COA 380907 ROBERT DAVIS V SECRETARY OF STATE Opinion - Per Curiam - Unpublished 6/2/2026

If this opinion indicates that it is “FOR PUBLICATION,” it is subject to
revision until final publication in the Michigan Appeals Reports.
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S T A T E O F M I C H I G A N
C O U R T O F A P P E A L S
ROBERT DAVIS,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
UNPUBLISHED
June 02, 2026
12:38 PM
v No. 380907
Court of Claims
SECRETARY OF STATE, LC No. 26-000099-MB
Defendant-Appellee.
ROBERT DAVIS,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v No. 380909
Court of Claims
SECRETARY OF STATE, LC No. 26-000103-MB
Defendant-Appellee.
Before: YOUNG, P.J., and BOONSTRA and LIEVENSE, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
In these consolidated appeals, plaintiff Robert Davis appeals as of right from the trial
court’s order granting summary disposition to defendant, the Secretary of State, and dismissing
plaintiff’s complaints. We affirm.
BACKGROUND IN DOCKET NO. 380907
In Docket No. 380907, plaintiff appeals as of right from the dismissal of his complaint for
mandamus and declaratory relief that he filed in lower court no. 26-000099-MB. The complaint
challenges the validity of administrative rules, as well as certain candidates’ affidavits of identity
(AOIs).

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As for his challenges to administrative rules, plaintiff argues in Docket No. 380907 that
Mich Admin Code, R 168.5 is invalid. That rule contains a 7-day deadline for challenges to AOIs,
and it contains a good-cause exception for late challenges. The rule provides as follows:
(1) Except as provided in subrule (3) of this rule, the filing official shall reject any
challenge received more than 7 days after the deadline for the filing of the affidavit
of identity.
(2) Except as provided in subrule (3) of this rule, the filing official shall reject any
challenge that is not in the form of a signed and notarized complaint.
(3) The filing official may exercise discretion to accept a challenge that does not
meet the requirements in subrules (1) and (2) of this rule on a showing of good
cause. [Id.]
Plaintiff also challenges Mich Admin Code, R 168.3. This rule concerns a candidate’s
ability to correct information in an AOI that has been filed. The rule provides, in full:
(1) Subject to subrule (2) of this rule, a candidate who omits information required
by section 558(2) of the Michigan election law, 1954 PA 116, MCL 168.558, may
correct the omission by filing a new affidavit of identity up until the filing deadline
elapses. The filing official shall disqualify a candidate who fails to correct an
omission by the filing deadline. For purposes of this subrule, omissions include, but
are not limited to, blanks or incomplete information on the affidavit of identity, but
do not include omissions on the compliance statement required by section 558(4)
of the Michigan election law, 1954 PA 116, MCL 168.558.
(2) The filing official shall disqualify a candidate who provides false information
as of the date the candidate signed the affidavit of identity regarding information
required by section 558(2) of the Michigan election law, 1954 PA 116, MCL
168.558. Candidates disqualified on this basis cannot reverse disqualification by
filing a corrected affidavit. [Id.]
In addition to challenging the administrative rules, plaintiff argues that Darryl Ervin, a
candidate for State House District 9, filed an invalid AOI. Ervin filed his AOI on December 9,
2025. Given the elected office sought by Ervin and its location within a single county, Ervin was
required to file his AOI with the Wayne County Clerk. See MCL 168.163; MCL 168.558(1).
Plaintiff waited until three days after the deadline for challenging the AOI, on May 1, 2026, to
challenge Ervin’s AOI with the Wayne County Election Clerk. The Wayne County Election clerk
rejected this challenge as untimely and without good cause.
Also on May 1, 2026, plaintiff submitted a challenge to the AOI of Mark Koroi, a former
candidate for the office of judge of the 31st District Court. Previously, Koroi filed his AOI with
the Secretary of State, as required under MCL 168.467b(1). Defendant rejected plaintiff’s
challenge to Koroi’s AOI as untimely.

