COA 369337 PEOPLE OF MI V DAYKOTA DALLAS HANDRICH Opinion - Per Curiam - Unpublished 6/18/2026

If this opinion indicates that it is “FOR PUBLICATION,” it is subject to
revision until final publication in the Michigan Appeals Reports.
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S T A T E O F M I C H I G A N
C O U R T O F A P P E A L S
PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
UNPUBLISHED
June 18, 2026
9:10 AM
v No. 369337
Mecosta Circuit Court
DAYKOTA DALLAS HANDRICH, LC No. 2022-010584-FC
Defendant-Appellant.
Before: WALLACE, P.J., and LETICA and FEENEY, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
Defendant appeals as of right his jury trial conviction of first-degree premeditated murder,
MCL 750.316. The trial court sentenced defendant, as a third-offense habitual offender, MCL
769.11, to mandatory life without parole. We affirm.
I. FACTS
This case arises out of the death of the victim, Ashley Godfrey. A police officer found the
victim’s body while patrolling the White Pine Trial in the early morning hours on June 3, 2022.
The area that the victim’s body was found was known as “the spot,” which was “a known area for
homeless to hang out . . . .” The victim’s exposed body was lying under brush and debris, which
appeared to be purposefully placed to conceal her. The victim’s autopsy revealed several injuries
all over her body, including a laceration to her forehead resulting from multiple blows to the head,
as well as fractured cartilage in her neck. The victim’s cause of death was “[m]ultiple injuries
including blunt force and strangulation,” and her manner of death was ruled a homicide.
Officers were quickly directed to a nearby homeless shelter called Our Brother’s Keeper
(OBK) and alerted that defendant may have been involved. Kenneth Harvell, a resident at OBK
who was “kind of dating” the victim when she was killed, testified that that at about 5:00 p.m. on
May 31, 2022, he and the victim went to the store to buy alcohol, and then they traveled over to
“the spot,” where they found defendant. Harvell left “the spot” pretty quickly because he had to

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return to OBK so that he did not set his parole ankle tether off.1 At about 8:20 p.m., Harvell
received text messages from the victim, which read together, stated “Okay, well [defendant] is
walking me back to the pharmacy and home. Because he is a gentleman.”2 Harvell responded to
those messages, but he received nothing in return. At about 10:00 p.m., Harvell saw defendant
arrive at OBK. Harvell testified that defendant “was nervous and acting strange.” For example,
he was dirty, “[p]acing[,] and rambling about some things.”3 Defendant, who had recently been
kicked out of OBK, begged the OBK workers to let him to stay there for the night, but they did
not allow him to.4 Harvell never saw the victim again after that night.
On June 3, 2022, defendant was arrested in front of a Super 8 motel and transported to a
secure interview room at Big Rapids Police Department. Defendant had the victim’s cell phone
and debit card in his possession. Defendant waived his Miranda5 rights and spoke with detectives
for approximately three hours total. Defendant initially denied any knowledge about the victim’s
death, but he eventually admitted that on May 31, 2022, he drank alcohol and had sex with the
victim at “the spot.” Defendant told the officers that the victim asked him to hit and choke her
with his hands because she liked pain, but at one point, he hit her too hard across the face, and she
stopped responding. Defendant explained that he got scared and tried to wake her up, but she
would not. He “couldn’t bear looking at her anymore,” so he dragged her body to the area that
police found her and covered her up with sticks. Defendant further told the officers that he had
returned to “the spot” since the victim’s death to clean the area up and “hang out” with people, and
he clarified that this was not an “anger thing, it was drinking and an accident.”
Once defendant was moved to the jail, he began talking about this case with an inmate
(“the inmate”) that he was housed with. The inmate decided to reach out to the Mecosta County
Prosecutor’s office after defendant started “telling [him] stuff about killing a lady and then trying
to blame it on somebody . . . .”6 In May 2023, officers conducted two interviews with the inmate.
After the first interview, defendant tried to get the inmate to help him concoct a story framing
Harvell for the murder. The inmate convinced defendant to write down the whole truth so that he
1 Harvell’s ankle tether allowed officers to confirm that he was not at “the spot” when the victim
died.
2 Those are the last messages that were ever sent from the victim’s phone.
3 The lead coordinator at OBK testified that this was typical behavior for defendant to exhibit after
he had been drinking. Specifically, defendant was usually argumentative and “wanting to fight”
after he had been drinking.
4 Defendant again returned to OBK on about June 1, 2022 or June 2, 2022, looking to get enrolled
in a 30-day rehabilitation program, which typically occurred in Petosky.
5 Miranda v Arizona, 384 US 436; 86 S Ct 1602; 16 L Ed 2d 694 (1966).
6 The inmate never had any intention of providing information in exchange for personal benefit;
he just thought it was the right thing to do. Accordingly, the inmate did not receive a deal in
exchange for testifying in this case.

