COA 371096 PEOPLE OF MI V DEPERRYON DEANTHONYDESEAN KING Opinion - Per Curiam - Unpublished 8/11/2026

If this opinion indicates that it is “FOR PUBLICATION,” it is subject to
revision until final publication in the Michigan Appeals Reports.
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S T A T E O F M I C H I G A N
C O U R T O F A P P E A L S
PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
UNPUBLISHED
August 11, 2026
10:25 AM
v No. 371096
Saginaw Circuit Court
DEPERRYON DEANTHONYDESEAN KING, LC No. 22-050186-FC
Defendant-Appellant.
Before: BOONSTRA, P.J., and YOUNG and KOROBKIN, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
Defendant, Deperryon Deanthonydesean King, appeals by right his jury-trial convictions
of first-degree murder, MCL 750.316(1), being a felon in possession of a firearm,
MCL 750.224f(6), being a felon in possession of ammunition, MCL 750.224f(7), carrying a
dangerous weapon with unlawful intent, MCL 750.226, and four counts of carrying a firearm
during the commission of a felony (felony-firearm), MCL 750.227b. We affirm.
I. PERTINENT FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
On June 19, 2022, Monte Wilson attended a Father’s Day neighborhood block party with
his family, including his wife, Ashanti Wilson, and his daughters, TW and MW. At the party,
Monte was intoxicated and argued with a group of other attendees. Eyewitnesses gave inconsistent
testimony regarding whether defendant was initially part of this argument. The argument
escalated, and one of the attendees, Cortez Owens,1 told MW that her father had said that he would
kill them. TW testified that she saw one of the attendees draw a handgun and begin “taunting”
Monte with it. TW attempted to pull Monte back to their house, but he refused. She testified that
Monte “pulled out a gun and there were shots fired.” According to TW, Monte returned fire. But
Ashanti testified that she did not know if Monte returned fire, and MW testified that she never saw
Monte with a gun. After an initial round of fire, Monte attempted to return to his house. But he
1 Owens was unavailable to testify because he died before defendant’s trial.

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was shot in the arm after a second round of fire. The bullet went through his arm and into his chest
cavity. He died from the injury.
Investigating officers found photographs on defendant’s phone of defendant at the block
party aiming a firearm. They also found several searches related to the shooting. At trial, the
defense did not offer any evidence or call any witnesses, instead arguing that the prosecution’s
evidence was insufficient or that, if defendant did shoot Monte, it was done in self-defense.
Defendant was convicted as described earlier, and this appeal followed. This Court granted
defendant’s motion to remand to the trial court for an evidentiary hearing regarding whether his
defense counsel was ineffective for failing to investigate and call Deshawn Reed-Davenport and
Emilio Zamora, both of whom were present during the shooting, as defense witnesses.2 After a
hearing, the trial court held that defense counsel was not ineffective and denied defendant’s motion
for a new trial. We now review that decision along with defendant’s other claims.
II. INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE
Defendant argues that he was denied the effective assistance of counsel when his defense
counsel failed to investigate and call witnesses who allegedly would have provided exculpatory
testimony, when he conceded defendant’s guilt during his closing argument, and when he failed
to object to a forensic pathologist’s testimony about Wilson’s cause of death. We disagree.
A. PRESERVATION AND STANDARD OF REVIEW
“Generally, whether a defendant had the effective assistance of counsel is a mixed question
of fact and constitutional law.” People v Heft, 299 Mich App 69, 80; 829 NW2d 266 (2012)
(quotation marks and citation omitted). “This Court reviews findings of fact for clear error and
questions of law de novo.” Id. To preserve a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, the
defendant must move in the trial court for a new trial or an evidentiary hearing or move in this
Court for a remand for an evidentiary hearing. Id.; People v Abcumby-Blair, 335 Mich App 210,
227; 966 NW2d 437 (2020). Defendant preserved this issue by moving in this Court for a remand,
but we granted the motion only with respect to his claim that defense counsel was ineffective for
failing to investigate or call witnesses with allegedly exculpatory testimony. Therefore, we
consider the results of the trial court’s Ginther3 hearing for that claim, but we review the other
claims for “errors apparent on the record.” Abcumby-Blair, 335 Mich App at 227. We review the
trial court’s decision to deny defendant’s motion for a new trial for an abuse of discretion. See
People v Russell, 297 Mich App 707, 715; 825 NW2d 623 (2012).
