COA 376042 IN RE VINSON MINOR Opinion - Per Curiam - Unpublished 4/13/2026

If this opinion indicates that it is “FOR PUBLICATION,” it is subject to
revision until final publication in the Michigan Appeals Reports.
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S T A T E O F M I C H I G A N
C O U R T O F A P P E A L S
UNPUBLISHED
April 13, 2026
11:28 AM
In re VINSON, Minor.
No. 376042
Wayne Circuit Court
Family Division
LC No. 2018-000286-NA
Before: KOROBKIN, P.J., and YOUNG and BAZZI, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
Respondent1 appeals as of right the order terminating her parental rights to her minor child
TV under MCL 712A.19b(3)(i), (j), and (k)(i). On appeal, respondent argues that her due process
rights were violated when the trial court held her termination of parental rights proceeding in her
absence. We vacate the termination order and remand for the reasons stated in this opinion.
I. BACKGROUND AND FACTS
In March 2024, the Department of Health and Human Services (DHHS) petitioned to
terminate respondent’s parental rights to TV after respondent was arrested for multiple outstanding
warrants and for operating a stolen vehicle. Respondent had been operating the stolen vehicle with
TV not properly secured therein and a firearm placed in the seat next to TV. The trial court
authorized the petition and placed TV with DHHS, noting that reasonable efforts to prevent
removal from respondent’s care were not required because respondent’s parental rights to three of
her other children had been terminated years earlier. TV was thereafter placed with foster parents.
At later pretrial hearings, TV’s foster care worker expressed concern that respondent had
mentioned that she had money stashed away and wanted TV to be removed from her foster family,
1 The parental rights of TV’s putative fathers were also terminated during the lower court
proceedings. Because neither putative father is a party to this appeal, we refer to TV’s mother
only as respondent.

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and that respondent had gotten into an argument with TV’s foster parents over Zoom. TV’s foster
care worker also testified that respondent had threatened her and other foster care workers and had
threatened to kidnap TV.
On January 1, 2025, a shooting occurred in the foster home where TV was residing. TV’s
foster mother and her foster mother’s father were fatally shot, and her foster father suffered
nonfatal gunshot injuries. TV was abducted from the home but eventually recovered. On
January 3, 2025, respondent was charged with open murder, first-degree home invasion, and
kidnapping, among other offenses. That criminal proceeding remains ongoing. On January 10,
2025, DHHS amended its petition to terminate respondent’s parental rights to TV, adding an
allegation that respondent had entered the foster placement with two men, killed TV’s foster
mother and her father, and shot TV’s foster father.
Respondent’s termination hearing commenced on April 3, 2025. Respondent appeared
virtually, i.e., by video conference, from the Washtenaw County Jail. When the trial court
transitioned to the portion of the hearing focused on her parental rights, respondent stated that she
was “not feeling good right now.” Following a two-hour recess, respondent again stated that she
was feeling sick. Respondent’s counsel asked the trial court to adjourn the termination hearing
until the following Monday, April 7, 2025. The trial court found “good cause to continue these
proceedings for the next trial date, which is April 7th.” The trial court stated that unless it had
“some documentation from a licensed medical provider indicating that the respondent is unable to
be present for these proceedings for the trial on Monday, then we will be going forward with the
trial on Monday.”
On April 3, 2025, the trial court issued a petition for writ of habeas corpus and subpoena
for respondent to appear in person on April 7, 2025. The Wayne County Sheriff’s Office informed
the court on April 4, 2025 that it was unable to accommodate the request for respondent to appear
in person “[d]ue to short notice.”2 The trial court also had separately ordered respondent to be
brought to a video area in the jail to participate in the April 7, 2025 hearing via video conference.
Further, a note was marked on the ready-for-trial document for the April 7, 2025 document stating,
“not enough time video already scheduled.”
The termination hearing resumed on April 7, 2025 about an hour and a half later than
scheduled. Respondent was not present via video conference or in person, and the court noted that
it “had an opportunity to have some in chamber communications with all attorneys at the table
and . . . we were trying to workout to see why [respondent] wasn’t presented.” The court stated
that after respondent failed to appear for the proceedings despite the court clerk’s “present[ation
of] a writ so that [respondent] would be brought forward to physically be present for the[]
proceedings,” it “was in communication with the jail to determine where mother was and why she
was not being presented forward. It’s my understanding that the reason she is not here today is
her refusal to be present.” The court then asked the parties whether they agreed that this was “an
accurate recitation” of the events that morning. Respondent’s counsel affirmed, but soon after
2 This request was seemingly for the Wayne County Sheriff’s Office to coordinate with the
Washtenaw County Jail to ensure respondent’s presence at the trial court, Wayne Circuit Court.

