COA 372003 PEOPLE OF MI V RUDY ASHTON MCPHAUL Opinion - Per Curiam - Unpublished 12/12/2025

If this opinion indicates that it is “FOR PUBLICATION,” it is subject to
revision until final publication in the Michigan Appeals Reports.
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S T A T E O F M I C H I G A N
C O U R T O F A P P E A L S
PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
UNPUBLISHED
December 12, 2025
8:35 AM
v No. 372003
Wayne Circuit Court
RUDY ASHTON MCPHAUL, LC No. 24-000836-01-FC
Defendant-Appellant.
Before: TREBILCOCK, P.J., and PATEL and WALLACE, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
Defendant appeals as of right his jury trial conviction of voluntary manslaughter, MCL
750.321. Defendant was sentenced, as a fourth-offense habitual offender, MCL 769.12, to 25 to
75 years’ imprisonment. We affirm.
I. BACKGROUND
This case arises from the death of Marcus Goins, Jr., after he was stabbed by defendant
during a fight at Shanta Howse’s townhouse. Howse, defendant’s ex-wife, testified that Goins,
her boyfriend at the time, got into a fight with defendant when defendant unexpectedly arrived to
pick up their mutual child. During the fight, Goins asked Howse “where[s] your gun, get your
gun, get your gun,” and threatened defendant, by saying that he’s “been waiting on to get him.”
Defendant stabbed Goins three times, causing him to die from a myocardial rupture.
Defendant was charged with second-degree murder. He asserted self-defense at trial. The
parties discussed jury instructions after the prosecution rested its case. The prosecution argued
that a self-defense instruction was unsupported, claiming a lack of evidence establishing that
defendant was in fear for his life during the fight. Conversely, defense counsel argued that the
evidence, which included Howse’s testimony, supported a self-defense and defense-of-others jury
instruction. The trial court ultimately included a self-defense jury instruction. Given that a self-
defense jury instruction was going to be presented to the jury without defendant’s testimony,
defendant did not testify, nor did the defense call any witnesses. The jury returned a verdict finding
defendant guilty of the lesser included offense of voluntary manslaughter. Defendant now appeals.

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II. INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL
Defendant argues, through his appellate counsel and in his Standard 4 brief, that he is
entitled to a new trial or a remand for a Ginther1 hearing because his trial counsel was ineffective
for not calling him to testify. Specifically, defendant argues that his testimony was necessary to
establish the state of mind required for self-defense. We disagree.
A. STANDARD OF REVIEW
An ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claim presents a “mixed question of fact and
constitutional law.” People v Yeager, 511 Mich 478, 487; 999 NW2d 490 (2023). We review de
novo constitutional questions, while we review the trial court’s findings of fact, if any, for clear
error. Id. To preserve a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, a defendant must raise the issue
in a motion for a new trial or a Ginther evidentiary hearing filed in the trial court, People v Heft,
299 Mich App 69, 80; 829 NW2d 266 (2012), or in a motion to remand for a Ginther hearing filed
in this Court, People v Abcumby-Blair, 335 Mich App 210, 227; 966 NW2d 437 (2020). Defendant
did none of these things and thus our review of this unpreserved issue is limited to errors apparent
on the record. Abcumby-Blair, 335 Mich App at 227.
B. LAW AND ANALYSIS
The United States and Michigan Constitutions afford criminal defendants the right to
effective assistance of counsel. Yeager, 511 Mich at 488, citing Const 1963, art 1, § 20; US Const
Am VI; Strickland v Washington, 466 US 668; 104 S Ct 2052; 80 L Ed 2d 674 (1984). To prevail
on a claim of ineffective assistance, “a defendant must show that (1) counsel’s performance fell
below an objective standard of reasonableness and (2) but for counsel’s deficient performance,
there is a reasonable probability that [the] outcome would have been different.” Yeager, 511 Mich
at 488 (cleaned up). “A reasonable probability is a probability sufficient to undermine confidence
in the outcome.” Id. (cleaned up). “Effective assistance of counsel is presumed, and the defendant
bears a heavy burden of proving otherwise.” People v Head, 323 Mich App 526, 539; 917 NW2d
752 (2018) (cleaned up).
We will not second-guess matters of trial strategy or “assess counsel’s competence with
the benefit of hindsight.” Abcumby-Blair, 335 Mich App at 237 (cleaned up). “Decisions
regarding what evidence to present, whether to call witnesses, and how to question witnesses are
presumed to be matters of trial strategy[.]” People v Horn, 279 Mich App 31, 39; 755 NW2d 212
(2008). “A particular strategy does not constitute ineffective assistance of counsel simply because
it does not work.” People v Carll, 322 Mich App 690, 702; 915 NW2d 387 (2018) (cleaned up).
1. FAILURE TO CALL DEFENDANT TO TESTIFY
Defendant has not overcome the strong presumption that his trial counsel made a
reasonably strategic decision when advising him not to testify. First, defendant’s testimony was
not required to establish self-defense. Michigan law is clear that a defendant can “show his state
1 People v Ginther, 390 Mich 436; 212 NW2d 922 (1973).

