COA 371098 IN RE CD MINOR Opinion - On Remand SCt - Per Curiam - Unpublished 5/13/2026

If this opinion indicates that it is “FOR PUBLICATION,” it is subject to
revision until final publication in the Michigan Appeals Reports.
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S T A T E O F M I C H I G A N
C O U R T O F A P P E A L S
UNPUBLISHED
May 13, 2026
10:37 AM
In re CD, Minor.
No. 371098
Crawford Circuit Court
Family Division
LC No. 21-004622-NA
ON REMAND
Before: MURRAY, P.J., and REDFORD and RICK, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
This matter returns to this Court on remand from our Supreme Court. In re CD Minor, ___
Mich ___; 25 NW3d 122 (2025) (In re CD II). This Court previously affirmed the trial court’s
order terminating respondent-mother’s parental rights to the minor child. In re CD Minor,
unpublished per curiam opinion of the Court of Appeals, issued June 24, 2025 (Docket
No. 371098) (In re CD I). On remand, we again affirm.
I. FACTUAL BACKGROUND
In In re CD I, we set forth the facts of the case as follows:
This case was commenced approximately a month after respondent-
mother’s home was raided by a police drug taskforce following three controlled
purchases of prescription drugs from respondent-mother, during which the police
found and confiscated a dangerous butane-based THC extraction lab from her
garage. The minor child, CD, was placed in the care of his father in an ex parte
custody order entered in a custody case between the father and respondent-mother.
The father was simultaneously granted a PPO against respondent-mother. The
same judge presided over this case, the custody case, and the PPO proceedings.
The trial court took judicial notice of the PPO proceedings in a contempt hearing
in this case without objection by respondent-mother’s attorney. Respondent-

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mother also was charged criminally, and a different judge presided over her
criminal case. [Id., unpub op at 1-2.]
The trial court terminated mother’s parental rights to CD under MCL 712A.19b(3)(j)
(reasonable likelihood of harm if child returned to parent). Mother argued in her first appeal to
this Court that the trial court erred by taking judicial notice of a separate PPO case involving CD’s
father. This Court affirmed the order terminating mother’s parental rights. Id., unpub op at 4.
Mother thereafter obtained new appellate counsel and filed an application for leave to appeal in
our Supreme Court. In that application, mother argued that she had been denied the effective
assistance of appellate counsel during the proceedings in this Court. Mother explained that, in the
prior appeal, her appointed appellate counsel raised only a single issue in a brief, two-paragraph
argument and did not meaningfully develop additional potential claims. In lieu of granting leave
to appeal, our Supreme Court agreed that further review was warranted and entered an order
remanding the matter “for a new appeal.” In re CD II, ___ Mich at ___.
On remand, mother filed a supplemental brief raising three primary issues that were not
previously presented: (1) that the trial court failed to properly advise her of her appellate rights
under MCR 3.972(F), thereby invalidating the court’s assumption of jurisdiction; (2) that the trial
court clearly erred in finding statutory grounds for termination; and (3) that the trial court also
erred in determining that termination was in CD’s best interests. We now consider those issues.
II. ANALYSIS
A. JURISDICTIONAL CHALLENGE
Mother first argues that the trial court failed to properly advise her of her appellate rights,
rendering the adjudication defective and depriving the court of jurisdiction. Even assuming that
the trial court did not strictly comply with MCR 3.972(F), mother is not entitled to relief.
“Whether a trial court can assert jurisdiction over a child protective proceeding is a question
of law we review de novo.”1 In re Hull, 345 Mich App 562, 567; 7 NW3d 114 (2023); see also In
re Ferranti, 504 Mich 1, 14-15; 934 NW2d 610 (2019). We review a jury’s verdict finding grounds
to take jurisdiction deferentially, considering the evidence in the light most favorable to the
petitioner to determine whether a rational juror could have found a ground for jurisdiction by a
preponderance of the evidence. In re Sluiter, ___ Mich App ___, ___; ___ NW3d ___ (2024)
(Docket No. 368266); slip op at 12. We must draw all reasonable inferences and make all
credibility choices in favor of the verdict. Id. at ___; slip op at 12. “Accordingly, this Court’s
focus is directed to what statutory grounds the jury could conclude were established by a
preponderance of the evidence.” Id. at ___; slip op at 13.