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BACKGROUND IN DOCKET NO. 380909
Docket No. 380909 arises from plaintiff’s complaint in lower court no. 26-000103-MB. In
that case, plaintiff filed a complaint with the Wayne County Clerk challenging the AOI of Toni
Price Mua, a candidate for State House District 9. Mua was born under a different name and
changed that name through a court proceeding under MCL 711.1 et seq., effective in 2020.
Because of the office sought by Mua and because the district at issue was located solely within
Wayne County, Mua had previously filed the AOI with the Wayne County Clerk. See MCL
168.163; MCL 168.558(1).
Plaintiff argued that Mua’s AOI was required to list Mua’s full former name in addition to
Mua’s current name. Mua had only listed a common-law name that Mua used for several years,
which was the same name Mua had changed it to in the court proceeding. The Wayne County
Clerk rejected plaintiff’s challenge to Mua’s AOI, citing defendant’s guidelines for the use of
common law names.
PERTINENT PROCEDURAL HISTORY
After he was unsuccessful in his challenges with election officials, plaintiff filed
complaints in the Court of Claims. He sought to compel defendant to disqualify the candidates
noted above and/or to compel the Wayne County Clerk to disqualify the candidates. After
consolidating the cases, the Court of Claims issued a thorough opinion that granted summary
disposition to defendant and that dismissed plaintiff’s complaints. Turning first to plaintiff’s
challenge to Koroi’s AOI, the Court of Claims dismissed the matter as moot. The court’s opinion
noted that Koroi was disqualified from the ballot due to his failure to meet residency requirements.
Accordingly, because Koroi would not be appearing on the ballot, plaintiff’s challenge to his AOI
was moot and no relief could be granted.
As for plaintiff’s challenge to Rule 168.3, the Court of Claims rejected the notion that the
rule conflicted with this state’s election law. Turning to plaintiff’s challenge to Rule 168.5, the
Court of Claims noted that this state’s election law does not contain procedures for resolving
challenges to AOIs. Hence, defendant was permitted, pursuant to statutorily bestowed rulemaking
authority, to promulgate rules and procedures for challenging AOIs. This included, the court
reasoned, placing time limits on challenges to AOIs.
Next, and turning to the remaining candidates challenged by plaintiff, the court noted that
Ervin filed his AOI on December 9, 2025, which was more than four months before the challenge
deadline. However, plaintiff waited until after the deadline to file his challenge to Ervin’s AOI.
The court reasoned that plaintiff could have filed his challenge earlier and therefore did not show
good cause.
As to Mua, the Court of Claims rejected the notion that the AOI did not comply with
statutory requirements for identifying the candidate’s name. The court also rejected the idea that
Mua could not secure both a statutory name change under MCL 711.1 et seq. and a common-law
name change, and noted that the Secretary of State had found that Mua had established a common-
law name change. Finally, the court rejected plaintiff’s claim that the cited guidelines for names
changes were not properly promulgated.

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ANALYSIS
This Court reviews de novo the trial court’s decision on a motion for summary disposition.
Kilian v TCF Nat’l Bank, 343 Mich App 621, 630; 997 NW2d 745 (2022). Plaintiff in this case
sought mandamus relief. The trial court’s decision whether to grant mandamus is reviewed for an
abuse of discretion. Sakorafos v Lyon Charter Twp, 349 Mich App 176, 185; 27 NW3d 329
(2023).
With respect to mandamus,1 we have described it as “an extraordinary remedy” that should
issue “to enforce duties created by law, where the law has established no specific remedy and
where, in justice and good government, there should be one.” Holliday v Bd of Canvassers, __
Mich App __, __; __ NW3d __ (2024) (Docket No. 372267), slip op at p. 7 (quotation marks and
citation omitted). To obtain mandamus relief, the plaintiff must establish:
(1) the plaintiff has a clear, legal right to performance of the specific duty sought,
(2) the defendant has a clear legal duty to perform, (3) the act is ministerial, and (4)
no other adequate legal or equitable remedy exists that might achieve the same
result. [Id. (quotation marks and citation omitted).]
Plaintiff also sought declaratory relief in the Court of Claims. In particular, he asked the
Court of Claims to declare that certain administrative rules were invalid. “Questions of law relative
to declaratory judgment actions are reviewed de novo, but the trial court’s decision to grant or
deny declaratory relief is reviewed for an abuse of discretion.” Barrow v Detroit Election Comm,
305 Mich App 649, 662; 854 NW2d 489 (2014) (quotation marks and citation omitted).
DOCKET NO. 380907
RULE 168.5
Plaintiff first takes issue with Rule 168.5. This rule imposes a 7-day period for challenging
a candidate’s AOI. The rule also gives filing officials the ability to exercise discretion to accept
late challenges on a showing of good cause. Plaintiff argues that the rule is invalid because state
law does not set any procedures for challenging AOIs. He essentially takes the position that, in
the absence of statutory procedures, no procedures should exist. He also argues that the good-
cause exception that affords discretion to filing officials is arbitrary and capricious.
As plaintiff notes, a rule that conflicts with a statute is invalid. Brightmore Gardens, LLC
v Marijuana Regulatory Agency, 337 Mich App 149, 161; 975 NW2d 52 (2021). In addition, “[a]n
agency’s legislative rule may be determined to be invalid when the rule goes beyond the
1 Plaintiff’s briefing pays only passing attention to mandamus relief and instead cursorily asserts
that the extraordinary remedy is warranted here. He also gives only passing consideration to the
idea that some of the relief he seeks is relief that could have been pursued against a local election
official, rather than against defendant. And for the reasons discussed infra, plaintiff’s legal
positions lack merit, leaving him unable to show the existence of a clear legal right or a clear legal
duty that is necessary to seek mandamus relief.