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stated that she understood respondent to not be present because respondent was not feeling well,
and then moments later requested an adjournment because she was unaware of “the extent of
[respondent’s illness] or if it’s just a refusal to come or if [respondent is] just too ill.”
The trial court proceeded to explain that it had been “very firm in that unless [it] got some
sort of medical documentation,” it would “proceed forward” and that “[t]he representation that [it]
had received from thus far is that [respondent is] refusing to be present.” The court described how
respondent’s counsel had attempted to reach respondent and to “figure out what is going on, why
[respondent is] not here, the whole nine and has been unsuccessful notwithstanding, she was
properly notified of today’s proceedings. Certainly given an opportunity to be present.” The court
continued, stating that it was “going to take [respondent’s] failure to appear as a refusal to appear
and be present for these proceedings” and that it would therefore not adjourn the trial any further.
The court concluded by stating that TV “deserves some sort of permanency” and “[s]o we certainly
cannot continue with whatever is going on behind the scenes.”
After hearing testimony from the Children’s Protective Services investigator assigned to
the case, the trial court found grounds for jurisdiction under MCL 712A.2(b)(1) and (2) and
determined that there was clear and convincing evidence to terminate respondent’s parental rights
under MCL 712A.19b(3)(i), (j), and (k)(i). And after hearing the testimony of TV’s foster care
worker, the trial court found that it was in TV’s best interests to terminate respondent’s parental
rights. Accordingly, the trial court ordered that respondent’s parental rights to TV be terminated.
Following the trial, the court issued an order of adjudication which stated in pertinent part:
The parties appeared for the bench trial in-person except Respondent Mother, who
refused to appear. During the 04/03/2025 bench trial, this Court advised on the
Record, the requirements for [respondent’s] failure to appear to be excused. The
Court at all times provided [respondent’s counsel] the opportunity to communicate
with her client while she was present Via Zoom at the Washtenaw County Jail on
04/03/2025. A Writ of Habeas Corpus was entered on 04/03/2025, for the
04/07/2025 bench trial and [respondent] was not brought forward in-person. The
04/07/2025 Order Adjourning Bench Trial[] memorialized [respondent’s]
requirements for medical documentation and further stated that failure to present
said documentation will result in the bench trial proceeding in her absence. This
Court therefore finds that [respondent’s] failure to appear was voluntary and was a
refusal to appear and participate in the proceedings after receiving proper Notice
and an opportunity to appear.
Respondent now appeals.
II. STANDARDS OF REVIEW
We “review[] a ruling on a motion for a continuance for an abuse of discretion.” In re
Utrera, 281 Mich App 1, 8; 761 NW2d 253 (2008). “An abuse of discretion occurs when the trial
court chooses an outcome that falls outside the range of principled outcomes.” Id. at 15 (quotation
marks and citation omitted).