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could help him point out what parts of the story he should change. The inmate then turned
defendant’s detailed writings over to police, and they were admitted into evidence.
Defendant’s written statement largely matched his statements to police officers and the
inmate, but the following deviations or additions should be noted:
• Defendant told the inmate that he was the person who sent Harvell the last message from
the victim’s phone. The inmate noted that defendant laughed when making this admission.
• In his police interview, defendant stated that he would have stopped hitting or choking the
victim if she said to stop; however, in his written statement, defendant admitted that
although the victim had tried to push him away and get him to stop choking her, he choked
her harder and “chose to continue because [he] was on [the] verge of climax.”
• During his police interview, defendant did not mention anything about the victim putting
her finger in his anus while she was performing oral sex; however, defendant’s written
statement stated as follows: “[The victim] asked me if she could finger my butt while giving
me head[.] I pushed her off my penis[.] Expressed to her [I] felt uncomfortable with
that . . . .” Moreover, the inmate testified as follows:
[Defendant] said she started giving him the oral sex and then she stopped and was,
like, do you care if I stick my finger in your butthole . . . . He didn’t [say] anything
so I was, like, why didn’t you say anything. Why didn’t you say yes or no. And
the reason I kind of asked was because the whole time I’m knowing the story still
ends with her dead. So I’m, like, why didn’t you say something. He was, like, I
don’t know. I figured if I liked it I’ll let it happen. If I didn’t I would just say no
or I’d stop her. And so he was, like, I let her do it—well, he didn’t, like, give her
consent but she did it. And . . . she must’ve did something wrong. She either like
stuck two fingers or had a messed up nail because it hurt real bad. And he said I
immediately just grabbed her arm back and said, “You know you just fucked up.”
And he said he looked at her. He said, “You just fucked up” and he seen the bottle
laying right next to him. He said he picked it up and he just—he didn’t say any
words. He literally just acted out. He said he (descriptive sound) two times. He
said almost immediately as soon as he hit her in the face, where he could see her
face, and he did another gesture like kind of blew his face up, like, and I’m, like,
yeah he’s showing his face swelled up.
• Defendant told the inmate that when he saw that the victim was “groggy,” he looked at her
and decided that he had to “finish her off.” When the inmate asked why defendant did not
just call for help, defendant stated that he “didn’t want to look like a creep.”
• In his written statement, and in his statements to the inmate, defendant added that he knew
that the victim was dead because he checked her neck for a pulse.
• In his police-interview, defendant stated that he accidentally kept the victim’s debit card
after their trip to the liquor store and that he found the victim’s cell phone at “the spot” the

