Clarksdale Public Utilities Commission v. Mississippi Department of Employment Security and Mark P. Johnson

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF MISSISSIPPI

NO. 2022-CC-01085-COA

CLARKSDALE PUBLIC UTILITIES APPELLANT
COMMISSION

v.

MISSISSIPPI DEPARTMENT OF APPELLEES
EMPLOYMENT SECURITY AND MARK P.
JOHNSON

DATE OF JUDGMENT: 09/09/2022
TRIAL JUDGE: HON. CHARLES E. WEBSTER
COURT FROM WHICH APPEALED: COAHOMA COUNTY CIRCUIT COURT
ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLANT: DAVID D. O’DONNELL
DAVID R. HUNT
ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEES: ALBERT B. WHITE
MARK P. JOHNSON (PRO SE)
NATURE OF THE CASE: CIVIL - STATE BOARDS AND AGENCIES
DISPOSITION: AFFIRMED - 02/13/2024
MOTION FOR REHEARING FILED:

EN BANC.

McDONALD, J., FOR THE COURT:

¶1. Clarksdale Public Utilities Commission (CPUC) appeals from the judgment of the

Coahoma County Circuit Court that affirmed the order of the Mississippi Department of

Employment Security’s (MDES) Board of Review, which approved unemployment

compensation benefits to Mark Johnson, whose employment at CPUC had been terminated.

The MDES Board of Review had affirmed an Administrative Law Judge’s (ALJ) finding that

Johnson was not disqualified from receiving benefits because of alleged misconduct or

insubordination. In its appeal here, CPUC argues (1) that the ALJ refused to admit evidence,
including board minutes, regarding Johnson’s insubordination and other acts of misconduct;

(2) that the ALJ’s award of unemployment benefits to Johnson was arbitrary and capricious;1

and (3) that collateral estoppel barred the ALJ from reconsidering the factual determination

of whether Johnson’s actions constituted misconduct. Having considered the arguments of

counsel and relevant caselaw, we affirm the circuit court’s judgment.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

¶2. Pursuant to Mississippi Code Annotated section 21-27-13 (Rev. 2015),2 the City of

Clarksdale created the Clarksdale Public Utilities Commission (CPUC) to operate the city’s

public utility. Although CPUC was a separate legal entity, the Commissioners were selected

by the City’s Board of Alderman.3 In accordance with its statutory authority, on June 19,

2017, CPUC hired Mark Johnson as the general manager to oversee the day-to-day

1
Encompassed in this argument is CPUC’s contention that it had proved by clear and
convincing evidence that Johnson engaged in acts of misconduct.
2
Mississippi Code Annotated section 21-27-13 provides:

The governing authorities of any municipality which now owns and operates,
or hereafter shall own and operate, any system or systems shall have the power
and authority to create a commission to control, manage and operate such
systems, or any one or more of them, which said commission shall consist of
not less than three (3) nor more than five (5) commissioners, to be elected by
the governing authorities of such municipality. In any municipality operating
under the council-manager plan of government, such commissioners shall be
selected by, and shall be under the control of, the mayor and councilmen of
the municipality, and not the city or town manager . . . .
3
City authorities can also remove commissioners according to Mississippi Code
Annotated section 21-27-15 (Rev. 2015), which provides that “[t]he governing authorities
of such municipality shall have the power to remove any member of said commission for
inefficiency or incompetency or any other cause.”

2
operations of the utility.

A. Johnson’s Termination

¶3. During the next year, events occurred that caused the Commission to question

Johnson’s job performance. The Commission engaged an independent investigator, James

Herring, to look into a number of matters. As a result of Herring’s report and other

allegations against Johnson, the Commission suspended Johnson and scheduled a pre-

disciplinary hearing. Prior to the hearing, on September 12, 2018, the Commission notified

Johnson of five grounds for potential discipline (some of which are repetitive): (1)

insubordination based on Johnson’s repeated efforts to have the Board of Aldermen remove

the Commissioners and reverse his suspension, his failure to cooperate with the independent

investigator, his illegal donation of labor and equipment to a local organization contrary to

the Commission’s instructions, and his release of confidential personnel disciplinary files and

information; (2) unauthorized and illegal expenditure of Commission funds for the purchase

of a new Interactive Voice Response (IVR) answering system,4 engagement of an

engineering firm to perform GIS mapping services without Commission approval, and the

authorization of illegal donations of Wi-Fi boxes to Clarksdale Revitalization Project; (3)

harassment and coercion of an employee to file false allegations of sexual harassment against

a Commissioner; (4) authorizing and failing to disclose the recording of all CPUC telephone

calls on the new IVR system without the knowledge or consent of the participants; and (5)

4
Often called a “touch-tone” system, IVRs are used to direct callers through menu
options over the phone. They can also record automated voicemail messages and route calls
to departments.

3
inefficient management of the advanced metering infrastructure project which resulted in

overtime costs and consumer complaints of billing delays and errors. The letter detailed the

policies Johnson allegedly violated.5

¶4. The Commission conducted the pre-disciplinary hearing on September 19, 2018, and

Johnson was represented by counsel. The Commission made no decision that day, but

unanimously decided to reconvene on September 25, 2018. At the reconvened meeting, the

Commission voted 4-1 to terminate Johnson. The Commission’s decision was based on the

following findings: (1) defying the legal authority of the Commission and failure to comply

with Commission policies; (2) making inappropriate expenditures; (3) attempting to obtain

a sworn statement from an employee concerning sexual harassment that the employee denies

occurred; (4) implementing a telephone call recording system that Johnson knew or should

have known was illegal; and (5) inefficient management of the advanced metering

infrastructure project. The Commission attached to the termination letter a twenty-nine-page

summary of its findings and conclusions, which, according to the letter, were the “complete

facts leading to [Johnson’s] discharge” and contained the documents and/or sworn statements

5
They include violations of 18 U.S.C. § 2511(1) (anti-wiretapping law); 18 U.S.C.
§ 4 (reporting law); Mississippi Code Annotated section 31-7-13(b)-(o) (Supp. 2012) (sole-
source purchasing law); Mississippi Code Annotated section 21-27-27 (Rev. 2015)
(prohibition on municipal authorities from furnishing free services); CPUC’s Standard
Operating Procedures P-1 (purchasing policies); CPUC’s Governance Policy G-9
(Commission-general manager relationship); CPUC’s Personnel Policies and Procedures
Manual §§ 4.300, et seq. and 16.400, et seq. (general manager’s duty to report and
investigate sexual harassment allegations of an employee); CPUC’s Personnel Policies and
Procedures Manual § 13.500, et seq. (failure of general manager to enforce rules); CPUC’s
Access to Public Records Policy (disclosure of personnel files to the public); and coercion
of an employee to make a false allegation.

4
submitted during Johnson’s termination hearing. Based on these findings, the Commission

terminated Johnson for inefficiency and misconduct. Johnson did not seek judicial review

of that decision.

B. Johnson’s Unemployment Benefits Proceedings

1. Application and Initial Determination

¶5. On October 10, 2018, Johnson applied for unemployment benefits with the

Mississippi Department of Employment Security (MDES). When notified, CPUC responded

that Johnson was disqualified from receiving benefits because of misconduct. On October

30, 2018, an MDES claims examiner awarded Johnson benefits, finding that the CPUC had

not proved that Johnson was discharged for misconduct connected with work. CPUC

appealed the decision of the claims examiner on November 5, 2018. After twice being

rescheduled, on January 30, 2019, the ALJ conducted a hearing de novo on CPUC’s appeal.

The issue was whether, as CPUC claimed, Johnson was disqualified from receiving benefits

because he was terminated for misconduct.

¶6. Prior to the hearing, CPUC filed a brief in opposition to Johnson’s claim, arguing that

collateral estoppel applied to the MDES proceeding and that because the Commission had

already determined that Johnson was guilty of misconduct, MDES was bound by that finding.

CPUC attached Exhibits A through F, consisting of (A) the notice of the pre-disciplinary

hearing, (B) the minutes from the September 19 pre-disciplinary hearing, (C) the documents

and evidence received and considered at the September 19 pre-disciplinary hearing; (D) the

minutes from the September 25 disciplinary hearing, (E) the Commission’s written findings

5
of fact and conclusions regarding Johnson’s termination, and (F) the notice to Johnson of his

discharge and the reasons for his termination. Altogether, these exhibits made up over 900

pages.

¶7. Johnson filed a response brief on January 23, 2019. In it, Johnson cited Mississippi

Employment Security Commission v. Philadelphia Municipal Separate School District of

Neshoba County, 437 So. 2d 388 (Miss. 1983), in which the Mississippi Supreme Court

found that MDES was not collaterally estopped by previous findings of the school board.

Id. at 396. On January 25, 2019, CPUC replied to Johnson’s brief, distinguishing the

Philadelphia school case from Johnson’s case.

¶8. Johnson also requested that the ALJ subpoena CPUC Commissioners Mitchell, Davis,

Hicks, and Humber to attend the hearing. CPUC moved to quash the subpoenas, arguing that

Johnson failed to show any necessity in subpoenaing the Commissioners. Ultimately, the

ALJ denied CPUC’s motion and required all five Commissioners to be present for the

January 30 hearing.

2. January 30, 2019 ALJ Hearing

¶9. At the ALJ hearing on January 30, 2019, before presenting any testimony, CPUC

sought to enter Exhibits A through F. Although CPUC’s counsel identified each exhibit,

counsel did not provide an explanation of what each document contained and what it was

being offered to prove. The ALJ refused to blanketly admit the exhibits because CPUC had

failed to show how each was relevant to the proceedings. Rather, the ALJ stated that it

would admit specific individual exhibits if there was testimony from the witnesses during the

6
hearing providing a foundation for the document’s relevance.