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We review a trial court’s factual findings for clear error. MCR 2.613(C); MCR 3.902(A)
(stating that MCR 2.613 applies in child protective proceedings). “A finding is clearly erroneous
if, although there is evidence to support it, the reviewing court is left with a definite and firm
conviction that a mistake was made.” In re AGD, 327 Mich App 332, 338; 933 NW2d 751 (2019)
(quotation marks and citation omitted).
And we review de novo “[w]hether a child protective proceeding complied with a person’s
right to due process,” In re Williams, 286 Mich App 253, 271; 779 NW2d 286 (2009), and the
interpretation of the court rules, In re AMAC, 269 Mich App 533, 536; 711 NW2d 426 (2006).
III. ANALYSIS
Respondent argues the trial court violated her due process rights by proceeding with the
termination hearing in her absence. Because the record is insufficiently developed as to why
respondent was absent, we cannot undertake an informed analysis of this issue and therefore vacate
the trial court’s termination order and remand for further proceedings.
We “function[] as a court of review that is principally charged with the duty of correcting
errors that occurred below.” Burns v City of Detroit (On Remand), 253 Mich App 608, 615; 660
NW2d 85 (2002) (quotation marks and citation omitted). Our review is therefore “limited to the
record established by the trial court.” Sherman v Sea Ray Boats, Inc, 251 Mich App 41, 56; 649
NW2d 783 (2002).
In deciding to proceed with respondent’s termination hearing in her absence, the trial court
concluded that respondent’s failure to appear was voluntary. The court inconsistently articulated
the basis for this finding, however. The trial court first explained how, because respondent was
not present at the hearing, it “was in communication with the jail to determine where [respondent]
was and why she was not being presented forward.” Notably, this alleged communication seems
to have been conducted without the presence of a court reporter, and there is no record evidence
about its content, with whom from the jail it was made, and the basis for the jail’s understanding.
The court then stated: “It’s my understanding that the reason she is not here today is her refusal to
be present.” The court later again reiterated this understanding, stating that “[t]he representation
that [it] had received from thus far is that she’s refusing to be present.”
At other times during the hearing, however, the court indicated that it had concluded that
respondent’s absence was voluntarily solely because the court had warned at the prior hearing that
it would proceed forward unless medical documentation of respondent’s illness was provided. The
court’s order of adjudication issued after the trial used this same rationale, stating that it had
clarified that respondent’s failure to present medical documentation “will result in the bench trial
proceeding in her absence. This Court therefore finds that [respondent’s] failure to appear was
voluntary and was a refusal to appear and particulate in the proceedings . . . .”
Unfortunately, the lack of record evidence as to the reason for respondent’s absence leaves
us unable to resolve the trial court’s inconsistent explanations for finding that respondent was
refusing to appear, and accordingly, whether the trial court clearly erred in so finding. This
incomplete record leaves us consequently unable to make an informed determination of whether
the trial court’s proceeding in respondent’s absence constituted a due process violation. Finding

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“the record in this matter . . . too incomplete to facilitate meaningful appellate review,” Jordan v
Dep’t of Health & Human Servs, 510 Mich 369, 376; 987 NW2d 119 (2022), we remand for further
fact-finding by the trial court as to the reason for respondent’s absence from the termination
hearing on April 7, 2025 with the direction that the trial court make this determination using record
evidence sufficient to facilitate meaningful appellate review. See id. at 379; People v Armstrong,
175 Mich App 181, 184; 437 NW2d 343 (1989) (“Generally, where the factual findings are
insufficient, the appropriate remedy is to remand the cause for additional fact-finding.”). We also
direct the trial court to decide whether it properly proceeded by holding respondent’s termination
proceeding without her given its determination of the reason for respondent’s absence.
Without constraining the trial court or the parties as the factual record is developed, we
offer the following commentary as to the due process implications of possible facts that may be
ultimately supported by the record.3
Respondent submits that she was denied due process when the trial court proceeded with
the termination hearing in her absence. “Procedural due process imposes constraints on
governmental decisions which deprive individuals of ‘liberty’ or ‘property’ interests within the
meaning of the Due Process Clause of the Fifth or Fourteenth Amendment.” Mathews v Eldridge,
424 US 319, 332; 96 S Ct 893; 47 L Ed 2d 18 (1976). “Due process is flexible,” id. at 334 (cleaned
up), and ultimately “requires fundamental fairness, which is determined in a particular situation
first by ‘considering any relevant precedents and then by assessing the several interests that are at
stake,’ ” In re Brock, 442 Mich 101, 111; 499 NW2d 752 (1993) (citation omitted).
Specific to the termination of respondent’s parental rights at issue here, “[p]arents have a
significant interest in the companionship, care, custody, and management of their children, and the
interest is an element of liberty protected by due process.” In re JK, 468 Mich 202, 210; 661
NW2d 216 (2003). Therefore, “[w]hen the State moves to destroy . . . familial bonds, it must
provide the parents with fundamentally fair procedures.” Santosky v Kramer, 455 US 745, 753-
754; 102 S Ct 1388; 71 L Ed 2d 599 (1982). Indeed, “due process requirements ‘are much greater’
in termination cases than in ordinary civil actions.’ ” In re Vasquez, 199 Mich App 44, 46; 501
NW2d 231 (1993) (quotation marks and citation omitted).
An incarcerated parent does not have an “absolute right to be present at the dispositional
hearing of a proceeding to terminate parental rights” and thus trial courts are not necessarily
required by due process to secure an incarcerated parent’s presence at a termination hearing. Id.
at 48, 50. Rather, this Court’s decision in Vasquez compels the application of the familiar three-
3 We also note, to the extent it aids the parties and the court on remand, that MCR 2.004(F), which
prohibits a court from “grant[ing] the relief requested by the moving party concerning the minor
child if the incarcerated party has not been offered the opportunity to participate in the proceedings,
as described in this rule,” applies only to parties who are “incarcerated under the jurisdiction of
the Department of Corrections.” MCR 2.004(A)(2). See also In re BAD, 264 Mich App 66, 74-
75; 690 NW2d 287 (2004). Because respondent was in the Washtenaw County Jail, she was not
under the jurisdiction of the Michigan Department of Corrections at the time of the April 7, 2025
hearing. MCR 2.004(F) therefore does not apply.

