COA 368356 PEOPLE OF MI V RICHARD MICHAEL FAUST Opinion - Per Curiam - Unpublished 9/2/2026

If this opinion indicates that it is “FOR PUBLICATION,” it is subject to
revision until final publication in the Michigan Appeals Reports.
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S T A T E O F M I C H I G A N
C O U R T O F A P P E A L S
PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
UNPUBLISHED
September 02, 2026
1:12 PM
v No. 368356
Arenac Circuit Court
RICHARD MICHAEL FAUST, LC No. 2023-004549-FC
Defendant-Appellant.
Before: GADOLA, C.J., and RIORDAN and SWARTZLE, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
Defendant appeals as of right his conviction of and sentence for first-degree criminal sexual
conduct (CSC-I), MCL 750.520b(2)(b) (victim under 13, offender over 17). We affirm, but we
remand to the trial court for the correction of defendant’s judgment of sentence.
I. BACKGROUND
The offense occurred the Friday after Thanksgiving in 2021. Defendant, who was 19 years
old at the time, and the victim, who was 12 years old, were watching a movie in defendant’s
bedroom with the victim’s younger sister, defendant’s sister, and the boyfriend of defendant’s
sister. When defendant and the victim were alone in the room, defendant retrieved a condom and
penetrated the victim’s vagina with his penis. The victim did not tell anyone about the assault until
several months later. The victim’s father confronted defendant when he learned what happened,
and defendant allegedly admitted to having sexual contact with the victim.
At the trial, the prosecution introduced the testimonies of the victim, the victim’s father,
and the victim’s sister. Notably, the victim testified about the incident and the victim’s father
testified about defendant’s admission. Defendant did not offer any proofs and did not call any
witnesses. Defendant was convicted as described above. Before his sentencing hearing, defendant
registered under the Sex Offenders Registration Act (SORA). The trial court then sentenced
defendant to a minimum sentence of 25 years’ imprisonment and lifetime electronic monitoring.
During the sentencing the trial court did not mention defendant’s registration requirement under
SORA and it did not indicate defendant’s SORA requirement on defendant’s judgment of sentence.

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After sentencing, defendant moved the trial court for a new trial on the grounds that his
trial counsel had been ineffective for failing to investigate several witnesses that would have
impeached the victim’s testimony. Specifically, defendant argued that his mother would have
testified that she was home on the night of the incident, in contradiction to the victim’s testimony
that she was not home. Additionally, defendant argued that his father would have testified that he
was not home on the night of the incident, also in contradiction to the victim’s testimony.
Defendant also stated that his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to investigate and gather the
testimonies of defendant’s sister and her boyfriend, who would have testified that the victim’s
recollection of their behavior that night was incorrect.
The court held a Ginther1 hearing on the matter, and defendant’s trial counsel testified that he
did not investigate or speak to these witnesses because he believed that they would only
corroborate the victim’s testimony and because defendant did not tell him to contact them.
Defendant’s father, defendant’s sister, and defendant’s sister’s boyfriend all testified at the Ginther
hearing. The court found that trial counsel’s failure to investigate these witnesses was
constitutionally deficient performance. However, the court reasoned that counsel’s deficient
performance did not prejudice the defendant because the jurors had heard that some of the victim’s
testimony about who was home was inaccurate, these witnesses did not clearly remember the day
of the assault, the victim’s sister corroborated the victim’s account of who was in the bedroom,
and the defendant made an admission to the victim’s father.
Defendant now appeals.
II. ANALYSIS
A. INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL
Defendant argues that the trial court erred when it found that trial counsel’s performance
did not prejudice him. “Generally, whether a defendant had the effective assistance of counsel is
a mixed question of fact and constitutional law.” People v Heft, 299 Mich App 69, 80; 829 NW2d
266 (2012) (quotation marks and citation omitted). “This Court reviews findings of fact for clear
error and questions of law de novo.” Id.
The United States Constitution and the Michigan Constitution both entitle a criminal
defendant to the assistance of counsel. US Const, Am VI; Const 1963, art 1, § 20. This counsel
must be effective to satisfy this constitutional requirement. Strickland v Washington, 466 US 668,
686; 104 S Ct 2052; 80 L Ed 2d 674 (1984). Counsel is ineffective if “(1) counsel’s performance
fell below an objective standard of reasonableness and (2) but for counsel’s deficient performance,
there is a reasonable probability that [the] outcome would have been different.” People v Yeager,
511 Mich 478, 488; 999 NW2d 490 (2023) (quotation marks and citation omitted). There is a
reasonable probability that the outcome would have been different if the probability is sufficient
to undermine confidence in the outcome. Id. “A reasonable probability need not rise to the level
of making it more likely than not that the outcome would have been different.” People v Grant,
470 Mich 477, 486; 684 NW2d 686 (2004). The burden is on the defendant to establish the factual
1 People v Ginther, 390 Mich 436; 212 NW2d 922 (1973).

