COA 371199 NICHOLAS TAIT V JOHN WALKER Opinion - Per Curiam - Unpublished 1/12/2026

If this opinion indicates that it is “FOR PUBLICATION,” it is subject to
revision until final publication in the Michigan Appeals Reports.
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S T A T E O F M I C H I G A N
C O U R T O F A P P E A L S
NICHOLAS TAIT,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
UNPUBLISHED
January 12, 2026
10:53 AM
v No. 371199
Tuscola Circuit Court
JOHN WALKER, LC No. 2023-032331-NI
Defendant-Appellee,
and
DTE ELECTRIC COMPANY,
Defendant.
Before: TREBILCOCK, P.J., and PATEL and WALLACE, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
In this negligence action, plaintiff contends that defendant John Walker is liable for injuries
that plaintiff sustained from an electrical shock. The incident occurred while plaintiff was coiling
up an extension cord that he had unplugged from an outlet inside the residence that he shared with
defendant.1 The trial court granted defendant summary disposition under MCR 2.116(C)(10),
concluding that there was no genuine issue of material fact on whether there was an unreasonable
risk of harm caused by a dangerous condition on the premises or whether defendant breached any
duty. For the reasons discussed in this opinion, we affirm.
1 Plaintiff resolved his claim against DTE Electric Company, and DTE is not a party to this appeal.
Accordingly, “defendant” refers to Walker only.

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I. BACKGROUND
Plaintiff and defendant lived together in defendant’s home. Defendant owned a
recreational vehicle (RV) that he parked in the driveway of his home. Before the subject incident,
defendant had connected three extension cords together and ran them from the RV into the home
through a window. The extension cords were plugged into an electrical outlet in the utility room
to provide electricity to the RV while defendant cleaned and winterized it.2 Plaintiff testified that
the cords were plugged in for at least one day before the incident. On the date of the incident,
there was a windstorm. Plaintiff observed flames, sparks, and smoke coming from the outlet where
the extension cords were plugged in. Plaintiff turned off the main power to the home,3 and the
flames and sparking stopped. A few minutes later, plaintiff unplugged the extension cords from
the outlet and began to wind up the extension cord. As plaintiff was winding the cord, he sustained
an electrical shock. An investigation revealed that the windstorm had caused a tree to fall onto an
overhead power line. Part of the line fell across the top the RV, and part fell on the ground across
the extension cord.
Plaintiff commenced this action alleging negligence claims against defendant and DTE.4
After resolving his claim against DTE, plaintiff amended his complaint to allege that defendant
was responsible for plaintiff’s injuries under a theory of premises liability and res ipsa loquitur.
Plaintiff claimed that defendant created a dangerous condition on the premises when he left the
RV connected to the home electrical service during the windstorm while it was parked near the
location where an energized power line had previously fallen.
The parties presented electrical engineering experts to support their positions. Plaintiff’s
expert, Brent McKinney testified, “If the RV wasn’t there, there would be nothing for the line to
fall on[,]” and “[i]f the extension cords were not there, there would not have been a path to bring
electricity into the house.” He further stated, “If [plaintiff] would have not picked up the cord, he
would not have been shocked in the manner that he was. . . . It would not have happened in the
way that it did.” However, McKinney described the setup—the multiple extension cords
connecting the RV to the home electrical system—as “[a] safe electrical condition” before the
power line fell onto the RV. And he did not find evidence of a short in the extension cords.
Although McKinney explained that heating issues can occur when extension cords are connected
in a series and that, normally, a ground fault interrupter outlet is used with an outside cord, he
stated that neither of these conditions contributed to the incident. He also testified that the location
where the RV was parked—under a power line—did not violate any known DTE rules or other
safety code requirements. Ultimately, McKinney opined that “[t]he high voltage would not have
been available” if the power line had not fallen.
2 There were no electrical outlets on the exterior of the home.
3 The power shut off was in the same room as the subject outlet.
4 Plaintiff also asserted a vicarious liability claim against DTE for the alleged negligent actions of
tree trimmers that DTE hired to clear the trees and vegetation from the area around the power lines.