B. FAILURE TO INVESTIGATE AND CALL WITNESSES
The United States Constitution and the Michigan Constitution both entitle a criminal
defendant to the assistance of counsel. US Const, Am VI; Const 1963, art 1, § 20. Counsel must
be effective to satisfy this constitutional requirement. Strickland v Washington, 466 US 668, 686;
2 People v King, unpublished order of the Court of Appeals, entered November 21, 2025 (Docket
No. 371096).
3 People v Ginther, 390 Mich 436; 212 NW2d 922 (1973).

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104 S Ct 2052; 80 L Ed 2d 674 (1984). Counsel is ineffective if “(1) counsel’s performance fell
below an objective standard of reasonableness and (2) but for counsel’s deficient performance,
there is a reasonable probability that [the] outcome would have been different.” People v Yeager,
511 Mich 478, 488; 999 NW2d 490 (2023) (quotation marks and citation omitted). “A reasonable
probability is a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome.” Id. (quotation
marks and citation omitted). The burden is on the defendant to establish the factual predicate for
an ineffective-assistance claim. People v Douglas, 496 Mich 557, 592; 852 NW2d 587 (2014).
“There is a presumption that counsel was effective, and a defendant must overcome the
strong presumption that counsel’s challenged actions were sound trial strategy.” People v Cooper,
309 Mich App 74, 80; 867 NW2d 452 (2015). “This Court will not substitute [its] judgment for
that of counsel on matters of trial strategy, nor will [this Court] use the benefit of hindsight when
assessing counsel’s competence.” Id. (quotation marks and citation omitted; alterations in
original). “An attorney’s decision whether to retain witnesses, including expert witnesses, is a
matter of trial strategy.” People v Payne, 285 Mich App 181, 190; 774 NW2d 714 (2009).
However, “[c]ounsel always retains the duty to make reasonable investigations or to make a
reasonable decision that makes particular investigations unnecessary.” People v Trakhtenberg,
493 Mich 38, 52; 826 NW2d 136 (2012) (quotation marks and citation omitted).
Defendant argues that defense counsel was ineffective for failing to call Zamora and Reed-
Davenport to testify in favor of defendant’s self-defense theory. At the Ginther hearing, Reed-
Davenport testified that he was at the block party on the day of the shooting. He heard Monte
arguing with Owens and heard Owens tell Monte that Monte was drunk and “tripping.” Reed-
Davenport also heard Monte say that he would put money on somebody’s head, meaning that he
would hire a hitman to kill someone. Monte was slurring his words, unable to stand up straight,
and smelled of alcohol. Ashanti came out of a nearby house with a gun in her hand and gave it to
Monte, who aimed and fired a shot. Reed-Davenport was unable to tell at whom Monte was aiming
the gun, and he left the area because of the shooting. According to Reed-Davenport, he contacted
defense counsel and told him what he had seen, but defense counsel never followed up with him.
He also did not speak to the police because he had an outstanding warrant for his arrest at the time
of the shooting. Reed-Davenport acknowledged that he communicated regularly with defendant
and that he was incarcerated with defendant at the Saginaw County Jail while defendant’s charges
were pending.
