COA 374778 AMAL ALI GOOBA V MOHAMED Z ALTAHERY Opinion - Per Curiam - Unpublished 8/13/2026

If this opinion indicates that it is “FOR PUBLICATION,” it is subject to
revision until final publication in the Michigan Appeals Reports.
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S T A T E O F M I C H I G A N
C O U R T O F A P P E A L S
AMAL ALI GOOBA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
UNPUBLISHED
August 13, 2026
11:48 AM
V No. 374778
Wayne Circuit Court
MOHAMED Z. ALTAHERY, LC No. 23-102094-DM
Defendant-Appellant.
Before: ACKERMAN, P.J., and BAZZI and LIEVENSE, JJ.
LIEVENSE, J., (dissenting).
I respectfully dissent because I believe we have jurisdiction in this case and should reach
the merits of this appeal.
When divorce proceedings began, the home where plaintiff-wife and defendant-husband
lived was titled in defendant’s father’s name. Plaintiff contested whether the home should be
considered marital property for purposes of the divorce. After a bench trial, the trial court held
that defendant had conspired with his father to defraud plaintiff out of her share of the home. It
determined plaintiff had a 25% interest, defendant’s father had a 50% interest, and defendant had
a 25% interest in the home. The trial court’s judgment then gave defendant two options: pay
plaintiff her 25% “share” of the home’s appraised value or sell the home and pay plaintiff 25% of
the sale “proceeds.”
Defendant filed a motion for reconsideration challenging the trial court’s authority to
include the latter option because his father was not a party to the case. The trial court denied the
motion and defendant appealed, asserting this Court had jurisdiction under MCR 7.203, which
covers appeals of right “filed by an aggrieved party.”
On appeal, defendant raised two claims of error by the trial court: (1) error “in ordering the
sale of a house owned” by a nonparty and (2) error in awarding “a share of real estate and sale of
property.”
Rather than address the merits, the majority sua sponte holds that we lack jurisdiction
because, since defendant’s reason for appealing is to protect his father’s property interest,

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“defendant identifies no harm that he has suffered and therefore has not shown that he is aggrieved
by the court’s decision.”
The majority is correct that MCR 7.203(A) limits our jurisdiction to certain appeals “filed
by an aggrieved party.” It is also correct that “[a] party who could not benefit from a change in
the judgment has no appealable interest.” Ford Motor Co v Jackson, 399 Mich 213, 226; 249
NW2d 29 (1976).
Defendant is, therefore, an aggrieved party because, if he succeeds on appeal, he would
benefit: he would not be required to sell his 25% interest in the home if he cannot afford to pay
plaintiff her share, and he would not be required to pay plaintiff anything if we had found the trial
court erred in awarding plaintiff a share in the home in the first place.1
The majority focuses on the defendant’s desire to preserve his father’s interest. The
majority overlooks, however, that defendant too has a property interest in the home, and the trial
court order obligates defendant to make a choice that impacts his interest: give plaintiff her 25%
“share” of the home in cash, or sell the home and pay plaintiff 25% of the “proceeds.” Defendant
argues that one of those options is unlawful because a nonparty owns 50% of the home. Whether
or not he is correct, just because the judgment gives defendant a choice between two options does
not mean he is not aggrieved by the trial court’s order. He is aggrieved because the order compels
him to choose between two options when he believes he should not have to make that choice.
Also, the fact that defendant may be pursuing this appeal to protect his father’s interest
does not dictate whether he is “aggrieved.” A litigant’s motivation for appealing, similar to the
issue of whether their claim of appeal has merit, does not dictate whether someone is “aggrieved”
by a trial court’s order. Trademark Props of Mich, LLC v Fed Nat’l Mtg Ass’n, 308 Mich App
132, 136; 863 NW2d 344 (2014) (“Standing in no way depends on the merits of the case.”)
(quotation marks and citation omitted).
Moreover, as referenced already, another problem with the majority’s analysis is that it
does not address that defendant also contests the trial court’s finding that he conspired with his
father to defraud plaintiff and its decision to award plaintiff a 25% interest in the home. Granted,
defendant’s brief is not perfectly written, but he challenges the trial court’s factual findings
regarding what happened with the home as being clearly erroneous, quoting Cassidy v Cassidy,
318 Mich App 463, 493-494; 899 NW2d 65 (2017), and outlines facts he believes support his
1 The record is imprecise when describing what defendant owes plaintiff under the trial court’s
order. We do not know whether the home is subject to a mortgage or any other encumbrance. As
a result, the trial court’s order specified that plaintiff was to receive a 25% “share,” which
presumably means 25% of the equity in the home around the time of the divorce, not 25% of the
full fair market value. This reading would be consistent with the trial court’s alternative contested
order that, if the home is sold, plaintiff would receive 25% of the “proceeds after sale expenses.”
Given the time that has passed and many other factors, the value of the property may have
increased or decreased since the 2023 appraisal. The trial court retained jurisdiction to enforce the
provisions of the judgment of divorce and is best positioned to address this potential ambiguity in
how much plaintiff is to receive, if necessary.

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position that no fraud occurred and plaintiff is not entitled to a 25% interest. The trial court’s
factual findings on this point were necessary to the judgment of divorce that outlined and affected
defendant’s rights and defendant seeks relief from that decision, meaning he is aggrieved.
The majority cites Zalewski v Zalewski, 342 Mich App 429, 438; 995 NW2d 553 (2022),
for the proposition that a nonparty adversely affected by a decision in a divorce action lacks
standing to appeal unless the nonparty properly intervened. But just because defendant’s father
perhaps could have intervened to acquire standing to appeal does not mean that defendant is not
an “aggrieved party.”
My dissent in this matter does not mean I agree with defendant on the merits of his appeal;
it simply means I believe we should reach the merits.
/s/ Andrew J. Lievense

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