Testimony of Former CPUC Chair Freddie Davis

¶10. The hearing proceeded with witness testimony, beginning with former Commission

chair Freddie Davis. Davis testified that he served on the Commission from April 2014 until

October 2018. He stated that he was representing the CPUC at the hearing, and the ALJ

referred to him as the employer representative for CPUC. During Davis’s testimony, CPUC

sought to admit only two of Exhibits A through F, including Exhibit E (the Commission’s

twenty-nine-page “Findings of Fact and Conclusions Re: General Manager Mark Johnson’s

Actions and Conduct Meriting Discipline”). Davis confirmed that the Commission had

adopted these findings, which detail a chronology of events gleaned from emails, documents

presented at board meetings, and other sources into the Commission’s minutes during its

September 25, 2018 hearing when the Commission terminated Johnson for cause. Over

Johnson’s objection, the ALJ admitted Exhibit E.

¶11. The only other exhibit CPUC attempted to admit was an invoice that it claimed proved

Johnson made a single-source purchase of the IVR system without the approval of the

Commission. CPUC policies required that any purchase over $5,000 must either (1) be

submitted to multiple vendors to bid on or, if no other vendors can be found, (2) be approved

by the Commission as a single-source purchase. Davis testified that Johnson did neither

when the IVR system was purchased. To show that Johnson could have found other vendors

to bid on the system, CPUC presented a quote that CPUC had obtained from a local vendor

on August 28, 2018, for a similar IVR system. Johnson objected to the admission of the

7
quote, arguing that this bid was secured after Johnson’s July 25 suspension in order to

fabricate a reason for terminating him. Johnson further argued that Davis could not

authenticate the bid because it was solicited by CPUC’s accounting department, not Davis.

CPUC responded that regardless of when the bid was obtained, Johnson failed to submit the

IVR purchase to the Commission for approval under the single-source exception. Ultimately,

the ALJ refused to admit the document, finding that it was not relevant and that CPUC failed

to establish its authenticity.

¶12. Significantly, after the admission of Exhibit E and the rejection of the August 28 IVR

quote, CPUC made no other attempt to enter any other exhibits into evidence or make a

proffer. However, Davis continued to testify about the reasons for Johnson’s termination.

Single-source Policy Violation

¶13. Although the ALJ did not admit the August 28, 2018 invoice, Davis testified that

Johnson violated Commission policy by purchasing the IVR system from a single source

without the Commission’s permission.

Recording of Telephone Calls

¶14. According to Exhibit E, the Commission learned in June 2018 that telephone calls on

all CPUC lines were being recorded without participants’ knowledge or consent. They were

concerned because the issue of recording calls had been raised ten years earlier and, to avoid

any violation of federal law,6 the Commission set a policy that only customer calls were to

6
18 U.S.C. § 2511(1) and (4)(a) provide:

(1) Except as otherwise specifically provided in this chapter any person who--
(a) intentionally intercepts, endeavors to intercept, or procures

8
be recorded and then with the knowledge or consent of participants on the call. The

Commission instructed Johnson to determine who had authorized these current recordings.

The Commission also instructed its counsel to report the matter to the Federal Bureau of

Investigation (FBI) because the attorney had advised them that even knowledge of the

any other person to intercept or endeavor to intercept, any wire,
oral, or electronic communication;
(b) intentionally uses, endeavors to use, or procures any other
person to use or endeavor to use any electronic, mechanical, or
other device to intercept any oral communication when--
(i) such device is affixed to, or otherwise transmits a
signal through, a wire, cable, or other like connection
used in wire communication; or
(ii) such device transmits communications by radio, or
interferes with the transmission of such communication;
or
(iii) such person knows, or has reason to know, that such
device or any component thereof has been sent through
the mail or transported in interstate or foreign commerce;
or
(iv) such use or endeavor to use (A) takes place on the
premises of any business or other commercial
establishment the operations of which affect interstate or
foreign commerce; or (B) obtains or is for the purpose of
obtaining information relating to the operations of any
business or other commercial establishment the
operations of which affect interstate or foreign
commerce; or
(v) such person acts in the District of Columbia, the
Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, or any territory or
possession of the United States;
....
shall be punished as provided in subsection (4) or shall be
subject to suit as provided in subsection (5).

(4)(a) Except as provided in paragraph (b) of this subsection or in subsection
(5), whoever violates subsection (1) of this section shall be fined under this
title or imprisoned not more than five years, or both.

9
interception of telephone conversations was a federal crime,7 and that anybody having actual

knowledge of the crime must report it to the appropriate federal authority as soon as possible.

The CPUC attorney reported the situation to the FBI on June 21, 2018. Davis testified that,

ultimately, the Commission engaged James Herring to conduct an independent investigation

of this and other matters.

¶15. Davis stated that Johnson requested permission from the Commission to report the

recording matter to the State Auditor and the Mississippi Attorney General’s office. Davis

admitted that they had initially told Johnson not to report the matter to these state agencies

because the Commission had already hired an independent investigator. However, Exhibit

E, the Commission’s findings, reflects that after a joint meeting between the Commission and

the Clarksdale Board of Aldermen, the state agencies were notified.

Wi-Fi Devices for Clarksdale Revitalization Project

¶16. Davis then testified that Johnson allowed Wi-Fi devices to be attached to CPUC’s

utility poles on behalf of the Clarksdale Revitalization Project,8 which was done without the

approval of the Commission. Davis said that this violated CPUC policy that required

7
18 U.S.C. § 4 states:

Whoever, having knowledge of the actual commission of a felony cognizable
by a court of the United States, conceals and does not as soon as possible
make known the same to some judge or other person in civil or military
authority under the United States, shall be fined under this title or imprisoned
not more than three years, or both.
8
Davis said that the Wi-Fi devices installed on the utility poles were requested by
the Clarksdale Revitalization Project, which sought to beautify and update the Clarksdale
downtown to attract industry. Davis could not explain the Revitalization Project’s funding,
but he did say he believed the City of Clarksdale was its primary source of funds.

10
payment of a fee for any attachment to a utility pole, which Johnson did not collect. Davis

said that the Attorney General had issued an opinion to another entity that prohibited

municipal authorities from providing such free service because doing so would constitute an

illegal donation to a private entity. Davis testified that this failure of Johnson was one of the

facts adopted by the Commission in its findings during its September 25 hearing.

False Allegations of Sexual Harassment

¶17. Davis further testified that after learning that the telephone-recording issue had been

reported to the FBI, Johnson sent an email to the Commissioners claiming that he had

received a notarized statement from a CPUC employee detailing sexual harassment and

verbal abuse by a Commissioner. The Commission later determined that Johnson, in fact,

had pressured the employee, Sheila Profit, to falsely accuse the Commissioner named. This

presentation of a false accusation against a Commissioner was an additional ground for

Johnson’s termination.

Release of Information from Personnel Files

¶18. According to the Commission’s findings in Exhibit E, Johnson cautioned the

Commission against reporting the telephone-call recording issue to the FBI because Johnson

felt that the FBI’s investigation may reveal a recording that had led to the forced resignation

of a Commissioner and a CPUC employee. However, the Board’s attorney informed Johnson

that both individuals in that case knew they were being recorded. Moreover, the CPUC

attorney cautioned that this information was part of a disciplinary hearing that was privileged,

confidential, and should not be released. Later, Johnson forwarded to the Commission an

11
email he had received from Paul Wilson of WROX (a local radio station) in which Wilson

said he planned to reveal “the whistleblower report” (i.e., the report to the FBI of

unauthorized phone call recording) and “activities of [Commissioners] Bo Plunk and George

Davis relative to CPU workers and potential employees.” Based on this email, Davis

testified that Johnson had released confidential information from employees’ personnel files

to a local radio station in violation of CPUC policies.

Other Acts of Insubordination

¶19. Davis testified that Johnson was insubordinate when he initially refused to be

interviewed by the independent investigator. According to Exhibit E, Johnson was scheduled

to be interviewed by Herring on the same day that Johnson met with the mayor and requested

that the Board of Aldermen remove all of the Commissioners. According to Davis, both

Johnson’s failure to attend the interview and his reports to the mayor and Board of Aldermen

constituted insubordination. However, Exhibit E’s findings noted that Johnson did

eventually comply and was interviewed by Herring.

Testimony of Sheila Profit

¶20. Sheila Profit testified about Johnson’s coercion of her to file sexual harassment

charges. Profit was the senior accountant for CPUC, and Johnson was her immediate

supervisor. Profit said that she filed a grievance with the human resources department on

July 24, 2018, because she was being pestered and bothered by Johnson. She said that he

was asking her to file a report of sexual harassment by a Commissioner with the city

whistleblower program. She said she had understood there was tension brewing between the

12
Commission and Johnson, and that she didn’t want to be involved in it. Profit said she never

signed a notarized affidavit claiming sexual harassment, and that Johnson’s claim that she

had was false.

¶21. Profit explained the genesis of the issue. She said she had shown Johnson a series of

threatening text messages she had received from some CPUC-assigned phone number. She

was trying to determine from Johnson the name of the person who was assigned that number

so she could identify who sent her the texts. Profit testified that the person identified was

another CPUC employee who had been terminated. The offending employee appealed his

termination but ultimately resigned. Profit stated it was her understanding that this

terminated employee told Johnson that she (Profit) had been sexually harassed by a

commissioner, which, Profit reasoned, was why Johnson felt that she needed to file a sexual

harassment claim against the commissioner. But Profit said she had not been sexually

harassed—only pressured by Johnson to file a claim that was not true.

Testimony of Mark Johnson

¶22. Johnson testified that he was provided a letter giving him the reasons for his

termination. The letter said that he was terminated for (1) installation of a recording system,

(2) inappropriate expenditures, (3) insubordination by attempting to thwart an investigation,

(4) coercion of a false statement by an employee, and (5) inefficient handling of a project.

He said that prior to being suspended, he had not been told he had violated any policies.

Recording of CPUC Telephone Calls

¶23. Concerning the IVR recording system, Johnson said that no proof was produced that

13
any individual calls were actually recorded—just that a recording system was installed.