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parameters of the enabling statute, when the rule does not comply with the legislative intent
underlying the enabling statute, or when the rule is arbitrary or capricious.” Id.
For purposes of the instant opinion only, this Court will assume without deciding that there
is a right to challenge an AOI as has been asserted by plaintiff’s complaints. And with that
assumption, we hold that the Court of Claims did not err when it held that plaintiff failed to show
that Rule 168.5’s temporal limit on AOI challenges was invalid. As plaintiff acknowledges, this
state’s election law “does not set forth any explicit procedure for resolving challenges to AOIs.”
Moore v Genesee Co, 337 Mich App 723, 732; 976 NW2d 921 (2021). See also Berry v Garrett,
316 Mich App 37, 43; 890 NW2d 882 (2016) (noting that Section 552 does not address the
resolution of challenges to affidavits of identity). Stated otherwise, this state’s election statutes
are silent about the procedures for officials to use when weighing AOI challenges. This silence is
precisely the type of scenario that is appropriate for administrative rulemaking. Indeed, it is
entirely appropriate for administrative rules to fill a “gap” that has been left by a statutory regime
that includes a delegation of rulemaking authority. See Dep’t of Labor & Econ Growth,
Unemployment Ins Agency v Dykstra, 283 Mich App 212, 224; 771 NW2d 432 (2009) (quotation
marks and citation omitted). Further, we discern no part of the challenged rule that goes beyond
the parameters of defendant’s statutory authority, nor any part of the rule that is contrary to the
Legislature’s intent. The Court of Claims did not err in holding that the seven-day deadline for
challenging an AOI was a permissible delegation of rulemaking authority.
Plaintiff’s argument that that the good-cause exception to the seven-day requirement is
arbitrary and capricious also fails. If plaintiff were correct, there would be no authority to allow
the late challenges that he brought in this case. In any event, however, there is no merit to the
assertion that the good-cause exception is arbitrary or capricious. The term “good cause” is a term
of art that appears in a number of statutes and Court Rules and which has generally been defined
to mean “a legally sufficient or substantial reason.” In re Utrera, 281 Mich App 1, 22; 761 NW2d
253 (2008) (quotation marks and citation omitted). This well-recognized standard is neither
arbitrary nor capricious. Indeed, “[a]rbitrary means fixed or arrived at through an exercise of will
or by caprice, without consideration or adjustment with reference to principles, circumstances or
significance, and capricious means apt to change suddenly, freakish or whimsical.” Mich Farm
Bureau v Dep’t of Environmental Quality, 292 Mich App 106, 141; 807 NW2d 866 (2011)
(quotation marks and citation omitted). Incorporating a well-established good-cause standard that
is accepted in several statutes and Court Rules is not “freakish” or “whimsical.”
In light of the above, the Wayne County Clerk had the authority to reject plaintiff’s
untimely challenge to Ervin’s AOI. Furthermore, and as the Court of Claims pointed out, plaintiff
waited months to challenge Ervin’s AOI and only did so after the deadline for doing so. The
prolonged delay undermines plaintiff’s ability to demonstrate good cause. The Wayne County
Clerk did not err, and defendant would have no obligation to inform the Wayne County Clerk to
do anything differently with respect to plaintiff’s challenge to Ervin’s AOI.
RULE 168.3
Plaintiff next argues that Rule 168.3 is invalid. That rule pertains to a candidate’s ability
to correct information on an AOI that that candidate has filed. In general, a candidate’s AOI must
strictly comply with statutory requirements. Moore, 337 Mich App at 729-730. The failure to file

