COA 370662 CHARLES CHESHURE V ELAINE MARRERO Opinion - Per Curiam - Unpublished 2/13/2026

If this opinion indicates that it is “FOR PUBLICATION,” it is subject to
revision until final publication in the Michigan Appeals Reports.
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S T A T E O F M I C H I G A N
C O U R T O F A P P E A L S
CHARLES CHESHURE,
Plaintiff/Counterdefendant-Appellee,
and
NAZEK A. GAPPY,
Plaintiff-Appellee/Cross-Appellant,
UNPUBLISHED
February 13, 2026
8:44 AM
V No. 370662
Oakland Circuit Court
ELAINE MARRERO, LC No. 2020-181296-CH
Defendant/Counterplaintiff-
Appellant/Cross-Appellee.
Before: CAMERON, P.J., and M. J. KELLY and YOUNG, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
In this case involving a boundary dispute between neighbors, defendant/counterplaintiff,
Elaine Marrero, appeals as of right the trial court order quieting title to the disputed area in favor
of plaintiff/counterdefendant, Nazek Gappy.1 Marrero argues that the trial court erred by finding
that she had failed to establish title to a 20 x 10 area of land on Gappy’s property by either adverse
possession or by acquiescence to the boundary for the statutory period of 15 years. She also asserts
that the trial court erred by failing to rule in her favor on her claim of conversion, by failing to
award her damages, and by failing to enter a default judgment against Gappy’s predecessor in
interest, plaintiff/counterdefendant, Charles Cheshure. In a cross-appeal, Gappy argues that the
trial court erred by failing to award her damages for Marrero’s trespass onto her property and by
failing to award her attorney fees for her representation of herself and her implied representation
1 Gappy represented herself in the lower court proceedings. She is also representing herself on
appeal and cross appeal.

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of Cheshure. For the reasons stated in this opinion, we affirm in part, vacate in part, and remand
for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
I. BASIC FACTS
This case involves a property-line dispute. On May 19, 2020, Cheshure filed a quiet-title
action asserting that he owned the property located at 2815 Devondale in Rochester Hills, which
he had purchased on January 31, 2020. He alleged that Marrero, who owned the adjacent parcel,
had been placing her personal property on a portion of his and his grantor’s real property since
approximately 2012. Cheshure sought to quiet title to the disputed portion of property, and he
alleged trespass and nuisance. In response, Marrero filed a counterclaim against Cheshure seeking
a declaratory judgment that she had acquired the disputed portion of property by adverse
possession. She also sought a declaration that Cheshure had wrongfully destroyed her personal
property and sought damages, attorney fees, and costs. Marrero later added a claim for
acquiescence.
Both Marrero and Cheshure sought summary disposition. Cheshure, however, did not
respond to Marrero’s motion, nor did he appear at the hearing held on that motion. The court,
therefore, granted Marrero summary disposition on the unopposed motion. Cheshure moved for
reconsideration, contending that he had not received a copy of the motion and stating that he had
sold the subject property to Gappy in June 2021. Gappy, who is a licensed attorney, sought
permission to join the case as a plaintiff. As part of that effort, Cheshure assigned his rights and
obligations in the litigation to Gappy. The court ultimately granted Gappy permission to join, but
refused to set aside the summary judgement entered in favor of Marrero. Gappy appealed to this
Court, which entered an order directing, in part, that the summary disposition motion be
reconsidered.2 The court then set the order summarily granting summary disposition aside. The
parties filed additional summary disposition motions, but the court denied them because there were
genuine issues of material fact.
The matter proceeded to a three-day bench trial conducted via “Zoom.” The trial court
took judicial notice of its orders, opinions, and pleadings, but stated that the attachments to those
documents would not be automatically admitted. Instead, the exhibits would need to be verified
through witness testimony and no affidavits would be admitted without the affiant’s testimony.