The plain language of MCR 3.972(F) and MCR 3.973(G) establish that, following
adjudication, a trial court must advise a respondent of certain appellate rights. These rights include
that the respondent has a right to appeal the assumption of jurisdiction and that failing to timely
1 Because this matter returns to us on remand for a new appeal, we consider mother’s claims as
though they were properly preserved and review them on the merits.

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file such an appeal may bar them from challenging the assumption of jurisdiction later. The trial
court did not comply with the court rules requiring advisement of appellate rights. Although that
error is not insignificant, it does not warrant reversal. Due process in child protective proceedings
requires that a respondent be afforded a meaningful opportunity to be heard before the state may
interfere with the parent-child relationship. In re Ferranti, 504 Mich at 16-17. If the adjudication
itself is constitutionally defective, such as where a respondent enters a plea without being properly
advised of the rights they are relinquishing, reversal is required because the defect goes to the very
foundation of the court’s authority to exercise jurisdiction. Id. at 29-30. That did not happen here.
This case proceeded to a jury trial at which DHHS was required to prove a statutory basis for
jurisdiction by a preponderance of the evidence. Mother was afforded her core due-process
protections, including representation by trial counsel and an opportunity to contest the allegations
against her. In re Rood, 483 Mich 73, 92-93; 763 NW2d 587 (2009). The jury’s verdict supplied
the factual predicate necessary for the court to exercise jurisdiction, and that determination is not
challenged on the basis of any defect in the adjudicative procedure itself. Thus, the asserted error
did not implicate the constitutional validity of the adjudication. See In re Ferranti, 504 Mich at 29.
Nor does the alleged error require reversal as a matter of rule-based compliance. A
violation of a court rule does not automatically entitle a party to relief. Rather, the error must be
shown to have affected the outcome or otherwise undermined the fairness or reliability of the
proceedings. See MCR 2.613(A). Mother has not made that showing. The record reflects that
mother ultimately pursued appellate review, including an appeal to this Court and an application
for leave to appeal in our Supreme Court, which resulted in the present remand. Accordingly, even
if the trial court’s advisement was incomplete, mother was not deprived of the ability to seek
appellate review, and the purpose of MCR 3.972(F) was not frustrated in any meaningful sense.2
Mother also argues that the trial court erred by assuming jurisdiction over CD. To exercise
jurisdiction in a child protective proceeding, DHHS must prove by a preponderance of the evidence
that the child comes within one or more of the statutory grounds set forth in MCL 712A.2(b). In
re Brock, 442 Mich 101, 108-109; 499 NW2d 752 (1993). The trial court here assumed jurisdiction
under MCL 712A.2(b)(1) and (2), which state, in relevant part:
(b) Jurisdiction in proceedings concerning a juvenile under 18 years of age found within
the county:
(1) Whose parent or other person legally responsible for the care and
maintenance of the juvenile, when able to do so, neglects or refuses to provide
proper or necessary support, education, medical, surgical, or other care necessary
for his or her health or morals, who is subject to a substantial risk of harm to his or
2 Mother nevertheless relies on In re Boursaw, 239 Mich App 161; 607 NW2d 408 (1999), to argue
that the trial court’s failure to comply with the court rules requires reversal. Boursaw involved
defects that undermined the adjudicative process itself and called into question the validity of the
court’s exercise of jurisdiction. By contrast, the error alleged here occurred after the adjudication
was completed and did not affect the jury’s determination that statutory grounds for jurisdiction
were established by a preponderance of the evidence. Accordingly, Boursaw is not dispositive.

