COA 377836 IN RE BREMER MINORS Opinion - Per Curiam - Unpublished 9/8/2026

If this opinion indicates that it is “FOR PUBLICATION,” it is subject to
revision until final publication in the Michigan Appeals Reports.
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S T A T E O F M I C H I G A N
C O U R T O F A P P E A L S
UNPUBLISHED
September 08, 2026
2:25 PM
In re BREMER, Minors.
No. 377836
Muskegon Circuit Court
Family Division
LC No. 2022-000003-NA
Before: WALLACE, P.J., and CAMERON and KOROBKIN, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
Respondent appeals by right the trial court’s order terminating his parental rights to TB
and KB under MCL 712A.19b(3)(c)(i) (conditions of adjudication continue to exist), (c)(ii)
(failure to rectify other conditions), (g) (failure to provide proper care and custody), (j) (reasonable
likelihood that children will be harmed if returned to parent), and (m) (parent convicted of
enumerated offense and continuing the parent-child relationship would be harmful to children).
On appeal, respondent contends that the trial court erred by finding that petitioner, the Department
of Health and Human Services, made reasonable efforts to reunify him with TB and KB, that there
were statutory grounds to terminate his parental rights, and that termination was in the children’s
best interests. For the reasons set forth in this opinion, we disagree with respondent’s arguments
and therefore affirm.
I. BACKGROUND AND FACTS
Following KB’s birth in December 2021 and the children’s mother’s death soon after,
petitioner petitioned to remove KB and one-year-old TB from respondent’s care on the basis that
respondent had a prior conviction for second-degree criminal sexual conduct (CSC) and that his
parental rights to three older children had been previously terminated. In January 2022, the trial
court authorized the petition and ordered that the children be placed with respondent’s brother and
sister-in-law. At the dispositional hearing in February 2022, petitioner reported that respondent’s
adjudicated barriers were his CSC conviction and the prior terminations of his parental rights, and
that respondent’s nonadjudicated barriers were his parenting skills, housing, income, and
intellectual capacity.

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Throughout the remainder of the trial-court proceedings, TB and KB remained in their
relative placement and respondent was permitted only supervised visits. Respondent also engaged
in various services to address his barriers to reunification. Respondent obtained appropriate
housing in March 2023 and was consistently employed. He further underwent numerous
assessments, including a parental capacity evaluation, and received counseling. And services like
supportive visitation, a behavioral specialist program, and virtual parenting courses, among others,
were provided to address respondent’s parenting-skills issues. Service providers had persistent
concerns, however, that respondent’s parenting skills did not sufficiently improve to enable
unsupervised visits or reunification.
In January 2025, petitioner filed a petition to terminate respondent’s parental rights,
asserting that respondent did not sufficiently benefit from the services provided and that
termination was in the children’s best interests. Following respondent’s termination trial later that
year, the trial court found in October 2025 that reasonable efforts were made to reunify respondent
with TB and KB, that there were statutory grounds for termination under MCL 712A.19b(3)(c)(i),
(c)(ii), (g), (j), and (m), and that termination was in the children’s best interests. The trial court
accordingly ordered that respondent’s parental rights be terminated.
Respondent now appeals.
II. STANDARD OF REVIEW
This Court reviews for clear error whether petitioner made reasonable efforts to reunify a
respondent with his children. In re Atchley, 341 Mich App 332, 338; 990 NW2d 685 (2022). We
likewise review a “trial court’s ruling that a statutory ground for termination has been established
and its ruling that termination is in the children’s best interests” for clear error. In re Mota, 334
Mich App 300, 320; 964 NW2d 881 (2020) (quotation marks and citation omitted). “Clear error
exists when some evidence supports a finding, but a review of the entire record leaves the
reviewing court with the definite and firm conviction that the lower court made a mistake.” In re
Baham, 331 Mich App 737, 751; 954 NW2d 529 (2020) (quotation marks and citation omitted).
In our review, this Court gives regard “to the special opportunity of the trial court to judge the
credibility of the witnesses who appeared before it.” In re Mota, 334 Mich App at 320 (quotation
marks and citation omitted).
III. ANALYSIS
A. REASONABLE EFFORTS
Respondent first contends that petitioner failed to make reasonable efforts to reunify him
with TB and KB by insufficiently accommodating his learning disability in the services petitioner
provided him. We disagree.
Absent aggravating circumstances not present in this case, petitioner has a statutory duty
to make “[r]easonable efforts to reunify the child[ren] and family . . . .” MCL 712A.19a(2). This
duty in turn requires petitioner to “create a service plan outlining the steps that both it and the
parent will take to rectify the issues that led to court involvement and to achieve reunification.”
In re Hicks/Brown, 500 Mich 79, 85-86; 893 NW2d 637 (2017). Petitioner is also obligated to

