASE: CIVIL - POST-CONVICTION RELIEF
DISPOSITION: AFFIRMED - 01/07/2025
MOTION FOR REHEARING FILED:

BEFORE CARLTON, P.J., WESTBROOKS AND LAWRENCE, JJ.

WESTBROOKS, J., FOR THE COURT:

¶1. This appeal stems from Mancel Rencher’s convictions and sentences in the Alcorn

County Circuit Court for aggravated assault and two counts of shooting into a motor vehicle.

The circuit court sentenced Rencher to serve twenty years in the custody of the Mississippi

Department of Corrections (MDOC) for the assault and to two five-year suspended terms for

the shooting, followed by five years of post-release supervision. Rencher filed a post-

conviction collateral relief (PCR) motion in the circuit court, which was ultimately denied.

Rencher now appeals the denial of his PCR motion. After a review of the record, we affirm

the circuit court’s decision.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
¶2. In March 2020, Rencher was living in a house with his girlfriend Alexa Nelson, his

children, and two of his friends, Angie McGaha and Casey Sanders. On March 12, 2020,

McGaha approached Rencher and told Rencher that she needed a ride away from the house

because she was scared of Sanders and that Sanders had held her there against her will.

Rencher admitted that during this period of time, he, McGaha, and Sanders were all users of

methamphetamine. Rencher agreed to drive McGaha to Walmart to meet her parents. Once

they arrived at Walmart, McGaha got in the vehicle with her parents. Even though neither

Rencher nor McGaha told Sanders they were leaving the home, Sanders showed up at

Walmart after walking there from the home, which was approximately two miles away. As

Sanders approached Rencher in the parking lot, Sanders told Rencher, “I’m fixing to f***

you up.” Sanders then assaulted Rencher by hitting him in the left temple. Rencher reacted

by pulling out a 9 millimeter gun allegedly to defend himself. Rencher shot the gun thirteen

times, purportedly “acting in self-defense.” Rencher then got in his truck and drove to his

parent’s home. His mother, who worked at Walmart at this time, contacted law enforcement

about the shooting. Rencher then turned himself in to the sheriff’s office.

¶3. At trial, Rencher recounted the story of what happened on March 12, 2020. Rencher

testified that he shot Sanders because he was in fear for his life even though Sanders had no

weapon at that time. Rencher also asked for leniency from the court, stating that he was not

the same person he was two years before when the crime occurred. He informed the court

he was then an avid church-goer and no longer used drugs.

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¶4. On July 8, 2022, Rencher pled guilty in Alcorn County Circuit Court to aggravated

assault, which was a negotiated reduced charge derived from his indicted charge of attempted

murder, and two counts of shooting into a motor vehicle. The circuit court ordered Rencher

to serve twenty years for the aggravated assault conviction and two five-year suspended

sentences for the shooting-into-a-motor-vehicle convictions. The court imposed five years

of post-release supervision. When the trial court judge initially informed Rencher of his

sentence, the judge misstated the length and terms of the sentence, but the State quickly

corrected him. The judge then correctly informed Rencher of his sentence using the proper

terms.

¶5. Rencher subsequently filed a PCR motion in the circuit court alleging ineffective

assistance of counsel, among other issues, and the circuit court denied the motion. On appeal

from that denial, Rencher filed a pro se brief in which he again raises the issue of ineffective

assistance of counsel by his trial court attorney and seeks to “vacate and set aside his

conviction” or at least receive an evidentiary hearing.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

¶6. “When reviewing a circuit court’s denial or dismissal of a PCR motion, we will only

disturb the circuit court’s decision if it is clearly erroneous; however, we review the circuit

court’s legal conclusions under a de novo standard of review.” Tingle v. State, 285 So. 3d

708, 710 (¶8) (Miss. Ct. App. 2019) (quoting Williams v. State, 228 So. 3d 844, 846 (¶5)

(Miss. Ct. App. 2017)).

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DISCUSSION

¶7. Rencher raises the issue of ineffective assistance of counsel. He asserts many

different reasons he believes his trial counsel was ineffective. Rencher believes his trial

counsel failed to request a presentence report as part of the sentencing phase, failed to

request a speedy trial and challenge the indictment, and failed to offer proper advice and

notice to him during plea negotiations.

¶8. “To succeed on an ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claim, [the defendant] must meet

both prongs of the test laid out in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984).”

Lovett v. State, 270 So. 3d 133, 135 (¶5) (Miss. Ct. App. 2018). Under the two-part test in

Strickland, “[f]irst, the defendant must show that counsel’s performance was deficient.” Id.

(quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687). Second, the defendant must “show that there is a

reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the

proceeding would have been different.” Id. (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694). “As

applied to the plea process, the focus of the first prong remains the same, while the second

prong focuses on whether counsel’s unprofessional performance affected the outcome.”

McBride v. State, 108 So. 3d 977, 980 (¶11) (Miss. Ct. App. 2012) (quoting Hannah v. State,

943 So. 2d 20, 24 (¶6) (Miss. 2006)).

¶9. Mississippi caselaw holds that “[a] prisoner seeking post-conviction relief must

‘allege both prongs of the above test with specific detail.’” Ingram v. State, 107 So. 3d 1024,

1028 (¶10) (Miss. Ct. App. 2012) (emphasis added) (quoting Coleman v. State, 979 So. 2d

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731, 735 (¶15) (Miss. Ct. App. 2008)). “The burden is on the defendant to bring forth proof

which demonstrates that both prongs of the Strickland test are met.” Anderson v. State, 766

So. 2d 133, 136 (¶10) (Miss. Ct. App. 2000). Additionally, “the claim must be supported by

affidavits other than his own.” Cook v. State, 301 So. 3d 766, 778 (¶36) (Miss. Ct. App.