Deeds were admitted establishing the chain of title for each property. As it relates to Marrero’s
property, commonly known as 2771 Devondale (the Marrero property), the record reflects that the
property was conveyed to her on December 16, 1998, by Brian Bishop. As it relates to Gappy’s
property, commonly known as 2815 Devondale (the Gappy property), the chain of title reflects
several owners.
Brian Bishop and Brandy Bishop conveyed the property to Michael Phelps on January 5,
2001; Phelps conveyed the property to Peter Zwirko on December 22, 2005; Zwirko lost the
property to foreclosure and, following a sheriff’s sale, the property was conveyed to the Federal
2 Cheshure v Marrero, unpublished order of the Court of Appeals (Docket No. 358932), entered
November 24, 2021.

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National Mortgage Association; the Federal National Mortgage Association conveyed the property
to Lek Kalaj on May 30, 2013; Kalaj conveyed the property to John Brochue on March 3, 2016;
Brochue conveyed the property to Cheshure on February 6, 2020, and Cheshure conveyed the
property to Gappy on June 9, 2021.
At trial, the court heard testimony from the following property owners: Zwirko, Kalaj,
Brochue, Gappy, and Marrero. The court also heard testimony from Marrero’s handyman, Randy
Miller, and from several witnesses relating to the destruction of Marrero’s fence and property by
Cheshure.3 Finally, the court heard testimony from Doris and Tara Lemcool, who testified
regarding their observations of the boundary dispute and to Marrero’s trespass and destruction of
vegetation in the disputed area. Cheshure did not appear at trial, and Gappy informed the court
that she was not representing him. Following the trial, the court entered an order quieting title in
favor of Gappy and finding that Marrero had not established title to the disputed area by adverse
possession or acquiescence. The court found that the claims against Cheshure were moot. It also
found that Gappy had established her claim for trespass, but that she had not established any
damages. Gappy filed post-trial motions for damages and attorney fees, both of which the court
denied. This appeal follows.
II. STANDING
As an initial matter, Marrero suggests that Cheshure and Gappy lacked standing to
challenge her claim to the disputed area because she acquired title to it either in 2013 or 2019.
Marrero cites no legal authority in support of her position. “It is not enough for an appellant in his
brief simply to announce a position or assert an error and then leave it up to this Court to discover
and rationalize the basis for his claims, or unravel and elaborate for him his arguments, and then
search for authority either to sustain or reject his position.” Mitcham v Detroit, 355 Mich 182,
203; 94 NW2d 388 (1959). Consequently, this aspect of Marrero’s argument is abandoned.
III. ADVERSE POSSESSION
A. STANDARD OF REVIEW
The trial court found that Marrero did not meet her burden of establishing the elements of
adverse possession. An action to quiet title is reviewed de novo. Walker v Bowen, 333 Mich 13,
20; 52 NW2d 574 (1952). Likewise, we review de novo claims for adverse possession. Beach v
Lima Twp, 283 Mich App 504, 508; 770 NW2d 386 (2009). The trial court’s factual findings
following a bench trial are reviewed for clear error. Patel v Patel, 324 Mich App 631, 633; 922
NW2d 647 (2018); see also Beach, 283 Mich App at 524 n 7. “A finding is clearly erroneous
where, although there is evidence to support the finding, the reviewing court on the entire record
is left with the definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been made.” Patel, 324 Mich App
at 633 (quotation marks and citation omitted). We “afford deference to the trial court’s superior
3 At trial, Gappy stated that Cheshure’s destruction of Marrero’s personal property was “at issue.”
The testimony that he destroyed her property, however, was unrefuted.

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ability to judge the credibility of the witnesses who appear before it.” Id. (quotation marks and
citation omitted).
B. ANALYSIS
“A party claiming adverse possession must show clear and cogent proof of possession that
is actual, continuous, open, notorious, exclusive, hostile, and uninterrupted for the relevant
statutory period.” Marlette Auto Wash, LLC v Van Dyke SC Props, LLC, 501 Mich 192, 202; 912
NW2d 161 (2018). The statutory period for adverse possession is 15 years. MCL 600.5801(4).
