COA 370480 IN RE PETITION OF EATON COUNTY TREASURER FOR FORECLOSURE Opinion - Per Curiam - Unpublished 1/13/2026

If this opinion indicates that it is “FOR PUBLICATION,” it is subject to
revision until final publication in the Michigan Appeals Reports.
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S T A T E O F M I C H I G A N
C O U R T O F A P P E A L S
In re PETITION OF EATON COUNTY
TREASURER FOR FORECLOSURE.
EATON COUNTY TREASURER,
Petitioner-Appellee,
UNPUBLISHED
January 13, 2026
2:30 PM
v No. 370480
Eaton Circuit Court
ANDREW ROTH, LC No. 20-000403-CZ
Respondent-Appellant.
In re PETITION OF EATON COUNTY
TREASURER FOR FORECLOSURE.
EATON COUNTY TREASURER,
Petitioner-Appellee,
v No. 370482
Eaton Circuit Court
NANCY VOGL, Personal Representative of the
ESTATE OF SALLY JOAN RANDALL, and
STACIA MATHIAS, Personal Representative of the
ESTATE OF RANDY MATHIAS,
LC No. 21-000537-CZ
Intervening Plaintiffs-Appellants.
Before: SWARTZLE, P.J., and GARRETT and WALLACE, JJ.
PER CURIAM.

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These consolidated appeals1 involve claims for the distribution of proceeds remaining from
the tax-foreclosure sales of properties after the alleged satisfaction of delinquent property taxes,
interest, penalties, and fees. In Docket No. 370480, respondent, Andrew Roth, appeals by right
the circuit court order denying his motion to disburse remaining proceeds. In Docket No. 370482,
intervening plaintiff Nancy Vogl, personal representative of the Estate of Sally Joan Randall (the
Randall Estate), and intervening plaintiff Stacia Mathias, personal representative of the Estate of
Randy Mathias (the Mathis Estate), appeal by right a separate order denying their motions to
disburse remaining proceeds. For the reasons stated herein, we affirm the circuit court’s order in
Docket No. 370480. In Docket No. 370482, we affirm in part, reverse in part, and remand for
further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
I. STATUTORY BACKGROUND
The Michigan Supreme Court held in Rafaeli, LLC v Oakland Co, 505 Mich 429, 484; 952
NW2d 434 (2020), that former owners of properties sold via tax-foreclosure for more than what
was owed in taxes, interests, penalties, and fees had “a cognizable, vested property right to the
remaining proceeds resulting from the tax-foreclosure sale of their properties.” Because this right
continued to exist after fee simple title to the properties vested with the foreclosing governmental
unit (FGU), the FGU’s “retention and subsequent transfer of those proceeds into the county general
fund amounted to a taking of plaintiffs’ properties” under the Takings Clause of Michigan’s
Constitution. Id. at 484-485, citing Const 1963, art 10, § 2. Accordingly, former owners were
entitled to just compensation in the form of the return of the remaining proceeds. Id. at 485. When
the Court decided Rafaeli, the General Property Tax Act (GPTA), MCL 211.1 et seq., did not
provide a means by which property owners could recover their remaining proceeds.
In response to Rafaeli, the Michigan Legislature passed 2020 PA 255 and 2020 PA 256,
which were given immediate effect on December 22, 2020. MCL 211.78t, a provision added to
the GPTA by 2020 PA 256, provides the exclusive means for former owners to claim and receive
any applicable “remaining proceeds”2 from the tax-foreclosure sales of their former properties.
This Court held in In re Petition of Muskegon Co Treasurer for Foreclosure, 348 Mich App 678;
20 NW3d 337 (2023), that MCL 211.78t was a duly enacted statute that passed constitutional
muster. Id. at 703-704.