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predicate for an ineffective-assistance claim. People v Douglas, 496 Mich 557, 592; 852 NW2d
587 (2014).
“There is a presumption that counsel was effective, and a defendant must overcome the
strong presumption that counsel’s challenged actions were sound trial strategy.” People v Cooper,
309 Mich App 74, 80; 867 NW2d 452 (2015). “This Court will not substitute [its] judgment for
that of counsel on matters of trial strategy, nor will [this Court] use the benefit of hindsight when
assessing counsel’s competence.” Id. (quotation marks and citation omitted; alteration in original).
“A sound trial strategy is one that is developed in concert with an investigation that is adequately
supported by reasonable professional judgments.” Grant, 470 Mich at 486. “Counsel must make
“an independent examination of the facts, circumstances, pleadings and laws involved....” and
“pursu[e] all leads relevant to the merits of the case.” Id. at 486-487 (quotation marks and citation
omitted). “The failure to make an adequate investigation is ineffective assistance of counsel if it
undermines confidence in the trial’s outcome.” Id. at 493.
Defendant alleges that trial counsel gave deficient performance by failing to investigate the
people who the victim said were at the house on the day of the offense: defendant’s mother,
defendant’s father, the victim’s sister, defendant’s sister, and defendant’s sister’s boyfriend. Given
that this case involved no physical evidence and rested on witness testimony, trial counsel’s failure
to investigate or speak to these witnesses was deficient performance. Trial counsel cannot have
developed a reasonable trial strategy without even contacting multiple witnesses. See Grant, 470
Mich at 486.
However, the absence of these witnesses did not prejudice defendant sufficiently to
undermine confidence in the outcome of the trial. Trial counsel was able to impeach the victim on
whether defendant’s mother was home the day after Thanksgiving, so further testimony on this
matter would be unlikely to have any effect on the outcome of the trial. Further, even though the
victim was not impeached at trial on whether defendant’s father was home, the presence of
defendant’s father is not particularly material to defendant’s conduct because the victim did not
testify that defendant’s father was in the room with her and defendant at any point or that he was
aware of the assault. Additionally, any testimony regarding the behavior of the victim’s sister,
defendant’s sister, or the boyfriend of defendant’s sister, is similarly not material to defendant’s
conduct given that the jury heard testimony that defendant was alone with the victim in the room
at the time of the assault. The fact that these witnesses might have testified that they were not
present on the night of the assault as the victim recalled they were, would not create a reasonable
probability of a different outcome in light of the other evidence presented at trial.
Finally, the victim’s father testified that he confronted defendant about the assault and that
defendant admitted to it. None of the witnesses indicated at the Ginther hearing that they would
have been able to provide testimony to impeach the victim’s father or to contradict the victim’s
testimony about what occurred when she was alone with defendant. For this reason, the trial court
did not err when it concluded that trial counsel’s performance, although deficient, did not
sufficiently prejudice defendant.