2020) (quoting Shavers v. State, 215 So. 3d 502, 507 (¶14) (Miss. Ct. App. 2016)). “In cases

involving post-conviction collateral relief, ‘where a party offers only his affidavit, then his

ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claim is without merit.’” Beasley v. State, 355 So. 3d 245,

205 (¶13) (Miss. Ct. App. 2022) (citing Mooney v. State, 130 So. 3d 145, 147 (¶12) (Miss.

Ct. App. 2013)), cert. denied, 355 So. 3d 774 (Miss. 2023).

¶10. The first problem with Rencher’s PCR motion is that the only affidavit he presented

was his own. He failed to provide the trial court with an affidavit submitted by someone

other than himself. Mississippi caselaw has consistently held that the petitioner’s claims

must be supported by affidavits other than his own. Willis v. State, 321 So. 3d 584, 591 (¶22)

(Miss. Ct. App. 2021) (citing Webster v. State, 152 So. 3d 1200, 1203 (¶8) (Miss. Ct. App.

2014)). For this reason, Rencher’s claims fail.

¶11. Further, Rencher merely makes bare assertions. In a PCR motion for ineffective

assistance of counsel, the petitioner is “required to plead claims of ineffective assistance with

specificity.” Id. (citing Webster, 152 So. 3d at 1203 (¶8)). “Bare allegations are insufficient

to prove ineffective assistance of counsel.” Ingram, 107 So. 3d at 1028 (¶13). Rencher did

not set forth specific facts showing his counsel was ineffective, nor did he specifically

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explain how the alleged “failures” led to his decision to plead guilty. This is also insufficient

support for Rencher’s claims to be brought before this Court on review.

¶12. In Willis, this Court heard a similar argument to the one at hand. In that case, “Willis

claim[ed] that he received ineffective assistance of counsel because his attorney (1) did not

properly advise him of the consequences of pleading guilty, and (2) did not correct

misinformation regarding his sentence.” Willis, 321 So. 3d at 590-91 (¶21). The Court in

Willis held that “Willis merely asserts that he received ineffective assistance of counsel. He

did not produce any proof, by affidavit or otherwise, to support his claim. For these reasons,

the court did not err in dismissing his motion without an evidentiary hearing. Therefore, this

issue is without merit.” Id. at 591 (¶23) (citation omitted).

¶13. The biggest distinguishing factor in that case and the one at hand is that Willis was

sentenced to life imprisonment without eligibility for parole. The dissent in Willis felt as if

Willis did not understand “what the maximum possible sentence (i.e., the only possible

sentence) could be, nor did he understand the effect of pleading as a habitual offender.” Id.

at 593 (¶31) (Westbrooks, J., dissenting). The dissent believed that

had he been told that his habitual status legally mandated the worst possible
sentence and that no worse outcome could have resulted at trial, it is highly
unlikely that he would have submitted a plea petition in the first place, much
less requested that the judge grant it after hearing the misleading statements
made at the hearing. Instead, Willis took the deal only because the
consequences were not explained to him. Willis did not enter his plea
voluntarily or intelligently.

For the foregoing reasons, I respectfully dissent from the majority and believe
this case should be remanded for an evidentiary hearing.

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Id. at 592-93 (¶¶31-32).

¶14. In the case sub judice, the circuit court judge similarly incorrectly stated Rencher’s

sentence at first; however, the judge was immediately corrected by the State. The circuit

court judge then clarified by stating,

Mr. Rencher, it was the intent of the Court to give you 20 years in custody of
the Mississippi Department of Corrections with none of those 20 years being
suspended, leaving 20 years to serve. I apologize for that technicality.

Mr. Rencher, the Court just gave you 20 years to serve followed by ten years
of suspended time with regards to Count II and with regards to Count III.

You’re going to be ordered to complete five years of post-release supervision.

Rencher does not allege that he entered into the plea involuntarily or unknowingly. He

simply asserts that his counsel failed to request a presentencing report. However, “[t]his

Court must apply a heavy measure of deference to counsel’s judgments.” Wiley v. State, 517

So. 2d 1373, 1379 (Miss. 1987). This is because “[c]ounsel has a duty to make reasonable

investigations or to make a reasonable decision that makes particular investigations

unnecessary.” Id.

¶15. Rencher also alleges that his trial counsel was ineffective by not requesting a speedy

trial. However, “[i]f a defendant voluntarily pleads guilty to an offense, then he waives all

nonjurisdictional rights to trial—including the constitutional right to a speedy trial.” Wright

v. State, 270 So. 3d 1145, 1147 (¶11) (Miss. Ct. App. 2018) (citing Anderson v. State, 577

So.2d 390, 391-92 (Miss. 1991)). During the sentencing proceedings, the court asked

Rencher, “Do you understand by entering a plea of guilty that you are waiving or giving up

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any rights you may have to assert that the State of Mississippi has committed a speedy trial

violation with regards to your case?” Rencher responded, “Yes, sir.” Therefore, Rencher’s

assertion that his counsel was ineffective by not requesting a speedy trial is without merit

because he pled guilty and waived the right to bring this claim.

CONCLUSION

¶16. For all of the foregoing reasons, we find Rencher’s claim of ineffective assistance of

counsel is without merit. Thus, we affirm the circuit court’s order denying Rencher’s PCR

motion.

¶17. AFFIRMED.

BARNES, C.J., CARLTON, P.J., McDONALD, LAWRENCE AND McCARTY,
JJ., CONCUR. WILSON, P.J., AND EMFINGER, J., CONCUR IN PART AND IN
THE RESULT WITHOUT SEPARATE WRITTEN OPINION. WEDDLE AND
ST. PÉ, JJ., NOT PARTICIPATING.

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