When asked by the Commission about the recording equipment and who approved its

installation, he told the Commission that he had spoken with CPUC administrators Liz

Haynes, Steve Reed, and Brandon Soldevila, who all said that Jim Hemphill had approved

the installation.9 Johnson also said it was his understanding that the CPUC attorney was

pursuing federal wiretapping charges against him personally.

Violation of Single Source Purchase Policy

¶24. Johnson said that he did not violate the single-source purchase policy. He said that

he informed the Commission of the single-source purchase of the IVR system, which the

Commission approved but neglected to record in its minutes. He said that preparing the

minutes was the Commission’s responsibility and that he should not be held responsible for

its neglect to include this approval in the minutes.

Installation of Wi-Fi Devices

¶25. Concerning the installation of Wi-Fi devices on utility poles for the Clarksdale

Revitalization Project, Johnson said that he received the request from the mayor, not the

Clarksdale Revitalization Project. Johnson said he directed the mayor to fill out the

appropriate form, which the mayor did. He emphasized that the City of Clarksdale “owns”

CPUC and that they generally cooperate and share equipment with each other. He said he

9
Exhibit E (the Commission’s findings) contradicts Johnson’s testimony. The
findings refer to a Commission meeting on June 24, 2018, where the Commissioners
questioned Haynes about Hemphill’s authorization of recording calls. Haynes told the
Commissioners that Hemphill had not told her this directly, but Soldevila had told her
Hemphill said this. Thereafter, two commissioners met with Soldevila in a private meeting
who denied telling anyone that Hemphill had said he had approved the recording of calls.

14
had never been told that installing the Wi-Fi devices was improper and he thought that it was

because CPUC had developed specific forms for sharing equipment with the city.

Release of Information from Personnel Files

¶26. Johnson said that he never released any CPUC personnel files to the public or

elsewhere. He said he left all personnel files on his desk when he was suspended. Johnson

emphatically denied turning any information over to WROX (the radio station) without

approval by the Commission.

Insubordination

¶27. Johnson admitted that he requested that the Board of Aldermen investigate and

remove the Commissioners. The CPUC findings contained in Exhibit E reflect that Johnson

sent numerous emails to the Commission with copies to the Commission attorney, alleging

wrongdoing and misconduct by the Commissioners and others, such as (1) paying back

favors with CPUC jobs; (2) reversing termination or suspensions for friends and relatives at

the expense of CPUC; (3) causing others to be indebted to them by providing a job or

favorable treatment at the expense of CPUC; (4) hiring or promoting a person in CPUC to

further the Commissioners personal or political agenda, and their “need for organizational

control, power, and information at the expense of CPUC”; (5) participating in inappropriate

subordinate/superior discussions and activities; and (6) violating CPUC policies. In

Johnson’s email, he told the Commissioners that these activities were ongoing, needed to

stop immediately, and would not go “unchecked” by him.

¶28. Johnson testified that he was called to the mayor’s office six days after he was

15
suspended and asked to turn over any information regarding illegal or unethical conduct by

the Commission. Johnson testified that he did this and requested that the Board reinstate

him, Steve Reed, and Chris Campos (both of whom had also been suspended). Johnson

maintained, in his opinion, that reporting commissioner irregularities was not insubordination

because his position required him to report the illegal and unethical conduct he had witnessed

at the Commission not only to the CPUC but also to the “highest authority” over the CPUC,

the Board of Aldermen.10

Pressuring Profit to Submit a False Accusation of Sexual
Harassment

¶29. In response to Profit’s testimony, Johnson said that she had approached him about

wanting to go forward with a claim of sexual harassment, but later, she changed her mind.

Johnson said he told her that if she did not report the harassment, he may have to report it

to the State Auditor himself for their investigation into abuse by public officials. When

Profit said she still did not want to pursue the claim in late July, Johnson said he accepted her

refusal to press the claim. He said that both times she came to him, he had two witnesses in

the office. He also said that when she came to the office to originally tell him about the

harassment, she had a notarized letter showing the harassment. He denied badgering Profit

in any way.

Other Miscellaneous Matters

¶30. Regarding inefficient handling of projects, Johnson said that there were never any

10
The CPUC’s findings (Exhibit E) reflect that after reviewing whatever Johnson
submitted, the mayor and Board of Aldermen took no action.

16
complaints about the services provided by CPUC until after he, Steve Reed, and Chris

Campos were suspended. He said that immediately after they were suspended, as many as

twenty people appeared at Commission meetings to lodge complaints. This, Johnson said,

would not have occurred had he not been suspended. In essence, the suspension caused the

inefficiency, not the other way around.

Closing Arguments

¶31. At the conclusion of testimony, the ALJ confirmed that the only document admitted

into evidence was Exhibit E (the Commission’s findings). CPUC made no other attempt to

offer exhibits into evidence or make a proffer of anything it contended was improperly

excluded.

¶32. In closing, CPUC argued it had met its burden of proving misconduct. It argued that

Johnson violated CPUC policy by approving purchases and granting favors to the Clarksdale

Revitalization Project, coercing Sheila Profit into making a falsified harassment claim against

a commissioner, approving the installation of illegal recording equipment, and

insubordination by attempting to thwart the CPUC’s investigation into personnel matters.

¶33. Johnson argued that CPUC had not proved any misconduct. Instead, he argued that

the evidence showed that CPUC had terminated him because he had challenged a number of

CPUC’s practices. Johnson also argued that the Commission terminated him because he had

been pressuring them to report the recording equipment issue to the State Auditor and

Attorney General and because of his cooperation with the mayor and the Board of Aldermen.

3. ALJ Decision

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¶34. On February 6, 2019, the ALJ issued her decision. The ALJ cited Mississippi Code

Annotated section 71-5-513(A)(1)(b) (Supp. 2012), which stated that an individual shall be

disqualified for benefits if he was discharged for misconduct connected with his work. The

ALJ noted that in cases of an employee’s termination, the burden of proving such misconduct

is on the employer. The ALJ defined misconduct based on Wheeler v. Arriola, 408 So. 2d

1381, 1383 (Miss. 1982), which stated:

[T]he meaning of the term “misconduct,” as used in [Wisconsin’s]
unemployment compensation statute, was conduct evincing such willful and
wanton disregard of the employer’s interest as is found in deliberate violations
or disregard of the standards of behavior which the employer has the right to
expect from his employee. Also, carelessness and negligence of such degree,
or recurrence thereof, as to manifest culpability, wrongful intent or evil design,
and showing an intentional or substantial disregard of the employer’s interest
or of the employee’s duties and obligations to his employer, came within the
term. Mere inefficiency, unsatisfactory conduct, failure in good performance
as the result of inability or incapacity, or inadvertencies and ordinary
negligence in isolated incidents, and good faith errors in judgment or
discretion were not considered “misconduct” within the meaning of the statute.

Further, the ALJ cited MDES Regulation 308.00, which states that misconduct shall be

defined as, but not limited to, (1) failure to obey orders, rules or instructions, or failure to

discharge the duties for which an individual was employed; (2) substantial disregard for the

employer’s interests or of the employee’s duties and obligations to the employer; (3) conduct

that shows intentional disregard—or utter indifference—of an employer’s interests as is

found in deliberate violations or disregard of standards of behavior the employer has the right

to expect of the employee; or (4) carelessness or negligence of such degree or recurrence as

to demonstrate wrongful intent.

¶35. The ALJ found that the evidence presented did not establish that Johnson intentionally

18
circumvented or violated the policies and procedures of CPUC and that the evidence did not

show Johnson directed the telephone lines to be recorded or that he intentionally withheld

information regarding the telephone lines being recorded. The ALJ stated that much of the

evidence reflected poor judgment on Johnson’s part. The ALJ concluded that

in light of the employer’s allegations of possible criminal wrongdoing, . . . the
employer was within its rights to terminate the claimant’s services for any
reason that it deems necessary; however, misconduct connected with the work
has not been established.[11]

Based on these considerations, the ALJ found that CPUC had not sufficiently proved

misconduct.

4. Appeal to the MDES Board of Review

¶36. Following the ALJ’s decision, CPUC requested review by the MDES Board of

Review. Among other things, CPUC asked the Board to review the other 900-plus pages of

exhibits that had not been entered in the record at the ALJ hearing. The Board made no

ruling on CPUC’s request concerning the additional exhibits and, based on a review of the

administrative record, the Board affirmed the ALJ’s decision on February 26, 2019.

C. Appeal to the Circuit Court

¶37. CPUC appealed the Board of Review decision to the Coahoma County Circuit Court

on March 13, 2019. In its petition for review, CPUC argued that CPUC, a municipal agency

of the City of Clarksdale, Mississippi, may only discharge an employee who is “found

inefficient or for other good cause.” Based on State law, CPUC had conducted a due process

11
The ALJ decision did not address Sheila Profit’s testimony, the claim of releasing
CPUC personnel records, or the approval of funds for the Clarksdale Revitalization Project.

19
hearing to ensure that it complied with the “good cause” requirement before terminating

Johnson from employment with CPUC. Thus, CPUC concluded, MDES was estopped from

relitigating the fact issue of his misconduct. CPUC also argued that the ALJ erred by

refusing to admit exhibits A, B, C, D, and F and only admitting Exhibit E (the Commission’s

findings of facts and conclusions regarding General Manager Mark Johnson’s actions and

conduct meriting discipline). CPUC also argued that the ALJ erred in requiring the

testimony of Commissioner Davis, based on the reasoning that a single Commissioner is not

entitled to speak for the Commission and that the Commission’s minutes are the only proper

method of evaluating what the Commission knew or considered. Lastly, CPUC argued that

the ALJ’s decision was arbitrary, capricious, unsupported by substantial evidence, and

contrary to the overwhelming weight of the evidence.

¶38. CPUC also moved the circuit court to supplement the record to include the 900-plus

pages of exhibits that the ALJ did not admit. The circuit court granted this motion.