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factor balancing test set forth in the United States Supreme Court’s decision in Mathews to
determine whether, under the circumstances of a particular case, procedural due process requires
a trial court to secure an incarcerated parent’s presence at a termination hearing. Id. at 50; see also
In re Render, 145 Mich App 344, 349-350; 377 NW2d 421 (1985) (applying the Mathews
balancing test in determining that the trial court “should have made an effort to bring respondent
to the courtroom”). Under this test, courts balance: (1) “the private interest that will be affected
by the official action”; (2) “the risk of an erroneous deprivation of such interest through the
procedures used, and the probable value, if any, of additional or substitute procedural safeguards;
and” (3) “the Government’s interest, including the function involved and the fiscal and
administrative burdens that the additional or substitute procedural requirement would entail.”
Mathews, 424 US at 335.
In the present case, under the first prong of the balancing test, the private interest weighs
heavily. See id. For in addition to TV’s interest in “her own proper care and custody,”
respondent’s “fundamental liberty interest in the care and custody of . . . her child” was at stake.
In re HRC, 286 Mich App 444, 455; 781 NW2d 105 (2009). Indeed, the termination proceeding
risked not simply infringing on respondent’s fundamental liberty interest, but the eradication
thereof. See Santosky, 455 US at 759. Respondent’s interest “in the accuracy and justice of the
decision to terminate . . . her parental status is, therefore, a commanding one.” Id. (quotation marks
and citation omitted).
The second prong requires consideration of the “the risk of an erroneous deprivation of
such interest through the procedures used, and the probable value, if any, of additional or substitute
procedural safeguards.” Mathews, 424 US at 335. In In re Render, this Court held that the risk of
an erroneous deprivation increased in the incarcerated parent’s absence, finding that although the
respondent “had an attorney at the dispositional hearing, it [wa]s impossible to determine whether
she could have provided the attorney with information helpful to her defense.” In re Render, 145
Mich App at 349. We additionally noted that “in many parental rights termination hearings, the
presence of the very person whose rights the state aims to take away is of some ‘probable value’
to the correctness of the result.” Id. We determined in In re Vasquez, however, that the
incarcerated parent’s absence did not increase the risk of erroneous deprivation because the
“respondent was well represented by his counsel at the termination hearing,” convincing us “that
[the] respondent’s presence at the side of his counsel would have changed nothing.” In re Vasquez,
199 Mich App at 48.
Here, the trial court certainly made some efforts to enable respondent to attend the
continuation of her termination hearing, issuing a petition for writ of habeas corpus and subpoena
on April 3, 2025 for respondent to appear in person on April 7, 2025 and a separate order for
respondent to be brought to a video area to participate in the April 7, 2025 hearing via video
conference. In addition, respondent states in her brief on appeal that “[t]he Zoom room had . . .
been set up.” And the court stated that it had been in communication with the jail to determine
why the respondent was not present, leading to its “understanding that the reason she [wa]s not
[t]here . . . [wa]s her refusal to be present.” If, on remand, the trial court finds that respondent was
voluntarily refusing to attend her termination hearing on the basis of record evidence
demonstrating the jail’s communication of that information, the procedures used by the trial court
appear tailored to significantly decrease the erroneous deprivation of respondent’s private interest.
For if respondent had voluntarily refused to attend her termination hearing, she affirmatively

