COA 375479 IN RE R SCHROLL MINOR Opinion - Per Curiam - Unpublished 2/5/2026

If this opinion indicates that it is “FOR PUBLICATION,” it is subject to
revision until final publication in the Michigan Appeals Reports.
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S T A T E O F M I C H I G A N
C O U R T O F A P P E A L S
In re R. SCHROLL, Minor. UNPUBLISHED
February 05, 2026
12:10 PM
No. 375479
Calhoun Circuit Court
Family Division
LC No. 2023-001135-NA
In re DUNN/SCHROLL, Minors. No. 375485
Calhoun Circuit Court
Family Division
LC No. 2023-001135-NA
Before: O’BRIEN, P.J., and MURRAY and LETICA, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
In these consolidated appeals,1 in Docket No. 375479, respondent-father appeals as of right
the trial court order terminating his parental rights to the minor child, RS, under
MCL 712A.19b(3)(c)(i) (conditions that led to adjudication continue to exist) and
MCL 712A.19b(3)(j) (reasonable likelihood of harm). Respondent-father challenges the trial
court’s finding of statutory grounds for termination. In Docket No. 375485, respondent-mother
appeals as of right the same order terminating her parental rights to RS, as well as her parental
rights to her two other minor children, HD and CD, under MCL 712A.19b(3)(c)(i),
MCL 712A.19b(3)(c)(ii) (other conditions exist), and MCL 712A.19b(3)(j). Respondent-mother
challenges the trial court’s findings that petitioner, the Department of Health and Human Services
(DHHS), made reasonable efforts, given her cognitive disability. She also argues that the trial
1 In re R Schroll Minor; In re Dunn/Schroll Minors, unpublished order of the Court of Appeals,
entered May 14, 2025 (Docket Nos. 375479 and 375485).

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court’s finding that termination was in the children’s best interests was clearly erroneous. We
affirm.
I. RELEVANT FACTS AND PROCEEDINGS
In April 2023, DHHS petitioned the trial court for an ex parte order to remove HD, CD,
and RS from respondents’ care, alleging physical and medical neglect of all three children. The
petition highlighted developmental delays in RS and interruptions in HD’s and CD’s medical and
mental-health services because of the family’s frequent relocations. The petition expressed
concerns that respondents’ cognitive impairments affected their ability to meet the children’s
needs. After a preliminary hearing, the trial court authorized the petition, placed the children with
DHHS for care and supervision, ordered that reasonable efforts to reunify the family were to be
made, and allowed respondents supervised parenting time.
After nearly two years of hearings and services, a termination hearing was held over five
days beginning in March 2025. When the termination hearing began, respondents were living in
a one-bedroom apartment that they obtained in September 2024. But foster-care specialist
Candace Williams, who took over the case in December 2024, testified that the apartment was not
appropriate for 12-year-old HD and 10-year-old CD, who could not share a bedroom. She
presumed, however, that the apartment would be appropriate should the trial court reunite RS with
respondents. There was no dispute that respondents participated in numerous services and that
they regularly attended parenting time. The issues central to the termination hearing were whether
DHHS accommodated respondents’ intellectual disabilities and cognitive impairments, whether
respondents benefited from the services provided, and whether reunification would be possible if
respondents were given more time to participate in and benefit from services.
Foster-care worker Carmen Davis testified about using the teach-back method to
communicate with respondents, which involved reading information to respondents, explaining
information, and having them repeat the information back to her. Davis testified that the Early On
service providers and school personnel who met with respondent-mother and her to discuss HD’s
and CD’s Individualized Education Programs used the teach-back method. Davis also testified
that she discussed respondent-mother’s limitations with all of respondent-mother’s service and
healthcare providers, and she said that the healthcare providers used language designed to help
respondent-mother better understand medical issues. Foster-care specialist Williams also testified
about how she presented material to respondents. She explained that respondents received Early
On services at parenting times with RS that were designed to distill and help respondents practice
what RS was learning in physical, occupational, and speech therapy.