Circuit Court Judgment

¶39. The circuit court entered its judgment on CPUC’s appeal on September 9, 2022. In

its judgment, the court held the following.

(1) Collateral Estoppel

¶40. The circuit court found that the procedural history in the present case was almost

identical to that in Mississippi Employment Security Commission v. Philadelphia Municipal

Separate School District, 437 So. 2d 388 (Miss. 1983). In particular, in Philadelphia, the

supreme court stated:

20
The fact inquiries necessarily before the School Board, on the one hand, and
the MESC, on the other hand, are, as a matter of law, different. . . . Second,
and more fundamental, the doctrine of collateral estoppel must never be seen
as anything other than an unusual exception to the general rule that all fact
questions should be litigated fully in each case. . . .This is not to say that the
proceedings before the School Board are wholly irrelevant. The findings of
fact made by the School Board were received by the Appeals Referee and
considered as evidence, though not preclusive evidence. This course of
proceeding is correct.

Id. at 396-98. Based on this case, the court found that the Commission’s “due process”

hearing, while not wholly irrelevant, did not preclude the ALJ’s findings concerning

misconduct because the CPUC’s analysis of “good cause” required for termination under its

enabling statute is entirely distinct from an analysis of those actions as “misconduct” under

MDES statutes and regulations.

¶41. In reaching this conclusion, the circuit court analyzed the particular language in

Mississippi Code Annotated section 21-27-17 (Rev. 2015), which states, “[CPUC] shall have

the right to discharge employees when found inefficient or for other good cause.” (Emphasis

added). Because the statute cites inefficiency as one type of good cause, the court

determined that CPUC’s “good cause” is entirely different from MDES’s misconduct. This

is because “[m]ere inefficiency . . . [is] not considered ‘misconduct’ within the meaning of

the [MDES]statute.” Wheeler, 408 So. 2d at 1383. Therefore, MDES’s test for

unemployment benefits is different from CPUC’s test for termination. Thus MDES is not

collaterally estopped from evaluating Johnson’s claim and any disqualification due to

misconduct.

(2) ALJ’s Refusal to Admit CPUC exhibits

21
¶42. To determine whether the ALJ abused its discretion in denying the admission of the

CPUC exhibits, the circuit court applied the rationale in Dailey v. MDES, 271 So. 3d 715

(Miss. Ct. App. 2018), which held that “formal rules of practice, procedure, and evidence are

more relaxed in proceedings before administrative agencies than in courts of law [, but]

ideas of fundamental fairness should prevail.” Id. at 718 (¶12) (citation omitted). Further,

as a practical matter, Dailey said the ALJ must have “some discretion to control the

presentation of evidence.” Id. Lastly, because the appellant’s “assertion had been

competently made with other evidence[,]” the ALJ’s reasoning in refusing to admit official

minutes was not an abuse of discretion. Because CPUC was able to competently assert its

arguments without the admission of the voluminous 900-plus pages of minutes, emails, and

CPUC files, the circuit court held that the ALJ had the authority to limit CPUC’s exhibits to

only those necessary to support its argument (namely Exhibit E, the Commission’s findings).

Moreover, the circuit court stated that it had reviewed the entire 900 or more pages of

supplemental record, “a time-consuming procedure,” and had determined that the

Commission’s findings were an adequate summary of the exhibits that CPUC had sought to

admit.

(3) Proof of Misconduct by Clear and Convincing Evidence

¶43. In its opinion affirming the findings of the MDES ALJ, the circuit court addressed

each of CPUC’s arguments concerning its proof of misconduct. The circuit court held that

because Johnson provided credible and persuasive testimony challenging CPUC’s reasons

for his termination, the ALJ was correct in finding that CPUC did not prove misconduct by

22
clear and convincing evidence. The circuit court emphasized that “[it] must not reweigh the

facts of the case or insert its judgment for that of the agency.” Allen v. Miss. Emp. Sec.

Comm’n, 639 So. 2d 904, 906 (Miss. 1994). The ALJ concluded that Johnson acted on

information that he deemed reliable concerning the allegation of sexual harassment,

testifying that Profit showed him a notarized document alleging sexual harassment. The

court noted that, in sitting as a reviewing, intermediate appellate court, it should defer to the

findings of the ALJ in issues involving credibility of witnesses.

¶44. On the telephone-recording issue, the court cited the ALJ’s decision that “[t]he

evidence does not show that [Johnson] directed that all telephone lines be recorded or that

he intentionally withheld information regarding said recording from the employer.” Johnson

testified that he did not direct the phone calls to be recorded, and that he reported to the

Commission that Hemphill had ordered the installation and recording of phone lines. For the

same reasons as stated above, the circuit court found that the ALJ’s weighing of the evidence

should not be disturbed.

¶45. Concerning the allegations of Johnson’s alleged disclosure of confidential

information, the court found that CPUC’s brief lacked any authority or citations to the record

to support this claim, and thus found it had been waived. Lastly, regarding Johnson’s

termination for inefficiency, the circuit court found that based on MDES’s standard for

misconduct, “mere inefficiency” cannot sustain a finding of misconduct. Thus, the circuit

court concluded that the ALJ was correct in not considering CPUC’s arguments surrounding

this issue. See Wheeler, 408 So. 2d at 1383-84.

23
D. Current Appeal

¶46. On October 10, 2022, CPUC filed its notice of appeal from the circuit court’s

judgment. In its brief, CPUC raises the following issues: (1) whether MDES was collaterally

estopped from considering Johnson’s claim because CPUC had already conducted a due

process hearing and adjudicated the fact that Johnson had committed misconduct; (2)

whether the ALJ erred in denying the admission of the Commission’s full set of exhibits; and

(3) whether the Commission proved misconduct by clear and convincing evidence.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

¶47. Whether a matter is barred by res judicata or collateral estoppel is a question of law

and is thus reviewed de novo. Claiborne v. Ocwen Loan Serv. LLC, 194 So. 3d 877, 880 (¶9)

(Miss. Ct. App. 2015) (quoting Baker & McKenzie LLP v. Evans 123 So. 3d 387, 401 (¶49)

(Miss. 2013)).

¶48. Mississippi Code Annotated section 71-5-531 (Supp. 2019) sets out the standard of

review of a decision of the MDES Board of Review:

In any judicial proceedings under this section, the findings of the Board of
Review as to the facts, if supported by evidence and in the absence of fraud,
shall be conclusive, and the jurisdiction of the court shall be confined to
questions of law.

“An agency’s conclusions must remain undisturbed unless the agency’s order: (1) is not

supported by substantial evidence, (2) is arbitrary or capricious, (3) is beyond the scope or

power granted to the agency, or (4) violates a statutory or constitutional right of the

complaining party.” Grace v. Miss. Dep’t of Emp. Sec., 328 So. 3d 1267, 1269-70 (¶7)

(Miss. Ct. App. 2021).

24
¶49. “When an appellate court reviews a trial court’s decision to affirm or deny an

administrative agency’s findings and decisions, the appropriate standard of review is abuse

of discretion.” Vector Transp. Co. v. Miss. Dep’t of Emp. Sec., 350 So. 3d 289, 293 (¶9)

(Miss. Ct. App. 2022) (quoting McGee v. Miss. Emp. Sec. Comm’n, 876 So. 2d 425, 427 (¶5)

(Miss. Ct. App. 2004)). We should only find that the circuit court abused its discretion if we

have a “definite and firm conviction” that the circuit court committed a “clear error of

judgment” in reaching its conclusion after weighing any relevant factors. McCord v.

Healthcare Recoveries Inc., 960 So. 2d 399, 405 (¶13) (Miss. 2007) (citing Ill. Cent. R.R. v.

McDaniel, 951 So. 2d 526 (Miss. 2006)).

DISCUSSION12

I. Whether collateral estoppel barred the ALJ from deciding whether
Johnson was guilty of disqualifying misconduct.

¶50. CPUC argues that because it made a factual determination that Johnson should be

terminated for good cause as required under Mississippi Code Annotated section 21-27-17,13

the MDES was collaterally estopped from making a separate factual determination of

Johnson’s misconduct. In other words, CPUC claims that its findings supporting Johnson’s

12
Before the Supreme Court assigned this appeal to this Court, Johnson filed a pro
se motion to dismiss CPUC’s appeal because opposing counsel allegedly breached the
Mississippi Rules of Professional Conduct. Johnson also claimed that CPUC’s appeal is
frivolous. A three-justice panel entered an order passing Johnson’s motion for consideration
with the merits of the appeal. Johnson subsequently filed another motion to dismiss and
alleged that opposing counsel “repeatedly failed to comply substantially with the Mississippi
Rules of Professional Conduct.” Johnson’s second motion has been treated as an attachment
to his first motion. After due consideration, both motions are denied.
13
“[CPUC] shall have the right to discharge employees when found inefficient or for
other good cause.”

25
termination established “misconduct” precluded any new examination by MDES.

¶51. The Mississippi Supreme Court has defined collateral estoppel as follows:

The doctrine of collateral estoppel—often considered a cousin of res
judicata—serves a dual purpose and protects litigants from the burden of
re-litigating an identical issue with the same party or his privy and promotes
judicial economy by preventing needless litigation. Collateral estoppel is an
unusual exception to the general rule that all fact questions should be litigated
fully in each case. Collateral estoppel precludes relitigating a specific issue,
which was: (1) actually litigated in the former action; (2) determined by the
former action; and (3) essential to the judgment in the former action.

Gibson v. Williams, Williams & Montgomery P.A., 186 So. 3d 836, 845 (¶21) (Miss. 2016)

(internal quotation marks omitted). Therefore, we must look to see if a specific issue being

raised now was addressed and ruled upon in the prior case. Baker, 123 So. 3d at 402 (¶49).