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her mental well-being, who is abandoned by his or her parents, guardian, or other
custodian, or who is without proper custody or guardianship . . . .
* * *
(2) Whose home or environment, by reason of neglect, cruelty,
drunkenness, criminality, or depravity on the part of a parent, guardian, nonparent
adult, or other custodian, is an unfit place for the juvenile to live in . . . .
The evidence supports the trial court’s exercise of jurisdiction under MCL 712A.2(b)(1).
Although mother correctly contends that there was no evidence she failed to provide food,
clothing, or shelter, her argument overlooks that subsection (b)(1) is written in the disjunctive. See
Dine Brands Global, Inc v Eubanks, ___ Mich ___; ___ NW3d ___ (2025) (Docket Nos. 165391
and 165392); slip op at 23 (ellipsis, quotation marks, brackets, and citation omitted) (stating that
“ ‘or’ is a disjunctive term, used to indicate a disunion, a separation, an alternative,” and placing
it between two words indicates two alternative options). Thus, MCL 712A.2(b)(1) can
alternatively be established if the child “is subject to a substantial risk of harm to his or her mental
well-being.”
On that subject, mother argues that, since her contact with CD was limited to supervised
parenting time, she could not have subjected him to a “substantial risk of harm” within the meaning
of MCL 712A.2(b)(1). But the mere fact that a child is not residing with a parent does not
necessarily preclude the parent from continuing to pose a risk to the child’s mental well-being. In
re Leach, 347 Mich App 26, 32-33; 14 NW3d 178 (2023). The record clearly shows that mother
treated CD inappropriately during parenting time. On various occasions, mother struck CD for
hanging up her phone, threatened to return his birthday gift if he did not make a phone call,
promised him that he would be home soon or that he would have a sibling soon, gave him
medications without checking whether he had already been given the medication, forced him to
participate in phone calls that he did not want to engage in, threatened to stop parenting-time visits
because he was hurting her feelings or being mean to her, and participated in a criminal plea
hearing during a parenting time.
Additionally, CD was not isolated from mother even outside of parenting time. Mother
repeatedly sent the police to CD’s father’s house, and when she was informed that CD was further
traumatized by the police, mother said that she “didn’t care” and threatened to “do it every day if
she had to.” Mother therefore showed manipulative and hurtful behavior toward CD even while
supervised, minimized her misbehavior, and demonstrated no concern for CD’s well-being. In
light of this evidence and the jury’s ability to evaluate mother’s credibility as a witness, see In re
Sluiter, ___ Mich App at ___; slip op at 12, the evidence supports the jury’s verdict that mother
posed “a substantial risk of harm to [CD’s] mental well-being[.]” MCL 712A.2(b)(1). Therefore,
there was no error in finding grounds to exercise jurisdiction under MCL 712A.2(b)(1).
DHHS need only prove “one or more of the statutory grounds for jurisdiction.” In re
Sanders, 495 Mich 394, 405; 852 NW2d 524 (2014). But we briefly observe that there was also
no error in finding MCL 712A.2(b)(2) proven as well. Even though CD’s father had full custody
of CD, custody was obtained through an ex parte order entered in a separate custody proceeding.
The custody order was thus potentially only temporary. The petition was filed because mother

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refused to cooperate to ensure that CD would remain safe if the order ended. The evidence
supported a finding that CD’s placement was not stable. It further supported a finding that mother
took no responsibility for her conduct and would expose CD to unsafe conditions unless the court
took jurisdiction. Under the circumstances, it was proper to consider “reasonably anticipated
future abuse.” See In re KV, ___ Mich App ___, ___; ___ NW3d ___ (2025) (Docket No. 374236);
slip op at 7. For the foregoing reasons, mother is not entitled to relief.
B. STATUTORY GROUNDS
Mother next argues that the trial court clearly erred in finding that DHHS established
statutory grounds for terminating her parental rights under MCL 712A.19b(3)(j). We disagree.