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next day; however, in his written statement, defendant admitted that he took the victim’s
cell phone and debit card directly after he covered her body with sticks.
• In his police-interview, defendant stated that he did not remember what shoes the victim
was wearing, but defendant told the inmate that he burned the victim’s shoes.
• Defendant told the inmate that he buried the victim’s ID card and exactly where it was
buried. With this information, officers were able to find the victim’s buried ID card.
• In his written statement, defendant admitted to watching pornography after arriving at the
Super 8 motel.
Notably, geographic cell phone location data showed that defendant was at “the spot” on
the evening of May 31, 2022, and defendant’s DNA was the only male contributing DNA found
in the victim’s vaginal swab and fingernail samples. Additionally, two of defendant’s ex-
girlfriends testified that they had engaged in consensual choking during sex with defendant in the
past, and that defendant historically stopped an action during sex if they asked him to. One of
defendant’s ex-girlfriends further testified that after defendant went to jail, he told her that the
victim “brought up something about his past which [caused] him to fight with her and then she
ended up dead.” When asked what that past information was, defendant’s ex-girlfriend stated “[i]f
he told me [those] kind of details, I tried to block them out.”
Defendant was convicted and sentenced, as stated earlier. Defendant now appeals.
II. JURY INSTRUCTION
On appeal, defendant first argues that the trial court erred by not instructing the jury of the
lesser included offense of manslaughter. We disagree.
A. PRESERVATION AND STANDARD OF REVIEW
Because defense counsel requested that the trial court instruct the jury on the lesser
included offense of voluntary manslaughter, this issue is preserved for appellate review. See
People v Sabin, 242 Mich App 656, 657; 620 NW2d 19 (2000). “Claims of instructional error are
reviewed de novo.” People v Montague, 338 Mich App 29, 37; 979 NW2d 406 (2021). We review
“the trial court’s determination whether a jury instruction is applicable to the facts of the case for
an abuse of discretion.” Id. (quotation marks and citation omitted). “An abuse of discretion occurs
when the trial court’s decision is outside the range of principled outcomes.” Id. (quotation marks
and citation omitted). Moreover, “jury instructions are reviewed in their entirety, and there is no
error requiring reversal if the instructions sufficiently protected the rights of the defendant and
fairly presented the triable issues to the jury.” Id.
B. ANALYSIS
“[A] requested instruction on a necessarily included lesser offense is proper if the charged
greater offense requires the jury to find a disputed factual element that is not part of the lesser
included offense and a rational view of the evidence would support it.” People v Cornell, 466
Mich 335, 357; 646 NW2d 127 (2002).

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Voluntary manslaughter is a lesser included offense of murder, “with murder possessing
the single additional element of malice.” People v Mendoza, 468 Mich 527, 540; 664 NW2d 685
(2003). “[T]o show voluntary manslaughter, one must show that the defendant killed in the heat
of passion, the passion was caused by adequate provocation, and there was not a lapse of time
during which a reasonable person could control his passions.” Id. at 535. Notably, “provocation
is not an element of voluntary manslaughter. Rather, provocation is the circumstance that negates
the presence of malice.” Id. at 536 (citation omitted). “[T]he degree of provocation required to
mitigate a killing from murder to manslaughter is that which causes the defendant to act out of
passion rather than reason. Further, in order for the provocation to be adequate it must be that
which would cause a reasonable person to lose control.” People v Mitchell, 301 Mich App 282,
286-287; 835 NW2d 615 (2013) (quotation marks and citations omitted). “Not every hot-tempered
individual who flies into a rage at the slightest insult can claim manslaughter.” People v Pouncey,
437 Mich 382, 389; 471 NW2d 346 (1991). “The law cannot countenance the loss of self-control;
rather, it must encourage people to control their passions.” Id. “The determination of what is
reasonable provocation is a question of fact for the factfinder,” but the trial court may determine
as a matter of law that no reasonable jury could find that the alleged provocation was adequate.
Id. at 390.
In this case, the trial court excluded the voluntary manslaughter jury instruction,
determining that the evidence presented did not constitute “adequate provocation to make a
reasonable person act in this manner based on the injuries.” On appeal, defendant points to two
bases of provocation: (1) the victim’s unspecified statement about defendant’s past, and (2) the
victim’s act of placing her finger in defendant’s anus. The trial court did not abuse its discretion
by finding that these bases did not constitute adequate provocation. See Montague, 338 Mich App
at 37; Mitchell, 301 Mich App at 286-287.
Regarding the first basis, defendant told his ex-girlfriend that the victim “brought up
something about his past which [caused] him to fight with her and then she ended up dead.”
Defendant’s ex-girlfriend was unsure what statements the victim allegedly made; therefore, it
would be entirely speculative to conclude that the victim’s unspecified statements would cause a
reasonable person to lose control and constitute adequate provocation. Nonetheless, when the
claimed provocation consists only of words, it is generally considered inadequate provocation.
See Pouncey, 437 Mich at 391.
Regarding the second basis, there was conflicting evidence as to whether the victim placed
her finger in defendant’s anus. Although defendant’s written statement noted that he told the
victim that he was “uncomfortable” with the idea of the act, defendant told the inmate that “[he]
figured if [he] liked it [he would] let it happen. If [he] didn’t [he] would just say no or [he would]
stop her.” Moreover, one of defendant’s ex-girlfriend testified that in the past, defendant had asked
her “to put her finger in his butt during sex.” Therefore, the evidence indicates that defendant may
have initiated the act, and even if he did not initiate the act, he felt like he could simply tell the
victim to stop if he did not like it. Accordingly, the evidence does not support defendant’s
allegation that such an act would have caused him to become so inflamed with a murderous passion
that he could not make reasoned decisions. See Mitchell, 301 Mich App at 286-287.
Regardless, even assuming arguendo that defendant was adequately provoked, the
evidence demonstrated that he had ample time to control his emotions. See Mendoza, 468 Mich