¶52. Interestingly, both CPUC and MDES cite Philadelphia as authority that supports their

distinctly different positions. In Philadelphia, the supreme court addressed the issue of

whether a school board’s finding of misconduct collaterally estopped the Mississippi

Employment Security Commission (MESC)14 from making its own factual determination of

whether a teacher had committed employee misconduct. Philadelphia, 437 So. 2d at 390.

In that case, the board held a non-renewal hearing of a teacher pursuant to the provisions of

the Education Employment Procedures Law of 2001. Id. Following this hearing, the board

made specific, detailed findings that the teacher was incompetent and unfit and that “good

cause” existed for his non-reemployment with the school district. Id. at 390-92. The teacher

in that case challenged this finding in the Chancery Court of Neshoba County, which

14
This Court takes judicial notice of the fact that the MESC has since been replaced
with the Mississippi Department of Employment Security.

26
affirmed the findings of the board. Id. at 392. The teacher then filed for unemployment

benefits with the MESC. Id. At a hearing before a MESC Appeals Referee, the referee

found that the teacher was entitled to unemployment benefits. Id. The school district

appealed this decision to the Circuit Court of Neshoba County, which reversed the MESC

referee’s decision, finding that MESC was collaterally estopped from considering the claim.

Id. MESC then appealed the circuit court’s decision to the Mississippi Supreme Court. Id.

¶53. The supreme court analyzed the differences between the school board’s definition of

misconduct and MESC’s definition of misconduct to determine whether the finding of

misconduct by the school board was essential to the board’s judgment. Id. at 396. In doing

so, the Supreme Court held that although the fact questions litigated before the school board

were the same as the fact questions decided by the MESC, “beyond that, however, we hold

that those fact findings were not ‘essential to the judgment’ in the PMSSD teacher

non-reemployment proceedings.” Id.

The fact inquiries necessarily before the school board, on the one hand, and
MESC, on the other hand, are as, a matter of law, different. In school teacher
non-reemployment proceedings, good cause is essentially an irrelevant
concept. The school administration is not required to demonstrate good cause
for its decision that a particular school teacher will not be reemployed.
Calhoun County Board of Education v. Hamblin, 360 So. 2d 1236, 1239-1240
(Miss. 1978). On the other hand, good cause amounting to willful misconduct
is required before an employee may be disqualified for unemployment
compensation benefits. See Wheeler v. Arriola, 408 So. 2d 1381, 1383 (Miss.
1982) . . . .

Id. Although the board had found the teacher’s contract should not be renewed “for good

cause,” such a finding was not necessary as a matter of law because, under the at-will

employment doctrine of Mississippi, school administrators may refuse to rehire a teacher for

27
“good reason, for bad reason, or for no reason at all.” Id. at 397. “The administration simply

may not base its decision not to rehire upon legally impermissible considerations.” Id. (citing

Hamblin, 360 So. 2d at 1239). Because the determination that the teacher was not being

rehired for misconduct was not essential to board’s decision, the supreme court found that

MESC was not collaterally estopped from considering whether misconduct actually occurred.

Id.

¶54. We find Philadelphia supports Johnson’s position in the present case. CPUC

terminated Johnson after a lengthy investigation and a series of hearings. At the close of its

investigation and hearings, CPUC determined that Johnson had committed various acts of

insubordination, policy violations, statutory violations, and misconduct. However, CPUC’s

enabling statute states “[CPUC] shall have the right to discharge employees when found

inefficient or for other good cause.” Miss. Code Ann. § 21-27-17 (emphasis added). As the

circuit court stated in its final judgment, “[i]n other words, according to this definition,

inefficiency represents one type of good cause or, as CPUC might argue - inefficiency

equates to misconduct.” But MDES’s standard for misconduct differs from that found in

CPUC’s governing statutes. Regulations define misconduct for the purposes of determining

if a claimant is disqualified from receiving unemployment benefits:

A. For purposes of Mississippi Code Section 71-5-513, misconduct shall be
defined as including but not limited to:
1. The failure to obey orders, rules or instructions, or failure to
discharge the duties for which an individual was employed;
a. An individual shall be found guilty of employee
misconduct for the violation of an employer rule only
under the following conditions:
i. the employee knew or should have known of the

28
rule;
ii. the rule was lawful and reasonably related to
the job environment and performance; and
iii. the rule is fairly and consistently enforced.
2. A substantial disregard of the employer’s interests or of the
employee's duties and obligations to the employer;
3. Conduct which shows intentional disregard -- or if not
intentional disregard, utter indifference - of an employer's
interests as is found in deliberate violations or disregard of
standards of behavior which the employer has the right to expect
of the employee; or
4. Carelessness or negligence of such degree or recurrence as to
demonstrate wrongful intent.
However, mere inefficiency, unsatisfactory conduct, failure to perform as the
result of inability or incapacity, a good faith error in judgment or discretion,
or conduct mandated by a religious belief or the law is not misconduct.
Conduct mandated by the law does not include court ordered conduct resulting
from claimant's illegal activity; this may be considered misconduct.

20 Miss. Admin. Code Pt. 101, R. 308.00 (emphasis added). The Mississippi Supreme Court

reiterated in Wheeler, 408 So. 2d at 1383, “Mere inefficiency . . . [is] not considered

‘misconduct’ within the meaning of [relevant Mississippi statutory law].” (Emphasis added).

Thus, MDES requires employers to show a higher degree of misconduct to consider an

employee ineligible for unemployment benefits than CPUC. Therefore, because the factual

and legal considerations of MDES are different from those considered by CPUC, collateral

estoppel does not apply.

¶55. Further, the court in Philadelphia also pointed out the disconcerting consequence that

may arise were we to allow municipal agencies to make findings of fact that precluded

MDES from granting unemployment benefits. The supreme court stated:

[A municipal agency] will always be tempted, out of its own self-interest and
in anticipation of unemployment compensation reimbursement proceedings,
to tailor its findings of fact so as to preclude [MDES’s] access to the [city’s]

29
treasury for reimbursement of the Employment Security Trust Fund.

Philadelphia, 437 So. 2d at 397. If we allowed a municipal agency to collaterally estop

MDES from considering whether an employee had committed misconduct, then we would

be allowing Commissioners to be both a party and the judge in their own proceedings. This

clearly would violate norms of justice and due process.

¶56. Accordingly, we find that MDES was not collaterally estopped from making a factual

determination on whether Johnson committed misconduct that made him ineligible for

unemployment benefits.

II. Whether the MDES ALJ erred in denying the blanket admission of
CPUC’s 900-plus pages of exhibits.

¶57. Of CPUC’s 900-plus pages of exhibits, the ALJ admitted one, Exhibit E, a twenty-

nine-page summary of the rest and refused to admit the only other individual exhibit CPUC

offered. On appeal, CPUC argues that the other exhibits, many of which were board minutes,

should have been admitted when it initially sought to enter them because “a board speaks

only through its minutes.” CPUC also argues that the ALJ abused its discretion in failing to

blanketly admit the other exhibits that it contends it had “proffered.” To resolve this issue,

we first look at what exhibits CPUC actually offered, and whether it made a proper proffer

of the others.

Insufficient Proffer

¶58. Rule 103 of the Mississippi Rules of Evidence states:

(a) Preserving a Claim of Error. A party may claim error in a ruling to admit
or exclude evidence only if the error affects a substantial right of the party and:

30
....

(2) if the ruling excludes evidence, a party informs the court of
its substance by an offer of proof, unless the substance was
apparent from the context.

¶59. “This court has repeatedly held that when testimony is excluded at trial, a record must

be made of the proffered testimony in order to preserve the point for appeal.” Abernathy v.

State, 30 So. 3d 320, 325 (¶19) (Miss. 2010) (quoting Murray v. State, 849 So. 2d 1281, 1289

(Miss. 2003)). In Abernathy, the trial court excluded an expert witness’s testimony, finding

it to be irrelevant. Id. However, after the trial court excluded the testimony, the defense

failed to make a sufficient proffer. Id. at (¶20). Although the defense had discussed the

witness’s proposed testimony prior to and during trial, the defense did not effect a sufficient

proffer at the time the court ruled. Id. On appeal, the supreme court stated that even if the

expert’s testimony may have been relevant,

the record is insufficient for us to determine whether it could have survived
under the Mississippi Rule of Evidence 403 balancing test for admissibility.
It is incumbent upon the proponent of evidence to make an adequate record of
the proposed testimony which this Court can review. This was not done in this
case[.]

Id. Because the record did not contain the necessary information for the supreme court to

make a determination on the admissibility of the evidence, the supreme court was unable to

review the trial court’s exclusion for error. Id. at 326 (¶21).

¶60. This rule applies to non-testimonial evidence as well. In Fontaine v. State, 256 So.

3d 615, 622 (¶19) (Miss. Ct. App. 2018), Fontaine objected to the State’s introduction of a

two-minute segment of the audio-recorded polygraph interview. We held that “[Fontaine’s]

31
failure to proffer the remaining contents or substance of the audio-recorded polygraph

interview constitutes a waiver of the issue on appeal.” Id.

¶61. While “[t]he standard for effecting a proffer is a rather low threshold,” a party is still

required to “dictat[e] into the record what the appellant desired to show by the testimony and

by the evidence.” Vaughn v. State, 759 So. 2d 1092, 1101 (¶28) (Miss. 1999). Doing so

officially indicates to this Court the purpose of the evidence. Id. However, where a party

fails to place into the record “the substance of the evidence he would have offered had the

court ruled otherwise[,]” and the purpose of the evidence was not “apparent from the

context,” the reviewing court is unable to review the decision to exclude the evidence.

Heidel v. State, 587 So. 2d 835, 844 (Miss. 1991) (emphasis added).

¶62. In the case at hand, prior to the hearing, CPUC submitted a brief in support of its

collateral estoppel argument and attached the 900-plus pages of Exhibits A through F upon

which the Commission relied in making their ultimate decision to terminate Johnson. These

documents included Exhibit E, a twenty-nine-page summary of the rest including board

minutes. After the ALJ denied CPUC’s argument on collateral estoppel, the parties

proceeded to the hearing.