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fulfill “its duty under the [Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 USC 12101 et seq.,] to reasonably
accommodate a disability” by making “reasonable modifications to the services or programs
offered to a disabled parent[.]” Id at 86. And in addition to petitioner’s “responsibility to expend
reasonable efforts to provide services to secure reunification, there exists a commensurate
responsibility on the part of respondents to participate in the services that are offered[,]” In re Frey,
297 Mich App 242, 248; 824 NW2d 569 (2012), and to “demonstrate that they sufficiently
benefited from the services provided[,]” In re Atchley, 341 Mich App at 339 (quotation marks and
citation omitted).
Although other barriers initially impeded reunification, a review of the record makes clear
that respondent’s parenting skills were the primary hurdle to reunification over the approximately
three years of services provided. Respondent reported in the trial-court proceedings that he had a
learning disability that created difficulties with reading and understanding written documents, and
he requested that petitioner make accommodations in its services, including specifically by
providing one-on-one aid. On appeal, respondent argues that petitioner failed to provide him “the
one-on-one parenting education he required” as a reasonable accommodation for his disability.1
Contrary to respondent’s contention, however, the record shows that respondent was given
access to a plethora of services aimed at helping him overcome the barrier his parenting skills
posed to reunification, many of which were provided to respondent one-on-one. For example,
respondent participated in a one-on-one infant mental-health program for TB and respondent, one-
on-one in-home parent coaching, and a one-on-one supportive-visitation program. Moreover, a
caseworker testified that she read various written documents to respondent and gave him an
opportunity to ask any questions he had, that she had monthly meetings with respondent to review
his service plans in which they would “go step by step through each barrier,” and that respondent
was referred to virtual parenting courses in response to a report that he benefited more from videos
than other modalities. Likewise, an in-home family services worker explained that she reviewed
various handouts with respondent and provided him videos on safety and parenting skills.
Furthermore, when challenging services provided by petitioner, “a respondent must
establish that he . . . would have fared better if other services had been offered.” In re Sanborn,
337 Mich App 252, 266; 976 NW2d 44 (2021). As described, petitioner offered respondent
numerous services to improve his parenting skills, and many of those services were provided in a
specialized manner to accommodate respondent’s learning disability. Given that respondent fails
to explain what made the one-on-one services he was provided insufficient and to state what other
1 We assume without deciding that respondent had a disability that required petitioner to provide
him with accommodations. The trial court concluded that petitioner was not required to make
reasonable modifications to the services it offered respondent because there was a lack of evidence
that respondent has a “disability” as that term is defined under the ADA, and respondent challenges
that finding on appeal. The trial court proceeded to find in the alternative, however, that petitioner
reasonably accommodated respondent’s reported disability. Because we find no clear error in the
trial court’s finding that petitioner provided reasonable accommodations in the services it offered
respondent in light of his reported disability, we need not decide whether the trial court erred in
not finding that respondent had a disability that required such accommodations.