II. RELEVANT FACTS AND PROCEEDINGS
In Docket No. 370480, the circuit court entered a judgment of foreclosure against
respondent’s property on February 17, 2021, effective March 31, 2021. It was undisputed that
respondent did not file Form 5743 pursuant to MCL 211.78t(2) to notify petitioner of respondent’s
intent to claim an interest in any remaining proceeds until February 2022, well beyond the statute’s
July 1, 2021 deadline. Respondent moved in the circuit court for the disbursement of remaining
1 In re Petition of Eaton Co Treasurer for Foreclosure, unpublished order of the Court of Appeals,
entered October 7, 2024 (Docket Nos. 370480 and 370482).
2 Rafaeli refers to “surplus proceeds,” whereas MCL 211.78t refers to “remaining proceeds.” We
will use these terms interchangeably.

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proceeds. Petitioner opposed the motion on the basis that respondent failed to file Form 5743 by
the statutory deadline. Following a hearing on respondent’s motion, the circuit court denied the
motion on the basis that respondent had not complied with MCL 211.78t’s applicable notice
requirement.
In Docket No. 370482, Sally Joan Randall owned property in Eaton County when she died
in 2020. Nancy Vogl, Sally’s daughter and personal representative of the Randall Estate, contacted
petitioner and told him that she and her brother wanted to give the property to the county.
Petitioner informed her that the county could not simply accept property and that the property
would have to go through the foreclosure process. A judgment of foreclosure entered against the
property on February 16, 2022. Three months later, petitioner and Delta Township, where the
property was located, entered into a consent agreement for demolition because the condition of the
structure on the property rendered it a public nuisance and a hazard to public health, safety, and
welfare. The demolition order provided that petitioner or subsequent holders of title to the
property, or both, would demolish all structures on the property because they were hazardous to
public safety. Petitioner obtained an estimate from a company indicating that demolition would
cost $81,926.63. This amount was added to the minimum bid. At the October 2022 tax-foreclosure
auction, a buyer paid $83,105: $1,179 for the property and $81,926.63 as a “guaranty” to ensure
compliance with the demolition order.3 Once the buyer demolished the hazardous structure,
petitioner refunded his $81,926.63 by check.
Petitioner sent the Randall Estate notice under MCL 211.78t(3) stating that there were no
remaining proceeds to distribute because the $1,179 sales price for the property was well below
the minimum bid. Instead of remaining proceeds, there was a deficit of $13,899.99.
Notwithstanding this notice, the Randall Estate moved the circuit court to disburse remaining
proceeds of $63,292.71. The Randall Estate argued that the property sold for $83,105, all of which
petitioner was required by MCL 211.78m(8) to place in a restricted account and pay in accordance
with the priorities listed in that statute. The top three priorities, in order, were the county where
the property was located, the FGU, and the Randall Estate. The Randall Estate contended that the
$83,105 sales price, minus unpaid taxes, interests, penalties, and fees, and minus petitioner’s 5%
sales commission left remaining proceeds of $63,292.71. At the hearing on the Randall Estate’s
motion to disburse remaining proceeds, petitioner explained the circumstances surrounding the
demolition order, the estimated cost of demolition, the property buyer’s $81,926.63 guaranty, the
buyer’s satisfaction of the demolition order, and petitioner’s return of the guaranty to the buyer.
The circuit court rejected the Randall Estate’s argument, adopted petitioner’s reasoning, and
denied the estate’s motion to disburse remaining proceeds.
Also in Docket No. 370482, a judgment of foreclosure was entered against property owned
by decedent Randy Mathias on February 11, 2021, effective March 31, 2021. The Mathias Estate
property sold at a tax-foreclosure auction for $6,723. After deducting the property’s unpaid taxes,
3 We note that petitioner attempted to sell the property at auction the previous month, with the
requisite amount of the minimum bid being $15,020.04 (that reserve price also included the above-
referenced guaranty in the amount of $81,926.63). However, the property did not sell in the first
auction.