Both foster-care worker Davis and foster-care specialist Williams testified that respondents
did not benefit from the services provided. Despite attending multiple parenting classes,
respondent-mother struggled with parenting skills without significant assistance. Williams
provided examples of respondents’ inability to internalize guidance, such as needing constant
redirection to assist RS with physical activities. Davis noted respondent-father’s developmental
delay and intellectual disability, stating that no additional services could compensate for his
cognitive delays. RS had significant developmental delays and a form of cerebral palsy. Both
Davis and Williams testified that neither respondent understood RS’s medical needs or could
manage appointments, convey information about RS to the medical staff, or implement

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recommendations. Both Davis and Williams opined that terminating respondents’ parental rights
was in the children’s best interests, emphasizing the children’s need for stability and permanency.
HD and CD were together in a preadoptive placement, were bonded with their foster family, and
were thriving. RS was in a new preadoptive placement, and although he had a bond with
respondents, they struggled to meet his needs.
Respondent-mother emphasized her bond with the children and expressed her desire to
reunite with them. She denied that domestic discord existed between her and respondent-father,
insisted that none of her children wanted to be adopted, and stated that CD was lying if she said
that respondent-father touched her inappropriately. Respondent-mother intended to stay with
respondent-father despite the issues in their relationship.
The trial court ruled that DHHS had made active efforts toward reunification but that
respondents failed to benefit from services. The court found statutory grounds for termination
under MCL 712A.19b(3)(c)(i), (3)(c)(ii), and (3)(j), citing respondents’ inability to care for the
children and the risk of harm if they were returned home. The court determined that termination
was in the children’s best interests given their need for stability and respondents’ failure to address
concerns about abuse and neglect. The trial court entered an order terminating respondents’
parental rights. Respondents now appeal.
II. STANDARDS OF REVIEW
This Court reviews for clear error a trial court’s decision that a ground for termination has
been proven by clear and convincing evidence. In re Keillor, 325 Mich App 80, 85; 923 NW2d
617 (2018). See also MCR 3.977(K). Likewise, this Court reviews for clear error a trial court’s
decision that termination is in the child’s best interest by a preponderance of the evidence. In re
Keillor, 325 Mich App at 93. A finding is clearly erroneous if, although there is evidence to
support it, this Court is left with a “definite and firm conviction” that a mistake was made. In re
Mason, 486 Mich 142, 152; 782 NW2d 747 (2010) (quotation marks and citation omitted).
In termination cases, unpreserved issues are reviewed for plain error affecting substantial
rights. In re Pawloski, ___ Mich App ___, ___; ___ NW3d ___ (2025) (Docket No. 372145); slip
op at 4, order scheduling oral argument ___ Mich ___; 25 NW3d 671 (2025) (quotation marks,
citations, and alteration brackets omitted). “To avoid forfeiture under the plain error rule, three
requirements must be met: 1) error must have occurred, 2) the error was plain, i.e., clear or obvious,
3) and the plain error affected substantial rights.” Id.; slip op at 4-5 (quotation marks and citation
omitted). “Generally, an error affects substantial rights if it caused prejudice, i.e., it affected the
outcome of the proceedings.” In re Utrera, 281 Mich App 1, 9; 761 NW2d 253 (2008). The
asserting party “bears the burden of persuasion with respect to prejudice.” In re Pederson, 331
Mich App 445, 463; 951 NW2d 70 (2020) (quotation marks and citation omitted).
III. DOCKET NO. 375479
Respondent-father contends that the trial court clearly erred by finding statutory grounds
to terminate his parental rights when he substantially complied with his parent-agency treatment
plan. We disagree.

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As stated, the trial court terminated respondent-father’s parental rights to RS under
MCL 712A.19b(3)(c)(i) and (3)(j). MCL 712A.19b(3)(c)(i) supports termination when “182 or
more days have elapsed since the issuance of an initial dispositional order” and the trial court finds
by clear and convincing evidence that “[t]he conditions that led to the adjudication continue to
exist and there is no reasonable likelihood that the conditions will be rectified within a reasonable
time considering the child’s age.”