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B. THE 25-YEAR MANDATORY MINIMUM
Defendant next argues that his 25-year mandatory minimum sentence for CSC-I is an
unconstitutional cruel or unusual punishment due to his age at the time of the offense. The issue
whether a defendant’s sentence constitutes cruel and/or unusual punishment receives de novo
review. People v Stovall, 510 Mich 301, 312; 987 NW2d 85 (2022). De novo review is
independent and requires no deference to the trial court. Id.
The Eighth Amendment of the United States Constitution prohibits cruel and unusual
punishment. US Const, Am VIII. Michigan’s Constitution prohibits cruel or unusual punishment.
Const 1963, art 1, § 16. “Legislatively mandated sentences are presumptively proportional and
presumptively valid.” People v Brown, 294 Mich App 377, 390; 811 NW2d 531 (2011). “In order
to overcome the presumption that the sentence is proportionate, a defendant must present unusual
circumstances that would render the presumptively proportionate sentence disproportionate.”
People v Bowling, 299 Mich App 552, 558; 830 NW2d 800 (2013). Four factors are considered
when determining if a sentence is disproportionate: “(1) the severity of the sentence relative to the
gravity of the offense; (2) sentences imposed in the same jurisdiction for other offenses; (3)
sentences imposed in other jurisdictions for the same offense; and (4) the goal of
rehabilitation. . . .” People v Parks, 510 Mich 225, 242; 987 NW2d 151 (2022).
This Court has already considered whether the 25-year mandatory minimum imposed for
CSC-I involving an offender over 17 years old and a victim under 13 years old is disproportionate
to the offense. In People v Benton, 294 Mich App 191, 204-207; 817 NW2d 599 (2011), this Court
determined that the 25-year mandatory minimum was not disproportionate for an adult offender,
even when there were no aggravating factors. In People v Payne, 304 Mich App 667, 674-676;
850 NW2d 601 (2014), this Court determined that the sentence was not unconstitutional as applied
to a juvenile offender. Under MCR 7.215(C)(2), these holdings are binding precedent that we are
bound to follow. Therefore, defendant’s 25-year sentence does not constitute cruel or unusual
punishment.
C. SORA REGISTRATION
Defendant next argues that lifetime SORA registration is cruel or unusual punishment as
applied to him due to his age at the time of the offense. He also argues that the trial court’s failure
to include SORA registration on his judgment of sentence necessitates his removal from the
registry. We disagree.
A defendant challenges a sentence as being cruel or unusual punishment by raising the
claim in the trial court. Bowling, 299 Mich App at 557. Defendant did not argue before the trial
court that lifetime registration under SORA constituted cruel or unusual punishment, so this issue
is unpreserved.
Unpreserved claims of error receive review for plain error affecting substantial rights. See
People v Carines, 460 Mich 750, 763; 597 NW2d 130 (1999). “To avoid forfeiture under the plain
error rule, three requirements must be met: 1) error must have occurred, 2) the error was plain, i.e.,
clear or obvious, 3) and the plain error affected substantial rights.” Id. “The third requirement
generally requires a showing of prejudice, i.e., that the error affected the outcome of the lower

