COA 362549 C-SPINE ORTHOPEDICS PLLC V AUTO CLUB GROUP INSURANCE CO Opinion - On Remand SCt - Per Curiam - Unpublished 12/16/2025

If this opinion indicates that it is “FOR PUBLICATION,” it is subject to
revision until final publication in the Michigan Appeals Reports.
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S T A T E O F M I C H I G A N
C O U R T O F A P P E A L S
C-SPINE ORTHOPEDICS, PLLC,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
UNPUBLISHED
December 16, 2025
2:11 PM
v No. 362549
Macomb Circuit Court
AUTO CLUB GROUP INSURANCE CO., LC No. 2020-001709-NF
Defendant-Appellee.
ON REMAND
Before: O’BRIEN, P.J., and LETICA and REDFORD, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
As the original panel1 explained, the material facts of, and issues presented by, this case
are virtually identical to those in C-Spine Orthopedics, PLLC v Progressive Mich Ins Co, 344 Mich
App 626, 629; 2 NW3d 71 (2022), aff’d on other grounds ___ Mich ___ (2025) (C-Spine I). It
was for that reason that the original panel concluded that C-Spine I controlled the outcome of this
appeal. See C-Spine Orthopedics, PLLC v Auto Club Group Ins Co, unpublished per curiam
opinion of the Court of Appeals, issued August 17, 2023 (Docket No. 362549) (Auto Club), p 1.
C-Spine I was appealed, however, and our Supreme Court addressed the same issues as C-Spine I
and affirmed on alternate grounds. C-Spine Orthopedics, PLLC v Progressive Michigan Ins Co,
___ Mich ___; ___ NW3d ___(2025) (Docket Nos 165537, 165538, and 165964) (C-Spine II);
slip op at 38. Our Supreme Court then remanded this case back to this Court for reconsideration
in light of C-Spine II. C-Spine Orthopedics, PLLC v Auto Club Group Ins Co, ___ Mich ___; 25
NW3d 336 (2025). Because our Supreme Court in C-Spine II ruled only that C-Spine I incorrectly
interpreted the impact of certain facts, there is little that this Court needs to do—the outcome of
this appeal continues to be the same as the outcome of the C-Spine case. So, consistent with C-
Spine II, we reverse and remand this case to the trial court for further proceedings.
1 Judges CAVANAGH and MARKEY were on the original panel, but they are no longer with the
Court, so Judges LETICA and REDFORD are sitting in their steads.

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The original panel summarized the facts of this case as follows:
Plaintiff, C-Spine Orthopedics, PLLC, appeals as of right the trial court’s
order granting the motion for summary disposition filed by defendant, Auto Club
Group Insurance Company. The underlying action involves C-Spine’s efforts to
collect no-fault benefits from Auto Club pursuant to certain assignments executed
by Adrian Glenn, who was injured in a motor vehicle accident and received medical
treatment from C-Spine. Before initiating this action, C-Spine assigned its rights
to Glenn’s accounts receivable to a number of factoring companies pursuant to
various agreements. Based on C-Spine’s assigning away its interest in Glenn’s
accounts receivable, the trial court ruled that C-Spine was not the real-party in
interest and lacked standing when it filed this action. In so ruling, the trial court
noted the existence of alleged counterassignments in which the factoring companies
purportedly conveyed the accounts receivable back to C-Spine, but the trial court
did not address the counterassignments . . . . [Auto Club, unpub op at 1.]
That panel then explained how these facts paralleled the material facts from C-Spine I:
(1) the injured motorist (Glenn) obtained medical treatment from C-Spine for
injuries incurred in the accident; (2) Glenn assigned his rights to obtain no-fault
benefits from the responsible insurer to C-Spine in separate assignments after each
visit; (3) C-Spine transferred all of its rights and interest in Glenn’s accounts
receivable to third-party factoring companies; (4) C-Spine subsequently
commenced this action against the responsible insurer (Auto Club) to recover no-
fault benefits for treatment rendered to Glenn; (5) Auto Club moved for summary
disposition on grounds that, in light of the assignments, C-Spine was not a real party
in interest and lacked standing; (6) C-Spine produced backdated
counterassignments from the factoring companies conveying back to C-Spine the
right to collect Glenn’s accounts receivable; and (7) the trial court granted summary
disposition to Auto Club on grounds that C-Spine was not a real party in interest
and lacked standing. [Id. at 1-2.]
Then, consistent with C-Spine I, the panel held that the trial court erred by concluding that C-Spine
did not have standing in this case because it had “statutory standing under MCL 500.3112.” Auto
Club, unpub op at 3. And, again consistent with C-Spine I, the panel held that C-Spine was a real
party in interest because, regardless of its assignment to third-party factoring companies, C-Spine
was still authorized by MCL 500.3112 to bring the suit, even if it was for the benefit of the factoring
companies. Auto Club, unpub op at 2-3.
In C-Spine II, our Supreme Court affirmed C-Spine I’s standing analysis, see C-Spine II,
___ Mich at ___; slip op at 26-27, so our conclusion as to that issue is the same as the original
panel’s. C-Spine has standing because it is permitted by MCL 500.3112 to bring a direct cause of
action against no-fault insurers like Auto Club.
As for the real-party-in-interest issue, while C-Spine II affirmed C-Spine I, its analysis
differed. C-Spine II concluded that, reading the plaintiff’s assignments in that case, it had “fully
assigned its rights to litigate [the injured motorists’] claims for PIP benefits before commencement