Zamora testified that he was also present during the shooting. He witnessed Monte
involved in an argument, during which Monte was acting “very aggressive” and saying that he
would put money on someone’s head. According to Zamora, Ashanti handed Monte a gun, and
Monte waved the gun around and was the first to shoot. Zamora dropped to the ground after Monte
fired the gun, and he then saw Owens and several others (but not defendant) shooting. Zamora
told the police in a recorded interview about the incident that defendant did not have a gun because
he did not feel a gun when he hugged defendant that day. When the shooting stopped, Zamora got
into a car with his cousins, and they drove away. Zamora also regularly communicated with
defendant. He and defendant were originally codefendants, and they regularly communicated with
each other while in jail after the shooting. But after their preliminary examination, Zamora pleaded
no-contest to a charge of being an accessory after the fact. Zamora testified that he did not know
what defendant meant when he “told people he wasn’t going to take a lick for [Zamora]” and when
defendant had said that Zamora “started something” and defendant “got fried for it.”

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Defendant testified that he had expected to have a joint trial with Zamora and that Zamora
had told him that he would testify in defendant’s favor. Defendant “thought [Zamora] was going
to be a man of his word and stick with it,” and he “really thought [Zamora] was on some BS” when
he learned that they would not be tried together. Despite those statements, defendant testified that
he was never upset with Zamora, explaining that “I still call him my brother to this day.” He
believed that it was “the system” that caused Zamora to forgo a trial, and that it was not defense
counsel’s fault. Defendant testified, consistently with the other two witnesses, that Monte was
drunk and aggressive, that Ashanti handed Monte a gun, and that Monte shot first. He explained
that he hid behind a car and pointed his own gun at Monte but did not shoot. He acknowledged
that his statement conflicted with Zamora’s testimony that defendant did not have a gun.
After hearing testimony from these witnesses and defense counsel, the trial court denied
defendant’s motion for a new trial. In a written order, it found that Zamora and Reed-Davenport
were not credible witnesses and that their testimony would not have supported the defense strongly
enough to affect the outcome of the trial. Defense counsel’s failure to investigate or call them as
witnesses, therefore, did not constitute ineffective assistance of counsel.
Considering the testimony from the Ginther hearing, we conclude that defense counsel was
not ineffective for failing to investigate and call Reed-Davenport or Zamora as defense witnesses
because their testimony would not have affected the jury’s verdict. See Yeager, 511 Mich at 488.
Most of the testimony elicited from these witnesses was cumulative to evidence presented at trial.
Reed-Davenport and Zamora testified that Monte was intoxicated, but the jury heard that a
toxicology analysis from Monte’s autopsy was positive for ethanol, cannabinoids, oxycodone, and
oxymorphone, and that Monte’s blood alcohol content was 0.113 grams per 100 milliliters. Trial
witnesses also testified that Monte had been in an argument involving Owens before the shooting
occurred and that Monte had threatened Owens. The jury also heard from one witness that Monte
fired shots and that Ashanti owned a firearm that was not in her house after the shooting and that
would have fired bullets consistent with shell casings found at the scene. From that information,
the jury could infer that Monte had used Ashanti’s gun. Given that the jury convicted defendant
despite that evidence, it is unlikely that cumulative testimony from Reed-Davenport and Zamora
would have affected the outcome of the trial.
The only substantively new information from Reed-Davenport and Zamora’s testimony
was the specific wording of Monte’s threat and the statement that Monte had fired first. But as the
trial court correctly noted, Monte’s drunken rant about hiring a hitman would actually undermine
a self-defense theory because the threat was less imminent and believable than MW’s testimony
at trial that Owens told her that Monte said that he was going to kill them. See MCL 780.972(1)(a)
(requiring the individual claiming self-defense to “honestly and reasonably believe[] that the use
of deadly force is necessary to prevent the imminent death of or imminent great bodily harm to
himself for herself or to another individual.”) (emphasis added).