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Defendant’s expert, James Heyl, agreed that a “safe electrical condition” existed before the
power line fell onto the RV. He also agreed that there were no known DTE rules or other safety
code requirements violated by parking the RV under the power line. He further agreed that the
high voltage would not have been conducted through the extension cords if the power line had not
fallen.
Defendant moved for summary disposition under MCR 2.116(C)(10) arguing that he bore
no duty to plaintiff because the risk was unforeseeable. He maintained that he did not create an
unreasonable risk of harm by plugging in the RV. Defendant asserted that the cause of plaintiff’s
injury was a downed powerline caused by a wind storm. He further argued that the res ipsa loquitor
doctrine was inapplicable. Plaintiff responded that defendant had notice of the dangerous
condition because he created the condition when he connected the RV to the outlet through an
extension cord and defendant was aware that a power line came down during a windstorm
previously. He further argued that defendant breached his duty to plaintiff by not moving the RV
when the wind storm started or by not unplugging the RV. Plaintiff asserted that liability was
established by defendant’s admission in his deposition that it was “a hundred percent [his] fault”
that plaintiff was injured “because [defendant] left [the RV] plugged in.” Plaintiff also contended
that defendant failed to support his motion with an affidavit and that plaintiff was entitled to
summary disposition on the issue of liability under MCR 2.116(I)(2).
The trial court concluded that there was no genuine issue of material fact concerning
whether there was an unreasonable risk of harm caused by a dangerous condition on the premises
or whether defendant breached any duty and thus granted summary disposition to defendant.
Plaintiff now appeals.
II. STANDARDS OF REVIEW
“We review de novo a trial court’s decision on a motion for summary disposition.” El-
Khalil v Oakwood Healthcare, Inc, 504 Mich 152, 159; 934 NW2d 665 (2019). Summary
disposition under MCR 2.116(C)(10) is warranted when “[e]xcept as to the amount of damages,
there is no genuine issue as to any material fact, and the moving party is entitled to judgment or
partial judgment as a matter of law.” MCR 2.116(C)(10). “A genuine issue of material fact exists
when the record leaves open an issue upon which reasonable minds might differ.” El-Khalil, 504
Mich at 160 (cleaned up). When reviewing a motion for summary disposition under MCR
2.116(C)(10), a court must consider the evidence submitted by the parties in the light most
favorable to the nonmoving party. Id.
Additionally, whether the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur is applicable to a particular case is a
question of law. Pugno v Blue Harvest Farms, LLC, 326 Mich App 1, 19; 930 NW2d 393 (2018).
III. PREMISES LIABILITY
Plaintiff argues that the trial court erred by granting defendant’s motion for summary
disposition because defendant had a duty to prevent plaintiff’s injury and had notice that such
injury was possible. We disagree.

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“All negligence actions, including those based on premises liability, require a plaintiff to
prove four essential elements: duty, breach, causation, and harm.” Kandil-Elsayed v F & E Oil,
Inc, 512 Mich 95, 110; 1 NW3d 44 (2023). “The first element, duty, is essentially a question
whether the relationship between the actor and the injured person gives rise to any legal obligation
on the actor’s part for the benefit of the injured person.” Id. (cleaned up). Factors used to
determine whether duty exists include “(1) foreseeability of the harm, (2) degree of certainty of
injury, (3) closeness of connection between the conduct and injury, (4) moral blame attached to
the conduct, (5) policy of preventing future harm, and (6) the burdens and consequences of
imposing a duty and the resulting liability for breach.” Id. “[B]efore a duty can be imposed, there
must be a relationship between the parties and the harm must have been foreseeable. If either of
these two factors is lacking, then it is unnecessary to consider any of the remaining factors.” Hill
v Sears, Roebuck and Co, 492 Mich 651, 660; 822 NW2d 190 (2012) (cleaned up). A defendant
has no duty to protect from unforeseeable harm. In re Certified Question from Fourteenth Dist
Court of Appeals of Texas, 479 Mich 498, 508; 740 NW2d 206 (2007). “Under Michigan common
law, foreseeability depends on whether a reasonable person could anticipate that a given event
might occur under certain conditions.” Iliades v Dieffenbacher North America Inc, 501 Mich 326,
338; 915 NW2d 338 (2018) (cleaned up). When there are no facts in dispute as to duty, the analysis
is a matter of law. See In re Certified Question, 479 Mich at 504 (“Whether a defendant owes a
duty to a plaintiff to avoid negligent conduct is a question of law . . . .”).
In this case, the parties presume that plaintiff was an invitee as a purported tenant5 and thus
defendant owed plaintiff a duty “to exercise reasonable care to protect [him] from an unreasonable
risk of harm caused by a dangerous condition of the land.” Kandil-Elsayed, 512 Mich at 112,
quoting Bertrand v Alan Ford, Inc, 449 Mich 606, 609; 537 NW2d 185 (1995). As our Supreme
Court explained in Hoffner v Lanctoe, 492 Mich 450, 459; 821 NW2d 88 (2012):
The law of premises liability in Michigan has its foundation in two general
precepts. First, landowners must act in a reasonable manner to guard against harms
that threaten the safety and security of those who enter their land. Second, and as
a corollary, landowners are not insurers; that is, they are not charged with
guaranteeing the safety of every person who comes onto their land. These
principles have been used to establish well-recognized rules governing the rights
and responsibilities of both landowners and those who enter their land. Underlying
all these principles and rules is the requirement that both the possessors of land and
those who come onto it exercise common sense and prudent judgment when
confronting hazards on the land.
Plaintiff alleges that defendant created a dangerous condition by leaving the RV plugged
into the home’s electrical system during the windstorm while the RV was parked near the location
where an energized power line had previously fallen. But plaintiff’s and defendant’s experts
5 “An ‘invitee’ is a person who enters upon the land of another upon an invitation which carries
with it an implied representation, assurance, or understanding that reasonable care has been used
to prepare the premises, and make it safe for the invitee’s reception.” Stitt v Holland Abundant
Life Fellowship, 462 Mich 591, 596-597; 614 NW2d 88 (2000) (cleaned up).