It is undisputed that more than 182 days elapsed since issuance of the initial dispositional
order in July 2023 and the termination hearing in March 2025. The conditions that led to
respondent-father’s adjudication were homelessness and parenting skills; specifically an inability
to provide proper care and custody for RS. At the time of the termination hearing, respondents
had lived for nearly six months in a one-bedroom apartment, which foster-care specialist Williams
presumed was suitable for reunification with RS. The critical issue was whether respondent-father
had sufficiently benefited from his treatment plan to be able to provide proper care for RS. Clear
and convincing evidence supported the trial court’s determination that he had not, nor could he be
expected to do so within a reasonable time.
Respondent-father completed parenting classes and supportive visitation, regularly
attended parenting time when he was in the county, was engaged in Early On services for RS, and
received various services through Summit Pointe. Nevertheless, concerns remained about
respondent-father’s ability to parent.
The witnesses at the termination hearing consistently testified that neither respondent had
demonstrated that he or she could provide the care that RS needed without substantial, ongoing
assistance. Case service plans, as well as witness testimony, indicated that respondent could follow
directions but lacked the capacity to incorporate guidance and initiate and complete tasks without
direction. Case service plans also noted that respondents would “likely need continuous ongoing
support to provide a proper safe environment with extensive community support” for the children’s
needs, including RS’s extensive needs. Respondent-father relied on respondent-mother to provide
food, clothing, and other items during parenting time. He also relied on respondent-mother to
schedule and remind him of his own appointments, and he would not attend appointments without
respondent-mother. Witnesses at the termination hearing acknowledged that respondent-father
loved and was bonded to RS. Throughout the child protective proceeding, however, both
respondents’ progress with respect to parenting skills was consistently assessed as poor.
Respondent-father asserts on appeal that he met the recommendations in his psychological
evaluation. The record does not support this assertion. Respondent-father’s psychological
evaluation concluded that his overall prognosis for developing the skills to parent independently
was poor given his “lack of insight, intellectual deficits, and tendencies to deny problems.” The
evaluator stated that respondent-father would need to commit “to the process of therapy, engage
fully in services, and make definitive changes.” Witnesses testified, and the record supports, that
none of these recommendations appeared to have been met. Respondent-father’s therapy was
interrupted by periodic moves out of Summit Pointe’s service area. Respondent-father engaged
in, but did not benefit from services, and there is no evidence that he made definitive changes. “A
parent’s failure to participate in and benefit from a service plan is evidence that the parent will not
be able to provide a child proper care or custody.” In re White, 303 Mich App 701, 710; 846
NW2d 61 (2014).

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On this record, we cannot say that the trial court clearly erred in determining that clear and
convincing evidence established MCL 712A.19b(3)(c)(i) as a statutory basis for the termination
of respondent-father’s parental rights. “If the trial court did not clearly err by finding one statutory
ground existed, then [this] one ground is sufficient to affirm the termination of respondent’s
parental rights.” In re Sanborn, 337 Mich App 252, 273; 976 NW2d 44 (2021). Therefore, we
need not consider the trial court’s determination that clear and convincing evidence also
established a ground for termination under MCL 712A.19b(3)(j).2
IV. DOCKET NO. 375485
A. REASONABLE EFFORTS
Respondent-mother contends that DHHS did not make the active efforts required in this
case to accommodate her cognitive and intellectual disabilities. We disagree.
This issue is unpreserved because respondent-mother did not object or indicate that her
services were inadequate. See In re Atchley, 341 Mich App 332, 337; 990 NW2d 685 (2022).
Under the probate code, DHHS “has an affirmative duty to make reasonable efforts to
reunify a family before seeking termination of parental rights.” In re Hicks/Brown, 500 Mich
79, 85; 893 NW2d 637 (2017), citing MCL 712A.18f(3)(b) and (c), and MCL 712A.19a(2). To
satisfy its obligations to make reasonable efforts toward reunification, DHHS “must create a case
service plan outlining the steps that it and the parent will take to rectify the issues that led to court
involvement and to achieve reunification.” In re Hicks/Brown, 500 Mich at 85-86. DHHS also
has obligations under the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), 42 USC 12101 et seq., “that
dovetail with its obligations under the Probate Code.” In re Hicks/Brown, 500 Mich at 86. DHHS
cannot meet its obligation to provide reasonable services if it does not accommodate a disability
under the ADA. Id. When challenging the services offered on the basis that DHHS violated the
ADA, a respondent must establish that he or she would have fared better if other services had been
offered. See In re Sanborn, 337 Mich App at 266.