Although the testimony that Monte was the first to shoot would have supported a self-
defense theory, the trial court specifically found that Reed-Davenport and Zamora were not
credible, and that finding was not clearly erroneous. There were several inconsistencies in Reed-
Davenport’s testimony, and defense counsel testified that he could not recall ever speaking to him
and that he likely would have remembered such contact because unsolicited communications from
witnesses are unusual. Both witnesses had communicated with defendant in jail before his trial,

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raising the suspicion that they had colluded to present certain testimony. Although Zamora and
defendant both denied that they had an agreement about the content of Zamora’s testimony, one
of defendant’s statements (“I’m pissed at [Zamora] because he did a separate trial, basically I took
a lick for him and he didn’t testify his statement from me that we agree about”), strongly suggests
that there was an agreement. And because Zamora had pleaded no-contest to being an accessory
after the fact, Zamora would have had a personal motive to frame Monte as the initial aggressor to
avoid civil liability in connection with the incident. See Lichon v American Universal Ins Co, 435
Mich 408, 417; 459 NW2d 288 (1990) (“The primary purpose of a plea of nolo contendere is to
avoid potential future repercussions which would be caused by the admission of liability,
particularly the repercussions in potential future civil litigation.”). Zamora’s claim that defendant
was unarmed was also contradicted by a photograph admitted at trial that showed defendant at the
party aiming a large handgun in an offensive rather than defensive posture, indicating active
participation in the shooting.
The evidence presented at the Ginther hearing, when considered within the context of the
evidence presented at trial, likely would not have changed the jury’s verdict. Because ineffective
assistance of counsel requires showing that defense counsel’s deficiencies created a reasonable
probability that the outcome of the trial would have been different, Yeager, 511 Mich at 488,
defendant has not shown that the trial court abused its discretion when it denied his motion for a
new trial.
C. CONCESSION OF GUILT
Defendant next argues that defense counsel was ineffective because he conceded that
defendant was guilty without defendant’s consent, which violated defendant’s right to maintain
his innocence. We disagree.
Decisions regarding “what evidence to highlight during closing argument” is presumed to
be a matter of trial strategy. People v Horn, 279 Mich App 31, 39; 755 NW2d 212 (2008). During
his closing argument, defense counsel made the following statement:
You know, I was thinking about going through the jury instructions that
day. Well, craziest things are out there. Let the jury know that if they think it’s
self-defense, it can be self-defense. There’s no evidence. We didn’t present any
evidence. We didn’t make that claim that it was self-defense. I just ask the Court,
well, why don’t you read that because I don’t know what a juror would be thinking
about that. [Emphasis added.]
Defendant argues that this statement effectively conceded his guilt. But when considered in
context, it is clear that defense counsel did not concede defendant’s guilt or abandon the self-
defense theory.
When defense counsel stated that “there’s no evidence” and that the defense “didn’t make
that claim that it was self-defense,” he appears to have been addressing the fact that only the

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prosecution presented evidence.4 Defense counsel followed the statement by arguing that Monte
was heavily intoxicated, “acting like a high, drunk guy,” and disrupting the party. He further
addressed the fact that Ashanti’s gun that was never found and suggested that the gun was hidden
“[b]ecause they thought Monte was the aggressor and they didn’t want the police to get that gun.”
Defense counsel also questioned why Monte did not drop to the ground to avoid being shot if he
was not the aggressor, and he highlighted MW’s testimony that someone told her that Monte had
threatened to kill them. Defense counsel clearly did not abandon the self-defense theory. And
there was a reasonable trial strategy that would justify his statement that the defense “didn’t make
the claim that it was self defense,” despite having approved the trial court’s jury instructions, which
included an instruction on self-defense. To affirmatively state that defendant acted in self-defense,
defense counsel would have had to concede that defendant shot Monte. But that concession would
have been inconsistent with the alternative defense theory that the prosecutor presented insufficient
evidence of the crime.