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court proceedings.” Id. “Reversal is warranted only when the plain, forfeited error resulted in the
conviction of an actually innocent defendant or when an error seriously affect[ed] the fairness,
integrity or public reputation of judicial proceedings independent of the defendant’s innocence.”
Id. at 763-764 (quotation marks and citation omitted; alteration in original).
Defendant was convicted of CSC-I, MCL 750.520b(2)(b) (victim under 13, perpetrator 17
or older). Under SORA, this is a tier III offense. MCL 28.722(v)(iv). Tier III offenders are
required to register under SORA for life. MCL 28.725(13).
1. CRUEL OR UNUSUAL PUNISHMENT
Defendant challenges the lifetime-registration requirement, without the ability to petition
for removal from the registry, as cruel or unusual punishment. The Michigan Supreme Court has
determined that registration under SORA constitutes punishment but that the registration
requirements for tier III offenders do not constitute cruel or unusual punishment. People v
Kardasz, ___ Mich ___; ___ NW3d ___ (2025) (Docket No. 165008), slip op at 33-34. Defendant
argues that the registration requirement is unconstitutional as applied to him due to his young age,
rendering the punishment harsher for him than it would be for an older offender. In doing so, he
references People v Taylor, ___ Mich ___; ___ NW3d ___ (2025) (Docket Nos. 166428 and
166654), in which the Michigan Supreme Court held that mandatory life without parole (LWOP)
was cruel or unusual punishment as applied to offenders who were 19 or 20 years old when they
committed the offense on the grounds that these offenders were neurologically similar to 18-year-
olds, would spend a significantly longer time in prison than older offenders who committed the
same offenses, and because mandatory LWOP for young offenders was contrary to the state
Constitution’s stated goal of rehabilitation. Id., slip op at 13-25, 33-34.
Addressing the proportionality factors for this case, the gravity of the offense (sexual
assault of a 12-year old committed by an individual who was 19 at the time of the offense) is
significant. While the lifetime-registration requirement is also a significant punishment, it is not
so severe as to be disproportionate to the offense. The punishment addressed in Taylor, lifetime
incarceration without the possibility of release, is far harsher than SORA registration, which, while
imposing restrictions on a registrant’s liberty, still permits registrants to live outside of prison. The
decision in Kardasz describes SORA registration as a “relatively moderate punishment” compared
to the gravity of the offense. Kardasz, ___ Mich at ___, slip op at 35.
The second factor, sentences imposed for other offenses, also weighs against SORA
registration being cruel or unusual as applied to defendant. Lifetime SORA registration is required
for all tier III sexual offenses, which include gross indecency committed against persons under 13
years old, CSC-I, CSC-III, and assault with intent to commit criminal sexual conduct involving
sexual penetration. MCL 28.722(v). Given that defendant’s offense in this case, CSC-I committed
against a victim under the age of 13, is especially serious, this factor also indicates that lifetime
registration is not cruel or unusual as applied to defendant.
The third factor also does not support defendant’s claim that the lifetime-registration
requirement is cruel or unusual punishment: as discussed in Kardasz, Michigan’s sex-offender-
registration regime is similar to a “plurality” of states, id. at 39, and other jurisdictions do not treat

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19-year-old offenders who committed offenses against children under 13 distinctly from older
offenders convicted of the same crimes.
However, the fourth factor, whether the punishment advances the goal of rehabilitation,
does weigh in favor of the registration requirement being cruel or unusual, given that it limits a
registrant’s ability to find employment and housing and invites social stigma that can inhibit
rehabilitation. Id. at 40-41. Nevertheless, given the balance of these factors, defendant has not
shown that the SORA registration requirement is unconstitutional as applied to him when
considered in light of the severity of the offense and the lack of exemptions for 19-year-old
offenders in sex-offender-registration regimes in other jurisdictions. The trial court did not plainly
err by ordering lifetime registration for defendant.
2. OMISSION FROM THE JUDGMENT OF SENTENCE
The omission of the SORA registration requirement from defendant’s judgment of sentence
does not necessitate his removal from the registry. A person who is required to register under
SORA is required to do so before sentencing, and the court may not impose a sentence until it
determines that the department of corrections has received the registration. MCL 28.724(5). MCL
28.726 includes further procedural requirements that the officer, court or agency provide a copy
of the registration or notification to the individual at the time of registration or notice and
immediately forward the registration or notification to the department.
Defendant did sign the sex offender registry form before his sentencing hearing. He was
also informed of the lifetime GPS monitoring requirement at his sentencing hearing. However,
defendant’s judgment of sentence left unchecked the box stating that sex-offender registration is
required. Under MCR 6.427(9), the judgment of sentence must include “the conditions incident
to the sentence.”
Defendant argues that, following People v Nunez, 342 Mich App 322; 994 NW2d 824
(2022), the trial court’s failure to include SORA in his judgment of sentence requires his removal
from the registry. However, Nunez is distinguishable. In Nunez, the defendant was convicted of
fourth-degree criminal sexual conduct (CSC-IV). Id. at 325. However, he was not given a SORA
registration form, was not informed of the registration requirement at sentencing, and his judgment
of sentence did not mention SORA. Id. He registered after receiving a letter from the prosecutor’s
office but later filed a motion to enforce the judgment of sentence, arguing that, because the
judgment of sentence omitted the registration requirement, he was not required to register. Id. at
326. The trial court denied his motion. Id. at 326-327. On appeal, this Court determined that the
district court violated the procedural requirements of SORA because the defendant was not
informed of the registration requirement until after he pleaded guilty and because it was too late
for the judge to amend defendant’s judgment of sentence. Id. at 330-334.
Unlike Nunez, defendant in this case was informed of the SORA registration requirement
before his sentencing and then registered. In an unpublished case with similar facts (a defendant
who registered under SORA before sentencing but whose judgment of sentence omitted the SORA
registration requirement), this Court determined that Nunez did not require that the SORA
requirement be voided because the trial court otherwise complied with SORA requirements.
People v Rickerd, unpublished per curiam opinion of the Court of Appeals, issued February 29,