Clear and cogent proof is “more than a preponderance of the evidence, approaching the level of
proof beyond a reasonable doubt.” Walters v Snyder, 225 Mich App 219, 223; 570 NW2d 301
(1997). “The evidence offered in support of adverse possession must be strictly construed with
every presumption being exercised in favor of the record owner of the land.” Rozmarek v
Plamondon, 419 Mich 287, 292; 351 NW2d 558 (1984) (quotation marks and citation omitted).
“When the elements of adverse possession have been met, the law presumes that the true owner,
by his acquiescence, has granted the land, or interest to the land, so held adversely.” Marlette Auto
Wash, LLC, 501 Mich at 202 (quotation marks and citation omitted).
“A cause of action does not accrue until the property owner of record has been disseised of
the land.” Beach, 283 Mich App at 512 (quotation marks and citation omitted). “Disseisin occurs
when the true owner is deprived of possession or displaced by someone exercising the powers and
privileges of ownership.” Id. (quotation marks and citation omitted). See also Wengel v Wengel,
270 Mich App 86, 92; 714 NW2d 371 (2006). The trial court found that the statutory period for
adverse possession ran from June 2013 until May 2020.
On appeal, Marrero suggests that her claim for adverse possession accrued in December
1998 based upon her use of “walking trails” in the disputed area. In support, she directs this Court
to testimony that when she purchased her property on December 16, 1998, there were already
walking trails in the disputed area. She believed that the area with the trail was part of her property
and used it as such. The trial court found that there were inconsistencies in Marrero’s testimony
when compared to her prior statements under oath. Regardless, the court found credible Marrero’s
testimony that she had used the walking trails that existed when she purchased her property in
1998, but it did not find her use to be exclusive. Exclusive use is a necessary element of adverse
possession. Marlette Auto Wash, LLC, 501 Mich at 202. Marrero did not testify to exclusive use
starting in 1998, nor did she testify to any actions that could be reasonably construed as having
deprived the true owner of possession or displaced the true owner from exercising the powers and
privileges of ownership. See Beach, 283 Mich App at 512. As such, she did not present clear and
cogent evidence that disseisin of the true owner occurred in 1998.
Marrero alternatively argues that her claim accrued in 2004. Marrero testified that, in 2004,
she had a fence built along what she assumed was the property line, and she added landscaping
and other small pieces of fence to the area to “extend” the property line. Indeed, she stated that
she also put up a vinyl fence and arbor vitae along the boundary line. She explained that she put

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the fence up to establish the boundary line and for privacy.4 Marrero’s testimony regarding the
fence was corroborated by Miller, who testified that he built it for Marrero in the spring of 2004.5
He added that he had also built a shed in 2004. Miller stated that the fence that was depicted in
trial exhibit 3 was the fence that he built for Marrero.
Gappy presented testimony disputing Marrero’s and Miller’s testimony that the fence was
built in 2004. Specifically, Zwirko, who purchased the Gappy property in December 2005 and
lost it to foreclosure in 2011, testified that the only fence on the property was an “L” shaped fence
on his “side” of the property that had been built by his predecessor in interest. He testified that the
photograph in trial exhibit 3 was not the same L-shaped fence that was on his property. He stated
that the fence in the photograph looked “totally different” and was longer.
The trial court did not resolve this factual dispute. Instead, the court recognized Miller’s
testimony that he built a fence and a deck in the disputed area in 2004. Yet, in its findings of fact,
the court noted that the fence was only “allegedly” built in 2004, and the court recognized that
there was a “material dispute” as to whether the fence existed in 2004. Then, when addressing the
claim for adverse possession, the court prefaced its analysis by stating that even if Miller had built
the fence in 2004, “no one acted hostile” toward Marrero’s use until June 2013. Based upon the
court’s statements in its opinion, it does not appear that the trial court found the fence’s installation
date to be dispositive as to the adverse-possession claim. We disagree.
