COA 372067 HOSSAM ALAQUIE V EES COKE BATTERY LLC Opinion - Per Curiam - Unpublished 8/10/2026

If this opinion indicates that it is “FOR PUBLICATION,” it is subject to
revision until final publication in the Michigan Appeals Reports.
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S T A T E O F M I C H I G A N
C O U R T O F A P P E A L S
HOSSAM ALAQUIE, also known as HOSSAM
ALAOUIE,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
and
PRAETORIAN INSURANCE COMPANY,
Intervening Plaintiff,
UNPUBLISHED
August 10, 2026
10:30 AM
v No. 372067
Wayne Circuit Court
EES COKE BATTERY, LLC, LC No. 22-011545-NO
Defendant-Third Party Plaintiff-
Appellee,
AUTO-OWNERS INSURANCE COMPANY,
Defendant-Appellee,
and
OLD WORLD INDUSTRIES, LLC and OLD
WORLD SPECIALTY CHEMICALS, LLC,
Third-Party Defendants.
Before: LETICA, P.J., and O’BRIEN and REDFORD, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
In this premises liability action, plaintiff, Hossam Alaquie, also known as Hossam Alaouie,
appeals as of right the trial court’s order granting the motion for summary disposition filed by

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defendant-third party plaintiff, EES Coke Battery, LLC, under MCR 2.116(C)(10).1 The trial court
concluded that ESS was entitled to summary disposition because EES owed no duty to plaintiff.
This was error. Plaintiff was an invitee on EES’s land, so EES owed plaintiff the common-law
duty to exercise reasonable care to protect plaintiff from an unreasonable risk of harm caused by
a dangerous condition on EES’s land. This duty arose by nature of the parties’ relationship, and it
existed regardless of whether there was, in fact, a defective or dangerous condition on EES’s land.
We reverse and remand for further proceedings.
I. BACKGROUND
EES contracted to have caustic soda—a highly corrosive liquid—delivered to its facility,
and plaintiff worked for the company responsible for carrying out this task. To deliver the caustic
soda to EES’s facility, plaintiff drove a tanker carrying the caustic soda to the facility and was
directed to the storage tank into which the caustic soda was to be offloaded. EES’s storage tank
had an internal valve that had to be open for caustic soda to enter the tank, and only an EES
employee could open the internal valve. Plaintiff hooked up a hose connecting his tanker to EES’s
storage tank and pressurized his tanker and the hose, but the pressure did not force the caustic soda
out of plaintiff’s tanker and into EES’s storage facility. Plaintiff then waited for an EES employee
to come out so that he could ask whether the internal valve was open. According to plaintiff, when
an EES employee did come out, the employee told plaintiff that the valve was open,2 so plaintiff
continued trying to offload the caustic soda. When the caustic soda was still not offloading,
plaintiff asked the EES employee again whether the internal valve was open, and the employee
assured plaintiff that it was.3 Unfortunately, this was inaccurate—the internal valve was never
opened. But believing that the reason he could not offload the caustic soda was a problem with
his equipment, plaintiff set about unhooking the hose connecting his tanker to EES’s storage
facility so that he could take his equipment offsite to have it inspected. Unfortunately, the hose
was still under pressure when plaintiff detached it, and plaintiff was not wearing proper personal
protection equipment, so when plaintiff detached the hose, caustic soda sprayed onto plaintiff’s
face and into his eyes, causing injury.
Plaintiff thereafter brought this suit against EES. Plaintiff’s complaint alleged in relevant
part that EES “was under a duty to maintain the valves at its caustic storage facility in proper
working order,” that EES breached this duty because one of its valves was “defective,” and that
this breach proximately caused plaintiff’s injuries.
Following discovery, EES moved for summary disposition under MCR 2.116(C)(10). EES
argued that plaintiff’s claim against EES must fail as a matter of law because the closed valve on
EES’s property was not a “defective” or “dangerous condition on the land.” EES further argued
that any amendment to plaintiff’s complaint would be futile because plaintiff could not establish
that EES owed plaintiff a duty to supervise him during the course of his job responsibilities. Lastly,
1 None of the remaining parties listed in the caption are parties to this appeal.
2 The only EES employee who had contact with plaintiff on the day he was injured disputes this.
3 Again, EES’s employee disputes this.