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interest, penalties, and fees, as well as petitioner’s 5% commission, petitioner sent the Mathias
Estate a notice to file a motion with the circuit court to claim $1,267.53 in remaining proceeds.
When the Mathias Estate moved in the circuit court for an order disbursing the remaining proceeds,
petitioner opposed the motion on the bases that no proceeds remained. According to petitioner,
the software program used to create the notices to file a motion in the circuit court to claim
remaining proceeds did not pick up additional taxes and fees that were included in the minimum
bid. At the time of the foreclosure, the sum of the property’s delinquent taxes, interest, penalties
and fees was $5,119.32 (the “minimum bid”); this was the amount reported on the notice that
petitioner sent to the Mathias Estate in compliance with MCL 211.78t(3). However, to this
amount, petitioner added $239.70 in taxes and $1,363.79 in expenses, thereby bringing the
minimum bid up to $6,723, the exact amount for which the property sold at auction.
At the hearing on the Mathias Estate’s motion for disbursement, the circuit court asked
petitioner why the Mathias Estate should not get the benefit of the error. Petitioner responded that
the notice that petitioner sent to the estate stated that the amount of remaining proceeds shown
“may be subject to additional deductions as allowed by statute.” Additionally, the Mathias Estate
argued that it should not be liable for $239.70 in property taxes for April to September, after the
effective date of the foreclosure. Petitioner’s attorney dismissed the estate’s argument, stating that
the correct person paid the taxes, and it did not matter whether the taxes were paid separately or
as part of the minimum bid. The Mathias Estate also challenged the imposition of an $895 charge
for “staff time,” questioning the charge’s reasonability and implying that petitioner was not using
the fees allowed by the statutory scheme to pay expenses. The circuit court adopted petitioner’s
rationale and denied the Mathias Estate’s motion to disburse.
Respondent and the Estates now appeal.
III. DISCUSSION
A. STANDARDS OF REVIEW
We review de novo questions of constitutional law. See Bonner v City of Brighton, 495
Mich 209, 221; 848 NW2d 380 (2014). We also review de novo whether a circuit court properly
interpreted and applied the relevant statutes. Makowski v Governor, 317 Mich App 434, 441; 894
NW2d 753 (2016). A circuit court’s factual findings are reviewed for clear error. Muskegon
Treasurer, 348 Mich App at 687. “Clear error exists when the reviewing court is left with the
definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been made.” In Forfeiture of 2000 GMC Denali
and Contents, 316 Mich App 562, 583; 892 NW2d 388 (2016) (quotation marks and citation
omitted).
B. DOCKET NO. 370480
Respondent first implies that the trial court erred by relying on Muskegon Treasurer to
deny his motion to disburse remaining proceeds, because that case did not address the issues that
he raises. Specifically, respondent claims that Muskegon Treasurer did not address the unique
language in the Takings Clause of Michigan’s Constitution, Const 1963, art 10, § 2. He also claims
that Muskegon Treasurer did not address whether the FGU’s actual notice about how to recover
remaining proceeds satisfied due process. Rather, this Court incorrectly assumed that notice was

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adequate. Respondent contends that Muskegon Treasurer is not binding on these issues, nor does
it provide guidance. Respondent is incorrect.
“A published opinion of the Court of Appeals has precedential effect under the rule of stare
decisis.” MCR 7.215(C)(2). Although “[s]tare decisis ensures uniformity, certainty, and stability
in the law,” precedents “can be revisited if wrongly decided.” Stokes v Swofford, 514 Mich 423,
451; 22 NW3d 97 (2024) (quotations marks and citation omitted). “A decision is wrongly decided
if it misunderstood or misconstrued a plainly worded statute or if it has fallen victim to a
subsequent change in the law.” Id. (quotations marks and citation omitted).