The trial court found that, even if the fence had been built in 2004, “no one acted hostile to
[Marrero’s] use of the Disputed Area until June 2013.” The court found that Phelps (2000-2005),
Zwirko (2005-2011), and the Federal National Mortgage Association (2011-2013), did not reside
at the property. It concluded that, starting in June 2013, however, Kalaj objected to Marrero’s
belongings in the disputed area. The court also found that the statutory period for adverse
possession ran from June 2013 until May 2020. Thus, the court appears to have concluded that
the element of hostility was established by Kalaj’s June 2013 objection and that Kalaj’s objection
started the clock on Marrero’s adverse-possession claim.
In finding hostility beginning in June 2013, the court erroneously focused on the true
owner’s hostility toward Marrero. An adverse possession claim, however, considers whether the
person possessing or using the property is hostile to the true owner. Wengel, 270 Mich App at 92-
93. Indeed, “[t]he term ‘hostile’ as employed in the law of adverse possession is a term of art and
does not imply ill will; rather, hostile use is that which is inconsistent with the right of the owner,
without permission asked or given, and which would entitle the owner to a cause of action against
the intruder.” Wengel, 270 Mich App at 92-93 (quotation marks and citation omitted).
4 Marrero also testified that she had added trails to the disputed area, but she did not clearly state
when she did so. She also hired someone to cut the grass in the disputed area starting in 2003, but
there are no findings by the trial court that her use at that time was exclusive.
5 On appeal, Gappy contends that Miller was “disabled due to strokes.” There is nothing in the
record to support that Miller had a stroke, let alone “strokes.” However, Miller testified that he
had a disability that affected his ability to read and write, but did not affect him physically. The
trial court took judicial notice that “Miller may be cognitively impaired.”

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Accordingly, the trial court’s finding that the adverse-possession claim accrued in June 2013 is
based upon an erroneous application of the law.
Moreover, in light of the testimony presented and the trial court’s failure to resolve the
factual dispute regarding when the fence was built, we conclude that remand for additional factual
findings is required. If the trial court finds the Marrero’s fence was built in the spring of 2004,
that finding would be sufficient to establish the hostility element of her adverse possession claim.
It is undisputed that the fence encroached on Gappy’s property. The erection of the fence is plainly
inconsistent with the rights of the true owner of the Gappy property. There is no testimony that
Marrero had asked for or obtained permission to build the fence. And given that the addition of
the fence was an unauthorized intrusion upon the Gappy property, it formed the basis for a trespass
action against Marrero. See id. If the trial court were to find that the fence was built in the spring
of 2004, then the 15-year statutory period for adverse possession would run until the spring of
2019. Alternatively, if the court finds that the fence was constructed at a later date, the statutory
period would run from that date until 15 years later. Until the accrual date of Marrero’s claim for
adverse possession is determined, it is impossible to determine whether the elements of adverse
possession were satisfied for the duration of that period.6
We therefore vacate the court’s decision on adverse possession and remand for further
factual findings. We believe that the factual disputes can be resolved on the existing record, but
leave it to the sound discretion of the trial court whether to take additional arguments from the
parties.
IV. ACQUIESCENCE
Marrero contends that the trial court erred by finding that she did not establish her claim
for acquiescence. We disagree.
“Under Michigan law, parties may acquiesce to a new property boundary line.” Houston
v Mint Group, LLC, 335 Mich App 545, 559; 968 NW2d 9 (2021). “Acquiescence is established
when a preponderance of the evidence establishes that the parties treated a particular boundary line
as the property line.” Id. (quotation marks and citation omitted). The three theories of
acquiescence include: (1) acquiescence for the statutory period; (2) acquiescence following a
dispute and agreement; and (3) acquiescence arising from intention to deed to a marked boundary."
Id. (quotation marks and citation omitted). At issue in this case is the first theory—acquiescence
for the statutory period. The statutory period for acquiring property by acquiescence is 15 years.
MCL 600.5801(4). To prevail, the party claiming acquiescence must show “that the property
owners treated a boundary line or marker as the property line for 15 years.” Id. (quotation marks
and citation omitted).