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accommodating services he believes should have been additionally provided, “we are left to
speculate what other services [petitioner] could have offered.” Id.
Thus, because respondent has not shown that the services petitioner provided insufficiently
accommodated his learning disability nor explained what other accommodating services could
have been offered, we find no clear error in the trial court’s determination that petitioner made
reasonable efforts to reunify respondent with TB and KB. See In re Atchley, 341 Mich App at 338.
B. STATUTORY GROUNDS
Respondent next contends that the trial court erred by finding statutory grounds for
termination. We disagree.
A trial court “may terminate a respondent’s parental rights if one or more of the statutory
grounds for termination listed in MCL 712A.19b(3) have been proven by clear and convincing
evidence.” In re Olive/Metts, 297 Mich App 35, 40; 823 NW2d 144 (2012). “If the trial court did
not clearly err by finding one statutory ground existed, then that one ground is sufficient to affirm
the termination of respondent’s parental rights.” In re Sanborn, 337 Mich App at 273. Among
other statutory grounds, the trial court found termination justified under MCL 712A.19b(3)(c)(ii),
under which grounds for termination exist if the trial court finds by clear and convincing evidence
that: (1) “182 or more days have elapsed since the issuance of an initial dispositional order,” MCL
712a.19b(3)(c); (2) conditions other than those that led to adjudication exist that cause the child to
come within the court’s jurisdiction; (3) the respondent received recommendations to rectify those
conditions and had a reasonable opportunity but failed to do so; and (4) there is no reasonable
likelihood that the respondent will do so within a reasonable time given the children’s ages, In re
Sanborn, 337 Mich App at 273 (citation omitted).
We find no clear error in the trial court’s finding that statutory grounds for termination
existed under MCL 712A.19b(3)(c)(ii). First, respondent’s parental rights were terminated in
October 2025, over 1,000 days after the initial dispositional order was issued in February 2022,
well beyond the 182-day threshold. See MCL 712a.19b(3)(c).
Second, there were conditions other than those that led to adjudication that caused the
children to come within the court’s jurisdiction. See In re Sanborn, 337 Mich App at 273.
Specifically, although jurisdiction was exercised over respondent based initially on his CSC
conviction and the prior terminations of his parental rights to other children, it subsequently
became clear that respondent’s deficient parenting skills significantly affected his ability to safely
and properly care for TB and KB. More specifically, there was a wealth of testimony and
documentation to the effect that respondent was unable to adequately respond to his children’s
needs in a timely manner, which often raised safety concerns such as when TB would get
approximately 50 feet away before respondent realized that TB had run away and when service
providers had to intervene while the children were putting foreign items in their mouths. There
was also evidence that respondent failed to appropriately respond to his children’s behavior,
particularly with respect to TB, who had behavioral challenges, without prompting and in a
consistent manner, and that respondent struggled to manage both children.

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Moreover, respondent’s parental capacity evaluation reported concern about respondent’s
ability to understand the impact of TB’s medical diagnosis, and that it was necessary, given
respondent’s parenting-skills issues, for respondent to have “a full network of support including
. . . a stable co-parent to assist him in improving upon his current level of parenting skills.” There
was a lack of evidence, however, that such a “stable co-parent” was present for respondent. And,
more generally speaking, there were numerous reports of respondent’s lack of improvement in his
parenting skills even after receiving services, like petitioner’s statement in November 2022 that
respondent had not shown “much benefit” from the supportive-visitation services, testimony in
March 2024 that respondent’s parenting skills had been “leveled out for quite some time,” and
testimony at respondent’s termination trial that respondent was unable to apply the feedback he
received during parenting time. Given this evidence, respondent’s inadequate parenting skills
caused TB and KB to come within the court’s jurisdiction.
Third, respondent received recommendations to rectify his parenting-skills issues and
failed to do so despite having a reasonable opportunity. See id. Respondent engaged with aids
such as an in-home parent-support coach and a behavioral specialist and participated in services
like a supportive-visitation program and infant mental-health services with TB. But despite the
various services administered, in addition to others that respondent did not engage in but was
referred to, there was significant evidence that respondent’s parenting skills failed to improve
sufficiently to enable him to safely parent TB and KB. See In re Lombard, 351 Mich App 523,
532-533; 35 NW3d 751 (2024) (finding statutory grounds for termination when the respondent
failed to “achieve[] any meaningful change” in her deficient parenting skills, among other
conditions).
And fourth, there is sufficient evidence to support the trial court’s finding that there is no
reasonable likelihood that respondent will rectify his parenting-skills issues within a reasonable
time given TB’s and KB’s ages. See In re Sanborn, 337 Mich App at 273. The children were
removed from respondent’s care when TB was one year old and KB was a few weeks old.2 By the
time respondent’s parental rights were terminated, the children had been in respondent’s brother’s
and sister-in-law’s care for almost four years and respondent had received services throughout the
pendency of the case. Despite respondent’s engagement with numerous services over the course
of multiple years, he failed to rectify his parenting-skills issues. In light of the length of the
provision of services without adequate improvement in respondent’s parenting skills, we find no
clear error in the trial court’s finding that there was no reasonable likelihood that respondent’s
parenting-skills issues would sufficiently improve within a reasonable time considering the ages
of his children. See id. at 274-275 (finding that it seemed unlikely a respondent’s parenting-skills
and emotional-stability issues would be rectified within a reasonable time given her child’s age
when the respondent had received services for about 12 months and the child had been in
petitioner’s care for 15 months); In re Williams, 286 Mich App 253, 273; 779 NW2d 286 (2009)
(concluding that there was no reasonable likelihood that the respondent would rectify the impeding
conditions within a reasonable time because “the two years [the child] already had spent in foster
2 Following birth, KB was admitted as a patient to the neonatal intensive care unit (NICU) of a
local hospital. She was removed from respondent’s care while still in the NICU.