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an AOI that conforms to this state’s election law is sufficient to disqualify a candidate from the
ballot. Stumbo v Roe, 332 Mich App 479, 481; 957 NW2d 830 (2020).
The issue in this case concerns a candidate’s attempt to amend an AOI. Pertinent here,
Rule 168.3(1) allows a candidate to correct omissions in an AOI by filing a new AOI until the
filing deadline passes. Plaintiff argues that this rule conflicts with MCL 168.164 and MCL
168.558(1).
The two statutes at issue that plaintiff cites deal with candidate withdrawal and AOIs in
general. As for the withdrawal statute, MCL 168.164 provides that:
After the filing of a nominating petition or filing fee by or in behalf of a proposed
candidate for the office of state senator or representative, such candidate shall not
be permitted to withdraw unless a written notice of withdrawal is served on the
official with whom his or her nominating petitions or filing fee were filed, or his or
her duly authorized agent, not later than 4 o’clock, eastern standard time, in the
afternoon of the third day after the last day for filing such petition.
In sum, the statute imposes limitations on a candidate’s ability to withdraw after a candidate files
a nominating petition. The statute is silent about amendments to AOIs.
MCL 168.558(1) provides that:
When filing a nominating petition, qualifying petition, filing fee, or affidavit of
candidacy for a federal, county, state, city, township, village, metropolitan district,
or school district office in any election, a candidate shall file with the officer with
whom the petitions, fee, or affidavit is filed 2 copies of an affidavit of identity. A
candidate nominated for a federal, state, county, city, township, or village office at
a political party convention or caucus shall file an affidavit of identity within 1
business day after being nominated with the secretary of state. The affidavit of
identity filing requirement does not apply to a candidate nominated for the office
of President of the United States or Vice President of the United States. [Id.]
The statute specifies what must happen when a candidate files the pertinent documents to run for
certain offices. To that end, the candidate must file, as is pertinent here, petitions, affidavits of
candidacy, and two copies of an AOI. The statute is silent about amending an AOI that has already
been filed.
Returning to this case, plaintiff argues that the combined effect of MCL 168.164 and MCL
168.558(1) is that an AOI must be filed along with nominating petitions or filing fees, and that two
copies of the AOI must be filed. He contends that an AOI can only be amended if a candidate
withdraws and then re-files and that the administrative rule regarding amendment contravenes
these statutory demands.
Plaintiff’s position is meritless. Neither statute he cites deals with amending AOIs. There
is a “gap” in the statutory scheme when it comes to amending AOIs. Once again, the
administrative rule at issue fills that gap. And it does so in a way that does not contravene the
appliable statutes, which are silent on the issue of amendment. In addition, the rule is related to

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the manner in which elections are conducted thereby making the rule consistent with the statute.
Further, the rule is consistent with the pertinent statutory scheme by ensuring accuracy in AOIs.
As a result, the rule at issue is not invalid for providing a procedure for timely amending an AOI.
Cf. Moore, 337 Mich App at 732 (holding that an untimely attempt to amend an AOI was not
permissible). Plaintiff has not identified any error or any legal right that defendant has with respect
to plaintiff’s challenge.
KOROI ISSUES
Plaintiff next argues that the Court of Claims erred by concluding that his requests for relief
related to Koroi were moot. As noted, there is no indication at this time that Koroi will appear on
the upcoming primary ballot. Koroi’s disqualification makes it impossible for this Court to grant
the relief plaintiff has requested, thereby rendering the matter moot. See Christenson v Sec’y of
State, 336 Mich App 411, 418; 970 NW2d 417 (2021) (“An issue is moot if an event has occurred
that renders it impossible for the court to grant relief.”). Although plaintiff asks the Court to weigh
in on whether he provided good cause for his late challenge to Koroi’s AOI, the same will have no
practical effect on the outcome of this case, confirming the mootness of the issue. See id. Nor has
plaintiff identified any issues that are significant, yet likely to evade judicial review.
DOCKET NO. 380909
Plaintiff’s remaining arguments concern the AOI filed by Mua and Mua’s failure to list a
former name on the AOI. The Wayne County Clerk rejected this challenge on the merits. The
Court of Claims did not grant plaintiff relief with respect to his challenge to Mua.
A candidate’s AOI “must contain the candidate’s name . . .” MCL 168.558(2). The statute
takes into account that a candidate might not use a name given to the candidate at birth. To that
end, MCL 168.558(2) provides that “If a candidate is using a name that is not a name that he or
she was given at birth, the candidate shall include on the affidavit of identity the candidate’s full
former name.” Hence, in general, the candidate must list prior names on an AOI.
However, the requirement of listing a name change “does not apply if the name in question”
is any of the following:
(a) A name that was formally changed at least 10 years before filing as a candidate.
(b) A name that was changed in a certificate of naturalization issued by a federal
district court at the time the individual became a naturalized citizen at least 10 years
before filing as a candidate.
(c) A name that was changed because of marriage.
(d) A name that was changed because of divorce, but only if to a legal name by
which the individual was previously known.
(e) A name that constitutes a common law name as provided in [MCL 168.560b.]
[MCL 168.558(3).]