Marrero contends that the boundary line was established when she installed her fence in
2004. As noted above, the trial court did not resolve the factual dispute as to whether the fence
was installed in 2004 or whether it was installed at some later date. However, the trial court held
6 Given our conclusion that additional fact finding is necessary, we decline to address the various
legal theories that Gappy raises in support of the court’s decision.

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that, even if it were to accept that the fence had been built in 2004, Kalaj’s objection to Marrero’s
belongings being placed in the disputed area would defeat the claim for acquiescence. That finding
is not clearly erroneous.
Kalaj testified that he believed that the fence across from his garage was where the property
line was located, that he was not sure if the fence actually was on the property line, and that he
was not sure if there was any argument between him and Marrero involving the fence. However,
he also testified that when he purchased the property Marrero had “stuff” on his side of the property
line and that she placed trash cans on his side, planted evergreens, and constructed a “deck
expansion.” He told her to remove her belongings. He called the police when she would not
remove them, but the police did not take any action. Kalaj explained that he knew that Marrero
was encroaching on his property because he measured the property using two points on the south
side of the property. He expressly testified that he did not accept the boundary line. He explained
that he did not bring a lawsuit against Marrero because it would be time consuming and expensive.
In light of Kalaj’s testimony that he challenged the boundary line after measuring the
property to determine that there was an encroachment, objected to Marrero’s belongings on his
side of the property, and called the police in an attempt to enforce his rights, the court’s finding
that Kalaj did not acquiesce to the boundary line is not clearly erroneous.
On appeal, Marrero suggests that none of the owners of Gappy’s property took legal action
against her during the 15-year period between 2004 and 2019. That is true. However,
acquiescence requires both parties to treat a boundary line as the property line. Id. Kalaj’s
testimony is sufficient to establish that he did not treat the boundary line as the property line.
On this record, the trial court did not clearly err by finding that Marrero failed to established
title to the disputed area by acquiescence.
V. CLAIMS AGAINST CHESHURE
Marrero contends that the court failed to rule on her statutory conversion claim under MCL
600.2919a. The trial court concluded that the claims against Cheshure were rendered moot by its
decision to quiet title in favor of Gappy. “An issue is moot if an event occurs that renders it
impossible for a court to grant relief.” Barrow v Detroit Election Comm, 305 Mich App 649, 659;
854 NW2d 489 (2014) (quotation marks and citation omitted). On appeal, Marrero does not argue
that the court’s finding that the claim was moot is erroneous. We conclude this issue is abandoned
in light of Marrero’s failure to challenge the legal basis for the court’s ruling. See Mitcham, 355
Mich at 203.
However, should the court on remand determine that Marrero established the elements of
adverse possession and therefore acquired title to the disputed area, the trial court should
reconsider Marrero’s conversion claim against Cheshure. That reconsideration should include
evaluation of Marrero’s request for a default judgment against Cheshure and her argument that
Cheshure and Gappy should be held jointly and severally liable for any damages.

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VI. MOTION FOR DAMAGES
A. STANDARD OF REVIEW
In her cross appeal, Gappy argues that the trial court erred by declining to award her
damages for her trespass claim. We review for clear error “a trial court’s determination of damages
following a bench trial.” Alan Custom Homes, Inc v Krol, 256 Mich App 505, 513; 667 NW2d
379 (2003).
B. ANALYSIS
Following a bench trial, the court found that Gappy had established her trespass claim
against Marrero, but that she had “failed to provide evidentiary support as to her damage claim.”
Accordingly, the court entered a judgment in the amount of $0 on the trespass claim. Gappy
brought a post-trial motion for damages. She maintained that she proved damages in the form of
lost rental income, the destruction of a 200-year-old walnut tree, and the demolition of vegetation
and bushes. She contended that the destruction of her property and the trespass resulted in mental
anguish, which resulted in additional damages. She maintained that she did not have “ample
opportunity to present certain evidence at the time of trial due to time constraints and the agony
and anguish of listening to [Marrero] testify about false prophecies.”