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of litigation,” so “it was not the real party in interest when it filed its complaints.” C-Spine II, ___
Mich at ___; slip op at 31. But C-Spine II held that the factoring companies valid
counterassignments of the injured motorists’ claims back to plaintiff “restored [plaintiff] as a real
party in interest.” Id. at ___; slip op at 32. That did not end the analysis, however, because “a
party may not cure a real party in interest defect through out-of-court action alone,” so the Court
held that the plaintiff needed to file an amended complaint “reflecting the counter-assignments or
take some other action that would have allowed the trial court to consider their effect.” Id. at 32.
The Court accordingly remanded the case to the trial court for further proceedings.
The facts of this case are materially identical to those of C-Spine II (just like they were
materially identical to the facts of C-Spine I). And because the facts of this case are materially
identical to those of C-Spine II, the result of this appeal is the same as the result of that one.
C-Spine transferred all of its rights and interests in Glenn’s accounts receivable to third-
party factoring companies,2 so it was not the real party in interest when it filed its complaint. But
during the litigation below, C-Spine produced counterassignments in which the factoring
companies purported to assign their rights and interests in Glenn’s accounts receivable back to C-
Spine after this litigation was commenced. If those counterassignments are valid,3 then C-Spine
is the real party in interest in this litigation. Even if valid, however, the existence of the
counterassignments alone is not dispositive. As explained in C-Spine II, C-Spine must still file an
amended complaint “reflecting the counter-assignments or take some other action that would have
allowed the trial court to consider their effect.” Id. at ___; slip op at 32. So, following C-Spine
II’s lead, we remand this case to the trial court so that C-Spine can take appropriate action to allow
the court to consider the legal effect of the purported counterassignments. Additionally,
[o]n remand, the parties may raise matters not previously addressed by the lower
courts. These include whether C-Spine can now file amended complaints pursuant
to MCR 2.118 and the implications of MCL 500.3145 on the case. Our decision is
also without prejudice to [Auto Club] seeking summary disposition under a
different legal theory, if doing so would be appropriate. [Id. at ___; slip op at 32-
33.]
In other words, while C-Spine may be a real party in interest by virtue of the counterassignments,
it was not the real party in interest when it filed its complaint, and “[w]hether C-Spine can still
cure the real party in interest defect in this case in the trial court may be addressed on remand.”
2 The language of the assignments at issue in C-Spine II is substantially similar to the assignments
at issue here. That aside, the plain language of the assignments at issue here clearly demonstrates
that C-Spine did not retain any interest in Glenn’s accounts receivable or the right to litigate the
assigned claims.
3 Auto Club disputed the validity of these counterassignments in its motion for summary
disposition, but that argument has never been litigated. C-Spine failed to address the arguments
in its response to Auto Club’s motion, which caused the trial court to not address the merits of
Auto Club’s arguments. All the court said on the matter was, “Plaintiff fails to address any of
Defendant’s arguments regarding the alleged counter-assignments.”

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Id. at ___; slip op at 38. The trial court may also address any other issue that Auto Club wishes to
raise on remand, including but not limited to whether C-Spine’s counterassignments are valid,
whether any amended complaint that C-Spine files relates back to C-Spine’s original complaint,
and the implications of MCL 500.3145 on the case.
Accordingly, like the original panel, we reverse the trial court’s order granting Auto Club’s
motion for summary disposition, and we remand this case to the trial court for further proceedings
consistent with this opinion. We do not retain jurisdiction.
We decline to award taxable costs under MCR 7.219.
/s/ Colleen A. O’Brien
/s/ Anica Letica
/s/ James Robert Redford

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