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at 540. The following evidence supports the proposition that defendant acted deliberately, rather
than spontaneously: (1) in his written statement, defendant admitted that although the victim had
tried to push him away and get him to stop choking her, he choked her harder and “chose to
continue because [he] was on [the] verge of climax” (emphasis added); (2) defendant told the
inmate that when he saw that the victim was “groggy,” he looked at her and decided that he had to
“finish her off”; (3) according to the medical examiner, death by strangulation takes approximately
two minutes; and (4) after defendant strangled the victim, he checked her neck for a pulse. This
evidence strongly suggests that even if there was adequate provocation in this case, there was also
“a lapse of time during which a reasonable person could control his passions.” Id. at 535.
Accordingly, the trial court did not abuse its discretion by excluding the voluntary
manslaughter jury instruction because a rational view of the evidence does not support it. See
Cornell, 466 Mich at 357; Montague, 338 Mich App at 37.
“Furthermore, where a defendant is convicted of first-degree murder, and the jury rejects
other lesser included offenses, the failure to instruct on voluntary manslaughter is harmless.”
People v Sullivan, 231 Mich App 510, 520; 586 NW2d 578 (1998), aff’d 461 Mich 992 (2000).
In this case, the jury rejected a verdict of second-degree murder in favor of first-degree murder;
therefore, any error in not providing the voluntary manslaughter jury instruction was harmless.
See id.
III. INSUFFICIENT EVIDENCE
Defendant further argues that there was insufficient evidence to prove first-degree
premeditated murder. We disagree.
A. PRESERVATION AND STANDARD OF REVIEW
A defendant does not need to take any “special steps” to preserve a challenge to the
sufficiency of the evidence. People v Hawkins, 245 Mich App 439, 457; 628 NW2d 105 (2001).
“This Court reviews de novo challenges to the sufficiency of the evidence.” People v Solloway,
316 Mich App 174, 180; 891 NW2d 255 (2016). “To determine whether the prosecutor has
presented sufficient evidence to sustain a conviction, we review the evidence in the light most
favorable to the prosecutor and determine whether a rational trier of fact could find the defendant
guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.” People v Smith-Anthony, 494 Mich 669, 676; 837 NW2d 415
(2013) (quotation marks and citation omitted). “A prosecutor need not present direct evidence of
a defendant’s guilt. Rather, circumstantial evidence and reasonable inferences arising from that
evidence can constitute satisfactory proof of the elements of a crime.” People v Williams, 294
Mich App 461, 471; 811 NW2d 88 (2011) (quotation marks, citation, and alteration omitted). “The
credibility of witnesses and the weight accorded to evidence are questions for the jury, and any
conflict in the evidence must be resolved in the prosecutor’s favor.” People v Harrison, 283 Mich
App 374, 378; 768 NW2d 98 (2009). “[W]e will not resolve credibility issues anew on appeal.”
People v Milstead, 250 Mich App 391, 404; 648 NW2d 648 (2002).
B. ANALYSIS
First-degree premeditated murder, includes “[m]urder perpetrated by means of poison,
lying in wait, or any other willful, deliberate, and premeditated killing.” MCL 750.316(1)(a).