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EES argued that any negligence-based claim brought by plaintiff against EES must fail “for lack
of causation.”
Plaintiff responded that EES owed plaintiff a duty to “advise, attend, and warn Plaintiff”
of the closed valve—a condition that EES “created and maintained”—because defendant had
“knowledge of Plaintiff’s delivery/unloading intentions.” The valve being closed was, according
to plaintiff, a breach of EES’s duty to plaintiff, and plaintiff argued that this breach proximately
caused his injuries because it was “clearly foreseeable” that not opening the valve after telling
plaintiff that it was open would cause plaintiff to do the things he did that led to his injuries.
The court held a hearing on EES’s motion, and, after listening to the parties’ arguments, it
delivered its ruling from the bench. The court granted EES’s motion for summary disposition “on
duty only” because it believed that “on proximate cause . . . there are some questions of fact that
perhaps need further airing out, if you will.” In short, the court ruled that EES was correct that it
owed no duty to plaintiff to prevent him from injuring himself. While the court was wrapping up,
plaintiff’s counsel interjected and asked the court if it was rejecting plaintiff’s argument that EES
owed plaintiff a “common law duty” given plaintiff’s status on EES’s land as “an invitee.” The
court responded that it was. Thereafter, the court entered an order granting EES’s motion for
summary disposition “for the reasons stated on the record.”
This appeal followed.
II. PRESERVATION
An issue is preserved if it is raised in or decided by the trial court. See Glasker-Davis v
Auvenshine, 333 Mich App 222, 227-228; 964 NW2d 809 (2020). EES contends that plaintiff did
not assert a claim for premises liability below, so any argument based on such a claim is waived.
It is true that none of the claims in plaintiff’s complaint are titled “premises liability,” but plaintiff’s
complaint does allege that plaintiff was injured by a condition on EES’s land. So, labels aside, the
gravamen of plaintiff’s claim sounds in premises liability, meaning that plaintiff’s complaint does
indeed allege a claim for premises liability. See Trowell v Providence Hosp & Med Ctrs, Inc, 502
Mich 509, 519; 918 NW2d 645 (2018) (explaining that, to determine what claims a complaint
pleads, courts are to “disregard the labels given to the claims and instead read the complaint as a
whole, seeking the gravamen of the claims”).
And even if plaintiff’s complaint did not sufficiently allege a claim for premises liability,
plaintiff still raised the claim below.4 When EES moved for summary disposition, it apparently
4 To the extent that EES seemingly contends that plaintiff’s failure to plead a premises liability
claim in his complaint precludes him from raising the issue now, that argument is without merit.
EES moved for summary disposition under MCR 2.116(C)(10). MCR 2.116(I)(5) states, “If the
grounds asserted are based on subrule (C)(8), (9), or (10), the court shall give the parties an
opportunity to amend their pleadings as provided by MCR 2.118, unless the evidence then before
the court shows that amendment would not be justified.” Adhering to this rule, plaintiff would
have been permitted to amend his complaint to plead a premises liability complaint if such an
amendment would have been justified.