¶63. At the beginning of the hearing, CPUC attempted to admit the entire 900-plus pages

of Exhibits A through F. The ALJ, however, questioned how it could determine that each

document contained within the 900-plus page submission was relevant. Counsel for Johnson

objected to the blanket-admission of the exhibits, arguing that no testimony had been

produced to establish any foundation for the exhibits. The ALJ agreed and refused to admit

32
all 900-plus pages without CPUC first presenting testimony or proof of the authenticity and

relevancy of each exhibit. Specifically, the ALJ said:

Ok. I’m not going to blanketly enter the entire volume of exhibits into the
record because I do not know that they are relevant to this hearing at this time.
In other words, the relevancy has not been established. [A] previous ruling, a
ruling—the outcome of another administrative hearing or proceeding—does
not really have a bearing on this case because the scope of review is different.
So therefore those documents may not be . . . relevant. This sheer volume of
documents makes me question whether or not every single document would
be relevant to this proceeding so I’m not going to blanketly enter those
documents into the record.

The ALJ specifically stated that she would determine the admissibility of a document into

evidence if and when that document is presented during the testimony of the witnesses.

Thus, the ALJ did not refuse to admit the rest of CPUC’s exhibits; she only required that

their relevancy to the proceedings be established. Significantly, CPUC made no proffer at

this time concerning the substance or relevancy of any of the other individual exhibits.

Further, given the variety of the nature of the documents found in these exhibits (emails,

minutes, recordings and transcripts of phone calls made by Herring to other CPUC

employees, et cetera), it cannot be said that the substance and relevancy of the 900-plus pages

of exhibits could be deemed “apparent from the context” as noted in Rule 103.

¶64. Thereafter, CPUC laid the proper the foundation with Davis, CPUC’s employer

representative, for Exhibit E, the Commission’s findings, which the ALJ then admitted.15

CPUC then questioned Davis about another exhibit, the August 28, 2018 IVR bid. The ALJ

refused to admit that document because Davis could not authenticate the bid and because the

15
Davis authenticated the exhibit and testified that the Commission had approved the
findings and adopted them into their minutes.

33
ALJ questioned the document’s relevancy to the overall charge of misconduct. However,

aside from these two isolated instances, CPUC made no further attempt to introduce any of

the other documents from the 900-plus pages of exhibits.

¶65. Nor did CPUC make a proffer about any of the other exhibits at any time, either

during the hearing or at the hearing’s end when the ALJ specifically noted that the only

exhibit that had been entered was Exhibit E. Apparently CPUC was satisfied that the

admission of Exhibit E sufficiently covered the proof it wanted to offer and decided to offer

nothing else. We cannot fault the ALJ for not admitting an exhibit that was not presented to

her and we find no error in her approach to the admission of CPUC’s documentary evidence

and her blanket exclusion of the 900-pages of documents.16

16
Sitting as an appellate court, the circuit court was bound by these same principles,
i.e., that exhibits should be admitted only when their relevancy and authenticity are
established in the record before the trier of fact and the offering party whose evidence is not
admitted must have made a proffer of the substance, authenticity, and relevance of the
excluded evidence. Because CPUC did not do this before the ALJ, the circuit court should
not have granted CPUC’s request to add them to the record thereafter.
Rule 10 of the Mississippi Rules of Appellate Procedure prohibits the addition to the
appellate record evidence not presented to the trial court:

(a) The parties shall designate the content of the record pursuant to this rule,
and the record shall consist of designated papers and exhibits filed in the trial
court, the transcript of proceedings, if any, and in all cases a certified copy of
the docket entries prepared by the clerk of the trial court.

....

(f) Nothing in this rule shall be construed as empowering the parties or any
court to add to or subtract from the record except insofar as may be necessary
to convey a fair, accurate, and complete account of what transpired in the trial
court with respect to those issues that are the bases of appeal.

In this case, with the exception to Exhibit E, the ALJ did not consider the rest of the CPUC’s

34
¶66. The separate opinion disagrees and would hold that without the wholesale admission

of board minutes, despite their contents, CPUC was deprived of its ability to prove its

grounds for termination. But due process, as noted in the separate opinion here, only requires

“that a party be afforded the opportunity to present all evidence.” Keeton ex rel. Gray v.

Ocean Springs Sch. Bd., 281 So. 3d 889, 894 (¶18) (Miss. Ct. App. 2019) (emphasis added).

Here, CPUC was given every opportunity to present whatever documents it thought were

relevant. Nothing prevented the CPUC from calling witnesses, such as its independent

investigator, and laying the foundation for the admission of the materials it considered

critical to its own findings. The burden should not fall on the ALJ to weed through 900

pages of documents and determine on its own what is relevant. That is why our Rules of

Evidence require that a foundation be laid and the relevancy of the evidence be proved by

the presenting party. Jackson v. State, 263 So. 3d 1003, 1009 (¶10) (Miss. Ct. App. 2018)

(“Authentication of evidence requires the offering party to lay a proper foundation.”). Even

though the rules of evidence are relaxed in administrative proceedings, some foundation for

specific evidence needs to be laid. Otherwise, a party could admit hundreds, if not

thousands, of pages of evidence at one time and avoid its burden of proving the relevancy

of the contents.

ALJ Discretion to Admit Evidence

¶67. Moreover, CPUC’s additional exhibits were not necessary because CPUC had

established information contained in them by the admission of Exhibit E. Thus, we agree

900 pages of documents, and no proper proffer of each of them was made. Accordingly,
the circuit court should not have supplemented the record to include them.

35
with the circuit court that the Dailey case is relevant to Johnson’s facts here. In Dailey, the

unemployment benefits claimant who had been employed by the Grenada Tourism

Commission sought to enter past Commission board minutes to show that she was terminated

and had not resigned. Dailey, 271 So. 3d at 717 (¶9). The ALJ did not admit the minutes

because Dailey had already testified about ongoing personnel issues with the Commission,

id. at (¶11), and because the ALJ found that her assertion of termination had been

competently made with other evidence. Id. at (¶12). In the case at hand, although CPUC did

have Commission minutes among its other documents, the information and materials from

those minutes were included in the twenty-nine-page summary that the Commission had also

prepared and adopted in its minutes. Therefore, in this case, the Commission did “speak

through its minutes” in Exhibit E, which competently covered the Commission’s assertions

concerning Johnson’s termination.17

¶68. In summary, we find that the ALJ did not improperly refuse to admit CPUC’s exhibits;

it merely required that there be laid a foundation for the relevance of any proposed exhibit.

Moreover, CPUC failed to make a proper proffer of the exhibits it contends were erroneously

excluded. We further find that the ALJ did not abuse its discretion in refusing to blanketly

admit the rest of CPUC’s exhibits, especially when CPUC’s claims were fully asserted in

17
The separate opinion would distinguish Dailey by pointing out that there was no
testimony from a member of the public board offered in Dailey and that the minutes were
never provided. However, if anything, these facts make Dailey even more relevant to
Johnson’s case because a board member did testify to lay the foundation for Exhibit E,
which was included in the board minutes and which summarized the rest of CPUC’s proof.
Moreover, the ALJ never prohibited the admission of other board minutes; the ALJ only
required a proper foundation be laid, which CPUC chose not to do.

36
Exhibit E, its findings, which the ALJ did admit.

III. Whether the circuit court abused its discretion in affirming the
ALJ’s decision that Johnson had not committed disqualifying
misconduct or insubordination.

¶69. In the alternative, CPUC argues it had met its burden of proving that Johnson had

committed disqualifying misconduct or insubordination under MDES statutes and

regulations. We disagree.

¶70. Under Mississippi Code Annotated section 71-5-513, the burden of proving an

employee’s misconduct is on the employer:

(b) For the week, or fraction thereof, which immediately follows the day on
which he was discharged for misconduct connected with his work, if so found
by the department, and for each week thereafter until he has earned
remuneration for personal services performed for an employer, as in this
chapter defined, equal to not less than eight (8) times his weekly benefit
amount, as determined in each case.

(c) The burden of proof of good cause for leaving work shall be on the
claimant, and the burden of proof of misconduct shall be on the employer.

Analyzing this section, the Mississippi Supreme Court in Wheeler stated:

There is little disagreement that work-connected negligence or inefficiency
constitutes “misconduct” within the meaning of the applicable statute
precluding a discharged employee from unemployment compensation benefits
when of such degree or recurrence as to manifest culpability, wrongful intent,
evil design, or an intentional and substantial disregard of an employer's
interests or of an employee’s duties and obligations.

Wheeler, 408 So. 2d at 1384 (emphasis added). Therefore, it is clear that in order for an

employee to be considered ineligible for unemployment benefits, the employer must prove

that the employee’s acts manifest “culpability, wrongful intent, evil design, or an intentional

and substantial disregard of an employer’s interests or of an employee’s duties and

37
obligations.” Id. In addition, “the employer bears the burden of proving misconduct by

substantial, clear, and convincing evidence.” City of Grenada v. Miss. Dep’t of Emp. Sec.,

320 So. 3d 523, 526 (¶16) (Miss. 2021) (citing Jackson Cnty. Bd. of Supervisors v. Miss.

Emp. Sec. Comm’n, 129 So. 3d 178, 183 (¶12) (Miss. 2013)).

Clear and convincing evidence produces in the mind of the trier of fact a firm
belief or conviction as to the truth of the allegations sought to be established,
evidence so clear, direct and weighty and convincing as to enable the
fact-finder to come to a clear conviction, without hesitancy, of the truth of the
precise facts of the case.

Parra v. Parra, 65 So. 3d 872, 878 (¶17) (Miss. Ct. App. 2011).