In addition to arguing self-defense, defense counsel also highlighted potential flaws in the
investigation of this case, noting that it was unclear when Monte was shot and where in the
neighborhood he was at that time. He also emphasized that there were multiple people firing shots,
which cast doubt on whether defendant or someone else had shot Monte, that the prosecutor had
not presented sufficient evidence to prove that defendant had aided and abetted the people who
actually shot Monte, and that many of the witnesses were possibly biased because they were related
to Monte. Defense counsel’s final statement in closing was “I’ll tell you one thing, they haven’t
proven that [defendant] intended to kill Monte Wilson.” This clearly was not a concession of guilt.
Rather, the closing argument reflects defense counsel’s sound trial strategy of presenting the
alternative defense theories of insufficient evidence and self-defense. Because defense counsel’s
performance was not deficient in that regard, defendant has failed to show that he was denied the
effective assistance of counsel on that basis. See Yeager, 511 Mich at 488.
D. EXPERT TESTIMONY
Finally, defendant argues that defense counsel was ineffective for failing to object to Dr.
David Moons’s expert testimony about Monte’s manner of death. Again, we disagree.
“[E]xpert testimony must be limited to opinions falling within the scope of the witness’s
knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education.” People v Unger, 278 Mich App 210, 251;
749 NW2d 272 (2008). A forensic pathologist is “qualified to opine with respect to the manner of
a decedent’s death,” not just the decedent’s cause of death. Id.
4 The trial court subsequently instructed the jury that defendant is presumed innocent and “is not
required to prove his innocence or to do anything.” Defense counsel approved that instruction
before making his closing argument, so he knew that the jury would not misconstrue his decision
to highlight that the defense did not present any evidence outside of cross-examination as a
concession or indication of guilt. See People v Zitka, 335 Mich App 324, 348; 966 NW2d 786
(2020) (“Jurors are presumed to follow their instructions, and jury instructions are presumed to
cure most errors.”) (quotation marks and citation omitted).

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The trial court qualified Dr. Moon as an expert in forensic pathology. He then testified that
he had performed Monte’s autopsy, which revealed that a bullet had passed through his right arm
and lodged into his chest cavity. He concluded that Monte’s cause of death was a gunshot wound.
He suggested that the manner of death be deemed a homicide because the autopsy revealed nothing
“consistent with a self-inflicted gunshot wound” and because he had received a summary of the
incident leading to Monte’s death.5 As a forensic pathologist, Dr. Moons was qualified to give
this testimony. See Unger, 278 Mich App at 251. Defendant argues that Dr. Moons’s opinion on
the manner of death was inadmissible because it was “based primarily on nonmedical evidence”
and should have been left for the jury to determine on its own. See People v Kowalski, 492 Mich
106, 122; 821 NWd 14 (2012) (“[E]ven proposed expert testimony that is offered by a qualified
expert and based on reliable scientific data and methods may be properly excluded if it . . . is
offered for a proposition that does not require the aid of expert interpretation.”). But defendant
overlooks the value of Dr. Moons’s expertise. Dr. Moons used “homicide” as a term of art—he
described it as one of the “five categories” that forensic pathologists use to describe the manner of
death (the others being natural death, accidental death, suicide, and “indeterminate”), and it only
means that “the death is due to the actions of another individual.” This differs from the layperson’s
understanding of the word “homicide” and inherently excludes other possible explanations for
Monte’s death. Dr. Moons’s expert opinion about the manner of death therefore aided the jury in
understanding the circumstances of Monte’s death beyond what they might have gleaned without
his testimony.
Because Dr. Moons’s testimony about Monte’s manner of death was admissible, any
objection to that testimony would have been unsuccessful. “Failing to advance a meritless
argument or raise a futile objection does not constitute ineffective assistance of counsel.” People
v Ericksen, 288 Mich App 192, 201; 793 NW2d 120 (2010). Accordingly, defense counsel was
not ineffective for failing to object to Dr. Moons’s testimony.
Affirmed.
/s/ Mark T. Boonstra
/s/ Adrienne N. Young
/s/ Daniel S. Korobkin
5 Dr. Moons also clarified that his conclusions were merely suggestions because “it’s the medical
examiner who determines the final cause and manner of death in a county.”

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