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Relevant here, the elements of first-degree premeditated murder are: “(1) the intentional killing of
a human (2) with premeditation and deliberation.” People v Oros, 502 Mich 229, 240; 917 NW2d
559 (2018). Although the Legislature has not explicitly defined the meaning of premeditation and
deliberation, our Supreme Court has stated that “to premeditate is to think about beforehand; to
deliberate is to measure and evaluate the major facets of a choice or problem.” Id. (quotation
marks, citation, and alteration omitted).
“Premeditation and deliberation may be established by an interval of time between the
initial homicidal thought and ultimate action, which would allow a reasonable person time to
subject the nature of his or her action to a ‘second look.’ ” Id. at 242 (citation omitted). Our
Supreme Court has explained that “some time span between the initial homicidal intent and
ultimate action is necessary to establish premeditation and deliberation, but it is within the province
of the fact-finder to determine whether there was sufficient time for a reasonable person to subject
his or her action to a second look.” Id. (quotation marks and citation omitted). Although “the
minimum time necessary to exercise this process is incapable of exact determination, it is often
said that premeditation and deliberation require only a brief moment of thought or a matter of
seconds.” Id. at 242-243 (quotation marks, citations, and alteration omitted). “The requisite state
of mind may be inferred from defendant’s conduct judged in light of the circumstances.” Id. at
243 (quotation marks and citation omitted). “Minimal circumstantial evidence is sufficient to
prove an actor’s state of mind.” People v Ortiz, 249 Mich App 297, 301; 642 NW2d 417 (2001).
In this case, defendant argues that there was insufficient evidence to prove beyond a
reasonable doubt that he committed first-degree premeditated murder. We disagree.
Defendant asserts that the victim’s death was an accident, arguing that: (1) defendant and
the victim were engaging in consensual sex that included suffocation, (2) defendant had a history
of engaging in suffocation during intercourse, (3) defendant had a history of stopping suffocation
when his partner requested, and (4) there was no evidence that the victim asked defendant to stop
what he was doing in this case. Although there was evidence that defendant had a history of
engaging in suffocation during intercourse and that he would stop suffocating his partner when
they requested, there was also evidence that the victim tried to get defendant to stop suffocating
her in this case, and he refused. In his written statement, defendant specifically admitted that
although the victim had tried to push him away and get him to stop choking her, he choked her
harder and “chose to continue because [he] was on [the] verge of climax.” Therefore, defendant’s
assertion that the victim’s death was an accident is directly rebutted by his own statement that he
chose not to stop choking her when she requested that he stop.
Additionally, there was ample evidence presented that could lead a rational trier of fact to
find defendant guilty of premeditated murder in this case, i.e. to find that there was sufficient time
for a reasonable person in defendant’s shoes to subject his action to a second look. See Oros, 502
Mich at 242. The following evidence supported a finding of premeditation and deliberation in this
case: (1) the nature, number, and location of the victim’s wounds, including evidence of multiple

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blows to her head, as well as fractured cartilage in her neck;7 (2) defendant’s DNA was found
under the victim’s fingernails, and officers noticed a large scratch down defendant’s back that
could potentially be a defensive wound;8 (3) defendant’s confession to the inmate that he sent the
last text message from the victim’s phone, impersonating the victim; (4) defendant’s written
admission that he “chose” to continue choking the victim despite her requests to stop “because
[he] was on [the] verge of climax”; (5) defendant’s confession to the inmate that he told the victim
that she had “just fucked up” before he hit her in the face with a bottle; (6) defendant’s confession
to the inmate that when he saw that the victim was “groggy,” he looked at her and decided that he
had to “finish her off”; (7) defendant’s act of checking the victim’s neck for a pulse after he
strangled her; (8) defendant’s post offense conduct of physically concealing the crime, including
covering the victim’s body with brush and debris, burning the victim’s shoes, burying the victim’s
identification card, and returning to the scene to clean up the area;9 (9) defendant’s behavior in the
few days between the victim’s death and his arrest, including his decision to return to “the spot”
to “hang out” with people;10 (10) defendant’s various lies after the offense, including his
inconsistent statements to officers, the inmate, and his ex-girlfriend;11 and (11) defendant’s attempt
to leave the area shortly after the victim’s death, including his request to enter a rehabilitation
program in Petosky.
Taken together, this evidence could allow a rational trier of fact to find that there was
sufficient time for a reasonable person in defendant’s shoes to subject his action to a second look.
See Oros, 502 Mich at 240. Therefore, the prosecution presented sufficient evidence to prove
beyond a reasonable doubt that defendant was guilty of first-degree premeditated murder. See
Smith-Anthony, 494 Mich at 676.
7 “The nature and number of a victim’s wounds may support a finding of premeditation and
deliberation.” People v Unger, 278 Mich App 210, 231; 749 NW2d 272 (2008). “Specifically,
evidence that a victim sustained multiple violent blows may support an inference of premeditation
and deliberation . . . because the time required to inflict multiple blows affords an assailant
sufficient time to . . . take a second look.” Id. (quotation marks and citations omitted).
Additionally, “manual strangulation can be used as evidence that a defendant had an opportunity
to take a second look.” Oros, 502 Mich at 244 (quotation marks and citation omitted).
8 “[E]vidence of a struggle between the defendant and the victim can be evidence of premeditation
and deliberation based on the defendant’s opportunity to take a second look.” Oros, 502 Mich at
244 (quotation marks omitted).
9 “[A] defendant’s attempt to conceal the killing can be used as evidence of premeditation.” People
v Gonzalez, 468 Mich 636, 641; 664 NW2d 159 (2003).
10 “Premeditation may be established through evidence of . . . the defendant’s conduct after the
homicide.” People v Walker, 330 Mich App 378, 384; 948 NW2d 122 (2019) (quotation marks
and citation omitted).
11 “A jury may infer consciousness of guilt from evidence of lying or deception.” Unger, 278
Mich App at 227.