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of mind by circumstantial evidence to establish that he acted in self-defense” and that he “need not
take the stand and testify.” People v Hoskins, 403 Mich 95, 100; 267 NW2d 417 (1978).
Furthermore, requiring a defendant to testify, even when claiming self-defense, would violate the
defendant’s Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination and the defendant’s “right to have
the prosecutor prove beyond a reasonable doubt that he was not acting in self-defense.” Id.
Trial defense counsel had an objectively reasonable basis to believe that the evidence he
introduced, if taken by the trier of fact to be true, was sufficient to establish self-defense. For
example, Howse testified that Goins was irate with defendant, and began cussing and yelling at
him. Goins then threw the first punch and asked Howse for a gun during the fight. At some point,
Goins threatened defendant by saying that he’s “been waiting on to get him.” This testimony
provided sufficient circumstantial evidence for the jury to conclude that defendant feared for his
life or great bodily harm during the fight, without defendant’s testimony.
Defendant’s argument hinges on the lack of evidence regarding his state of mind at the
time of the stabbing. The jury heard a recording of defendant telling someone that he was unaware
if the victim or Howse had a gun during the fight. Defendant now claims, in his Standard 4 brief,
that the victim had a gun during the fight. The evidence presented at trial and his prior statement
do not support this claim. If defendant had testified, he risked contradicting his prior statement
and being impeached, which could have undermined the circumstantial evidence that supported
his self-defense theory.
For these reasons, the trial court record does not support that trial counsel’s decision to not
call defendant to testify was objectively unreasonable.
2. OTHER ALLEGED FAILURES RAISED IN STANDARD 4 BRIEF
Defendant further argues, in his Standard 4 brief, that his trial counsel was ineffective for
not mentioning that the victim had a gun during the fight, not mentioning that the Law Enforcement
Information Network (LEIN) indicated that Howse’s townhouse was defendant’s home address,
not fingerprinting Howse’s gun, not calling defendant’s son to testify, not conferencing with
“witness,” and arguing with the trial judge about a personal matter. We disagree.
Defendant argues that his trial counsel was deficient for not mentioning that the victim had
a gun during the fight and by not fingerprinting Howse’s gun. However, “defendant has the burden
of establishing the factual predicate for his claim of ineffective assistance of counsel” and has
failed to do so. People v Hoag, 460 Mich 1, 6; 594 NW2d 57 (1999). Defendant’s allegations are
wholly unsupported by the trial court record. For example, defendant was recorded saying, “I
don’t know if he [the victim] had a gun, I don’t know if Shanta [Howse] had a gun.” Additionally,
testimony established that no gun was found on the victim or at the scene, other than Howse’s gun
that was untouched and downstairs during the fight. Further, the victim was transported to the
hospital in his underwear, leaving no possibility that a gun was lost or disposed of en route to the
hospital. Defendant’s argument has no merit on the record before us, and defendant has failed to
offer evidence establishing otherwise.
Defendant also cursorily alleges that his trial counsel was ineffective for not mentioning
that the LEIN indicated that Howse’s townhouse was defendant’s home address, not calling

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defendant’s son to testify at trial, not investigating threats made to Howse, and not conferencing
with “witness.” Like the arguments above, defendant has not shown that he is entitled to relief on
these alleged issues because “defendant has failed to establish the factual basis” for his claim.
Hoag, 460 Mich at 7 n 5. First, defendant has provided no evidence that LEIN indicated that
Howse’s townhouse was defendant’s home address or how it would have made a different outcome
at trial reasonably probable. Second, defendant has provided no evidence regarding what his son
would testify about or how it would have made a different outcome at trial reasonably probable.
Third, defendant has provided no evidence that the victim’s family threatened Howse or how
establishing this fact would have made a different outcome at trial reasonably probable. Fourth,
defendant has provided no evidence regarding who the “witness” is that he believes should have
testified, what the testimony would have established, or how it would have made a different
outcome at trial reasonably probable. Defendant has failed to establish a factual basis for his
cursory allegations supporting his claim of ineffective assistance of counsel; therefore, his claims
have no merit.
Lastly, defendant’s trial counsel was not ineffective for having an argument with the judge
regarding a scheduling conflict. The conversation between defendant’s trial counsel and the trial
judge was not unprofessional. The record does not indicate any name calling, swearing, or yelling.
Rather, defendant’s trial counsel was firmly advocating for the case to resume on a mutually
agreeable date and time, and doing so in a professional manner is not objectively unreasonable.
Furthermore, “the initial assumption is that a trial judge designs to be impartial,” and defendant
has offered no factual support to show otherwise. People v Stevens, 498 Mich 162, 175; 869 NW2d
233 (2015). Defendant has not established that his trial counsel’s conversation with the judge
about a scheduling conflict was objectively unreasonable or that it affected the outcome of his
trial.2
Affirmed.
/s/ Christopher M. Trebilcock
/s/ Sima G. Patel
/s/ Randy J. Wallace
2 Defendant alternatively requests a remand for a Ginther hearing. A defendant is only entitled to
a Ginther hearing if he sets forth “additional facts that would require development of a record to
determine if defense counsel was ineffective . . . .” People v Williams, 275 Mich App 194, 200;
737 NW2d 797 (2007). Under MCR 7.211, a motion to remand to the trial court for an evidentiary
hearing “must be supported by affidavit or offer of proof regarding the facts to be established at a
hearing.” Defendant has only provided cursory allegations to support remand for a Ginther
hearing.. He has not provided an affidavit or offer of proof related to the facts to be established at
the hearing. Defendant’s cursory allegations do not entitle him to a Ginther hearing.

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