On appeal, she directs this Court to testimony and exhibits that she contends support her
claim for damages. However, a party asserting a claim “has the burden of proving damages with
reasonable certainty, and damages predicated on speculation and conjecture are not recoverable.”
Health Call of Detroit v Atrium Home & Health Care Srvs, Inc, 268 Mich App 83, 96; 706 NW2d
843 (2005). In denying the motion for damages, the court reasoned that Gappy had been given an
opportunity to present evidence in support of her claims during the trial. She had presented
testimony from multiple witnesses, including herself, and submitted multiple exhibits in support
of her arguments. No exhibits relating to damages were admitted. Given the lack of evidence
related to damages, the court determined that Gappy had failed to prove her damages with
reasonable certainty. Given that no evidence was admitted as to the value of Gappy’s claim, we
conclude that the court’s finding is not clearly erroneous.7 The court did not err by denying
Gappy’s motion for damages.
7 We note that Gappy attached documentation in support of her claim for damages to briefs and
motions filed after the trial. The documents, however, were not admitted at trial and she did not
attempt to reopen the proofs to submit such evidence. We also find dubious Gappy’s contention
that she was not given a chance to present the claim because of time constraints and emotional
distress related to Marrero’s testimony regarding false prophecies. Having reviewed the trial
record, we can identify no instance of the trial court imposing time restraints on her presentation
of the case. Moreover, given that Gappy presented her case-in-chief first, Marrero did not, in fact,
testify until after Gappy rested. Her claim of being too distressed to properly present her claim is,
therefore, implausible.

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VII. MOTION FOR ATTORNEY FEES
A. STANDARD OF REVIEW
Gappy argues that the trial court abused its discretion by denying her motion for attorney
fees. A trial court’s decision to award or deny attorney fees is reviewed for an abuse of discretion.
Reed v Reed, 265 Mich App 131, 164; 693 NW2d 825 (2005).
B. ANALYSIS
Gappy raises several issues related to her request for attorney fees. We address each in
turn.
Gappy argues that she is entitled to recover attorney fees on behalf of Cheshure. We
disagree. When she placed her appearance on the record on the first day of trial, Gappy indicated
that she was “Nazek Gappy, and I’m alone.” She then indicated that she had tried many times to
“reach” Cheshure but had not heard anything back. She did not know if he was going to appear
for trial. On the second day of trial, the following exchange occurred:
Marrero’s lawyer. Okay. And a point of clarification, is—I assume Ms.
Gappy is representing herself and Not Mr. Cheshure. There’s been no appearance
filed on—she’s defending herself and Cheshure is not being represented.
Gappy. That is correct.
On the third day of trial, the court inquired whether Marrero’s allegation that Cheshure burned
down her fence was disputed. Gappy responded that it was disputed, noting that Cheshure “isn’t
even here to defend himself.” She did not indicate that she was, in fact, representing him. Finally,
it her closing argument, she stated that “I don’t want to say too much about the claim against Mr.
Cheshure, because I don’t represent him.”
In light of Gappy’s express representations that she did not represent Cheshure, she has
waived any argument that she is entitled to recover attorney fees based upon her representation of
him at trial. “A waiver is a voluntary, intentional abandonment of a known rights.” K2 Retail
Constr Srvs, Inc v West Lansing Retail Development, LLC, ___ Mich App ___, ___; ___ NW2d
___ (2025) (Docket No. 367762); slip op at 14 n 12. “A party who waives a right is precluded
from seeking appellate review based on a denial of that right because waiver eliminates any error.”
Braverman v Granger, 303 Mich App 587, 608; 844 NW2d 485 (2014). “[A] party may not take
a position before this Court that is contrary to a position the party took before the lower court.”
K2 Retail, ___ Mich App at ___; slip op at 14 n 12.