The record in the present case shows that DHHS was aware of respondent-mother’s
cognitive and intellectual disabilities. After the adjudication, DHHS prepared a joint parent-
agency treatment plan for respondents. Foster-care worker Davis testified that she read the parent-
agency treatment plans to respondent-mother, asked her to explain different sections of the parent-
agency treatment plans in her own words, and gave her an opportunity to ask questions and offer
suggestions about services. Davis also testified that she urged service providers to use the teach-
back method with respondent-mother. In addition, Davis testified that, during their two-hour drive
to parenting time, she talked with respondent-mother about how Davis could better help her,
assisted respondent-mother with calendaring, and reviewed the dates for upcoming services. The
2 Respondent-father does not challenge the trial court’s finding that termination was in the
children’s best interests. As such, we may presume that the trial court did not clearly err by finding
that a preponderance of the evidence established that termination of respondent-father’s parental
rights was in RS’s best interests. See In re JS & SM, 231 Mich App 92, 98-99; 585 NW2d 326
(1998), overruled in part on other grounds In re Trejo, 462 Mich 341; 612 NW2d 407 (2000).

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record shows that Davis helped respondent-mother complete forms and prepare for RS’s medical
appointments; obtain, complete, and submit applications for housing and for services at Women’s
Co-Op and Summit Pointe; and obtain a post office box. Moreover, rather than overwhelming
respondent-mother with RS’s physical-therapy, occupational-therapy, and speech-therapy
appointments, Early On distilled the lessons from those therapies and provided respondent-mother
with hands-on training to implement the lessons.
Through Summit Pointe, respondent-mother received services to help her develop
independence, insight, a support system, and a healthy lifestyle for herself and her family.
Specifically, respondent-mother received medication services, vocational assistance, case service
management at least once a month, and one-on-one peer support to help her with a range of
activities. Respondent-mother was also referred to counseling at Summit Pointe to help her gain
insight into her behaviors and their effect on her family.
Respondent-mother argues on appeal that DHHS did not make the required active efforts.
As evidence supporting this argument, respondent-mother points to foster-care specialist
Williams’s testimony that she was unfamiliar with the teach-back method and to the absence of
evidence that other service providers used the teach-back method. The record shows, however,
that, although Williams testified at the termination hearing that she was unfamiliar with the teach-
back method, Williams actually conveyed information to respondents in a manner consistent with
the teach-back method, even if she did not label it as such. Williams testified that she read
information to respondents, explained what it meant, and then asked them whether they understood
and had them repeat the information back to her. Under questioning by the trial court, Williams
affirmed that this was her method of conveying information, and the trial court identified
Williams’s practice as the teach-back method. To the extent that respondent-mother’s argument
relies on Williams’s unfamiliarity with terminology while overlooking evidence indicating that
Williams conveyed information in accordance with the teach-back method, her argument that
DHHS failed to accommodate her cognitive and intellectual disabilities fails.
As to the second prong of respondent-mother’s argument, whether the courses that
respondent-mother took at the Women’s Co-Op used the teach-back method cannot be determined
from the record. Even so, foster-care worker Davis testified that the Women’s Co-Op
accommodated respondents by reading questions aloud to them so that they could answer verbally
rather than in writing. Davis also testified that Early On workers and school personnel used the
teach-back method and that she discussed respondent-mother’s limitations with all of respondent-
mother’s service and healthcare providers, who used language designed to help respondent-mother
better understand medical issues. When respondent-mother was not referred to a Nurturing
Parenting Program because she did not understand the material, Davis provided an alternative
means of conveying comparable information.