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IV. ADMISSION OF EVIDENCE
Defendant further argues that the trial court erred by admitting cell phone evidence
showing that defendant watched pornographic materials after the victim’s death. Even if we
assume that the evidence was admitted in error, any error was harmless.
A. PRESERVATION AND STANDARD OF REVIEW
Defendant preserved this issue by objecting to the admission of the evidence, arguing that
the evidence was not relevant, was highly prejudicial, and had no probative value. See People v
Jones, ___ Mich App ___, ___; ___NW3d ___ (2024) (Docket No. 362854); slip op at 2. “A trial
court’s discretionary decisions concerning whether to admit or exclude evidence will not be
disturbed absent an abuse of that discretion.” People v Mardlin, 487 Mich 609, 614; 790 NW2d
607 (2010) (quotation marks and citation omitted). “A trial court abuses its discretion when its
decision falls outside the range of reasonable and principled outcomes.” Jones, ___ Mich App at
___; slip op at 3. “When the decision involves a preliminary question of law however, such as
whether a rule of evidence precludes admission, we review the question de novo.” Mardlin, 487
Mich at 614.
B. ANALYSIS
“ ‘Relevant evidence’ means evidence having any tendency to make the existence of any
fact that is of consequence to the determination of the action more probable or less probable than
it would be without the evidence.” MRE 401.12 Generally, “[a]ll relevant evidence is
admissible . . . .” MRE 402. But even relevant evidence “may be excluded if its probative value
is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or
misleading the jury, or by considerations of undue delay, waste of time, or needless presentation
of cumulative evidence.” MRE 403. “Notably, MRE 403 does not regulate evidence that is simply
‘prejudicial’ because all relevant and material evidence is prejudicial.” Jones, ___ Mich App at
___; slip op at 3 (quotation marks and citation omitted). “Rather, it is only when the probative
value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice that evidence is excluded.” Id.
(quotation marks and citation omitted). “This involves a two-part test: First, this Court must decide
whether introduction of the evidence at trial was unfairly prejudicial. Then, this Court must apply
the balancing test and weigh the probativeness or relevance of the evidence against the unfair
prejudice.” Jones, ___ Mich App at ___; slip op at 3-4 (quotation marks and citation omitted).
In this case, defendant argues that the trial court abused its discretion by admitting the cell
phone evidence displaying that on both nights when defendant stayed at the Super 8 motel after
the victim’s death, he accessed pornographic websites for about 10 to 45 minutes at a time.
Defendant specifically argues that this evidence should have been excluded under: (1) MRE 401
12 The Michigan Rules of Evidence were substantially amended on September 20, 2023, effective
January 1, 2024. See ADM File No. 2021-10, 512 Mich lxiii (2023). We rely on the version of
the rules in effect at the time of trial.

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because it was irrelevant, and (2) MRE 403 because “[i]t was clearly offered to show that
[defendant] was a sexual deviant and that this had motivated the killing.”
Even assuming, arguendo, that the evidence was improperly admitted, any error was
harmless. The harmless-error standard presumes that a preserved evidentiary error is not a ground
for reversal unless, after an examination of the entire cause, it affirmatively appears that it is more
probable than not that the error was outcome determinative. People v Lukity, 460 Mich 484, 495-
496; 596 NW2d 607 (1999). In this case, there was overwhelming evidence of defendant’s guilt,
and the cell phone evidence was merely cumulative to defendant’s written admission that he
watched pornography after arriving at the Super 8 motel. Therefore, any error in admitting the
cell phone evidence was not outcome determinative. See id.
Affirmed.
/s/ Randy J. Wallace
/s/ Anica Letica
/s/ Kathleen A. Feeney

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