Johnson’s Misconduct

¶71. On appeal, CPUC argues two bases for considering Johnson guilty of misconduct:

first, Johnson’s unfounded reports to the Mayor and Board of Aldermen that the Commission

was incompetent and should be removed, and second, Johnson’s alleged violations of

numerous workplace rules and policies.

Reports to the Mayor and Board of Alderman

¶72. Concerning its first argument, CPUC cites no caselaw or precedent to support its

contention that Johnson was guilty of misconduct because he made allegations against the

Commissioners. “Generally, a party’s failure to cite any authority in support of an argument

precludes this Court from addressing that argument on appeal.” Smith v. Miss. Dep’t of Pub.

Safety, 348 So. 3d 993, 1002 n.5 (Miss. Ct. App. 2022) (citing Hale v. State, 191 So. 3d 719,

724 n.1 (Miss. 2016)). Accordingly, we will not consider CPUC’s argument that Johnson

was guilty of misconduct based on his reports to the municipal authorities.

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Policy Violations

¶73. CPUC next argues that Johnson was guilty of misconduct because he allegedly

violated several of CPUC’s policies, including violation of the single-source purchase policy

and other expenses; coercion of an employee to file a sexual harassment claim against a

CPUC Commissioner; the illegal recording of CPUC telephone lines; and inefficiency

regarding a new metering system. However, Johnson provided an explanation for each

alleged violation, and given the deference afforded to the fact-finding of the ALJ, we agree

that the evidence presented on this conduct did not meet the high burden of proof required

to show disqualifying misconduct.

¶74. For example, CPUC’s former Commissioner Davis testified that Johnson had

purchased the IVR recording system without public bidding and without the consent of the

Commission in violation of the single-source policy. However, Johnson testified that he had

submitted the single-source purchase to the Commission for approval, but they had neglected

to enter the approval into their minutes. Concerning this issue of the recording of phone

calls, Johnson denied that he had authorized it, and CPUC presented no definitive proof that

he did. According to CPUC’s findings in Exhibit E, the FBI ultimately declined to

investigate the matter. Davis testified Johnson violated CPUC policy by releasing personnel

files to a local radio station. However, CPUC presented no evidence to establish the Johnson

had in fact done this and Johnson denied doing so. Davis further testified that Johnson had

initially refused to be interviewed by Herring; however, the CPUC’s Exhibit E reflects that

after retaining counsel, Johnson did comply and was interviewed. “The supreme court has

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held that an isolated incident is not a constant or continuing intentional refusal [to obey a

direct or implied order].” Gammage, 113 So. 3d at 1297 (¶¶13, 15) (citing Gore v. Miss.

Emp. Sec. Comm’n, 592 So. 2d 1008, 1010 (Miss. 1992)).

¶75. There are several other examples where the evidence was in dispute as to whether

Johnson violated CPUC’s policies but little that established any violation was wilfull or

intentional. Davis testified that Johnson violated CPUC policies and an opinion by the

Attorney General by installing Wi-Fi boxes on CPUC utility poles for a private group at no

cost. However, Johnson testified that the requestor was the City of Clarksdale, a public

entity that had established the CPUC. He stated that the City and CPUC had often

cooperated on the use of equipment in the past and actually had a set procedure for

processing such requests. Thus the city’s request for the installation of the Wi-Fi boxes did

not violate the Attorney General’s opinion or policy. The ALJ had to decide which argument

to accept, and it is not our role to second-guess the ALJ.

¶76. Davis further testified that Johnson pressured Profit to make a false accusation of

sexual harassment against a Commissioner. Although Profit testified that she felt pressured

by Johnson to file a complaint, she also testified that Johnson may have been acting on

misinformation that she may have been harassed by a Commissioner provided to him by

others.

¶77. Finally, the CPUC argues that Johnson inefficiently handled a metering infrastructure

project. As has been previously stated, “mere inefficiency . . . [is] not considered

‘misconduct’ precluding a discharged employee from unemployment benefits.” Wheeler, 408

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So. 2d at 1383. Thus, any allegations regarding Johnson’s inefficiency, unless evidenced to

have amounted to “culpability, wrongful intent, evil design, or an intentional and substantial

disregard of an employer’s interests or of an employee’s duties” is not sufficient to prove

misconduct as defined by MDES. Id. The ALJ did not find compelling evidence that

Johnson’s alleged inefficiency manifested the necessary culpability to find that it rose to the

degree of misconduct.

¶78. After considering the witnesses’ testimony, the ALJ found that CPUC had failed to

meet its burden of producing clear and convincing evidence supporting its claim of

misconduct. In unemployment benefits cases, “[i]t is the role of the agency, in its expertise,

to determine the weight of the evidence and the credibility of the witnesses.” Jackson Cnty.,

129 So. 3d at 183 (¶15). The credibility of witnesses “is a matter for the Board—not this

[C]ourt—to decide.” Franklin Collection Serv. Inc. v. Miss. Dep’t of Emp. Sec., 181 So. 3d

304, 309 (¶20) (Miss. Ct. App. 2015) (finding that “where there is substantial evidence, an

agency’s fact finding must be allowed to stand even though there might be room for

disagreement on that issue”). Having reviewed the record, we find that there was substantial

evidence for the ALJ to find that CPUC had not met the burden of proof required to establish

misconduct because of Johnson’s alleged violations of CPUC policies.

Insubordination

¶79. “Insubordination is defined as a constant or continuing intentional refusal to obey a

direct or implied order, reasonable in nature, and given by and with proper authority.”

Gammage v. Miss. Dep’t of Emp. Sec.,113 So. 3d 1294, 1297 (¶13) (Miss. Ct. App. 2013)

41
(citing Gordon v. Miss. Emp. Sec. Comm’n, 864 So. 2d 1013, 1019 (¶27) (Miss. Ct. App.

2004)). CPUC cites two instances that it considered sufficient to show Johnson’s

insubordination: first, his installation of the Wi-Fi boxes on utility poles, and Johnson’s

“efforts to convince the City Mayor and Board to intervene in the Commissioner’s internal

personnel decisions by reversing his suspension.” But the record does not reflect that

Johnson was specifically instructed not to install the boxes, and that he intentionally and

deliberately contravened that instruction. Rather, the record reflects that this matter arose

after the fact, during Herring’s investigation into Johnson’s management of the utility. There

was also a dispute concerning who requested the Wi-Fi installation—a public entity (the

City) or a private entity (the Revitalization Project). Further, just as CPUC did when it

argued that Johnson’s reports to the mayor and board of aldermen constituted misconduct,

CPUC cites no authority to support its claim that Johnson’s reports or installation of the Wi-

Fi boxes constituted insubordination.

¶80. Mississippi Code Annotated section 71-5-531 provides that “[i]n any judicial

proceedings under this section, the findings of the [Board] as to the facts, if supported by

evidence and in the absence of fraud, shall be conclusive, and the jurisdiction of the court

shall be confined to questions of law.” City of Grenada, 320 So. 3d at 525 (¶12). Because

the record supports the ALJ’s factual finding, we accept it as conclusive. Accordingly, we

find no error by the ALJ because, as stated in Wheeler, “good faith errors in judgment or

discretion” are not considered misconduct for the purposes of determining eligibility for

unemployment benefits. Wheeler, 408 So. 2d at 1383; see also Greenwood Pub. Sch. Dist.

42
v. Miss. Dep’t. of Emp. Sec., 962 So. 2d 684, 687 (¶7) (Miss. Ct. App. 2007)).

¶81. In accordance with the deferential and limited standard of review, we find that the

decision of the circuit court and the MDES Board of Review upholding the ALJ’s grant of

benefits in this case was supported by substantial evidence, was not arbitrary or capricious,

was within the agency’s authority, and did not violate any party’s constitutional rights.

CONCLUSION

¶82. We find that the circuit court did not abuse its discretion in affirming the Board of

Review and ALJ’s decision, and as a matter of law, the judgment of the circuit court should

be affirmed. MDES was not collaterally estopped from determining whether Johnson was

disqualified from receiving benefits because of disqualifying misconduct because statutes

and regulations governing MDES and those governing CPUC have different definitions and

standards for establishing misconduct. Further, the ALJ did not err in refusing to blanketly

admit the 900-plus pages of exhibits that CPUC initially offered because CPUC had not

established a foundation for the admission of each of the exhibits. Thereafter, CPUC itself

only attempted to enter two exhibits, one of which was allowed. If CPUC desired that others

be admitted but were not, CPUC failed to make a sufficient proffer of the substance of the

evidence contained in the documents. Lastly, the circuit court did not abuse its discretion in

finding sufficient evidence in the record to support the finding of the ALJ and MDES Board

of Review that Johnson did not commit disqualifying misconduct or insubordination under

the definition used by MDES. Accordingly, we affirm the circuit court’s judgment.

¶83. AFFIRMED.

43
SMITH AND EMFINGER, JJ., CONCUR. WESTBROOKS AND McCARTY,
JJ., CONCUR IN PART AND IN THE RESULT WITHOUT SEPARATE WRITTEN
OPINION. WILSON, P.J., CONCURS IN RESULT ONLY WITHOUT SEPARATE
WRITTEN OPINION. GREENLEE, J., CONCURS IN PART AND DISSENTS IN
PART WITHOUT SEPARATE WRITTEN OPINION. CARLTON, P.J., CONCURS
IN PART AND DISSENTS IN PART WITH SEPARATE WRITTEN OPINION,
JOINED BY GREENLEE AND LAWRENCE, JJ. BARNES, C.J., NOT
PARTICIPATING.

CARLTON, P.J., CONCURRING IN PART AND DISSENTING IN PART:

¶84. Because I find that the ALJ erred in excluding the Clarksdale Public Utilities

Commission’s minutes and exhibits, I respectfully concur in part and dissent in part from the

majority’s opinion.

¶85. The record shows that the Commission terminated Johnson’s employment after

finding that he committed disqualifying misconduct and insubordination pursuant to MDES

statutes and regulations. Johnson filed a claim for employment benefits, which the MDES

claims examiner granted. The Commission appealed this decision, and a hearing before the

MDES ALJ was scheduled.