In Muskegon Treasurer, this Court observed that, “ ‘[a]lthough the courts of this state have
applied the state and federal Takings Clauses coextensively in many situations, this Court has
found that Const 1963, art 10, § 2 offers broader protection than do US Const, Ams V and XIV.’ ”
Muskegon Treasurer, 348 Mich App at 699-700, quoting AFT Mich v Michigan, 497 Mich 197,
217; 866 NW2d 782 (2015) (citations omitted). However, because the respondents in Muskegon
Treasurer did not argue that Michigan’s Takings Clause should be applied any differently than its
federal counterpart, this Court concluded that it did not need to ask whether the two Takings
Clauses should be applied differently, and this Court considered the two clauses collectively.
Muskegon Treasurer, 348 Mich App at 700.
In the present case, respondent argues that Michigan’s Takings Clause should be applied
differently because, unlike its federal counterpart, Michigan’s Takings Clause requires just
compensation before the government takes private property for public use. However, respondent
does not offer a cogently developed explanation of the practical effect of that difference in the
present case. To the extent that respondent is suggesting that petitioner should have paid just
compensation for respondent’s remaining proceeds before taking respondent’s remaining
proceeds, this argument makes no sense. “It is not sufficient for a party simply to announce a
position or assert an error and then leave it up to this Court to . . . unravel and elaborate for him
his arguments, and then search for authority either to sustain or reject his position.” ER Drugs v
Dep’t of Health and Human Servs, 341 Mich App 133, 146-147; 988 NW2d 826 (2022) (quotation
marks and citation omitted). Respondent also argues that this Court’s takings analysis in
Muskegon Treasurer does not apply because its reliance on Nelson v City of New York, 352 US
103; 77 S Ct 195; 1 L Ed 2d 171 (1956), was misplaced. Respondent asserts that Tyler v Hennepin
Co, 598 US 631; 143 S Ct 1369; 215 L Ed 2d 564 (2023), and Knick v Scott Twp, 588 US 180;
139 S Ct 2162; 204 L Ed 2d 558 (2019), question Nelson and compel a different result, that the
Rafaeli Court did not find Nelson helpful, and that this Court failed to understand the effect of the
procedural differences between the foreclosure scheme at issue in Nelson and the statutory scheme
established by 200 PA 256. Because this Court has already considered and rejected these
arguments, we need not address them now. See, e.g., Muskegon Treasurer, 348 Mich App at 701-
703.
Respondent next argues that Muskegon Treasurer does not govern with respect to the
adequacy of notice because the attorney for the respondents in that case conceded that notice was
adequate. On the basis of that concession, this Court presumed that notice was adequate and
declined analysis of the constitutional sufficiency of the actual notice provided to the respondents.
Again, respondent is incorrect. The attorney for the respondents in Muskegon Treasurer argued
that notice was not sufficient, id. at 693 n 1, and this Court did not presume that the notice the

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respondents received, informing them of their right to recover remaining proceeds and how to
enforce that right, was adequate. In fact, this Court considered at length whether the statutorily
required notice, as well as the notice actually provided, was constitutionally sufficient. Id. at 695-
698.
Because respondent has not shown that Muskegon Treasurer is not binding with respect to
the issues that he raises, he has not shown that the circuit court’s reliance on Muskegon Treasurer
(to deny his motion to disburse) was erroneous.
Respondent next implies that petitioner’s compliance with MCL 211.78 results in a civil
forfeiture of foreclosed owners’ remaining proceeds. This Court has already rejected attempts to
frame an FGU’s compliance with MCL 211.78 as resulting in an unconstitutional taking, id. at 701,
or unjust enrichment. We also reject respondent’s attempt to frame an FGU’s compliance with
MCL 211.78 as resulting in a civil forfeiture, not least of all because the failure to pay property
taxes is not inherently a criminal offense under Michigan law. See Rafaeli, 505 Mich at 450.
Finally, respondent advances a bevy of arguments that this Court has already rejected.