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care, her entire life, constituted too long a period to await the mere possibility of a radical change
in [the respondent’s] life”).
The trial court therefore did not clearly err by finding that grounds for terminating
respondent’s parental rights under MCL 712A.19b(3)(c)(ii) were established by clear and
convincing evidence.3 See In re Mota, 334 Mich App at 320.
C. BEST INTERESTS
Respondent lastly contends that the trial court erred by finding that termination of his
parental rights was in the children’s best interests. We find no clear error in this determination.
“Once a statutory ground for termination has been proven, the trial court must find that
termination is in the child’s best interests before it can terminate parental rights.” In re
Olive/Metts, 297 Mich App at 40, citing MCL 712A.19b(5); MCR 3.977(E)(4). “Best interests
are determined on the basis of the preponderance of the evidence.” In re LaFrance, 306 Mich App
713, 733; 858 NW2d 143 (2014). In deciding whether termination of parental rights is in a child’s
best interests, a trial court “should place its focus on the child rather than the parent,” In re CJM,
___ Mich App ___, ___; ___ NW3d ___ (2024) (Docket No. 367565); slip op at 4 (quotation
marks and citation omitted), and “weigh all the evidence available[,]” In re White, 303 Mich App
701, 713; 846 NW2d 61 (2014). Factors to be considered by a trial court in making a best-interest
determination “may include ‘the child’s bond to the parent, the parent’s parenting ability, the
child’s need for permanency, stability, and finality, and the advantages of a foster home over the
parent’s home.’ ” In re White, 303 Mich App at 713, quoting In re Olive/Metts, 297 Mich App
at 41-42. A trial court may also consider “the length of time the child was in care, the likelihood
that the child could be returned to her parents’ home within the foreseeable future, if at all, and
compliance with the case service plan.” In re Atchley, 341 Mich App at 346-347 (quotation marks
and citation omitted). Moreover, “because a child’s placement with relatives weighs against
termination,” a trial court must explicitly consider that fact when determining whether termination
is in the child’s best interests. In re Olive/Metts, 297 Mich App at 43 (quotation marks and citation
omitted).
The trial court did not clearly err by finding that termination was in TB’s and KB’s best
interests. In conducting its best-interest analysis, the trial court acknowledged respondent’s love
for the children as well as respondent’s bond with TB. See In re White, 303 Mich App at 713. In
light of testimony that KB has no bond with respondent and that KB “plays independently at
visitation and does not seek [respondent] out for comfort, . . . nor does she run up to [respondent]
for hugs at the beginning of parenting time,” the trial court did not clearly err by finding that
respondent and KB did not share a bond. See id.
3 Because the trial court did not clearly err by finding statutory grounds to terminate respondent’s
parental rights under MCL 712A.19b(3)(c)(ii), we need not address whether statutory grounds also
existed under MCL 712A.19b(3)(c)(i), (g), (j), and (m). See In re Sanborn, 337 Mich App at 273.