¶86. The record reflects that prior to the MDES evidentiary hearing, the Commission

submitted certified copies of the relevant minutes, the transcript of the pre-disciplinary

hearing, and all the exhibits referenced by the Commission’s “Findings of Fact and

Conclusions.” The ALJ ruled that she would not admit all the documents because the

relevancy of all the documents had not been established at that time. The ALJ explained that

the “sheer volume of the documents”—over 900 pages—made her “question whether or not

every single document would be relevant to this proceeding.” As acknowledged by the

majority, the Commission made no proffer at this time concerning the substance or relevance

44
of the individual exhibits. The ALJ also compelled the testimony of a board member, despite

the Commission’s objection. The board member provided testimony consistent with the

“Findings of Facts and Conclusions.”

¶87. After the hearing, the ALJ found that while Johnson was guilty of insubordination,

the Commission’s evidence failed to establish that Johnson engaged in misconduct. The ALJ

explained that

the evidence does not establish that [Johnson] intentionally circumvented
and/or violated policies and procedures. The evidence does not show that the
claimant directed that all telephone lines be recorded or that he intentionally
withheld information regarding said recording from the employer. Much of
the evidence presented reflects poor judgment on the claimant’s part. The
claimant’s actions must be considered in light of the employer’s allegations of
possible criminal wrongdoing and the alleged notification of federal
authorities. . . . The Commission did not claim that Johnson was responsible
for the unauthorized recording of all telephone lines. Employer was within its
rights to terminate the claimant’s services for any reason that it deems
necessary; however, misconduct connected with the work has not been
established.

The Commission appealed the ALJ’s decision to the Board of Review, which affirmed the

decision of the ALJ. The Commission then appealed to the circuit court, which also

affirmed. This appeal followed.

¶88. On appeal, the Commission argues that the ALJ erred by excluding its minutes and

the corresponding exhibits. The Commission acknowledges that its board member provided

testimony consistent with the “Findings of Fact and Conclusions” at the hearing before the

ALJ; however, the Commission asserts that the findings and conclusions failed to provide

a complete basis for Johnson’s “for cause” termination. Rather, the Commission maintains

that its minutes and the exhibits provided direct evidence of Johnson’s insubordination and

45
misconduct, and the ALJ’s refusal to admit these documents prevented the Commission from

proving its grounds for terminating Johnson. The exhibits the ALJ excluded included

evidence obtained as a result of the independent investigation into whether Johnson recorded

phone calls without disclosure—namely, the sworn statements of nine employees, as well as

emails sent by Johnson, purchase records, affidavits, and other documents. Based on these

documents, the Commission found that Johnson implemented a system to record all phone

calls received and made from Clarksdale Public Utilities and that he implemented this system

without the knowledge or approval of the Commission. The minutes and the exhibits also

show other instances of insubordination and misconduct by Johnson, including that Johnson

approved “inappropriate expenditures” in violation of statutes applicable to purchases made

by the Commission; that he attempted to obtain a sworn statement from a Commission

employee claiming that a Commissioner sexually harassed her after the employee expressed

that she did not want to file a complaint, which led to the employee filing a grievance against

Johnson regarding his attempted coercion and harassment of her; and that Johnson’s

inefficient management of the Commission’s Advanced Metering Infrastructure Project led

to unusually high utility bills for customers and damaged the public’s perception of the

Commission. After my review, I find that the ALJ’s exclusion of this evidence denied the

Commission an opportunity to fully prove their grounds for terminating Johnson.

¶89. The majority finds, however, that the ALJ did not err in excluding the documents

submitted by the Commission. The majority explains that the “Findings of Fact and Law,”

which the ALJ admitted into evidence, established the information contained in the exhibits,

46
and therefore the exhibits were not necessary. In support of its decision, the majority relies

on Dailey v. Mississippi Department of Employment Security, 271 So. 3d 715 (Miss. Ct. App.

2018).

¶90. In Dailey, the Grenada Tourism Commission’s (GTC) board accepted the resignation

of Charlotte Dailey, a GTC employee. Id. at 717 (¶4). Dailey filed for unemployment

benefits, and the claims examiner ultimately found that she was disqualified from benefits.

Id. at 717 (¶5). Dailey then appealed to the MDES administrative law judge (ALJ), who held

a telephonic hearing and determined that Dailey voluntarily resigned her employment without

good cause. Id. at (¶6). During the hearing, Dailey asked that the GTC board’s minutes be

entered into evidence. Id. at 718 (¶10). The ALJ asked Dailey how the minutes were

relevant, and Dailey responded, “Ongoin’ personnel issues. They didn’t show any personnel

issues bein’ discussed with me over the past year.” Id. Because Dailey had already testified

regarding the continuing personnel issues, the ALJ did not admit the minutes. Id. at (¶11).

¶91. In reviewing Dailey’s case on appeal, this Court acknowledged that “it is well

established that formal rules of practice, procedure, and evidence are more relaxed in

proceedings before administrative agencies than in courts of law.” Id. at (¶12). We

recognized, however, that “ideas of fundamental fairness should prevail.” Id. “As a practical

matter, an ALJ must have some discretion to control the presentation of evidence.” Id. This

Court ultimately found that the ALJ did not act arbitrarily or capriciously in declining to

admit the board’s minutes into evidence. Id. Dailey informed the ALJ that she wanted the

minutes admitted into evidence to show that there were no ongoing personnel issues, and the

47
ALJ declined to admit the minutes after finding that Dailey’s “assertion had been

competently made with other evidence.” Id. This Court also clarified that Dailey never

provided the minutes to the ALJ, and therefore they were not in the appellate record. Id.

Relevant to the present case, no testimony from a member of the public board was offered,

admitted, or required by the ALJ in Dailey’s case. Hence, Dailey differs from the case now

before us.

¶92. In the case before us, the Commission appealed the ALJ’s decision to exclude the

Commission’s minutes and exhibits. In its brief to the circuit court, the Commission argued

that the entirety of the minutes should have been admitted for the purposes of

plac[ing] in proper context the notice to Johnson of the due process hearing,
his being made aware of the charges of misconduct being made against him,
the conduct of the hearing itself (at which Johnson was represented by counsel
and allowed the opportunity to present such evidence that he desired), and the
actual factual testimonial and documentary evidence received by that
municipal tribunal at that hearing.

The circuit court rejected this argument and affirmed the rulings of the ALJ and MDES

Board of Review after finding that the ALJ did not err by refusing to admit the Commission’s

minutes and exhibits. The circuit court explained that the ALJ “permitted other competent

evidence of such alleged misconduct . . . [and] heard substantial oral testimony from a board

member that largely echoed the content of the board minutes as well as the findings of fact

and conclusions.” However, the circuit court expressed “some concern as to whether the

board member should have been compelled to testify.” The circuit court ultimately found

that compelling the board member’s testimony amounted to harmless error that “would not

justify the reversal of the entire case, especially considering that the assertions were made

48
by other competent evidence as allowed by the Dailey case.” The circuit court also found

that Commission failed to identify any substantial right that has been affected by the ALJ’s

solicitation of the testimony from its board member.

¶93. After reviewing the Commission’s minutes and the exhibits in the record before us,

I find that the ALJ’s refusal to admit this evidence deprived the Commission of its ability to

sufficiently prove its grounds for terminating Johnson. Although the “formal rules of

practice, procedure, and evidence are more relaxed” in administrative proceedings, “due

process always stands as a constitutionally grounded procedural safety net in administrative

hearings.” Sherman-Oliver v. Pub. Emps. Ret. Sys. of Miss., 291 So. 3d 387, 395 (¶36)

(Miss. Ct. App. 2020). The supreme court has clarified that due process requires a party be

afforded the opportunity “to present all relevant evidence” and to allow a party's claims to

be heard “at a meaningful time and in a meaningful manner.” Keeton ex rel. Gray v. Ocean

Springs Sch. Bd., 281 So. 3d 889, 894 (¶18) (Miss. Ct. App. 2019) (quoting Warnick v.

Natchez Cmty. Hosp. Inc., 904 So. 2d 1019, 1023 (¶19) (Miss. 2004)). Furthermore, in the

notice of the hearing before the ALJ, which MDES provided to both Johnson and the

Commission, MDES states that “[a]t the hearing, you will have the opportunity to present all

evidence and facts as may be proper and pertinent to your appeal.” By excluding the minutes

and exhibits, the AJ denied the Commission its opportunity to be heard in a meaningful

manner and to present all the evidence and facts pertinent to its appeal. Rather than allowing

the Commission to present all the evidence it relied on in deciding to terminate Johnson’s

employment, the ALJ instead erroneously relied on the testimony of one Commissioner.

49
¶94. Additionally, the Mississippi Supreme Court has found error where a court allowed

individual members of a public board to testify “what the board did, and what the board

understood, and what the board had authorized to be done in the premises.” Smith v. Bd. of

Sup’rs of Tallahatchie Cnty., 124 Miss. 36, 86 So. 707, 709 (1921). The supreme court

explained that a public board “can act only as a body, and its act must be evidenced by an

entry on its minutes.” Id. The supreme court has clearly stated that the board’s minutes “are

the sole and exclusive evidence of what the board did.” Id.; see also Tinseltown Cinema LLC

v. City of Olive Branch, 158 So. 3d 367, 374 (¶22) (Miss. Ct. App. 2015) (“[O]ne member

of [a public] [b]oard does not necessarily speak for the whole.”). Accordingly, I find that the

ALJ erred by excluding the minutes and exhibits submitted by the Commission. I would

therefore reverse the circuit court’s judgment and remand this case to MDES for a new

hearing, with instructions for MDES to admit into evidence the Commission’s minutes and

corresponding exhibits.

GREENLEE AND LAWRENCE, JJ., JOIN THIS OPINION.

50