Respondent contends that MCL 211.78t(2)’s July 1 deadline for submitting Form 5743 is an
unreasonable and unjustified procedural restriction that divests foreclosed owners of the ability to
enforce their constitutional right to remaining proceeds. He argues that foreclosed owners do not
have a claim for remaining proceeds until after the tax-foreclosure sale of their properties, that the
requirement to give notice that they intend to retain their interests in surplus proceeds is contrary
to the “initiating burden” that Takings Clauses place on the government. Respondent also
insinuates that the right to surplus proceeds is a fundamental property right and, therefore, that any
conditions placed on this right must pass strict scrutiny. Having already considered and rejected
the substance and premises of these arguments in Muskegon Treasurer, we see no need to do so
here. See Muskegon Treasurer, 348 Mich App at 694, 696, 698-699, 704; see also In re Petition
of Barry Co Treasurer for Foreclosure, ___ Mich App ___, ___; ___ NW3d ___ (2024) (Docket
No. 362316); slip op at 4.
Lastly, respondent offers a due-process analysis under Mathews v Eldridge, 424 US 319,
334-335; 96 S Ct 893; 47 L Ed 2d 18 (1976), and suggests that remaining proceeds should simply
be held in escrow for the benefit of foreclosed owners until the owners claim them. After
conducting a due-process analysis using the Eldridge factors, this Court concluded that the
statutory scheme set up by our Legislature for recovering remaining process, when followed by
FGUs, satisfies due process. Muskegon Treasurer, 348 Mich App at 695-696. This Court also
observed that, “[s]o long as the statutory system adopted by our Legislature comports with due
process—as MCL 211.78t does—whether such a scheme makes sense, or whether a ‘better’
scheme could be devised, are policy questions for the Legislature, not legal ones for the judiciary.”
Id. at 697.
For the foregoing reasons, respondent has not shown that the circuit court erred by relying
on Muskegon Treasurer to deny his motion to disburse. Muskegon Treasurer has not been
superseded by the federal cases that respondent cites, and we reject respondent’s insinuation that
the statutory scheme that allows foreclosed property owners to recover remaining proceeds to
which they have a legal right actually results in civil forfeiture.

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C. DOCKET NO. 370482
1. THE RANDALL ESTATE
The Randall Estate first argues that the circuit court erred when it allowed petitioner to
disburse proceeds from the sale of the Randall Estate’s foreclosed property other than in
accordance with the mandatory priorities listed in MCL 211.78m(8). This argument is without
merit.
MCL 211.78m(8) states, in relevant part, that the FGU “shall deposit the proceeds from
the sale of property under this section into a restricted account designated as the ‘delinquent tax
property sales proceeds for the year___’.” The first three distribution priorities,
MCL 211.78m(8)(a) through (c), are: (1) the county where the foreclosed property is located,
(2) the FGU, and (3) those entitled to remaining proceeds under § 78t.
Contrary to the Randall Estate’s assertions, petitioner arguably strictly complied with
MCL 211.78m(8). As noted, MCL 211.78m(8) requires FGUs to deposit the “proceeds from the
sale of the property” into a specifically designated restricted account. Although the GPTA does
not define “proceeds,” we can easily ascertain the meaning of that term by analyzing the definition
of “remaining proceeds” in MCL 211.78t(12)(b), which states that, as used in this section,
“Remaining proceeds” means the amount equal to the difference between the
amount paid to the foreclosing governmental unit for a property due to the sale or
transfer of the property under section 78m and the sum of all of the following:
(i) The minimum bid under section 78m.
(ii) All other fees and expenses incurred by the foreclosing governmental unit
pursuant to section 78m in connection with the forfeiture, foreclosure, sale,
maintenance, repair, and remediation of the property not included in the minimum
bid.
(iii) A sale commission payable to the foreclosing governmental unit equal to 5%
of the amount paid to the foreclosing governmental unit for the property.