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understood plaintiff to be raising a claim for premises liability because EES’s motion for summary
disposition recited caselaw concerning premises liability and argued that EES did not owe plaintiff
a duty sounding in premises liability. More importantly, in response to EES’s motion for summary
disposition, plaintiff explicitly stated that he was raising a claim sounding in premises liability and
argued that this claim should survive EES’s motion for summary disposition. Then, at the hearing
on EES’s motion, plaintiff’s counsel interjected to ask the trial court to clarify whether it was
rejecting plaintiff’s claim sounding in premises liability, and the court said that it was.
The foregoing thoroughly rebuts EES’s contention that plaintiff failed to raise its premises-
liability argument below. The issue is therefore preserved. See Glasker-Davis, 333 Mich App at
227-228.
III. STANDARD OF REVIEW
A trial court’s ruling on a motion for summary disposition is reviewed de novo. West v
Gen Motors Corp, 469 Mich 177, 183; 665 NW2d 468 (2003). Defendant moved for summary
disposition in relevant part under MCR 2.116(C)(10). A (C)(10) motion tests the factual
sufficiency of a claim. Maiden v Rozwood, 461 Mich 109, 120; 597 NW2d 817 (1999). In
reviewing a motion brought under MCR 2.116(C)(10), all the facts are viewed in the light most
favorable to the nonmoving party. Maiden, 461 Mich at 120. A (C)(10) motion is properly granted
if “there is no genuine issue as to any material fact, and the moving party is entitled to judgment
or partial judgment as a matter of law.” MCR 2.116(C)(10). “A genuine issue of material fact
exists when the record, giving the benefit of reasonable doubt to the opposing party, leaves open
an issue upon which reasonable minds might differ.” West, 469 Mich at 183.
Whether a duty exists is a question of law, reviewed de novo. Bailey v Schaaf, 494 Mich
595, 603; 835 NW2d 413 (2013).
IV. ANALYSIS
Plaintiff contends that the trial court erred by concluding that EES did not owe plaintiff a
duty insofar as plaintiff’s claim sounded in premises liability. We agree.
A suit alleging premises liability is a negligence claim. The elements for a premises
liability claim are therefore the same as the elements of an ordinary negligence claim: the plaintiff
must prove (1) that the defendant owed the plaintiff a duty, (2) that the defendant breached that
duty, and (3) that the defendant’s breach of its duty caused injury to the plaintiff. See Estate of
Trueblood v P&G Apartments, LLC, 327 Mich App 275, 285; 933 NW2d 732 (2019). The duty
owed in a premises liability action arises from the “special relationship” that exists between owners
and occupiers of land and visitors on that land. Bailey, 494 Mich at 604. The contours of this duty
depend on the visitor’s status on the land. Stitt v Holland Abundant Life Fellowship, 462 Mich
591, 596; 614 NW2d 88 (2000). An individual invited onto the land for business purposes is
considered an invitee. See Hoffner v Lanctoe, 492 Mich 450, 460 n 8; 821 NW2d 88 (2012). A
premises possessor owes an invitee a duty to exercise reasonable care to protect the invitee from
an unreasonable risk of harm caused by a dangerous condition on the land. Kandil-Elsayed v F &
E Oil, Inc, 512 Mich 95, 148; 1 NW3d 44 (2023).