Gappy next argues that she is entitled to attorney fees under MCL 600.2591 and MCR
1.109. Under MCR 1.109(E)(6), if a document is signed in violation of MCR 1.109, then the court
shall impose sanctions and the sanctions “may include an order to pay to the other party . . . the
amount of the reasonable expenses incurred because of the filing of the document, including
reasonable attorney fees.” (Emphasis added). Under MCL 600.2591,

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(1) Upon motion of any party, if a court finds that a civil action or defense
to a civil action was frivolous, the court that conducts the civil action shall award
to the prevailing party the costs and fees incurred by that party in connection with
the civil action by assessing the costs and fees against the nonprevailing party and
their attorney.
(2) The amount of costs and fees awarded under this section shall include
all reasonable costs actually incurred by the prevailing party and any costs allowed
by law or by court rule, including court costs and reasonable attorney fees.
[Emphasis added.]
As a pro se party, Gappy did not incur any attorney fees. As explained in FMB-First Mich
Bank v Bailey, 232 Mich App 711, 725-726; 591 NW2d 676 (1998), MCL 600.2591 predicates an
award of attorney fees on the idea that fees are actually incurred by the litigant. However, a pro
se litigant does not incur attorney fees because she represents herself. Id. at 726. Additionally,
notwithstanding that Gappy is both a lawyer and a pro se litigant, she cannot act as an “attorney”
for herself. Id. “[A]n attorney is an agent or substitute who acts in the stead of another, a party
acting in propria persona cannot truly be said to be an attorney for himself.” Id. As such, an
attorney who acts in propria persona is not entitled to recover her attorney fees under MCL
600.2591 because she neither acts as an attorney for herself nor incurs attorney fees. Id. The same
reasoning applies to an award of attorney fees under MCR 1.109(E), which, like MCL 600.2591,
predicates an award of attorney fees on the idea that the fees are actually incurred. Although the
trial court did not decide the case on this ground, we nevertheless affirm the trial court’s order
denying Gappy’s request for her attorney fees on this alternate ground. Lavey v Mills, 248 Mich
App 244, 250; 639 NW2d 261 (2001) (quotation omitted, alteration in original) (“[w]hen this Court
concludes that a trial court has reached the correct result, this Court will affirm even if it does so
under alternative reasoning.”).
Finally, we conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion by denying Gappy’s
motion for attorney fees under MCR 2.3312 and MCR 2.313(C). Pursuant to MCR 2.312, Gappy
served Marrero with requests for admission. Under MCR 2.313(C)(2) provides:
If a party denies. . . the truth of a matter as requested under MCR 2.312, and
if the party requesting the admission later proves . . . the truth of the matter, the
requesting party may move for an order requiring the other party to pay the
expenses incurred in making that proofs, including attorney fees. The court shall
enter the order unless it finds that
* * *
(c) the party failing to admit had reasonable ground to believe that he or she might
prevail on the matter . . . .
In denying Gappy’s motion, the trial court found that Marrero “had reasonable grounds” to believe
that she might prevail on the matter. The court further noted that the prior judge had “entered an
opinion granting summary disposition for [Marrero], which was later reversed by the court.”
Moreover, the record reflects that the court denied subsequent motions for summary disposition

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because material issues of disputed fact continued to exist. Indeed, even now, there remain factual
disputes that need to be resolved in order to fully evaluate the validity of Marrero’s claim for
adverse possession. The court’s decision not to award sanctions under MCR 2.313 was not in
error.
The trial court did not err by denying Gappy’s motion for attorney fees.
We affirm the court’s determination as to Marrero’s claim for acquiescence and the court’s
denial of Gappy’s requests for damages and attorney fees. We vacate the judgment quieting title
in favor of Gappy and its determination that Marrero failed to establish title to the disputed area
by adverse possession and remand for further factual and legal findings consistent with this
opinion. We do not retain jurisdiction. Neither party having prevailed in full, no taxable costs are
awarded. MCR 7.219(A).
/s/ Thomas C. Cameron
/s/ Michael J. Kelly
/s/ Adrienne N. Young

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