Because the Legislature chose to define “remaining proceeds” as the difference between the
amount paid to the FGU for a sale or transfer of the property under 78m and the sum of various
figures, we can define “proceeds” as “the amount paid to the foreclosing governmental unit for a
property due to the sale or transfer of the property under section 78m.”4
Although the Randall Estate maintained that its foreclosed property sold for $83,105, it did
not rebut the affidavit filed by petitioner indicating that the actual amount of the sale price was
4 Certainly, the Legislature was free to separately define the term “proceeds,” but it chose not to
do so.

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$1,179, nor did it rebut evidence that $81,926.63 was security posted for the demolition of a
structure on the property, including the affidavit submitted by petitioner.5 Thus, the facts show
that $81,926.63 of the $83,105 that petitioner received from the auction was unrelated to the
monetary value of the property and was, instead, a liability of the property. Importantly, these
funds were not “proceeds from the sale of the property,” because they did not constitute an amount
paid to the FGU “due to the sale or transfer of the property under section 78m.” Rather, the
$81,926.63 was security posted with the FGU in order to ensure removal of blight on the property,
which security was returned following removal of the blight. Put another way, the $81,926.63 was
never actually “paid” to petitioner as a part of the sale of the property; again, that amount was
posted as security and returned following removal of the blight.6 Consequently, petitioner was not
required to deposit the $81,926.63 into its restricted delinquent tax property sales account and
distribute it in accordance with the priorities listed in MCL 211.78m(8) (i.e., there were never any
“proceeds” to distribute from the security posted). In light of the facts before the circuit court, the
court did not err by denying the Randall Estate’s motion for the disbursement of remaining
proceeds.
The Randall Estate also argues that the circuit court erred by not requiring, or allowing,
testimony at the hearing on the estate’s motion to disburse remaining proceeds. We disagree. At
the hearing for the motions to disburse proceeds, which began on August 30, 2023, the Randall
Estate said that it wished to take testimony in support of its position. The Court instructed the
parties to file briefs on the pertinent issues and indicated that it would review those briefs before
deciding whether it needed to hear testimony. The hearing subsequently resumed on March 12,
2024, at which time the court said it was not aware of there being any question of fact on any
material issue before it, but that it would nonetheless allow the Randall Estate to mark exhibits and
take testimony if counsel could articulate such a material question of fact. The estate could not,
nor has the estate identified a material factual dispute on appeal. Under these circumstances, we
cannot say that the trial court erred by not allowing testimony.
In light of the facts before the circuit court, the circuit court did not err by rejecting the
Randall Estate’s argument that petitioner violated MCL 211.78m(8) or by denying the estate’s
motion for the disbursement of remaining proceeds. Nor did the circuit court err by prohibiting
5 At the hearing conducted on March 12, 2024, counsel for petitioner explained that the $81,926.63
was accepted as a performance bond that was deposited into a trust account and returned to the
purchaser after the purchaser performed the required demolition, i.e., after the purchaser removed
the blight. Counsel for the Randall Estate essentially argues that no document called a
“performance bond” ever existed in this matter. While “performance bond” is one of the ways in
which petitioner’s counsel described the $81,926.63, he also referred to the money as a “guaranty,”
and a “demolition payment bond.” A fair reading of the record shows that, regardless of the term
used, the money operated to ensure compliance with the demolition order, i.e., it was not part of
the sale price.
6 On the record, the trial court correctly noted that the $81,926.63 “had nothing to do with the sale
price of the property.”

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the Randall Estate from taking testimony at the hearing on the estate’s motion to disburse
remaining proceeds, because the estate did not show that there were any actual factual disputes.
2. THE MATHIAS ESTATE
The Mathias Estate, as well as the Randall Estate, argue that the circuit court erred by not
requiring petitioner to prove that it offset incurred costs against the statutory fees to which it was
entitled before allowing petitioner to impose additional charges. We disagree.