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rejected the opportunity to provide the “ ‘probable value’ to the correctness of the result” that her
presence would have otherwise provided. In re Render, 145 Mich App at 349. Thus, as in In re
Vasquez, attaining respondent’s presence at the termination hearing despite her outright refusal to
attend indicates “that respondent’s presence at the side of h[er] counsel would have changed
nothing.” In re Vasquez, 199 Mich App at 48.
If the trial court concluded that respondent was refusing to attend simply because
respondent was not present and had not provided the court the medical evidence it requested,
however, the risk of an erroneous deprivation of respondent’s private interest appears much
greater. Respondent’s incarcerated status likely hindered her ability to attain the requested
documentation from a medical provider and subsequently furnish this to the trial court over a four-
day period that included that weekend. And if respondent had been willing but unable to attend
due to legitimate illness, further delaying the termination hearing would have likely decreased the
risk of an erroneous deprivation of her liberty interest. Cf. In re Utrera, 281 Mich App at 12
(concluding that the trial court had adjourned respondent’s termination hearing for good cause
when respondent was hospitalized). For respondent’s counsel indicated that she had intended to
call respondent to testify during the continuation of the termination hearing, and respondent had
earlier spoken during the April 3, 2025 hearing. Respondent thus appeared able to “provide[] [her]
attorney with information helpful to her defense,” and without her testimony, there is greater risk
that the trial court reached the incorrect result, erroneously depriving respondent of her
fundamental interest. See In re Render, 145 Mich App at 349.
The third and final factor to be balanced is “the [g]overnment’s interest, including the
function involved and the fiscal and administrative burdens that the additional or substitute
procedural requirement would entail.” Mathews, 424 US at 335. “[T]he state has a legitimate and
important interest in protecting the health and safety of minors” which is undermined “when a
father or mother is erroneously deprived of his or her fundamental right to parent a child.” In re
Sanders, 495 Mich 394, 415-416; 852 NW2d 524 (2014). In In re Render, we concluded that the
state did not face a substantial burden in attempting to bring the respondent to attend her
termination hearing because the respondent was incarcerated in a county jail in Michigan. In re
Render, 145 Mich App at 349. But because the respondent in In re Vasquez was incarcerated in
Texas, we recognized that the “the financial and administrative burden on the state in order to
bring respondent . . . to attend the hearing would have been far greater than in Render.” In re
Vasquez, 199 Mich App at 48. We also noted that “[i]n light of present-day telecommunications,
other means that fall short of securing the physical presence of a parent are available to ensure that
an incarcerated prisoner receives due process at a dispositional hearing.” Id. at 48-49. Those
options may indeed be more cost- and administratively effective for the state.
Because respondent here “was incarcerated in the county jail,” In re Render, 145 Mich App
at 349, and “present-day telecommunications,” like the videoconferencing technology at the
Washtenaw County Jail evidenced by respondent’s remote appearance at the April 3, 2025
termination hearing, were “available to ensure that” respondent “receive[d] due process,” see In
re Vasquez, 199 Mich App at 48-49, the state would not have been substantially burdened by
undertaking additional efforts to attain respondent’s presence. Nor is it likely that a second
adjournment to accommodate respondent’s illness and recovery time would impose fiscal or
administrative burdens substantial enough to overcome respondent’s interest in being present. See
In re Utrera, 281 Mich App at 12. Of course, if respondent was voluntarily refusing the

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opportunity to attend the termination hearing and thus her presence “would have changed nothing,”
id. at 48, we see no need for the state to have borne the additional, even if insubstantial, burden of
undertaking additional efforts to ensure respondent’s presence. If, however, the trial court
concluded that respondent was refusing to attend only because she was not present and had not
provided the requested medical documentation but four days after the continuance was granted,
the burden borne by the state in providing additional procedural safeguards to attain respondent’s
presence seems minimal in comparison to the increased risk of erroneous deprivation of her
compelling private interest that respondent’s absence entailed and of the state’s important interest
in protecting TV’s welfare.
We reiterate “that the record in this matter is too incomplete to facilitate meaningful
appellate review,” Jordan, 510 Mich at 376, and that “due process is flexible,” Mathews, 424 US
at 334 (cleaned up). As such, the fact-finding that we direct on remand may result in the need for
the trial court to re-conduct respondent’s termination hearing to satisfy due process requirements.
But, again, the development of the record in the trial court may ultimately leave the trial court
satisfied that respondent’s due process rights were not violated by its proceeding in her absence
on April 7, 2025. If that is the case, the trial court need not conduct another hearing on the
termination of respondent’s parental rights at that juncture.
Vacated and remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. We do not
retain jurisdiction.
/s/ Daniel S. Korobkin
/s/ Adrienne N. Young
/s/ Mariam S. Bazzi

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