“A court may terminate a respondent’s parental rights if one or more of the statutory
grounds for termination listed in MCL 712A.19b(3) have been proven by clear and convincing
evidence” and the trial court finds that termination is in the child’s best interests. In re Olive/Metts
Minors, 297 Mich App 35, 40; 823 NW2d 144 (2012). The trial court’s best-interest findings and
statutory-grounds findings are both reviewed for clear error. Id. “A finding of fact is clearly
erroneous if the reviewing court has a definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been
committed, giving due regard to the trial court’s special opportunity to observe the witnesses.” In
re Moss, 301 Mich App 76, 80; 836 NW2d 182 (2013) (quotation marks and citation omitted).
In the absence of circumstances that are not alleged here, reasonable efforts at reunifying
the child and a parent must be made in all cases. In re Simonetta, 340 Mich App 700, 707-708;
987 NW2d 919 (2022). Termination of parental rights is premature if the parent “was not afforded
a meaningful and adequate opportunity to participate” in those efforts. In re Mason, 486 Mich
142, 152; 782 NW2d 747 (2010). “Although DHHS has a responsibility to expend reasonable
efforts to provide services to secure reunification, there exists a commensurate responsibility on
the part of the respondent-parent to participate in the services and demonstrate having benefited
from them.” In re MJC Minor, 349 Mich App 42, 61; 27 NW3d 122 (2023). A parent’s failure to
participate in, comply with, and benefit from a service plan is evidence that the parent will not be
able to provide the child with proper care and custody and that the child will be harmed if returned
to the parent’s care. In re Kaczkowski, 325 Mich App 69, 77; 924 NW2d 1 (2018). If a parent has
demonstrated significant progress, termination of the parent’s parental rights may be improper
even if the parent is not yet a model parent. In re Boursaw, 239 Mich App 161, 176-177; 607
NW2d 408 (1999), overruled in part on other grounds by In re Trejo, 462 Mich 341, 353-354 &
354 n 12; 612 NW2d 407 (2000). But “[e]ven if conditions improved in the months before the
termination hearing, a trial court may look to the totality of the evidence to determine whether a
parent accomplished meaningful change in the conditions that led to adjudication.” In re
Jackisch/Stamm-Jackisch, 340 Mich App 326, 334; 985 NW2d 912 (2022).
MCL 712A.19b(3)(j) permits termination where “[t]here is a reasonable likelihood, based
on the conduct or capacity of the parent, that the child will be harmed if he or she is returned to
the home of the parent.” The record reflects that mother’s conduct leading to adjudication involved
criminal activity, substance-related concerns, and unsafe conditions in the home, including the
presence of controlled substances and materials associated with a butane extraction process. More
significantly, the evidence demonstrated that mother failed to meaningfully benefit from services
over the course of the case. Mother initially refused to engage in services, resisted cooperation

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with DHHS, and failed to provide necessary releases or participate in recommended treatment in
a timely manner. Although she eventually participated in some services, the trial court found that
her progress was delayed, inconsistent, and largely superficial.
The distinction between participation and benefit is critical. A parent must not only
participate in services but must also demonstrate that the services have rectified the conditions that
led to adjudication. In re White, 303 Mich App 701, 710-711; 846 NW2d 61 (2014). Here, the
trial court expressly found that mother had not internalized the goals of the case service plan and
had not achieved meaningful behavioral change. The record supports that finding. By the time of
the termination hearing, mother had been participating in therapy for a year. Her therapist opined
that mother was minimally six months, and perhaps longer, away from achieving the kind of
stability she would need before parenting time could be resumed. Mother frequently missed her
drug and alcohol screenings and parenting-time visits. During the proceedings, she also married
an individual who had been convicted of a felony even after the trial court prohibited her from
bringing that individual around CD.