As the foregoing illustrates, the record contains substantial evidence that DHHS fulfilled
its obligation under the ADA to “make reasonable modifications in polices, practices, or
procedures” to accommodate respondent-mother’s disabilities. In re Sanborn, 337 Mich App
at 263 (quotation marks and citation omitted). Caseworkers used the teach-back method, along
with pictures and every-day examples, to convey expectations to respondent-mother; urged
respondent-mother’s service providers to use the teach-back method or to otherwise instruct
respondent-mother in a way that she could understand; referred respondent-mother to providers

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with expertise in providing services to cognitively and intellectually impaired individuals, such as
Summit Pointe and Early On; and attempted to provide alternative means of instruction whenever
necessary. Given this record, the trial court did not plainly err by determining that DHHS met its
obligation to accommodate respondent-mother’s cognitive and intellectual disabilities and,
therefore, that DHHS’s efforts at reunification were reasonable under the circumstances.3
B. BEST INTERESTS
Respondent-mother next argues that the trial court clearly erred by finding that termination
of her parental rights was in the children’s best interests, given the parent-child bonds, the older
children’s opposition to termination of her parental rights, and the trial court’s reliance on unsworn
statements from the lawyer-guardian ad litem (L-GAL) as the basis for its best-interest
determination. Again, we disagree.
If the trial court finds “that there are grounds for termination of parental rights and that
termination of parental rights is in the child’s best interests, the court shall order termination of
parental rights and order that additional efforts for reunification of the child with the parent not be
made.” MCL 712A.19b(5). The trial court must find by a preponderance of the evidence that
termination of parental rights is in a child’s best interests. In re Moss, 301 Mich App 76, 90; 836
NW2d 182 (2013). In making its best-interest determination, a trial court may consider “the child’s
bond to the parent, the parent’s parenting ability, the child’s need for permanency, stability, and
finality, and the advantages of a foster home over the parent’s home[.]” In re Gonzales/Martinez,
310 Mich App 426, 434; 871 NW2d 868 (2015) (brackets, quotation marks, and citation omitted).
The court may also consider “the parent’s compliance with treatment plans, the child’s well-being
in care, and the possibility of adoption.” In re Sanborn, 337 Mich App at 277. In making a best-
interest determination, the focus is on the child, not the parent. In re Schadler, 315 Mich App 406,
411; 890 NW2d 676 (2016). “[I]f the best interests of the individual children significantly differ,
the trial court should address those differences when making its determination of the children’s
best interests.” In re White, 303 Mich App at 715.
A preponderance of the evidence showed that termination of respondent-mother’s parental
rights was in RS’s best interests. The record showed that respondent-mother was unable to help
RS meet his normal developmental milestones, let alone understand and meet his ongoing medical
needs. RS was nearly three years old at the time of the termination hearing and had been in foster
care since he was nine months old. He was in a preadoptive placement that was meeting all his
needs, and he was interacting well with the foster parents, their children, and the household pets.
Given these facts, it was not clearly erroneous for the trial court to determine that termination of
respondent-mother’s parental rights was in RS’s best interests.
3 Apart from arguing that DHHS did not make the efforts required to accommodate her cognitive
and intellectual disabilities, respondent-mother does not argue that the statutory grounds for
termination were not proved. “The failure to brief the merits of an allegation of error is deemed
an abandonment of the issue.” In re JS & SM, 231 Mich App at 98. Therefore, we may assume
for purposes of this appeal that the trial court did not clearly err by finding that clear and convincing
evidence established at least one statutory ground for termination. See id. at 98-99.

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As to HD and CD, HD vacillated regarding whether he wanted to be reunited with
respondent-mother or adopted. HD indicated at his psychological evaluation that he wanted to go
back home to respondent-mother. When questioned later by foster-care specialist Williams, HD
said that he was “fine” staying with his foster family, concerned primarily that, if adopted, then he
would never see respondent-mother or respondent-father again. CD, on the other hand, did not
indicate at her psychological evaluation that she wanted to be reunited with respondent-mother,
and she indicated to Williams that she felt safe in her foster home and wanted to be adopted.
Both children’s psychological evaluations indicated that they had suffered from neglect
and had experienced the world as a harsh, unsafe, and inconsistent place. Recommendations for
both included developing a sense of trust in the adults in their lives. CD’s psychological evaluation
in particular indicated that she needed an environment that was structured and characterized by a
high degree of supervision, consistency, support, with clearly defined rules, expectations, and
consequences. CD needed “to experience this environment over a long period of time in order to
internalize the adult world as a safe and consistent place that is able to meet her needs regularly.”