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testified that connection of the RV to the home electrical system was safe. And neither expert took
issue with the location where the RV was parked. Although both experts agreed that the extension
cords were the pathway that brought the electricity into the house, they both opined that the voltage
would not have passed through the cords if the power line had not come down. Thus, the issue
whether defendant owed plaintiff a duty rests upon whether plaintiff’s injury was reasonably
foreseeable. Neither expert testified that it was foreseeable that the power line would fall on the
RV, energize the RV and the extension cords, and back feed the high voltage power into the home.
Nor is there evidence that it was foreseeable that plaintiff would disconnect the energized extension
cord from the outlet and be harmed in the process. Plaintiff testified that he was aware that the
RV was connected to the home’s electrical system for at least a day before the incident. He also
knew about the previous downed-wire incident, and testified that he did not have any concerns
about the RV being connected to the home’s electrical system. Although defendant took blame
for leaving the RV connected to the home and providing the pathway for the current, there is no
evidence that leaving the RV connected to the home was dangerous or that an injury to plaintiff
was foreseeable. Plaintiff has failed to show that the RV’s connection to the home’s electrical
system constituted an unreasonably dangerous condition that posed an unreasonable risk of harm
to plaintiff and thus defendant did not owe a duty to plaintiff.
We also find no merit in plaintiff’s argument that MCR 2.116(G)(3) required defendant to
support his motion for summary disposition with an affidavit. The plain language of the court rule
states that a party must submit “[a]ffidavits, depositions, admissions, or other documentary
evidence in support of” a dispositive motion. MCR 2.116(G)(3) (emphasis added). “[W]hen the
language of the rule is unambiguous, it must be enforced as written.” Micheli v Mich Auto Ins
Placement Facility, 340 Mich App 360, 367; 986 NW2d 451 (2022) (cleaned up). “ ‘[O]r’ is . . . a
disjunctive [term], used to indicate a disunion, a separation, an alternative.” Dine Brands Global,
Inc v Eubanks, __ Mich __, __; __ NW3d __ (2025) (Docket No. 165392); slip op at 23 (cleaned
up). Defendant’s motion was properly supported by depositions and other documentary evidence.
Defendant was not required to submit affidavits in addition to the other evidence.
Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to plaintiff as the nonmoving party, the
trial court did not err by concluding that there was no material factual dispute concerning whether
there was an unreasonable risk of harm caused by a dangerous condition on the premises and thus
defendant did not owe a duty to plaintiff.
IV. RES IPSA LOQUITUR
Plaintiff also argues that the trial court erred by failing to address his claim of res ipsa
loquitur. We disagree.
The doctrine of res ipsa loquitur “[i]s not an independent cause of action.” Pugno v Blue
Harvest Farms LLC, 326 Mich App 1, 19; 930 NW2d 393 (2018). Rather, it is a rebuttable
presumption or inference that a defendant was negligent that arises upon proof that the
instrumentality causing a plaintiff’s injuries was in the defendant’s exclusive control, and that the
accident was one which ordinarily does not happen in absence of negligence. Woodard v Custer,
473 Mich 1, 6 n 2; 702 NW2d 522 (2005), quoting Black’s Law Dictionary (6th ed); see also,
Jones v Porretta, 428 Mich 132, 150-151; 405 NW2d 863 (1987). Our Supreme Court has

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provided the following conditions that must be met in order for a plaintiff to avail herself of the
doctrine of res ipsa loquitor:
(1) the event must be of a kind which ordinarily does not occur in the absence of
someone’s negligence;
(2) it must be caused by an agency or instrumentality within the exclusive control
of the defendant;
(3) it must not have been due to any voluntary action or contribution on the part of
the plaintiff; and
(4) evidence of the true explanation of the event must be more readily accessible to
the defendant than to the plaintiff. [Woodard, 473 Mich at 7 (cleaned up).]
But “before this inference of negligence can be drawn, something more must be shown than the
mere happening of the accident.” Fuller v Wurzburg Dry Goods Co, 192 Mich 447, 448; 158 NW
1026 (1916).
Plaintiff has not presented any evidence to establish that defendant was negligent. Plaintiff
must produce some evidence of wrongdoing beyond the mere happening of the event. Id. There
was no evidence that the extension cord was negligently used or that the RV was negligently
parked. Accordingly, the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur is not applicable to plaintiff’s claim.
Affirmed. Defendant, having prevailed, may tax costs under MCR 7.219(A).
/s/ Christopher M. Trebilcock
/s/ Sima G. Patel
/s/ Randy J. Wallace

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