The trial court found that mother lacked insight into the impact of her conduct on CD and
failed to take responsibility for the conditions that led to CD’s removal from her care. The
evidence further showed that mother minimized her behavior, resisted acknowledging
wrongdoing, and viewed the proceedings as unjustified rather than as an opportunity to address
legitimate concerns. A parent’s lack of insight and failure to accept responsibility strongly
supports a finding that the risk of harm remains. Id.
Mother nevertheless argues that she made significant progress and should have been
afforded additional time. But the trial court considered that argument and found that mother had
been given ample opportunity to participate in and benefit from services but failed to demonstrate
more than superficial improvement. The court was not required to disregard mother’s history of
noncompliance and lack of benefit in favor of her late-stage efforts. Importantly,
MCL 712A.19b(3)(j) does not require certainty of harm, only a reasonable likelihood. Given
mother’s unresolved issues, lack of insight, and continued poor judgment, the trial court did not
clearly err in concluding that returning CD to her care would place CD at risk of harm.
Accordingly, the trial court did not clearly err in finding that MCL 712A.19b(3)(j) was established
by clear and convincing evidence.
C. BEST INTERESTS
Mother also argues that termination of her parental rights was not in CD’s best interests.
We disagree.
When determining a child’s best interests, the trial court may rely on the entire record and
consider the child’s bond to the parent; the parent’s parenting ability; the child’s need for
permanency, stability, and finality; the child’s age; and inappropriate parenting techniques. In re
Sanborn, 337 Mich App 252, 276-277; 976 NW2d 44 (2021). The court may also “consider the
parent’s compliance with his or her case service plan, the parent’s visitation history with the child,
the child’s well-being while in care, and the possibility of adoption.” In re MJC, 349 Mich App
at 62 (quotation marks, brackets, and citation omitted). A child’s “placement with a relative
weighs against termination, but that fact is not dispositive.” Id. at 66.

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The trial court properly considered the relevant best-interest factors. It acknowledged that
mother and CD shared a bond and that CD was placed with his nonrespondent father. However,
the court found that these considerations were outweighed by mother’s inability to provide safe
and stable care and by CD’s need for permanence and stability. The record supports that
conclusion. The same concerns that supported termination under subsection (j), including
mother’s lack of insight, poor judgment, and failure to benefit from services, also bore directly on
the determination of CD’s best interests. A child’s need for safety and stability outweighs the
preservation of a parental relationship where the parent has not demonstrated the ability to provide
appropriate care. See In re Moss, 301 Mich App 76, 87-88; 836 NW2d 182 (2013) (stating that,
at the best-interests stage of child protective proceedings, the focus of the inquiry is on the child,
not the parent).
The trial court also considered the quality of the parent-child bond between mother and
CD. The court found that it had diminished over time, particularly as a result of mother’s
inconsistent parenting time and inappropriate behavior during visits. The evidence showed that
mother’s interactions with CD were at times harmful or confusing and did nothing to promote
CD’s emotional well-being.
Further, CD was doing well in his placement with his father. CD had stability and his
father met his needs. These advantages supported the trial court’s decision. Although placement
with a relative or parent may weigh against termination, it is not dispositive. In re Olive/Metts
Minors, 297 Mich App at 43. The trial court reasonably concluded that termination was necessary
to provide CD with permanence and to protect him from ongoing risk associated with mother’s
conduct. The trial court thus also properly considered CD’s need for finality. Mother’s progress
was incomplete and delayed, and further delay would not serve CD’s best interests. A child is not
required to wait indefinitely for a parent to achieve stability, particularly where the parent has
failed to demonstrate meaningful change over the course of the proceedings. In re Dahms, 187
Mich App 644, 647; 468 NW2d 315 (1991). Given the totality of the circumstances, the trial court
did not clearly err in concluding that termination of mother’s parental rights was in CD’s best
interests.
Affirmed.
/s/ Christopher M. Murray
/s/ James Robert Redford
/s/ Michelle M. Rick

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