The record shows that respondent-mother was unable to provide herself with a stable environment,
let alone a stable, consistent, environment that inspired trust. The trial court heard testimony that
HD and CD were together in a preadoptive placement, where they felt safe, were bonded with their
foster parents, and had their needs met. The foster home provided the longest period of stability
that either child had ever known.
It was undisputed that the children were bonded with respondent-mother. However, the
parent-child bond was only one factor for the trial court to consider when assessing the children’s
best interests. See In re White, 303 Mich App at 714. As the foregoing shows, respondent-
mother’s “parenting ability, the children’s need for permanency, stability, and finality, and the
advantages of the foster homes over the parent’s home,” In re Gonzales/Martinez, 310 Mich App
at 434, as well as respondent-mother’s inadequate benefit from her treatment plan, the children’s
well-being while in care, and the possibility of adoption were factors that weighed in favor of
termination. Accordingly, the trial court did not clearly err when it concluded that termination of
respondent-mother’s parental rights was in the children’s best interests.
Respondent-mother argues on appeal that the trial court’s best-interest assessment was
clearly erroneous because (1) she and the children had a strong bond; (2) she credibly testified that
she took care of HD and CD before RS was born, she credibly denied the existence of any domestic
violence, and there was no indication that she posed a threat to the children’s safety; (3) HD and
CD would be separated from RS under an adoption plan; and (4) the trial court based its
determination decision in part on the L-GAL’s unsworn statements made during closing
arguments, in violation of respondent-mother’s due-process rights. None of these arguments are
persuasive.
As already noted, the strength of the parent-child bond is only one of several factors that a
trial court must consider when determining a child’s best interests. See id. Even considering
respondent-mother’s bond with her children, the preponderance of the evidence showed that
termination was in the children’s best interests. As to the credibility of respondent-mother’s
testimony, it is axiomatic that “regard is to be given to the special opportunity of the trial court to
judge the credibility of the witnesses who appeared before it.” In re Ellis, 294 Mich App 30, 33;
817 NW2d 111 (2011). The trial court found respondent-mother’s denial of domestic violence to

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be untruthful. Not only is this finding entitled to due regard, but it is also supported by our review
of the record. As to HD and CD being separated from RS, although keeping siblings together is
often in their best interests, it is not the absolute rule. If keeping siblings together is contrary to
the best interests of an individual child, then the best interests of that child will control. See In re
Olive/Metts, 297 Mich App 35, 42; 823 NW2d 144 (2012). In the present case, the trial court
considered the age gap between RS and the two older children, as well as the fact that RS had been
in care for most of his life, and concluded that keeping the half siblings together did not weigh
against termination. The trial court’s analysis comports with our analysis in In re Olive/Metts, and
respondent-mother has given us no reason to disturb it.
As to respondent-mother’s assertion that the trial court improperly relied on unsworn
statements made by the L-GAL during her closing, our review of the record shows that testimony
at the termination hearing provided the basis of the L-GAL’s closing argument. The trial court
asked the L-GAL whether HD had stated a preference regarding adoption and whether the children
knew what adoption meant. The L-GAL answered, in essence, that the children loved respondent-
mother, but that they would be fine with making their forever home somewhere where their
physical and emotional needs were met. She also surmised that HD and CD understood what
adoption meant. The L-GAL’s responses comported with the hearing testimony of foster-care
specialist Williams. Moreover, nothing in the trial court’s ruling suggests that respondent-mother
was prejudiced by the L-GAL’s responses to the trial court’s questions. The trial court
acknowledged that HD once stated that he wanted to be returned to respondent-mother, referred to
the children’s needs as expressed in their psychological evaluations, observed their need for
stability and finality, and noted that their placement provided them with the greatest stability that
they had ever experienced. Under these circumstances, and in light of the grounds for the trial
court’s best-interest determination and ultimate ruling, respondent-mother has not shown a due-
process violation.
Accordingly, we affirm the trial court’s order terminating respondent-father’s parental
rights to RS in Docket No. 375479 and respondent-mother’s parental rights to RS, HD, and CD in
Docket No. 375485.
/s/ Colleen A. O’Brien
/s/ Christopher M. Murray
/s/ Anica Letica

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