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At issue here is the exception for common-law names as provided in MCL 168.560b. That
statute provides guidance for common law names, including that “a candidate may specify that a
common law name used in accordance with Michigan department of state guidelines for use of a
common law name on a driver license or state personal identification card shall appear on that
ballot.” MCL 168.560b(3). Accordingly, when MCL 168.558(3)(e) and MCL 168.560b(3) are
read together, a candidate’s AOI need not list a candidate’s name change if the candidate goes by
a name that is a common-law name that meets the requirements of MCL 168.560b(3).
To meet the requirements of MCL 168.560b(3) for common-law names, the statute directs
that the Department of State guidelines for common-law names must be consulted. Plaintiff
characterizes the following as constituting those guidelines2:
Common Law Name Changes The common law name change process is used to
adopt a name that is a reasonable derivation of a customer’s current name, provided
that the change is not done for fraudulent purposes. The common law name change
process does not require court issued documents but other documentation is
required.
A customer can change the name on their driver’s license or ID card by presenting
three documents issued from various sources showing the name they wish to adopt.
Plaintiff has not argued that Mua’s common-law name change failed to comply with the
guidelines. Instead, he raises two challenges: (1) that Mua could not effectuate both a statutory
and a common-law name change; and (2) that the guidelines cannot be relied upon under this
state’s election law.
Turning to plaintiff’s first argument, plaintiff notes that Mua followed the statutory name-
change procedures set forth in MCL 711.1(1). This process sets forth the procedure for filing a
petition for name changes in the family division of the circuit court. Id. In In re Warshefski, 331
Mich App 83, 90; 951 NW2d 90 (2020), this Court recognized that the common law provides an
additional means for a name change. The common-law method and the statutory method may both
be utilized, and the statutory method did not displace the common-law method for changing one’s
name. Id. Given that the statutory name-change method did not abrogate the common law, there
is no merit in plaintiff’s argument in this case. As a result, Mua qualifies for the exception found
in MCL 168.558(3)(e) and the AOI did not need to indicate a name change.
Plaintiff’s second issue takes aim at the use of the Department of State guidelines for
common-law names. As noted above, these guidelines were authorized by MCL 168.560b.
Plaintiff argues that defendant should have promulgated these guidelines as rules under the
Administrative Procedures Act (APA), MCL 24.201 et seq.
2 Defendant contends that the document reflecting this language is a “branch office procedure.”
However, defendant does not contest that the document reflects an accurate description of the
Department of State guidelines on this issue.

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Plaintiff misreads the statute. The election statute at issue here does not involve a directive
to defendant to promulgate formal regulations. Rather, the statute reflects the Legislature’s intent
to authorize the use of common-law names used in accordance with Department of State
guidelines. The APA’s constraints on guidelines and rulemaking are not implicated in this case
because this particular matter does not involve an agency promulgating anything.3 The Court of
Claims did not err by concluding that Mua complied with the law or that the Wayne County Clerk
did not err in rejecting plaintiff’s challenge. And as a result, defendant did not need to advise or
direct the Wayne County Clerk with respect to this matter.
CONCLUSION4
In both Docket No. 380907 and 380909, we affirm the decision of the Court of Claims.
This opinion shall have immediate effect. MCR 7.215(F)(2).
/s/ Adrienne N. Young
/s/ Mark T. Boonstra
/s/ Andrew J. Lievense
3 Plaintiff argues that the Court of Claims should have taken notice of his attempt to supplement
the record with documentation from a Freedom of Information Act Request he filed with the
Michigan Legislative Council. Any appeal to this documentation would be meritless because it is
premised on plaintiff’s incorrect assertions about the APA’s applicability in this case.
4 We decline to address the alternate grounds for affirmance argued by defendant.

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