COA 375313 AMNA MAHMOOD V IRFAN MAHMOOD Opinion - Per Curiam - Unpublished 7/16/2026

If this opinion indicates that it is “FOR PUBLICATION,” it is subject to
revision until final publication in the Michigan Appeals Reports.
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S T A T E O F M I C H I G A N
C O U R T O F A P P E A L S
AMNA MAHMOOD,
Plaintiff/Counterdefendant-Appellee,
UNPUBLISHED
July 16, 2026
2:45 PM
V No. 375313
Macomb Circuit Court
IRFAN MAHMOOD, LC No. 2021-009917-DO
Defendant/Counterplaintiff-Appellant,
and
ASMAT MIRZA,
Third-Party Defendant,
and
JACOB KAHN, Receiver,
Appellee.
Before: GADOLA, C.J., and BOONSTRA and CAMERON, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
In a prior appeal in this divorce action, this Court held that the trial court had jurisdiction
to determine whether plaintiff held an interest in certain property in Bloomfield Hills, and we
affirmed the trial court’s determination that the property “belonged within the marital estate.”
Mahmood v Mahmood, unpublished per curiam opinion of the Court of Appeals, issued
November 15, 2025 (Docket No. 366683), p 8. The trial court subsequently appointed a receiver
to list and sell that property so that plaintiff and defendant could share in the proceeds equally
under the terms of the judgment of divorce. Defendant now appeals the trial court’s order
appointing a receiver. We leave the trial court’s order appointing a receiver undisturbed and
dismiss the appeal for lack of jurisdiction.
Under MCL 600.308(1), “[t]he court of appeals has jurisdiction on appeals from all final
judgments and final orders from the circuit court . . . as those terms are defined by law and supreme

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court rule . . . .” Additionally, “[i]n receivership and similar actions, the court may direct that an
order entered before adjudication of all of the claims and rights and liabilities of all the parties
constitutes a final order on an express determination that there is no just reason for delay.”
MCR 2.604(B).
The order from which defendant appeals is not a final order because it explicitly states that
it “does not resolve the last pending claim or close the case.” And the trial court did not exercise
its discretion under MCR 2.604(B) to deem the appointment of a receiver a final order. Therefore,
we lack jurisdiction to address the issue. See Children’s Hosp of Mich v Auto Club Ins Ass’n, 450
Mich 670, 677; 545 NW2d 592 (1996) (noting that even if it would be more efficient to process
an appeal of a nonfinal judgment, “the existence of such a situation is a ground upon which to
apply for leave to appeal, not an exception to the rules governing appeals of right”).
Dismissed.
/s/ Michael F. Gadola
/s/ Mark T. Boonstra
/s/ Thomas C. Cameron

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