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Plaintiff was on EES’s land with EES’s permission for business purposes, so he was an
invitee. See Hoffner, 492 Mich at 460 n 8. As an invitee on EES’s land, EES owed plaintiff a
duty to exercise reasonable care to protect plaintiff from an unreasonable risk of harm caused by
a dangerous or defective condition on EES’s land. Kandil-Elsayed, 512 Mich at 148. The trial
court thus erred by concluding that EES owed plaintiff no duty.
EES’s arguments on appeal attempt to obscure the duty it owed plaintiff, but none of the
arguments successfully explain why EES did not owe plaintiff the common-law duty EES owed
to all invitees on its land. EES contends that it “did not owe a duty to Plaintiff to prevent him from
his own reckless discharge of caustic soda,” which may be true, but it does not somehow eliminate
the duty that EES owed plaintiff by virtue of being in control of the premises that plaintiff was
visiting. EES alternatively contends that it actually “lack[ed] control over the premises” where
plaintiff was offloading the caustic soda because “every element which ultimately led to the release
of caustic soda were caused entirely by acts and omission of Plaintiff.” The former does not follow
the latter, however. That plaintiff had control over the things he was doing on EES’s land did not
deprive EES of control over its premises, which is what gave rise to the duty that EES owed
plaintiff. EES lastly contends that it did not owe plaintiff a duty because there was no dangerous
condition on EES’s land. But the duty that EES owed plaintiff arose from the special relationship
that existed between EES, as the owner and occupier of the land, and plaintiff, as an invitee on
EES’s land. See Bailey, 494 Mich at 604. EES’s duty to plaintiff was not triggered by a condition
on EES’s land, dangerous or not.5
Briefly, plaintiff claims that EES owed him a couple of other duties, but EES did not owe
plaintiff any of the alternative duties that plaintiff identifies. First, plaintiff argues that because
“EES contracted with other companies by purchasing caustic soda and having that product
delivered to its facility,” “EES had a duty to use reasonable care to see that the product was
unloaded safely into its storage tank.” This argument fails because the “general rule” is that “an
owner of property is not liable” for negligence if a contractor’s employee is injured while doing a
job on the property owner’s land because “the actual employer of a worker is immediately
responsible for job safety and for maintaining a safe work place.” Portelli v IR Const Prod Co,
Inc, 218 Mich App 591, 596; 554 NW2d 591 (1996). See also Samodai v Chrysler Corp, 178
Mich App 252, 255; 443 NW2d 391 (1989). It follows that EES did not have a freestanding duty
to use reasonable care to ensure that plaintiff safely unloaded the caustic soda merely because EES
contracted to have the caustic soda delivered to its storage tank. Plaintiff’s actual employer was
responsible for his safety and working conditions. See id.6
5 The same holds true to the extent that plaintiff argues that EES owed plaintiff a duty because
EES stored hazardous materials on its land. The condition of EES’s land did not create the duty
that EES owed plaintiff. That duty arose from plaintiff’s status as an invitee on EES’s land.
6 Plaintiff couches this argument in terms of the common-law duty that “imposes on every person
engaged in the prosecution of any undertaking an obligation to use due care, or to so govern his
actions as not to unreasonable endanger the person or property or others.” Clark v Dalman, 379
Mich 251, 261; 150 NW2d 755 (1967). Plaintiff argues that the “undertaking” in which EES was

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Second, plaintiff contends that EES’s “employees had an obligation” to follow EES’s
standard operating procedures. This is incorrect insofar as EES’s standard operating procedures
did not give rise to a duty that EES owed plaintiff. As EES notes on appeal, it is well established
that “a private entity’s internal rules do not ‘fix the standard of [its] duty to others.’ ” Meyers v
Rieck, 509 Mich 460, 473; 983 NW2d 747 (2022), quoting McKerman v Detroit Citizens’ Street-
R Co, 138 Mich 519, 530; 101 NW 812 (1904). “[T]he mere allegation that a defendant breached
its own internal rule or regulation does not, without more, make out a claim for negligence.”
Meyers, 509 Mich at 473.
For the reasons explained, however, EES did owe plaintiff a common-law duty by virtue
of the fact that plaintiff was an invitee on EES’s land. The trial court stated that it was granting
EES’s motion for summary disposition “on duty only,” concluding that EES owed no duty to
plaintiff. This was error, so we reverse that ruling and remand for further proceedings. Whether
EES breached the duty that it owed plaintiff and whether that breach was a proximate cause of
plaintiff’s injuries are different questions, and we decline to reach those issues in this appeal.
Reversed and remanded for further proceedings. We do not retain jurisdiction.
/s/ Anica Letica
/s/ Colleen A. O’Brien
/s/ James Robert Redford
engaged was contracting to have caustic soda delivered to its premises, but plaintiff was clearly
not injured while EES was contracting to have materials delivered. Plaintiff was injured while
performing the contracted-for work, and any argument that EES had a duty to ensure plaintiff’s
safety during that work fails for the reasons explained above. Plaintiff does not argue that, standing
alone, the EES’s employee’s action of representing that the internal valve was open gave rise to a
duty, so we consider any such argument abandoned on appeal. See Lashbrook v Grasak, ___ Mich
App ___, ___ n 4; ___ NW3d ___ (2025) (Docket No. 369669); slip op at 5 n 4.

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