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The trial court also emphasized respondent’s struggles with parenting skills, explaining
how respondent could not understand TB’s special needs and was unable “to provide follow-
through at parenting times, even after much instruction.” See id. These deficient parenting skills
posed a risk to the children’s safety when they were in his care without additional supervision. In
re Kaczkowski, 325 Mich App 69, 79; 924 NW2d 1 (2018) (concluding that termination was in the
child’s best interests when a caseworker “stated that termination would provide the child with the
permanency she needed, especially considering that respondent would not be able to improve her
deficient parenting skills within a reasonable period of time”). Although the record demonstrated
respondent’s love of the children, there was not a reasonable likelihood that the children would be
able to safely return to his care in the foreseeable future, if ever. See In re Atchley, 341 Mich App
at 346-347.
Moreover, the trial court properly considered that the children’s placement with relatives
weighed against termination, concluding that termination was in the children’s best interests
“despite this being a relative placement.” See In re Olive/Metts, 297 Mich App at 43. The trial
court further noted the children’s bond with their foster parents, highlighting evidence that the
children call them “Mom and Dad” and the foster parents’ willingness to adopt the children. And
although respondent argues that the trial court improperly favored the foster parents’ higher
income, the trial court’s discussion makes clear that the court properly considered their ability to
provide the children a stable environment, and it is not error for a trial court to consider the
advantages of a foster home over a parent’s home. See In re Atchley, 341 Mich App at 346-348
(finding termination was in a child’s best interests when the respondent was not making progress
toward reunification and “[t]he child was doing better in foster care and her need for stability and
permanency weighed in favor of termination”). The trial court stated, for example, that the foster
home was “the only home [KB has] ever known” and that respondent’s bond with TB was
“outweighed by [TB’s] needs for proper care and stability.” See In re Frey, 297 Mich App at 248-
249 (concluding that the trial court did not clearly err in finding termination of parental rights in
the child’s best interests when “[t]he child was in foster care or placed with relatives for 22
months” and “the evidence showed that it was unlikely that the child could be returned to her
parents’ home within the foreseeable future, if at all”). The court also contrasted the foster parents’
ability to care for TB’s special needs with respondent’s need for someone to be “present all of the
time in order to be around [the] children.” See In re Atchley, 341 Mich App at 346. In light of the
numerous factors described by the trial court, as supported by the evidence the court highlighted,
we find no clear error in its determination that termination was in the children’s best interests. See
In re Mota, 334 Mich App at 320.
Respondent also argues that the trial court erred by “not seriously considering a juvenile
guardianship” with their aunt and uncle, the foster parents who were willing to adopt them. “Under
appropriate conditions, a trial court may forgo termination and instead place a child in a
guardianship[,]” In re Lombard, 351 Mich App at 534, “allow[ing] the child to keep a relationship
with the parent when placement with the parent is not possible[,]” In re TK, 306 Mich App 698,
705; 859 NW2d 208 (2014). However, “[a] trial court is not required to establish a guardianship
in lieu of termination if it is not in the child’s best interests to do so.” In re Lombard, 351 Mich
App at 534.
Although respondent’s interest in a guardianship fluctuated throughout the trial-court
proceedings, when rendering its opinion the trial court observed that “[a]ny mention of [a

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guardianship] during the trial had [respondent] shaking his head no, as he continues to do so today.
He is . . . not willing to do that.” The record reflects that there was significant conflict between
respondent and the foster parents. Although the foster parents initially supervised respondent’s
visits with the children, arguments arose after respondent spent time on video calls during the visits
rather than with the children. The foster parents then became unwilling to supervise parenting
time, at which point their relationship with respondent deteriorated, and they were unable to
resolve their differences despite participation in a family team meeting and mediation. Continuing
to allow this conflict to fester during a guardianship would not have been in the children’s best
interests. And at the same time, as of respondent’s termination trial, TB and KB had already been
in foster care for most of their lives and were strongly bonded with their caregivers, who in turn
were willing to adopt the children and were able to provide for their needs. In light of this evidence,
the trial court did not clearly err in not finding that a guardianship was in the children’s best
interests. See id.
Affirmed.
/s/ Randy J. Wallace
/s/ Thomas C. Cameron
/s/ Daniel S. Korobkin

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