“It is an elementary rule of statutory interpretation that courts cannot and should not add
requirements to the statute that are not found there.” Bronson Health Care Group, Inc v Esurance
Prop and Cas Ins Co, 348 Mich App 428, 443; 19 NW3d 151 (2023) (quotation marks and citation
omitted). If the Legislature does not require FGUs to render an accounting to foreclosed property
owners, then the circuit court did not err by declining to impose such a requirement. See id.
The Mathias Estate next argues that the circuit court erred by allowing petitioner to charge
the Mathias Estate for taxes that fell due after the effective date of foreclosure. This argument has
merit.
MCL 211.78m(16)(c) defines “minimum bid” as
the minimum amount established by the foreclosing governmental unit for which
property may be sold or transfer under subsections (1) to (3). The minimum bid
must include all of the delinquent taxes, interest, penalties, and fees due on the
property, and may include any additional expenses incurred by the foreclosing
governmental unit in connection with the forfeiture, foreclosure, maintenance,
repair, or remediation of the property or the administration of this act for the
property, including but not limited to, foreclosure avoidance, mailing, publication,
personal service, legal personnel, outside contractor, and auction expenses.
As noted, petitioner is required to include in the minimum bid “all of the delinquent taxes, interest,
penalties, and fees due on the property . . . .” MCL 211.78m(16)(c). Petitioner added unpaid taxes
covering April to September to the minimum bid for the Randall Estate’s foreclosed property.
Although no year was mentioned, the Mathias Estate’s attorney assumed, and petitioner did not
dispute, that the taxes were for 2022. If so, these taxes would not be considered “delinquent” until
March 1, 2023. See MCL 211.78a(2). Although petitioner’s attorney dismissed the estate’s
position at oral argument, stating that it did not matter whether the taxes were paid separately or
as part of the minimum bid, it does make a difference. Adding the $239.70 to the minimum bid
instead of requiring the buyer to pay the taxes separately reduced the Mathias Estate’s remaining
proceeds by $239.70. Therefore, we reverse the circuit court’s order denying the Mathias Estate’s
motion to disburse remaining proceeds and remand for entry of an order awarding the Mathias
Estate $239.70 in remaining proceeds.
Lastly, the Mathias Estate argues that the circuit court erred by allowing petitioner to
charge the estate $895 for “staff time.” Petitioner responds by arguing, inter alia, that only the
minimum bid was accepted for the Mathias property, meaning there were no remaining proceeds
from the sale.

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Under Michigan law, a county treasurer is considered a public officer, MCL 15.181(e),
and, in the absence of contrary evidence, public officers are presumed to act in accordance with
the law and to perform their duties properly. See Leach v Inglis, 340 Mich 202, 206; 65 NW2d
746 (1954); Casterline v Meyers, 226 Mich 155, 157; 197 NW 561 (1924). Overcoming the
presumption that officials discharged their public duties requires “substantial proofs to the
contrary.” People v Craig, 342 Mich App 217, 227; 994 NW2d 792 (2022) (quotation marks and
citation omitted). A flat charge of $895 added to “everyone’s account” would raise suspicion.
However, on this limited lower court record, including documents attached to petitioner’s response
to the Mathias Estate’s underlying motion, which indicate that the charge pertained to fees included
in the minimum bid, and which were unrebutted by the Mathias Estate, we cannot say that the
Mathias Estate presented “substantial proof” that petitioner did not properly and regularly perform
his duty.
We affirm in Docket No. 370480. In Docket No. 37482, we affirm that portion of the
circuit court’s order denying the Randall Estate’s motion to disburse remaining proceeds.
However, we reverse that portion of the order denying the Mathias Estate’s motion to disburse
remaining proceeds and remand for the trial court to enter an order awarding the Mathias Estate
$239.70 in remaining proceeds.
Affirmed, affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded for further proceedings
consistent with this opinion. We do not retain jurisdiction.
/s/ Brock A. Swartzle
/s/ Kristina Robinson Garrett
/s/ Randy J. Wallace

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