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2024 (Docket No. 365408), p 9.2 Accordingly, the panel remanded to the trial court so that the
defendant’s judgment of sentence could be corrected to reflect the SORA registration requirement.
Id. The same remedy is appropriate in this case because defendant otherwise complied with, and
was aware of, the SORA requirements when considering his conviction.
D. LIFETIME ELECTRONIC MONITORING
Finally, defendant argues that the lifetime electronic monitoring (LEM) requirement
constitutes cruel or unusual punishment and an unreasonable search. Defendant did not raise this
argument before the trial court, so the issue is unpreserved and subject to review for plain error
affecting substantial rights. See People v Vandenberg, 307 Mich App 57, 61; 859 NW2d 229
(2014); Carines, 460 Mich at 763-764.
1. CRUEL OR UNUSUAL PUNISHMENT
Defendant was convicted of CSC-I, MCL 750.520b(2)(b) (victim under 13, perpetrator 17
or older). As such, he is required to be subject to LEM. MCL 750.520n(1). This Court has held
that LEM is a punishment. People v Hallak, 310 Mich App 555, 571; 873 NW2d 811 (2015),
rev’d in part on other grounds 499 Mich 879 (2016). This Court has also held that it is not a cruel
or unusual punishment for CSC-II committed against a victim under the age of 13. Id. at 575-577.
This Court determined that LEM promotes rehabilitation by limiting the offender’s ability to
reoffend, that it is not excessive compared to other punishments due to the vulnerability of child
victims, and that it is not unique because at least 10 other states have mandatory LEM for certain
CSC offenses. Id. at 573-576. Hallak is binding precedent that we must follow. See MCR
7.215(C)(2). Furthermore, the facts in this case indicate that defendant’s offense was graver than
the offense in Hallak; defendant committed CSC-I whereas the defendant in Hallak committed
CSC-II. Accordingly, the reasoning provided in Hallak as a basis for LEM not being cruel or
unusual punishment is applicable in this case as well.
2. UNREASONABLE SEARCH
Binding caselaw also provides that LEM does not constitute an unreasonable search. Even
though electronic monitoring is a search under the Fourth Amendment, Grady v North Carolina,
575 US 306, 310; 135 S Ct 1368; 191 L Ed 2d 459 (2015), this Court has held that LEM for
defendants convicted of CSC-II against a minor under 13 years of age is reasonable, Hallak, 310
Mich App at 579. This is because the public interest in reducing recidivism and protecting society
outweighs the diminished privacy interest afforded to those who have been convicted of the
offense. Id. at 580-582. Under MCR 7.215(C)(2), the Hallak decision remains binding precedent,
and we are required to hold that defendant is not entitled to resentencing on this issue.
2 Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent, but this Court may consider them for their
persuasive value. People v Green, 260 Mich App 710, 720 n 5; 680 NW2d 477 (2004).

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III. CONCLUSION
We affirm defendant’s conviction and sentence. However, we remand to the trial court so
that it may correct defendant’s judgment of sentence to include registration under SORA. We do
not retain jurisdiction.
/s/ Michael F. Gadola
/s/ Michael J. Riordan

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